

AN ADVANCED HISTORY OF INDIA

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VASCO DA GAMA
fro·n an old print

AN ADVANCED HISTORY OF INDIA

Vol. II

By

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MODERN INDIA

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[2] Book II, chapters i–iv and ix are by Dr. R. C. Majumdar; and chapters v to viii and Appendix I by Dr. Kalikinkar Datta.


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MODERN INDIA

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THE RISE AND GROWTH OF THE BRITISH POWER


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CHAPTER I

ADVENT OF THE EUROPEANS

FOREIGNERS could enter India mainly through two routes—the well-known land-route across the north-west frontier and the sea-route. The Muslims from Ghaznī and Ghūr, Samarqānd and Kābul invaded this country through the land-route. The Mughul Empire took care to maintain a large standing army to buttress its authority; but it failed to realise the importance of guarding the sea-coast by building a strong navy, which, among the Indian powers of modern times, the Marāthas alone tried to do. Evidently the Mughuls did not aspire to rule the sea, across which came to India the European trading nations, who ultimately gave a new turn to the history of this land.

India hád commercial relations with the countries of the West from time immemorial. But from the seventh century A.D. her sea-borne trade passed into the hands of the Arabs, who began to dominate the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. It was from them that the enterprising merchants of Venice and Genoa purchased Indian goods. The geographical discoveries of the last quarter of the fifteenth century deeply affected the commercial relations of the different countries of the world and produced far-reaching consequences in their history. Bartholomew Diaz doubled the Cape of Good Hope, or the Stormy Cape, as he called it, in 1487; and Vasco da Gama found out a new route to India and reached the famous port of Calicut on the 27th May, 1498. "Perhaps no event during the Middle Ages had such far-reaching repercussions on the civilised world as the opening of the sea-route to India."

1. The Portuguese

The discoveries of Vasco da Gama, who received friendly treatment from the Hindu ruler of Calicut bearing the hereditary title of *Zamorin*, brought the merchants of Portugal, who had always coveted the advantages of eastern trade, into direct maritime touch with India and opened the way for their commercial relations with her. On the 9th March, 1500, Pedro Alvarez Cabral sailed

out from Lisbon to India in command of a fleet of thirteen vessels. But the Portuguese, instead of confining themselves within the limits of legitimate trade, became unduly ambitious to establish their supremacy in the eastern seas by forcibly depriving the merchants of other nations of the benefits of their commerce, and molesting them. This inevitably brought them into hostilities with the ruler of Calicut, whose prosperity was largely dependent on Arab merchants. The Portuguese on their side began to take part in the political intrigues among the States of Peninsular India and entered into alliances with the enemies of the ruler of Calicut, the chief of whom was the ruler of Cochin.

It was Alfonso de Albuquerque who laid the real foundation of Portuguese power in India. He first came to India in 1503 as the commander of a squadron, and the record of his naval activities being satisfactory, was appointed Governor of Portuguese affairs in India in 1509. In November, 1510, he captured the rich port of Goa, then belonging to the Bijāpur Sultānate, and during his rule did his best to strengthen the fortifications of the city and increase its commercial importance. With a view to securing a permanent Portuguese population, he encouraged his fellow-countrymen to marry Indian wives; but one serious drawback to his policy was his bitter persecution of the Muslims. The interests of the Portuguese were, however, faithfully served by him, and when he died in 1515 they were left as the strongest naval power in India with domination over the west coast.

A number of important Portuguese settlements were gradually established near the sea by the successors of Albuquerque. These were Diu, Damān, Salsette, Bassein, Chaul and Bombay, San Thomé near Madras and Hugli in Bengal. Their authority also extended over the major part of Ceylon. But in course of time they lost most of these places with the exception of Diu, Damān and Goa, which they still retain. We have already noted how Qāsim Khān captured Hugli during the reign of Shāh Jahān, and the Marāthas captured Salsette and Bassein in A.D. 1739.

Though the earliest "intruder into the East", the Portuguese lost their influence in the sphere of Indian trade by the eighteenth century. Many of them took to robbery and piracy, though a few adopted more honourable careers. Several causes led to their decline. Firstly, their religious intolerance provoked the hostility of the Indian powers, which became too strong for them to overcome. Secondly, their clandestine practices in trade ultimately went against them. Thirdly, the discovery of Brazil drew the colonising activities of Portugal to the West. Lastly, they failed

to compete successfully with the other European Companies, who had come in their wake. These were jealous of the prosperity of Portugal due to her eastern trade and would not accept her policy of exclusion and extravagant claims, though these were based on priority of occupation and a Papal Bull.

In A.D. 1600 the English East India Company secured a royal charter granting them "the monopoly of commerce in eastern waters". The United East India Company of the Netherlands was incorporated for trading in the East by a charter granted by the Dutch States General on the 20th March, 1602, which also empowered the said Company to make war, conclude treaties, acquire territories and build fortresses. It was thus made "a great instrument of war and conquest". The Danes came in A.D. 1616. The French East India Company, sponsored by the famous French statesman Colbert and formed under State patronage in A.D. 1664, was destined to have an important career in the East. The Ostend Company, organised by the merchants of Flanders and formally chartered in A.D. 1722, had but a brief career in India. A Swedish East India Company was formed in A.D. 1731, but its trade was confined almost exclusively to China. A bitter contest among these trading companies was inevitable, as the object of their ambition was the same. Their designs of territorial expansion increased the bitterness of their commercial rivalry. There was a triangular contest during the first half of the seventeenth century—between the Portuguese and the Dutch, between the Portuguese and the English, and between the Dutch and the English. The Dutch opposition to the growth of English influence in India finally collapsed owing to the former's defeat at the battle of Bedara (Biderra) in A.D. 1759, but the Anglo-French hostility that had begun in the meanwhile continued throughout the eighteenth century.

2. The Dutch

In 1605 the Dutch captured Amboyna from the Portuguese and gradually established their influence at the cost of the latter in the Spice Islands. They conquered Jacatra and established Batavia on its ruins in 1619, blockaded Goa in 1639, captured Malacca in 1641 and got possession of the last Portuguese settlement in Ceylon in 1658. The Dutch came to the islands of Sumatra, Java and the Moluccas, attracted by the lucrative trade in pepper and spices, with which those islands abounded, so that "the Archipelago was not only the strategic and administrative centre of their system, it was also their economic centre".

Commercial interests drew the Dutch also to India, where they established factories in Gujarāt, on the Coromandel Coast and in Bengal, Bihār and Orissa, entering deep into the interior of the lower Ganges valley. The more important of their factories in India were at Pulicat (1610), Surāt (1616), Chinsurā (1653), Cāssimbāzār, Barānagore, Patna, Balāsore, Negapatam (1659) and Cochin (1663). By supplanting the Portuguese, the Dutch practically maintained a monopoly of the spice trade in the East throughout the seventeenth century. They also became the carriers of trade between India and the islands of the Far East, thus reviving a very old connection maintained in the palmy days of the Vijayanagar Empire. At Surāt the Dutch were supplied with large quantities of indigo, manufactured in Central India and the Jumnā valley, and from Bengal, Bihār, Gujarāt and Coromandel they exported raw silk, textiles, saltpetre, rice and Gangetic opium.

The Spanish and Portuguese Crowns remained united from A.D. 1580 to 1640. England concluded peace with Spain in A.D. 1604; but the English and the Portuguese became rivals of each other in the eastern trade. By allying themselves with the Shāh of Persia, the English captured Ormuz in the Persian Gulf from the Portuguese in A.D. 1622 and obtained permission to settle in Gombroon and take half the customs dues. From this time, however, Portuguese rivalry began to be less acute. The treaty of Madrid, concluded in 1630, provided for the cessation of commercial hostilities between the English and the Portuguese in the East, and in 1634 Methold, the President of the English factory at Surāt, and the Portuguese Viceroy of Goa signed a convention, which "actually guaranteed commercial inter-relations" between the two nations in India. The growth of peaceful relations between the English and the Portuguese was facilitated by the recovery in A.D. 1640 of Portugal's independence from the control of Spain, the old enemy of England. The right of the English to the eastern trade was recognised by the Portuguese in a treaty, dated July, A.D. 1654; and another treaty, concluded in A.D. 1661, secured for the Portuguese from Charles II, who received Bombay as a part of the dowry of Catherine of Braganza, the promise of English support against the Dutch in India. In fact, the English were no longer faced with bitter commercial rivalry from the Portuguese in India, who came to be too degenerate to pursue any consistent policy, though individual Portuguese traders occasionally obstructed the collection of investments by the English in their factories in the eighteenth century.

The Dutch rivalry with the English, during the seventeenth century, was more bitter than that of the Portuguese. The policy

of the Dutch in the East was influenced by two motives: one was to take revenge on Catholic Spain, the foe of their independence, and her ally Portugal, and the other was to colonise and establish settlements in the East Indies with a view to monopolising commerce in that region. They gained their first object by the gradual decline of Portuguese influence, which we have already noted. The realisation of their second object brought them into bitter competition with the English. In Europe also the relations between England and Holland had been hostile under the Stuarts and Cromwell, owing to commercial rivalry, and the French alliance and pro-Spanish policy of the Stuarts.

The naval supremacy of the Dutch and the negotiation of a twenty-one years' truce between Spain and Holland in 1609, by freeing them from the danger of war in Europe and some restrictions in the Spice Islands, encouraged the Dutch to oppose English trade in the East Indies more vigorously than before. During this period, the activities of the Dutch were mostly confined to Java and the Archipelago. However, they established themselves on the Coromandel Coast and fortified a factory at Pulicat in 1610, to provide themselves with cotton goods for which a ready market could be found in the Archipelago. Conferences held in London and at the Hague (A.D. 1611 and 1613–1615) led to an amicable settlement between the Dutch and the English. They came to terms in A.D. 1619 but hostilities were renewed after two years, and the cruel massacre of ten Englishmen and nine Japanese at Amboyna in 1623 "marked the climax of Dutch hatred" of the English in the East. Though the Dutch began to confine themselves more to the Malay Archipelago and the English to India, the former did not cease to be commercial rivals of the latter in India. During the years 1672–1674 the Dutch frequently obstructed communications between Surāt and the new English settlement of Bombay and captured three English vessels in the Bay of Bengal. In 1698 the Dutch chief of Chinsurā complained to Prince 'Azīm-us-Shān, when he visited Burdwān, that while his company paid a duty of 3½ per cent on their trade, the English paid only Rs. 3,000 per annum, and asked that the Dutch might be granted the same privilege as the English. The commercial rivalry of the Dutch and the English remained acute till A.D. 1759.

3. The English East India Company

The completion of Drake's voyage round the world in 1580, and the victory of the English over the Spanish Armada, inspired

the people of England with a spirit of daring and enterprise in different spheres of activity and encouraged some English sea-captains to undertake voyages to the eastern waters. Between 1591 and 1593 James Lancaster reached Cape Comorin and Penang; in 1596 a fleet of vessels under Benjamin Wood sailed eastwards; and in 1599 John Mildenhall, a merchant adventurer of London, came to India by the overland route and spent seven years in the East. It was on the 31st December, 1600, that the first important step towards England's commercial prosperity was taken. On that memorable day the East India Company received a charter from Queen Elizabeth granting it the monopoly of eastern trade for fifteen years. At first the Company dispatched "separate voyages", each fleet being sent by a group of subscribers, who divided among themselves the profits of their trade, and it had to encounter various difficulties. "It had to explore and map out the Indian seas and coasts, it had painfully to work out a system of commerce, to experiment with commodities and merchandise, to train and discipline a staff of servants. It had to brave or conciliate the hostility of England's hereditary Catholic enemy and her new Protestant rival. Further, it had to establish a position even at home . . . there was no active State support given to England's first essays in the East. The East India Company was cradled in the chilly but invigorating atmosphere of individualism. It had to cope with the lingering medieval prejudice against the export of bullion and a fallacious theory of foreign trade."

The early voyages of the English Company were directed to Sumatra, Java and the Moluccas in order to get a share of the spice trade. It was in 1608 that the first attempt was made to establish factories in India. The Company sent Captain Hawkins to India, and he reached the court of Jahāngīr in 1609. He was at first well received by the Mughul Emperor, who expressed his desire to permit the English to settle at Surāt, for which Hawkins had petitioned. But the hostile activities of the Portuguese, and the opposition of the Surāt merchants, led him to refuse the English captain's petition. Hawkins left Āgra in 1611 and at Surāt met three English ships under the command of Sir Henry Middleton. Middleton adopted a policy of reprisals against the Surāt merchants with regard to their Red Sea trade, which alarmed the latter and led them to admit to Surāt two English vessels under Captain Best in 1612. The force sent by the Portuguese was defeated by Best, and early in 1613 Jahāngīr issued a *firman* permitting the English to establish a factory permanently at Surāt. Soon the English Company sent an accredited ambassador

of the King of England, James I, to the Mughul court with a view to concluding a commercial treaty with the Emperor. The person chosen was Sir Thomas Roe, who was "of pregnant understanding, well spoken, learned, industrious, and of a comely personage". Roe remained constantly at Jahāngīr's court from the end of 1615 till the end of 1618, and though certain factors prevented him from concluding any definite commercial treaty with the Mughul Emperor, he succeeded in securing several privileges for the Company, particularly the permission to erect factories in certain places within the Empire. Before Roe left India in February, 1619, the English had established factories at Surāt, Āgra, Ahmadābād and Broach. All these were placed under the control of the President and Council of the Surāt factory, who had also the power to control the Company's trade with the Red Sea ports and Persia. English factories were also started at Broach and Barodā with the object of purchasing at first hand the piece-goods manufactured in the localities, and at Āgra, in order to sell broadcloth to the officers of the imperial court and to buy indigo, the best quality of which was manufactured at Biyāna. In 1668 Bombay was transferred to the East India Company by Charles II, who had got it from the Portuguese as a part of the dowry of his wife Catherine of Braganza, at an annual rental of £10. Bombay gradually grew more and more prosperous and became so important that in 1687 it superseded Surāt as the chief settlement of the English on the west coast.

On the south-eastern coast the English had established a factory at Masulipatam, the principal port of the kingdom of Golkundā, in 1611 in order to purchase the locally woven piece-goods, which they exported to Persia and Bantam. But being much troubled there by the opposition of the Dutch and the frequent demands of the local officials, they opened another factory in 1626 at Armāgāon, a few miles north of the Dutch settlement of Pulicat. Here also they were put to various inconveniences, and so turned their attention again to Masulipatam, and to their great advantage the Sultān of Golkundā granted them the "*Golden Firman*" in A.D. 1632 by which they were allowed to trade freely in the ports belonging to the kingdom of Golkundā on payment of duties worth 500 *pagodas* a year. These terms were repeated in another *firman* of A.D. 1634. But this did not relieve the English traders from the demands of local officers and they looked for a more advantageous place. In A.D. 1639 Francis Day obtained the lease of Madras from the ruler of Chandragiri, representative of the ruined Vijayanagar Empire, and built there a fortified factory which came to be known

as Fort St. George. Fort St. George soon superseded Masulipatam as headquarters of the English settlements on the Coromandel Coast.

The next stage in the growth of English influence was their expansion in the north-east. Factories had been started at Hariharpur in the Mahānadī Delta and at Balāsore in A.D. 1633. A factory was established at Hugli, under Mr. Bridgeman, in 1651, and soon others were opened at Patna and Cāssimbāzār. The principal articles of the English trade in Bengal during this period were silk, cotton piece-goods, saltpetre and sugar, but owing to the irregular private trade of the factory the Company did not derive much advantage before some time had elapsed. In 1658 all the settlements in Bengal, Bihār and Orissa, and on the Coromandel Coast, were made subordinate to Fort St. George.

Owing to various reasons, the prospects of the Company's trade at Madras and Surāt were not very bright during the first half of the seventeenth century. But its misfortunes disappeared during the second half of that century, owing to changes in the policy of the home government. The charter granted by Cromwell in 1657 gave it fresh opportunities. The thirty years following the Restoration of 1660 formed a period of expansion and prosperity. Both Charles II and James II confirmed the old privileges of the Company and extended its powers. At the same time, the establishment of a permanent joint-stock backing greatly relieved the Company of its past financial difficulties.

The Company's policy in India also changed during this period. A peaceful trading body was transformed into a power eager to establish its own position by territorial acquisitions, largely in view of the political disorders in the country. The long warfare between the imperial forces, the Marāthas and the other Deccan states, the Marātha raids on Surāt in 1664 and 1670, the weak government of the Mughul viceroys in Bengal, which became exposed to grave internal as well as external dangers, the disturbances caused by the Malabar pirates and the consequent necessity of defence made the change inevitable. Gerald Aungier, successor of Sir George Oxenden as President at Surāt and Governor of Bombay since 1669, wrote to the Court of Directors that "the times now require you to manage your general commerce with the sword in your hands". In the course of a few years the Directors approved of this change in the Company's policy and wrote to the Chief at Madras in December, 1687, "to establish such a politie of civil and military power, and create and secure such a large revenue to secure both . . . as may be the foundation

of a large, well grounded, secure English dominion in India for all time to come". Sir Josiah Child, the dominant personality in the affairs of the Company in the time of the later Stuarts, was largely responsible for this new policy, though it did not actually originate with him. In pursuance of it, in December, 1688, Sir John Child, his brother, blockaded Bombay and the Mughul ports on the western coast, seized many Mughul vessels and sent his captain to the Red Sea and Persian Gulf "to arrest the pilgrimage traffic to Mecca". But the English had underestimated the force of the Mughul Empire, which was still very strong and could be effectively exercised. Sir John Child at last appealed for pardon to Aurangzeb, who granted it (February, 1690), and also a licence for English trade when the English agreed to restore all the captured Mughul ships and to pay one-and-a-half lacs of rupees in compensation.

In Bengal, where the staples of commerce could not be purchased near the coast but had to be procured from places lying far up the waterways of the province, the Company was subject to payment of tolls at numerous customs-posts and to vexatious demands by the local officers. In 1651 Sultān Shujā issued a *firman* granting the Company the privilege of trading in return for a fixed annual payment of duties worth Rs. 3,000. Another *nishān*, granted in 1656, laid down that "the factory of the English Company be no more troubled with demands of customs for goods imported or exported either by land or by water, nor that their goods be opened and forced from them at under-rates in any places of government by which they shall pass and repass up and down the country; but that they buy and sell freely, and without impediment". But the successors of Sultān Shujā did not consider the *nishān* to be binding on them and demanded that the English, in view of their increasing trade, should pay duties similar to the other merchants. The Company procured a *firman* from Shāista Khān in 1672 granting them exemption from the payment of duties, and the Emperor Aurangzeb issued a *firman* in 1680 ordering that none should molest the Company's people for customs or obstruct their trade, and that "of the English nation, besides their usual custom of 2 per cent for their goods, more 1½ *jezia*, or poll-money, shall be taken". But in spite of these *firmans*, the Company's agents in all places—Bombay, Madras and Bengal—could not escape from the demands of the local customs-officers and their goods were occasionally seized.

The Company at last decided to protect themselves by force, for which they thought it necessary to have a fortified settlement

at Hugli. Hostilities actually broke out between the Mughuls and the English on the sack of Hugli by the latter in October, 1686. Hijli and the Mughul fortifications at Balāsore were also stormed by the English. The English were repulsed from Hugli, and abandoning it went down the river to a fever-stricken island at the mouth of the river, whence the wise English agent, Job Charnock, opened negotiations which ended in securing permission for the English to return to Sutanutī in the autumn of 1687. But hostilities were renewed in the next year when a fresh naval force was sent from London, under Captain William Heath, with orders to seize Chittāgong. The commander, however, failed in his object and then retired to Madras.

These rash and unwise actions on the part of the English stopped when the President and Council of Bombay concluded a peace with the Mughul Emperor in 1690. Job Charnock returned to Bengal in August, 1690, and established an English factory at Sutanutī. Thus was laid "the foundation of the future capital of British India, the first step in the realisation of the half-conscious prophecy of 1687". Under the orders of the Mughul Emperor, Ibrāhīm Khān, successor of Shāista Khān in the government of Bengal, issued a *firman* in February, 1691, granting the English exemption from the payment of customs-duties in return for Rs. 3,000 a year. Owing to the rebellion of Sobhā Singh, a zamindār in the district of Burdwān, the English got an excuse to fortify their new factory in 1696, and in 1698 they were granted the *zamindārī* of the three villages of Sutanutī, Kalikātā (Kalighata = Calcutta) and Govindapur on payment of Rs. 1,200 to the previous proprietors. In 1700 the English factories in Bengal were placed under the separate control of a President and Council, established in the new fortified settlement which was henceforth named Fort William, Sir Charles Eyre being the first President of Fort William. The position of the Company in its Bengal settlement was somewhat peculiar. It held Bombay on behalf of the English Crown, no Indian prince having any jurisdiction there. At Madras its powers were based on the acquiescence of the Indian rulers and also on its English charters. "In Bengal this dual source of the Company's position was much more evident." It owed its authority over the English subjects here to English laws and charters; but over the Indian inhabitants it exercised authority as a zamindār.

The prosperity of the Company under Charles II and James II roused the jealousy of its enemies who resented its monopoly of trading privileges after the Revolution of 1688, which gave power to the Whigs. The Whigs were opposed to a body of traders who

had been in alliance with the old government. They lent assistance to the interlopers, as the private traders were called. In 1694 the House of Commons passed a resolution to the effect that all the subjects of England had an equal right to trade in India unless prohibited by statute. In 1698 a Bill was passed into law establishing a new Company on the lines of a regulated Company. This new body came to be called the "General Society" and the old Company joined it as a member from 1707 in order to preserve the right of trading in India. About the same time a large number of other subscribers were incorporated into another joint-stock Company under the title of the "English Company of Merchants". In spite of financial embarrassments, the new Company became indeed a serious rival of the old one, and sent Sir William Norris as an ambassador to the court of Aurangzeb to secure trading privileges for itself. But the mission ended in failure. Under some pressure from the ministry, the two Companies resolved upon amalgamation in 1702, which came into effect under the award of the Earl of Godolphin in 1708–9. The two Companies were henceforth amalgamated under the title of "The United Company of Merchants of England Trading to the East Indies" and their internecine quarrels stopped for ever. The legal monopoly of the United Company remained untouched till A.D. 1793.

The expansion of the English East India Company's trade and influence in India during the first forty years of the eighteenth century was quiet and gradual, in spite of the political disorders of the period, which only created occasional, but not very serious, hindrances for it and were easily overcome. The most important event in the history of the Company during this period was its embassy to the Mughul court in 1715, sent with a view to securing privileges throughout Mughul India and some villages round Calcutta. It was conducted from Calcutta by John Surman, assisted by Edward Stephenson. William Hamilton accompanied it as a surgeon and an Armenian named Khwāja Serhud as an interpreter. Hamilton succeeded in curing the Emperor Farrukhsiyar of a painful disease, and he, being thus pleased with the English, issued *firmans* complying with their request and directed the governors of the provinces to observe them. The privilege enjoyed by the English of trading in Bengal, free of all duties, subject to the annual payment of Rs. 3,000 per annum, was confirmed; they were permitted to rent additional territory round Calcutta; their old privilege of exemption from dues throughout the province of Hyderābād was retained, they being required to pay only the existing rent for Madras; they were exempted from the payment

of all customs and dues at Surāt hitherto paid by them, in return for an annual sum of Rs. 10,000; and the coins of the Company minted at Bombay were allowed to have currency throughout the Mughul dominions.

In Bengal, Murshid Qulī Jāfar Khān, a strong and able governor, opposed the grant of the additional villages to the English. Still, the other rights secured by the *firman* of 1716–17 greatly furthered their interests. It has been aptly described by Orme as the "Magna Charta of the Company". The trade of the Company in Bengal gradually prospered, in spite of the occasional demands and exactions of the local officials. The importance of Calcutta increased so that it came to have a population of 100,000 by A.D. 1735, and the Company's shipping at the port during the ten years following the embassy of 1715 amounted to ten thousand tons a year.

For about eighteen years after Farrukhsiyar's *firman*, the trade of the English Company on the western coast suffered from the quarrels between the Marāthas and the Portuguese, and the ravages of the Marātha sea-captains, notably Kānhojī Angria, who dominated the coast between Bombay and Goa from two strongholds, Gheria (or Vijayadrug) and Suvarndrug. During the government of Charles Boone from 1715 to 1722, a wall was built round Bombay and armed ships of the Company were increased in order to defend its factory and trade against hostile fleets. After these eighteen years, the Company's trade in Bombay began to increase, its military strength was developed and Bombay had a population of about 70,000 in A.D. 1744, though the Marātha sea-captains were not finally crushed before 1757. The English concluded a treaty with the Marāthas in 1739, and in alliance with the Peshwā, launched attacks against the Angrias. Suvarndrug was captured by Commodore James in 1755 and in 1757 Clive and Watson captured their capital, Gheria. At Madras also the English carried on a "peaceful commerce", being on "excellent terms" both with the Nawāb of the Carnatic and his overlord, the Subahdār of the Deccan. In 1717 they took possession of five towns near Madras which Thomas Pitt, Governor of Madras from 1698 to 1709, had originally obtained from the Nawāb of the Carnatic in 1708, and in 1734 they also got Vepery and four other hamlets.

4. The French East India Company and French Settlements

Though "the desire for eastern traffic displayed itself at a very early period among the French", they were the last of the European powers to compete for commercial gains in the East with the other

European Companies. Nevertheless leading Frenchmen like Henry IV, Richelieu and Colbert realised the importance of Eastern commerce. At the instance of Colbert, the "Compagnie des Indes Orientales" was formed in A.D. 1664. Though created and financed by the State, the French Company's first movements were "neither well considered nor fortunate", because its energies were then frittered away in fruitless attempts to colonise Madagascar, which had already been visited by Frenchmen. But in 1667 another expedition started from France under the command of François Caron, who was accompanied by Marcara, a native of Ispahān. The first French factory in India was established by François Caron at Surāt in A.D. 1668, and Marcara succeeded in establishing another French factory at Masulipatam in 1669 by obtaining a patent from the Sultān of Golkundā. In 1672 the French seized San Thomé, close to Madras, but in the next year their admiral, De la Haye, was defeated by a combined force of the Sultān of Golkundā and the Dutch and was forced to capitulate and surrender San Thomé to the Dutch. Meanwhile, in 1673 François Martin and Bellanger de Lespinay, one of the volunteers who had accompanied Admiral De la Haye, obtained a little village from the Muslim governor of Valikondāpuram. Thus the foundation of Pondicherry was laid in a modest manner. François Martin, who took charge of this settlement from A.D. 1674, developed it into an important place, through personal courage, perseverance and tact, "amid the clash of arms and the clamour of falling kingdoms". In Bengal, Nawāb Shāista Khān granted a site to the French in 1674, on which they built the famous French factory of Chandernagore in 1690–1692.

The European rivalries between the Dutch (supported by the English) and the French adversely influenced the position of the French in India. Pondicherry was captured by the Dutch in 1693 but was handed back to the French by the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697. Martin, again placed in charge of this settlement, restored its prosperity so that it came to have a population of about 40,000 at the time of his death in 1706 as compared with the 22,000 of Calcutta in the same year. But the French lost their influence in other places, and their factories at Bantam, Surāt and Masulipatam were abandoned by the beginning of the eighteenth century. The resources of the French Company were practically exhausted by this time, and till 1720 it passed through very bad days, even selling its licences to others. Of the five governors of Pondicherry who held office from 1707 to 1720 none followed the strong and wise policy of Martin. But with the reconstitution of the Company, in June, 1720, as the "Perpetual Company of the

Indies", prosperity returned to it under the wise administration of Lenoir and Dumas between 1720 and 1742. The French occupied Mauritius in 1721, Māhé on the Malabar coast in 1725, and Karikal in 1739. The objects of the French, during this period, were, however, purely commercial. There "was nothing in the conduct of Lenoir or Dumas that allows us to credit the Company with political views and still less ideas of conquest; its factories were more or less fortified, but for motives of simple security against the Dutch and the English; and although it enlisted troops, it used them only for purposes of defence". After 1742 political motives began to overshadow the desire for commercial gain and Dupleix began to cherish the ambition of a French Empire in India, which being challenged by the English opened a new chapter in Indian history.

CHAPTER II

RISE OF THE BRITISH POWER, 1740–1765

1. The English and the French : The First Carnatic War

For nearly twenty years the Carnatic—the name given by the Europeans to the Coromandel Coast and its hinterland—became the scene of a long-drawn contest between the French and the English, which led to the ultimate overthrow of the French power in India. It had its repercussions also in Bengal which produced unexpected and momentous results. In the light of later events, we may justly regard this struggle as having decided once for all that the English and not the French were to become masters of India. For these reasons the Carnatic war has attained a celebrity in history which is not fully justified either by the immediate issues involved or by the incidents of the war itself.

In order to understand fully the nature of the struggle, we have to keep in view not only the position of the English and French Companies in India and the relations of the two nations in Europe, but also the prevailing political conditions in the Deccan and the somewhat uncertain relationship subsisting between the English and French merchants on the one hand and the local Indian powers on the other. All these important factors shaped the course of events as they developed from a petty struggle for privileges of trade into a bold bid for the empire of the Mughuls.

As has already been noted, Madras and Pondicherry were the chief trading stations of the English and the French on the Coromandel Coast. Each of these was a fortified city with about 500 Europeans and 25,000 Indians. The English also possessed in addition the Fort of St. David, a little to the south of Pondicherry. All three cities were situated on the sea-coast and depended for their safety and fresh supplies of resources from home upon the command of the sea. This aspect was not indeed fully realised at first, but its importance was gradually revealed. It put both the English and the French on a vantage-ground in respect of the local authorities, who had no navy, and ultimately made the success of the struggle between the two European

Companies dependent upon the power of each to maintain command over the sea.

Not only did the local Indian authorities possess no navy, but their condition was such that they shortly ceased to count as important military powers even on land. Politically, the whole of the Carnatic was almost in the melting-pot. It formed a province under the Subahdār of the Deccan, and was ruled by a governor, called the Nawāb, with headquarters at Arcot. But as Nizām-ul-mulk, the Subahdār of the Deccan, had made himself independent to all intents and purposes, the Nawāb of Arcot, in his turn, behaved almost like an independent prince. The Nizām, his nominal suzerain, was so engrossed with the Marāthas and the affairs of Northern India that he could hardly exercise any effective authority in the affairs of the Carnatic, except when, on rare occasions, he could spare some time and energy to visit the southern province.

One such occasion arose in the beginning of 1743. Three years earlier the Marāthas had plundered the Carnatic, killed its governor, Nawāb Dost 'Ālī, and taken his son-in-law, Chanda Sāhib, as prisoner to Sātārā. Safdar 'Ālī, the son of Dost 'Ālī, had saved his life and kingdom by promising to pay the Marāthas a crore of rupees, but he was soon murdered by a cousin, and his young son was proclaimed Nawāb. All these incidents created a feeling of panic and uncertainty in the Carnatic and induced the Nizām to come there in person to restore order. It was, however, beyond his power to settle affairs in that troubled region, and although he appointed Anwār-ud-dīn Khān, a tried servant, Nawāb of the Carnatic, things drifted on almost as hopelessly as in previous years. The appointment of the new Nawāb made things worse as he was sure to be regarded as an intruder and rival by Nawāb Dost 'Ālī's relatives, who still held many forts and enjoyed extensive *jāgīrs*.

While the whole of the Carnatic was being convulsed by these political events, the English and the French settlements were carrying on their peaceful avocations of trade and commerce, without any effective hindrance from any of the combatants. The French and the English had not as yet begun to take any active part in Indian politics except when it directly affected the interests of their trade. Nor did the local authorities regard them as of sufficient importance to be seriously taken notice of. Thus, left to themselves, they might have gone on pursuing their normal activities unaffected by what was going on around them.

But this was not to be. In 1740 England was involved in a European war known as the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–

1748). It is not necessary to discuss here either the origin or the progress of that war, but it will suffice to state that England and France took opposite sides and fought in the Netherlands for a period of nearly eight years.

The outbreak of war between England and France also placed the two mercantile Companies in India technically in a state of war. But the French authorities, both in Europe and India, at first tried hard to maintain neutrality in this country. There was precedent for such a state of things, and Dupleix, the governor of Pondicherry, opened direct negotiations with the English authorities in India for this purpose. But as the authorities in England declined to accept the proposal, their representatives in India, although willing to avoid hostilities, were unable to guarantee any neutrality, especially in seas where they had no control over His Majesty's ships.

As a matter of fact, hostilities were opened by the capture of French ships by the English navy under Barnett. As the French had no fleet in Indian waters, Dupleix sent an urgent appeal to La Bourdonnais, the governor of Mauritius, to come to his rescue. After a great deal of difficulty the latter equipped a squadron and reached the Indian seas with eight ships of the line.

The arrival of La Bourdonnais changed the course of the war. The commander of the English ships was either unwilling or unable to engage in a serious contest with the French and sailed to Hugli leaving the whole Madras coast at the mercy of the French squadron.

The French now besieged Madras both by land and sea. Within a week Madras surrendered, after a loss of only six killed. The English had so far displayed an amazing incapacity to fight the French on land or sea, and fortune seemed to smile upon the efforts of Dupleix.

But the greatest surprise of the war was yet in store. Anwār-ud-dīn, the newly appointed Nawāb of the Carnatic, was not a silent spectator of the contest that was raging within his kingdom. As the ruler of the country he was at least a nominal protector of both the English and the French, and each of them openly recognised this position in times of need. Thus, when at the outbreak of hostilities the English were all-powerful at sea, Dupleix had appealed to the Nawāb to protect the French ships. The English, however, did not respect his authority and paid no heed to his protests and complaints. But when Madras was besieged by the French, the English in their turn sought the protection of the Nawāb. Anwār-ud-dīn, true to his role of protector, asked Dupleix to raise the siege of Madras, but the French were no more disposed

than the English to respect his authority when it suited their purpose not to do so. There was, however, one vital difference. The Nawāb was unable to interfere actively in naval affairs as he possessed no navy. It was quite different in the case of warfare on land, as here the Nawāb was willing and seemed able to back up his demand by force. Dupleix knew this and sought to pacify him by diplomacy. He told the Nawāb that he was taking Madras only to place it in his hands. The Nawāb was, however, too astute to believe this, and when his repeated warnings went unheeded he sent an army against the French force besieging Madras.

Had the English in Madras resisted a little longer, the French would have been caught between two fires. As it was, the army of the Nawāb found the French in possession of the city, and blockaded them. But the tiny French force made a sally and scattered the unwieldy host of the Nawāb. The Nawāb's army was forced to retire to St. Thomé and was again defeated by a detachment of the French army which was coming to reinforce the French in Madras.

The defeat of the Nawāb's troops had far-reaching consequences which will be discussed in the proper place. For the time being the success of the French seemed complete and their material gains and increase in prestige seemed to exceed their highest ambitions.

But the overwhelming success brought in its train discord and disunion. La Bourdonnais had promised to restore Madras for a suitable ransom, but Dupleix was strongly against this policy. After a prolonged quarrel, Dupleix seemed ready to submit, when a hurricane caused severe damage to the French fleet and forced La Bourdonnais to retire with his ships from the Indian seas. Dupleix now formally denounced the treaty which La Bourdonnais had made with the Council of Madras and plundered Madras "from top to bottom".

But the success of his policy was dearly purchased. With the departure of La Bourdonnais the English obtained the command of the sea. The first effect of this change was the failure of Dupleix to take Fort St. David in spite of a prolonged siege of eighteen months. In June, 1748, a large squadron was sent out from England under Rear-Admiral Boscawen to avenge the capture of Madras, and now the English in their turn besieged Pondicherry, both by land and sea. Fortune again smiled on Dupleix. Pondicherry was saved by the lack of military skill of the besieging army, and in October Boscawen was forced to raise the siege on the approach of the monsoon. Before he could renew the siege the War of the Austrian Succession had been concluded by the Treaty of Aix-la-

Chapelle (1748). Under the terms of the Treaty, Madras was restored to the English, and Boscawen sailed back to Europe. Thus closed the first stage of the struggle without any territorial gain on either side.

2. The Second Carnatic War

Outwardly the two parties were left by the Treaty exactly where they were before, but events soon proved that the situation had really changed a great deal. The recent struggle had some obvious lessons which the quick mind of Dupleix did not fail to grasp. They formed the basis of a new and daring policy which in its ultimate effects changed the whole course of Indian history.

The war had illustrated the great importance of sea-power. It demonstrated beyond doubt that, situated as they were, neither the French nor the English could hope to obtain a decisive and permanent success unless they could control the sea. The recognised supremacy of the English in this respect offered, therefore, but a gloomy prospect to the French. Besides, the French power was practically limited to the Carnatic, whereas the English had important settlements both in Bombay and Bengal. In any struggle for supremacy the French would therefore be at a great disadvantage, as regards both supplies from home and command of resources in India itself. The chances of ultimate success of the French against the English appeared thus to be very small indeed.

Any other person would have been dismayed by these sombre prospects. But the genius of Dupleix shone forth and suggested to him the only way out of the difficulty. The episode of Anwār-ud-dīn's discomfiture before Madras made a deep impression upon his mind and suggested immense possibilities in a new direction. The utter rout of Anwār-ud-dīn's huge forces by the small French army on land proved that in warfare better discipline and up-to-date equipment counted far more than mere numbers; and that vast Asiatic armies were no longer a match for even a handful of European troops. In his small but brave and disciplined army he thus possessed an effective weapon which would prove a decisive factor in any quarrel between two Indian princes. And in those days of political unrest, Indian princes would not be wanting who would be prepared to offer any price to Dupleix for turning the scale in their favour. Backed by the prestige and resources of such an Indian authority the French would ultimately be more than a match for the English.

So argued Dupleix, and as the events showed, reasonably enough. Fortune favoured him, and placed before him a unique

opportunity to work out his new policy. We have already referred to the fact that the appointment of Anwār-ud-dīn Khān as the Nawāb of the Carnatic gave rise to discontent among the friends and relations of the late Nawāb Dost 'Ālī. This was brought to a head by Chanda Sāhib, the son-in-law of Dost 'Ālī, who had been taken prisoner by the Marāthas in 1741 as related above, but was set free after seven years. He now conspired to get back the throne of his father-in-law. A similar contest was then going on for the throne of the Deccan. Asaf Jāh Nizām-ul-mulk, who founded the kingdom, died in A.D. 1748, and was succeeded by his son, Nāsir Jang, but his grandson, Muzaffar Jang, laid claim to the throne on the ground that the Mughul emperor had appointed him Subahdār of the Deccan.

Dupleix was eagerly waiting for a situation like this. He concluded a secret treaty with Chanda Sāhib and Muzaffar Jang with a view to placing them on the thrones of the Carnatic and the Deccan respectively. On the 3rd of August, 1749, the three allies defeated and killed Anwār-ud-dīn at the battle of Ambur, to the south-east of Vellore. Muhammad 'Ālī, the son of Anwār-ud-dīn, fled to Trichinopoly and a French army was sent to reduce that town.

The English could not fail to realise the great danger which threatened them, but they lacked the energy of Dupleix. They sent urgent invitations to Nāsir Jang to come and crush his enemies in the Carnatic and sent some help to Muhammad 'Ālī at Trichinopoly. But they could not organise an effective confederacy against the one headed by Dupleix. The result was that Nāsir Jang, in spite of some initial successes in the Carnatic, was ultimately killed (December, 1750). Muzaffar Jang, who had been kept a prisoner, was now set free and proclaimed Subahdār of the Deccan. The grateful Subahdār suitably rewarded the services of his French ally. He appointed Dupleix governor of all the Mughul territories south of the Kṛishṇā river and ceded to him territories near Pondicherry as well as on the Orissa coast, including the famous market-town of Masulipatam. In return, at the request of Muzaffar Jang, Dupleix placed at his disposal the service of his best officer, Bussy, with a French army. It proved to be the surest means to guarantee French influence at the court of the Nizām.

So far, things had gone admirably for the French, and Dupleix's policy triumphed beyond his most sanguine expectations. His protégés, Muzaffar Jang and Chanda Sāhib, occupied the thrones at Hyderābād and Arcot. In less than two years an insignificant body

of foreign merchants was raised to the position of supreme political authority in the Deccan and the Carnatic. To friends and foes alike Dupleix's success appeared nothing short of a miracle.

In order to complete his success it was necessary for Dupleix to come to a settlement with Muhammad 'Ālī, who had taken refuge at the strong fort of Trichinopoly. The French force sent to reduce that city had wasted its energy in a fruitless effort to reduce Tanjore. Dupleix, therefore, decided to try the effect of diplomacy. He would perhaps have succeeded but for the intervention of the English, whose help and encouragement stiffened the resistance of Muhammad 'Ālī.

It was now clear, even to the most obtuse mind, that the British position in Madras would be irrevocably lost if Dupleix were left free to complete his designs. Fortunately for the English their new governor, Saunders, who took over charge in September, 1750, was more energetic than his predecessor. Under his guidance the English threw their whole weight into the struggle, and the home authorities, realising the gravity of the situation, determined to back him up with all the resources at their disposal. Thus although there was then no regular declaration of war or even avowed hostility between the English and the French nations in Europe, they engaged in an open war in India, nominally as auxiliaries of the native powers, but really as the principals in a life-and-death struggle.

Had Dupleix been able to strike a decisive blow at Muhammad 'Ālī before the English could come to his rescue he might have nullified altogether the belated efforts of his rivals. But he was out-manœuvred by the clever diplomacy of his opponents. On the advice of the English, Muhammad 'Ālī kept up the negotiations opened by Dupleix, simply to gain time till the English were in a position to send effective assistance to him. Dupleix did not realise that he was being duped, till in May, 1751, a British detachment actually set out towards Trichinopoly. He then sent a French army under Law to capture the place, but Law proved hopelessly incompetent for the task. The siege of Trichinopoly dragged on, and by the end of the year the rulers of Mysore and Tanjore and the Marātha chief, Morārī Rāo, joined Muhammad 'Ālī and the English.

In the meantime events were marching rapidly in the north. Robert Clive, a civilian employee in Madras, had lately joined the army. He proposed an expedition against Arcot, which had been already suggested by Muhammad 'Ālī and approved of by the English governor, Saunders, as the best means of preventing the

fall of Trichinopoly, for Chanda Sāhib was sure to divert an effective part of his army to the protection of his capital. The proposal was accepted and Clive was entrusted with its execution. With only two hundred Europeans and three hundred sepoys he occupied Arcot without any serious opposition. As he foresaw, Chanda Sāhib immediately sent a relieving force from Trichinopoly to recapture his capital. For fifty-three days Clive heroically defended the city till the besieging forces withdrew (Sept.–Oct. 1751).

The capture of Arcot was the most remarkable achievement of the war. This daring exploit at once enhanced the reputation of the English as a fighting power and gave a crushing blow to the prestige of the French. Law, the French general in charge of the siege of Trichinopoly, was unnerved by the success of Clive and took refuge on the island of Śrīrangam. At the instance of Robert Clive the English besieged the island. Dupleix sent reinforcements, but they surrendered to the English on June 9, 1752. Three days later Law and his troops became prisoners of the English. To complete the disaster of the French, Chanda Sāhib surrendered and was beheaded by the Tanjorean general.

Dupleix's high hopes were now dashed to the ground. By the incredible folly and incompetence of his generals he had lost the prize which was almost within his grasp. Still he worked on undaunted by recent reverses. He won over Morārī Rāo and the ruler of Mysore to his side and secured the neutrality of the Rājā of Tanjore. He then began active operations (31st December, 1752) and renewed the siege of Trichinopoly. Minor military engagements took place throughout 1753 with alternate success and failure on both sides. Up to the very end Dupleix did not give up hope of taking Trichinopoly.

But the French authorities at home were thoroughly tired of Dupleix and decided to recall him. They never understood the full implications of the masterly policy of their gifted governor and were greatly concerned at the discomfiture of the French troops and the heavy financial losses which his policy involved. Accordingly they sent Godeheu to investigate the local conditions and take proper measures to retrieve the situation. Godeheu landed on 1st August, 1754, superseded Dupleix, and reversed his policy. He opened negotiations with the English and concluded a treaty. The English and the French both agreed not to interfere in the quarrels of the native princes and each party was left in possession of the territories which it actually occupied at the time of the treaty.

Thus the French lost almost everything that Dupleix had gained for them. In the Deccan alone Dupleix's policy still bore some

fruit. By dint of extraordinary ability and energy, Bussy still maintained his influence there against the almost universal opposition of the nobility, who disliked the French and wanted to drive them out of the Deccan. Often Bussy thought of retiring to the Carnatic but was prevented by Dupleix, who steadily pursued the policy of maintaining an effective control at headquarters. By a masterly stroke of policy Bussy induced the Nizām to grant him the Northern Sarkārs for the payment of his troops. These consisted of the four districts of Mustafānagar, Ellore, Rājāhmundry and Chicacole, yielding an annual revenue of more than thirty lacs of rupees. But even this solid acquisition did not enable Bussy to render any substantial assistance to the French in the Carnatic in the most critical hours.

The subsequent history of the French in the Deccan and the Carnatic will be dealt with in due course. But before we leave the subject we may pause for a while to consider the causes which led to the failure of Dupleix. It is obviously beyond the scope of this work to discuss at length the different views held on this subject, both by contemporaries and later historians. Passions and prejudices have clouded the issues and an insufficient knowledge of the relevant material makes it impossible to arrive at any definite conclusion. We must, therefore, confine ourselves to a broad general review of the whole situation without descending into details.

It is agreed on all hands that the immediate and the main cause of Dupleix's discomfiture was the failure of the home authorities to appreciate the merit of his plans and to support their execution by sending adequate assistance. It is, however, suggested that Dupleix alone was responsible for this, inasmuch as he never cared to take his superiors into his confidence or divulge his plans to them in all details until it was too late. But if this is true, it only reveals the inherent conviction of Dupleix, justified in a large measure by later events, that the Government of France were either unwilling or unable to devote serious attention to Indian issues and were always apt to view them as minor and subsidiary parts of their general policy. For while in England there was a private body, like the East India Company, whose whole interest was bound up with that of the English factories in India, the French trading concern was directly controlled by the Government, whose policy was naturally dictated by larger political issues. As a matter of fact, one of the chief reasons which induced them to settle amicably with the English in India was the fear of complications in America.

In the second place, it has been suggested that Dupleix attempted too much, and the division of his forces in the Deccan and the Carnatic was the real cause of his failure. It is hard to accept this view as even substantially correct. In the first part of 1754 Dupleix had enough military strength at his disposal to force the issue to a final decision. Even after the English had advanced to the help of Muhammad 'Ālī, there was no reasonable apprehension that the French could be either outnumbered or out-manœuvred by the English.

On a careful consideration of all the relevant facts, the failure of Dupleix seems to be due to two main causes. He failed to recognise that the game in which he was engaged was one at which two could play, that the English could imitate his own policy in retrieving their lost position. Had he recognised this, he would certainly have come to a final reckoning with Muhammad 'Ālī, one way or the other, before the English were ready to send any effective help to him.

Secondly, the hopeless incompetence of the French generals prevented him from rectifying his initial mistake. It is idle to deny the fact that the subsequent course of events in the Carnatic was determined to a large extent by personalities rather than circumstances. The brilliant genius and bold dash of Clive on the one hand, and the indecision and lack of energy displayed by Law and his colleagues on the other, determined the issues. Had Dupleix had at his disposal a military genius of the type of Clive, the history of the French in India might have been altogether different. If Dupleix could have triumphantly ended the war either at the beginning or even at the end of 1751, the French Government would have hailed him as the founder of their Empire in India and sent abundant supplies to him in men and money. His failure to do this involved him in disgrace and obloquy. He was engaged in one of those risky undertakings where success elevates a man to the rank of a hero but failure denounces him as an obstinate and perverse adventurer.

3. English Success in Bengal

The peace between the English and the French continued undisturbed till the outbreak of the Seven Years' War in Europe, news of which reached India towards the end of 1756. As in the case of the War of the Austrian Succession, England and France took opposite sides in this European war, forcing the English and the French in India to engage in hostilities which neither of them probably desired.

During the interval between the two wars, the relative positions of the English and the French had changed considerably, first by the struggle in the Carnatic which we have described above, and secondly by the events in Bengal to which we now turn.

Like the Deccan, Bengal was under a Subahdār who nominally acknowledged the suzerainty of the Mughul Emperor of Delhi, but was to all intents and purposes an independent king. Like the Deccan, too, Bengal lacked any political strength or stability. Conspiracies and revolutions were the order of the day and corruption and inefficiency sapped the vitality of the State.

'Ālīvardī Khān, the Nawāb of Bengal, who owed his accession to the throne in 1740 to a successful revolution against his master, Nawāb Sarfarāz Khān, proved a strong and capable ruler. But almost his whole regime was spent in an unceasing warfare with the Marātha plunderers, whose repeated incursions caused untold miseries to the people of Bengal. At last he had to buy peace by the cession of the revenues of a part of Orissa and an annual payment of twelve lacs of rupees as *Chauth* to them (May or June, 1751). During the remaining five years of his reign he tried to restore order and set up a regular system of government, but failed (p. 539).

The failure was due partly to the ill-health of the Nawāb, but mainly to the uncertainty of succession after his death. 'Ālīvardī had no male heir. His three daughters were married to three sons of his brother. Sirāj-ud-daulah, the son of his youngest daughter, was his chosen successor, but the arrangement was naturally disliked by the two other sons-in-law, who were governors respectively of Dacca and Purnea. It was inevitable that they should be centres of plots and conspiracies by scheming persons. Although both of them died towards the close of 'Ālīvardī's reign, Ghasiti Begam, the widow of the former, and Shaukat Jang, the son of the latter, pursued their policy up to the very end. Ghasiti was ably supported by her *Diwān* Rājballabh, who really carried on affairs in the name of the princess.

Amidst these troubles 'Ālīvardī died on 9th April, 1756, and Sirāj-ud-daulah ascended the throne without any difficulty. But although his succession was unopposed, his troubles indeed were great. In addition to the hostile activities of Rājballabh and Shaukat Jang, he found himself implicated in a bitter dispute with the English Company.

Even when Sirāj-ud-daulah was administering the State during the illness of 'Ālīvardī, the relations between the Nawāb and the English had been anything but friendly. The main cause of the dispute was the additional fortification of Calcutta, which the

English had recently undertaken, ostensibly as a measure of precaution against the French. The recent events in the Carnatic were certainly calculated to rouse the suspicion of the Nawāb against any such measure. The manner in which it was done increased the wrath of the Nawāb still further. The English not only mounted guns on the old fort but also commenced to build additional fortifications without the permission or even the knowledge of the Nawāb. The fact was that the English discounted, like many others, the chances of Sirāj-ud-daulah's accession to the throne, and were therefore eager to court the favour of Rājballabh, the leader of the opposing party, with surer chances of success. This explains why at the request of Watts, their agent at Cāssimbāzār, the English agreed to give protection to Rājballabh's son Kṛishṇadās, who fled to Calcutta with his family and treasure. They knew full well that this step was calculated to provoke the wrath of Sirāj-ud-daulah against them. There is no doubt also that Sirāj-ud-daulah construed the event as proving the complicity of the English in the schemes of Rājballabh against him.

The contemporary historian, Orme, writes: "There remained no hopes of Alivardy's recovery; upon which the widow of Nawajis (i.e. Ghasiti Begam) had quitted Muxadabad (the capital city of Murshidābād) and encamped with 10,000 men at Moota Ghill (Moti jhil), a garden two miles south of the city, and many now began to think and to say that she would prevail in her opposition against Surajo Dowla (Sirāj-ud-daulah). Mr. Watts therefore was easily induced to oblige her minister and advised the Presidency (of Calcutta) to comply with his request."

Indeed, the rumour was widely spread in Murshidābād that the English had espoused the cause of Ghasiti Begam. Dr. Forth, attached to the factory of Cāssimbāzār, visited 'Ālīvardī about a fortnight before his death. While he was talking with the Nawāb, Sirāj-ud-daulah came in and reported that he had information to the effect that the English had agreed to help Ghasiti Begam. The dying Nawāb immediately questioned Forth about this. Forth not only denied the charge but disavowed on behalf of his nation any intention to interfere in Indian politics.

This denial had but little effect on the mind of Sirāj-ud-daulah which was already embittered against the English over the question of fortification. Immediately after his accession to the throne, he communicated his views to Watts, the chief of the English factory at Cāssimbāzār, in remarkably plain language. The Nawāb pointed out that he looked upon the English only as a set of merchants

and they were welcome as such, but he disapproved of their recent fortifications and insisted on their immediate demolition. The Nawāb also sent envoys to Calcutta with similar instructions and a demand for the surrender of Rājballabh's family, but they were dismissed with scant respect by the English governor. This incredible conduct can only be explained by a tenacious belief that Rājballabh would ultimately succeed against Sirāj-ud-daulah.

The first concern of Sirāj-ud-daulah after his accession to the throne was, therefore, to remove the great internal danger that threatened his safety. By a masterly stroke, which has not been sufficiently recognised in history, he succeeded in quietly removing Ghasiti Begam to his own palace, without any bloodshed. The English now came to realise their mistake. Excuses and apologies were offered for their late conduct. But Sirāj-ud-daulah was not the man to be satisfied by mere hollow promises. He wrote a letter to Mr. Drake, the governor of Calcutta, repeating his orders to demolish the additional fortifications. For the time being he could do no more, for although Ghasiti Begam had been suppressed, Shaukat Jang, the governor of Purnea, still remained the centre of a revolutionary conspiracy against him. The Nawāb rightly concluded that he must remove this danger before he could adopt a strong policy towards the English. Accordingly he marched towards Purnea. When he reached Rājmahal, the reply of Governor Drake reached him. It was couched in polite language, but contained no indication that he would comply with the Nawāb's request. The Nawāb immediately changed his mind, and returned to Murshidābād, in order to begin a campaign against the English in good earnest. The letter of Drake evidently convinced him that he had more to fear from the inveterate enmity of the British than anything that Shaukat Jang could do against him.

Once having taken the decision, Sirāj-ud-daulah acted with unwonted energy. The return journey from Rājmahal commenced on 20th May. He reached Murshidābād on 1st June and on 4th June seized the English factory at Cāssimbāzār. On 5th June he marched against Calcutta and reached there on the 16th. Three days later, Governor Drake, the Commandant and many prominent Englishmen abandoned the fort to its fate and sought their own safety on board the ships. Next day, i.e. on 20th June, Fort William surrendered to Sirāj-ud-daulah after a feeble resistance.

The capture of Calcutta will ever remain memorable in history on account of the so-called Black Hole episode, which occupies a prominent place in the narrative of Holwell. According to his version, 146 English prisoners were confined during the night in

a small room, known as the Black Hole, 18 feet long by 14 feet 10 inches wide. One hundred and twenty-three died of suffocation, and 23 miserable survivors alone remained to tell the tale of that tragic summer night.

The truth of this story has been doubted on good grounds. That some prisoners were put into the Black Hole and a number of them, including those wounded in the course of the fight, died there, may be accepted as true. But the tragic details, designed to suit a magnified number of prisoners, must almost certainly be ascribed to the fertile imagination of Holwell, on whose authority the story primarily rests. In any case, it is agreed on all hands that Sirāj-ud-daulah was not in any way personally responsible for the incident.

Leaving his general Mānikchānd in charge of Calcutta, Sirāj-ud-daulah returned to Murshidābād. Shaukat Jang had in the meantime procured from the titular Mughul Emperor of Delhi the formal *Sanad* for the Subahdārship of Bengal and made no secret of his intention to make a bold bid for the viceregal throne. He no doubt relied upon the help of disaffected chiefs of Bengal like the banker Jagat Seth and the general Mīr Jāfar. But before they could agree upon any general plan, Sirāj-ud-daulah marched against Shaukat Jang and defeated and killed him.

It reflects no small credit upon the young and inexperienced Nawāb that he could get rid of his three powerful enemies within a few months of his accession to the throne. A superficial observer might well have regarded the future with equanimity, and perhaps even the Nawāb was led into a false sense of security. But if he had been a true statesman he should not have been unaware of the dangers and difficulties ahead.

It was, for instance, sheer ineptitude to expect that the English would retire from Bengal after their first defeat without making fresh efforts to retrieve their situation. For, although small in number, the possession of the sea gave them a decided advantage in any warfare with the Nawāb as it kept open the way for retreat when pressed hard, and the means of securing fresh supplies of resources, either from home or from other settlements in India. If the Nawāb had fully realised this fact he would have continued his hold upon Calcutta in order to keep the English permanently in check.

The Nawāb would perhaps have devoted his serious attention to this problem and evolved suitable measures if his own house were in order. But that was the chief plague-spot. Bengal, like most other provincial States, lacked almost every element that makes a State strong and stable. It had only recently emerged as a semi-independent kingdom; and no tradition or attachment bound

the people to the ruling house. The theoretical powers of the Emperor of Delhi still existed, and the case of Shaukat Jang showed what practical use could be made of them. The common people were too accustomed to revolutions to trouble themselves seriously about any change in the government, while the more influential chiefs shaped their policy with a view to their own interests alone. The idea of nationality or patriotism was virtually unknown. Personal allegiance to the ruler, which was the main foundation of government in those days, was conspicuously lacking in the case of Sirāj-ud-daulah. Although we may not credit all the stories of his severity and self-indulgence, which were mostly invented by his enemies, we cannot but regard him as a wayward, pleasure-loving and erratic young man, a typical product of the age in which he lived. To prove this we need only recall a few incidents of his life such as his deliberate defiance of 'Ālīvardī, when merely a boy of fifteen, his drinking bouts in Moti jhil, and the murder of Husain Qulī Khān in a public street in broad daylight. However we might condone them, they were not certainly calculated to inspire either love or confidence in the young Nawāb.

Had Sirāj-ud-daulah belonged to a royal family of long standing and ruled over a kingdom which had enjoyed for years a settled form of government, even his faults might not have proved his ruin. As it was, the circumstances of the times as well as his youth and inexperience tempted disaffection and conspiracy which neither his character nor his personality helped to allay.

The discomfited English leaders knew the situation in Bengal well enough, and, having experienced the force of the Nawāb's arms, they sought to retrieve their position by exploiting the internal situation. After the fall of Calcutta, they had taken refuge in Fulta, and from this place they carried on intrigues with the leading persons whom they knew to be hostile to the Nawāb. The attempt of Shaukat Jang to seize the throne opened up new hopes to them. They sent him a letter with presents "hoping he might defeat Sirāj-ud-daulah". When that hope failed they won over to their cause Mānikchānd, the officer in charge of Calcutta, Omichānd, a rich merchant of the city, Jagat Seth, the famous banker, and other leading men of the Nawāb's court. At the same time they made appeals to the Nawāb to restore their old privileges of trade in Calcutta. This appeal, backed by the support of the interested advisers, induced the Nawāb to consent to an accommodation with the English.

In the meantime warlike preparations were being made by the Madras Council. As soon as they received the news of the

capture of Calcutta, they decided upon sending a large military expedition. Fortunately, a fully equipped army and navy which had been made ready for an expedition against the French were immediately available. After some discussion it was resolved to send the expedition under Clive and Admiral Watson. The expedition set sail on 16th October and reached Bengal on 14th December. The Nawāb was evidently quite ignorant of this. While the English fugitives at Fulta were lulling his suspicions by piteous appeals, and his treacherous officers and advisers were pleading the cause of the "harmless traders", Clive and Watson arrived at Fulta with the force from Madras. It is only fair to note that the English at Fulta were perhaps equally ignorant of the help sent from Madras, and did their very best to induce Clive to desist from warlike operations against the Nawāb, who was ready to concede their reasonable demands. But Clive and Watson paid no heed to the proposals of their compatriots in Fulta. On 17th December Watson addressed a letter to the Nawāb asking him not only to restore the ancient "rights and immunities" of the Company but also to give them a reasonable compensation for the losses and injuries they had suffered. The Nawāb appears to have sent a pacific reply, but it probably never reached Watson. Clive marched towards Calcutta. Mānikchānd made a pretence of war and then fled to Murshidābād. Clive recovered Calcutta on 2nd January, 1757, without any serious fighting. The English then plundered Hugli and destroyed many magnificent houses in that city.

Even after these provocations, Sirāj-ud-daulah came to Calcutta and concluded the Treaty of 'Ālīnagar (9th February, 1757), conceding to the English practically all their demands. This pacific attitude of Sirāj-ud-daulah, offering such a strange contrast to his earlier policy, is difficult to explain. It has been suggested that a night attack on his camp by Clive terrified him into a humble submission. But that attack, according to Orme, was a great failure for which Clive was taken to task even by his own soldiers. Besides, the letters written by Sirāj-ud-daulah, even before he reached Calcutta, contained proposals of peace similar to those to which he afterwards agreed. It is probable that the known treacherous designs of his own officers and the apprehension of an invasion from the north-west induced him to settle with the English at any cost.

Whatever may be the right explanation, it is quite clear that from this time onward Sirāj-ud-daulah displayed a lack of energy and decision at almost every step. The outbreak of the Seven Years' War introduced a new element into the situation. The English

naturally desired to conquer the French possession of Chandernagore. Sirāj-ud-daulah very reasonably argued that he could never allow one section of his subjects to be molested by another. When the English made preparations for sending an expedition to Chandernagore he accused them of violating the Treaty of 'Ālīnagar and loudly proclaimed his determination never to sacrifice the French. Yet he did nothing to protect the French and Chandernagore was easily conquered by Clive and Watson in March, 1757. It is admitted by the English themselves that the Nawāb had a large force near Chandernagore under Nanda Kumār, the Faujdrā of Hugli, and if he had not moved away they could not have conquered the French city. It is almost certain that Nanda Kumār was bribed, but it does not appear that the Nawāb had given any definite orders to Nanda Kumār to resist the English.

The Nawāb, gallantly enough, afforded shelter to the French fugitives at his court, and refused to drive them away even when the English offered in exchange military help against a threatened invasion of Bengal by the heir-apparent to the Mughul Empire. Generosity and prudence alike must have dictated the course of policy which the Nawāb pursued, for in any war with the English the French support would have been of inestimable value to him.

The English fully understood the danger of the situation. While the war was going on with the French, a Nawāb of Bengal with sympathy for the French cause was an element of potential danger. A French force from Pondicherry might join the Nawāb and renew in more favourable circumstances the policy of expelling the English which Dupleix had so brilliantly initiated in the Carnatic.

Hence the English leaders were bent upon replacing Sirāj-ud-daulah by a Nawāb more amenable to their control. A conspiracy was set on foot with the help of the disaffected chiefs, and it was ultimately resolved to place Mīr Jāfar upon the throne of Bengal. Mīr Jāfar and Rāi Durlabh, the two generals of the Nawāb, as well as Jagat Seth, the rich banker, all joined in the plot. A regular treaty was drawn up (10th June) which stipulated, among other things, the reward to be given to the Company and to their chief servants in Calcutta for their military help. A difficulty arose at the last moment. Omichānd, who acted as the intermediary, asked for a large share of the plunder, and Clive silenced him by a forged copy of the treaty in which Omichānd's demands were admitted. As Watson refused to sign this treaty his signature was forged at the instance of Clive.


The Nawāb displayed a lamentable lack of decision and energy in this critical moment. After having drawn upon himself the

wrath and inveterate hostility of the English by his support to the French fugitives, he ultimately agreed to send them away on the advice of his treacherous ministers. At the time of their departure the French gave him friendly warning of the conspiracy, which was evidently patent to everybody save the Nawāb. His eyes were not opened until he came to know of the secret treaty. Even then he failed to act vigorously. Had the Nawāb promptly imprisoned Mīr Jāfar, the other conspirators would have been struck with terror and the plot might perhaps have come to nothing. The Nawāb's courage, however, failed. Far from taking any energetic measures, he himself paid a visit to Mīr Jāfar (15th June) and made pathetic appeals to him in the name of 'Ālīvardī Khān. Mīr Jāfar gave him most solemn assurances of support and the Nawāb was apparently satisfied. He hastily began to make preparations for the war, with Mīr Jāfar as commander of his forces.

Three days before this interview the English forces had left Calcutta on their expedition against the Nawāb. So thoroughly did treachery pervade all ranks of the Nawāb's army, that little or no real opposition was offered to the English even by the garrisons at Hugli or Kātwah. On the night of 22nd June Clive reached the mango grove of Plassey, on the bank of the Bhāgīrathī, where the Nawāb was already entrenched with his troops.

The battle broke out on the morning of the 23rd June. On the Nawāb's side Mīr Jāfar and Rāi Durlabh stood still with their large armies, and only a small force under Mohanlāl and Mīr Madan, backed by a French officer, took part in the battle. Had Mīr Jāfar loyally fought for the Nawāb the English forces might have easily been routed. Even the small advance party made the situation too critical for the English. After half an hour's fighting Clive withdrew his forces behind the trees. At eleven o'clock he consulted his officers. It was resolved to maintain the cannonade during the day and to attack the Nawāb's camp at midnight. Unfortunately a stray shot killed Mīr Madan and this so unnerved the Nawāb that he sent for Mīr Jāfar and accepted his treacherous advice to recall the only troops which were fighting for him. What followed may be best described in the words of a contemporary historian, Ghulām Husain, the author of the *Siyar-ul-mutakherin* :—

> "By this time Mohanlāl, who had advanced with Mīr Madan, was closely engaged with the enemy; his cannon was served with effect; and his infantry having availed themselves of some covers and other grounds, were pouring a quantity of bullets



A. *Position of the* British Army *at* 9 *in the Morning.*

B. *Four guns advanced to check the fire of the* French Party *at the tank* D.

C. *The* Nabob's Army.

D. *A Tank from whence the French Party cannonaded till* 3 *in the Afternoon, when part of the* British Army *took Post there, and the Enemy retired within their Entrenched Camp.*

E & F. *A Redoubt and mound taken by Assault at ½ past* 4, *and which completed the Victory.*

G. *The Nabob's Hunting House. The dotted line* BE *shows the encroachment of the River since the Battle.*

From V. A. Smith : "The Oxford History of India" (*Clarendon Press*).

in the enemy's ranks. It was at this moment he received the order of falling back, and of retreating. He answered: 'That this was not a time to retreat; that the action was so far advanced, that whatever might happen, would happen now; and that should he turn his head, to march back to camp, his people would disperse, and perhaps abandon themselves to an open flight.' Sirāj-ud-daulah, on this answer, turned towards Mīr Jāfar, and the latter coldly answered: 'That the advice he had proposed was the best in his power; and that as to the rest, His Highness was the master of taking his own resolutions. Sirāj-ud-daulah, intimidated by the General's coldness, and overcome by his own fears and apprehensions, renounced his own natural sense, and submitted to Mīr Jāfar's pleasure; he sent repeated orders, with pressing messages, to Mohanlāl; who at last obeyed, and retreated from the post to which he had advanced.

"This retreat of Mohanlāl's made a full impression on his troops. The sight of their General's retreat damped their courage; and having at the same time spied some parties which were flying (for they were of the complot), they disbanded likewise, and fled, every one taking example from his neighbour; and as the flight now had lost all its shame, whole bodies fled although no one pursued; and in a little time the camp remained totally empty. Sirāj-ud-daulah, informed of the desertion of his troops, was amazed; and fearing not only the English he had in his front, but chiefly the domestic enemies he had about his person, he lost all firmness of mind. Confounded by that general abandonment, he joined the runaways himself; and after marching the whole night, he the next day at about eight in the morning arrived at his palace in the city."

Sirāj-ud-daulah reached Murshidābād on the morning of the 24th. The news of his defeat created the utmost panic and confusion in the city. He made an effort to collect his forces, but both men and officers fled pell-mell in all directions. In vain did he lavish considerable treasures to induce the troops to stand by him, and then, finding no other way, he fled with his wife Lutf-un-nisā and one trusted servant.

Mīr Jāfar reached Murshidābād on the 25th and Clive followed him a few days later. Mīr Jāfar was proclaimed Subahdār of Bengal. In a few days news arrived of the capture of Sirāj-ud-daulah. He was brought back to the capital and immediately murdered by the orders of Mīran, the son of Mīr Jāfar. Thus the treacherous

conspiracy of Mīr Jāfar was brought to a triumphant conclusion. Clive and his colleagues secured large rewards for themselves in addition to the *zamindārī* of the Twenty-four Paraganās and a large sum for the Company.

The battle of Plassey was hardly more than a mere skirmish, but its result was more important than that of many of the greatest battles of the world. It paved the way for the British conquest of Bengal and eventually of the whole of India. Consequently everything in connection with it has been magnified beyond all proportions. Petty follies of Clive have been exaggerated almost as much as his valour and heroism. The forged document in favour of Omichānd is no doubt a stain on his character, but considering the circumstances in which he was placed, and the moral standards of the age in which he lived, these things should be looked at in the proper perspective. On the other hand, he can lay no special claim to either extraordinary military skill or statesmanship. He was opposed to the rupture with the French, which was the immediate cause of the war with Sirāj-ud-daulah, and was only forced unwillingly to this step by the obstinacy of Watson. Even when war broke out he was always hesitating. In the war-council held at Kātwah, only two days before the battle of Plassey, he gave his vote in favour of retreat. At Plassey itself he took Major Kilpatrick to task for ordering the troops to advance. Thus it would be hardly any exaggeration to say that Clive won the battle of Plassey in spite of himself. But all this does not take away from Clive the undoubted gifts of leadership and a spirit of dash and enterprise which he possessed in an unusual degree.

Clive's opponent, Sirāj-ud-daulah, has been regarded by some as a martyr and by others as a monster of iniquity. There is as little justification for the one as for the other view. He was not much worse than most rulers of his age, and certainly better than Mīr Jāfar, Nawāzish Muhammad or Shaukat Jang. In the first few months of his reign he showed undoubted ability and vigour, but lack of energy and decision was the prime cause of his ruin. There is also hardly any doubt that the conspiracy that cost him his life and throne was at least partially due to his personality and character.

Lastly, the conspiracy of Mīr Jāfar and others has been regarded as the "Great Betrayal" of the country by her unpatriotic sons. It was, however, nothing of the kind. Such conspiracies were far from being unusual in those days, and 'Ālīvardī Khān himself owed to them his accession to the throne. It would be quite wrong to regard Sirāj-ud-daulah as fighting for the country and Mīr Jāfar and others as betraying it. Both sides acted from pure

self-interest and do not appear to have given a thought to the country as a whole. As a matter of fact, nobody perhaps thought, or had any reasonable grounds for thinking, that the conspiracy set on foot by Mīr Jāfar and his colleagues would make the British the rulers of Bengal. Even as it was, the battle of Plassey gave Clive no better prospect in this respect than that of Bussy in the Deccan. That things took a different turn in Bengal was largely due to the character of Mīr Jāfar and the nobles of his court, and also to the political circumstances of Bengal. But in some measure, at least, it was due to that unknown and unknowable factor called fate or destiny which sometimes plays no inconsiderable part in the affairs of man.

4. The Third Carnatic War

The peace which was established in the Carnatic by the treaty of Godeheu was again broken by the Seven Years' War. As in the case of the First Carnatic War, a war in Europe forced the English and the French in India to engage in hostilities which none perhaps desired at that moment. The news of the outbreak of the war reached India in November, 1756, and one of its immediate effects was the capture of Chandernagore—a French possession in Bengal—by Clive and Watson as described above.

In Madras, however, neither the English nor the French possessed enough military resources to commence hostilities at once. The major part of the military and naval forces of Madras had been sent under Clive and Watson to recover Calcutta. Even after that object was achieved, Clive delayed his return to Madras, on account of his ambitious political schemes which ultimately led to the battle of Plassey. The French resources were similarly crippled as the governor of Pondicherry had to send assistance to Bussy at Hyderābād.

So it was not until A.D. 1758 that warlike operations began on a large scale. The English fleet returned from Bengal under the command of Pocock who had succeeded Watson after the latter's death in A.D. 1757. The French received reinforcements from home and Count de Lally was sent to conduct the war. He was invested with absolute power in all civil and military affairs but he had no control over the naval forces which were commanded by d'Ache. This division of command, leading to disunion and discord, hampered the progress of the French and, as we shall see, ultimately ruined their cause.

Lally began splendidly. He besieged Fort St. David on 1st May and the place capitulated on 2nd June. He now wisely decided

to strike at the root of the British power in the Carnatic by reducing Madras. But d'Ache, who had already been defeated by the English fleet on the 28th April, refused to sail. It was impossible to carry on operations against Madras without the help of the navy, and so Lally decided to relieve his financial difficulties by forcing the Rājā of Tanjore to pay 70 lacs of rupees which he owed to the French. He invested Tanjore (18th July) but could not press the siege owing to lack of ammunition. The fact was that there was no spirit of mutual trust and concord between Lally and his men. He irritated them by his rude and haughty conduct and consequently he was ill-served by them. Lally, no doubt, possessed a high degree of military skill, but he was too hasty and ill-tempered to co-ordinate the different parts of the war machine. He wasted much time before Tanjore without being able to do anything. In the meantime, the English fleet had engaged d'Ache's squadron and inflicted heavy losses upon it (3rd August). As soon as Lally received this news, he raised the siege of Tanjore (10th August), thereby inflicting a heavy blow not only to his own reputation but also to the prestige of the French army.

The French fleet now left the Indian seas and Lally had to wait till the English fleet would be forced to leave the harbourless Madras coast on the approach of the monsoon. He utilised the interval by making conquests of minor English outposts till the English possessed nothing in the Carnatic save Madras, Trichinopoly and Chingleput. Then when the English ships left he besieged Madras on 14th December. But the siege of Madras was marked by defects of the same kind as were noticed in the case of Tanjore. It dragged on till 16th February, 1759, when the British fleet reappeared, and Lally immediately raised the siege. This ignoble failure practically sealed the fate of the French in India.

The next twelve months completed the debacle. Lally had taken a very unwise step in recalling Bussy from Hyderābād and leaving the French troops there under incompetent commanders. Clive took this opportunity to send an army from Bengal under Colonel Forde against the French troops in the Northern Sarkārs. Forde defeated the French, successively occupied Rājāhmundry (7th December) and Masulipatam (6th March) and concluded a favourable treaty with the Nizām Salābat Jang.

In the Carnatic also the English took the aggressive. They were at first defeated near Conjeeveram, but the French could not follow up their success on account of discontent among their troops for lack of pay, which ultimately led to an open mutiny. The discomfiture of the English was, however, more than made up by the

severe defeat inflicted by Pocock upon the French fleet of d'Ache which had reappeared in September. After this third defeat at the hands of Pocock, d'Ache left India for good, leaving the English the undisputed masters of the sea.

At the end of October, the able General Coote arrived in Madras with his troops and the English resumed the offensive. After a number of minor engagements a decisive battle took place (22nd January, 1760) near the fort of Wandīwāsh which Lally was besieging. The French army was totally routed and their fate was decided once for all.

Coote followed up his success by reducing the minor French possessions in the Carnatic. In course of three months the French lost everything in the Carnatic save Jinjī and Pondicherry. The English then laid siege to Pondicherry (May, 1760).

Reduced to the last desperate strait, Lally hoped to retrieve the French position by an alliance with Hyder 'Ālī, then at the helm of affairs in Mysore. The idea was well conceived but led to no practical result. Hyder sent a contingent to the aid of the French, but the allies were not able to concert any military plan which held out a chance of success against the English. Thereupon Hyder's contingent returned to Mysore, leaving Lally to his fate.

Pondicherry was closely blockaded both by land and sea. Lally lacked sufficient funds to maintain his army, and, even at this critical moment, failed to work in harmony with his men and officers. At last the inevitable took place, and on 16th January, 1761, Pondicherry made an unconditional surrender. The victors ruthlessly destroyed not merely the fortifications, but also the city itself. As Orme put it so pithily, "in a few months more not a roof was left standing in this once fair and flourishing city".

The surrender of Pondicherry was followed shortly by that of Jinjī and Mahé, a French settlement on the Malabar coast. The French thus lost all their possessions in India.

The causes of the failure of Lally are not far to seek and some of them have been discussed in connection with the failure of Dupleix. Both suffered equally from the insufficient supply from home, which was due partly to the defective organisation of the Company as a minor branch of the Government, and partly to the failure of the home authorities to recognise the importance of securing political power in India. The inferiority of the French at sea and the discord between commanders of land and sea forces were again common handicaps to both, though they operated more decisively against the French in the Third Carnatic War.

In addition, the possession of the military and financial resources

of Bengal gave the English a decisive advantage over Lally. From this secure base they could send a constant supply of men and money to Madras, and create a diversion in its favour by attacking the French in the Northern Sarkārs. Although it was not fully recognised at the time, the position of the English in Bengal made the struggle of the French a hopeless one from the very beginning of the Third Carnatic War. The battle of Plassey may be truly said to have decided the fate of the French in India.

The character and conduct of Lally also contributed not a little to the disastrous results. He had military skill and displayed bravery and energy but possessed neither the tact of a leader nor the wisdom of a statesmen. His end was tragic indeed. He was detained in England as a prisoner of war for two years, and allowed to return to France in 1763 at the end of the Seven Years' War. But a worse fate awaited him there. He was imprisoned in the Bastille for more than two years and afterwards executed with ignominy and insult.

In spite of Lally's undoubted failings and shortcomings, it is only fair to remember that the difficulties confronting him were really insurmountable, and that the French had no real chance of success against the English even under the best of leaders. There is a large element of truth in the remark of a historian, that "neither Alexander the Great nor Napoleon could have won the empire of India by starting from Pondicherry as a base and contending with the power which held Bengal and command of the sea".

5. British Ascendancy in Bengal

The revolution of 1757 definitely established the military supremacy of the English in Bengal. Their hated rivals, the French, were ousted, and they obtained a grant of territories for the maintenance of a properly equipped military force. More valuable still was the prestige they had gained by the decided victory over the unwieldy hosts of the Nawāb.

As regards the government of the country, there was no apparent change. The sovereignty of the English over Calcutta was recognised, and they secured the right of keeping a Resident at the Nawāb's court. Save for these minor changes, the position of Mīr Jāfar differed, in theory, but little from that of Sirāj-ud-daulah. In practice, however, the supreme control of affairs had passed into the hands of Clive, as the new Nawāb was entirely dependent upon his support for maintaining his newly acquired position.

The position of Clive in Bengal was anomalous in the extreme. He was merely a servant of the Governor and Council of Madras when he gained the victory at Plassey. But in June, 1758, the Calcutta Council, on their own initiative, elected him to the governorship of Bengal, a position which was legalised by the orders of the Company towards the end of that year.

The anomaly of Clive's position with regard to the Nawāb, however, still continued. Without any formal rights or prerogatives, he exercised an effective control over the actions of Mīr Jāfar, and, in particular, he prevented the latter from ruining some notable Hindu officials such as Rāi Durlabh, the *Diwān*, and Rām Nārāyan, the governor of Bihār. Mīr Jāfar chafed at the interference of Clive, but he could hardly dispense with the military help of the English. This was strikingly illustrated when, in 1759, 'Ālī Gauhar (later known as Shāh 'Ālam II) planned to occupy Bengal and Bihār and laid siege to Patna. Mīr Jāfar succeeded in averting this danger with the help of Clive, but the episode was a rude reminder to him, if any such were necessary, that however unwelcome the English might be, their help was essential to keep himself on the throne.

Finally, Mīr Jāfar tried the desperate expedient of changing one master for another and entered into a conspiracy with the Dutch at Chinsurā. The Dutch were very eager to supplant the English influence by their own and made an attempt to import fresh military forces from their settlements in Java. But the vigilance of Clive thwarted their design. They were defeated and humbled at Bedārā in November, 1759, and sued for peace.

Clive thus maintained the supremacy of the English in Bengal for nearly three years, mainly by his personality and character. His departure on 25th February, 1760, was followed shortly by the death of Mīran, the son of the Nawāb, and the question of succession immediately came to the forefront. The treachery and incompetence of the Nawāb and his failure to make the payments due to the Company made him and his family distasteful to the English. Holwell, the acting Governor, suggested the bold step of taking over the administration of the country, but the other members of the Council did not approve of the plan. He then supported the cause of Mīr Kāsīm, the son-in-law of the Nawāb, and Vansittart, the permanent Governor, acquiesced in this view. A secret treaty was accordingly concluded with Mīr Kāsīm on 27th September, 1760. Mīr Kāsīm agreed to pay off the outstanding dues to the Company and also to cede the three districts of Burdwān, Midnāpur and Chittāgong. In return for these concessions the English offered

to appoint him Deputy Subahdār and guaranteed his succession to the throne.

Vansittart and Caillaud, the commander of the Company's troops, thereupon proceeded to Murshidābād. But Mīr Jāfar refused to appoint Mīr Kāsīm as Deputy Subahdār. After a fruitless discussion for five days, Caillaud was ordered to occupy the Nawāb's palace. The helpless Nawāb decided to abdicate rather than yield to the demands of the English. Mīr Kāsīm was then declared Nawāb and the revolution of A.D. 1760 was effected without any bloodshed.

It is somewhat singular that neither the English nor the new Nawāb took advantage of the new agreement to clear up the relations between the two parties. It was gradually becoming clear that, while the Nawāb claimed to be an independent ruler, the English authorities in Bengal had been acting in a manner which was incompatible with that position. It was evident that sooner or later the matter must come to a head, and the crisis came much earlier than was expected.

Vansittart followed throughout the policy of strengthening the hands of the Nawāb. While Clive protected Rām Nārāyan, the deputy governor of Bihār, Vansittart handed him over to Mīr Kāsīm who first robbed him and then put him to death. Having thus asserted his internal autonomy, Mīr Kāsīm felt strong enough to enter into that dispute with the English regarding inland trade which was to prove his ruin.

By an imperial *firman* the English Company enjoyed the right of trading in Bengal without the payment of transit dues or tolls. But the servants of the Company also claimed the same privileges for their private trade (see p. 807–8). The Nawābs had always protested against this abuse, but the members of the Council being materially interested, the practice went on increasing till it formed a subject of serious dispute between Mīr Kāsīm and the English. At last towards the end of 1762 Vansittart met Mīr Kāsīm at Monghyr, where the Nawāb had removed his capital, and concluded a definite agreement on the subject. The Council at Calcutta, however, rejected the agreement. Thereupon the Nawāb decided to abolish the duties altogether; but the English clamoured against this and insisted upon having preferential treatment as against other traders. Ellis, the chief of the English factory at Patna, violently asserted what he considered to be the rights and privileges of the English, and even made an attempt to seize the city of Patna. The attempt failed and his garrison was destroyed, but the events led to the outbreak of war between the English and Mīr Kāsīm (1763).

On 10th June Major Adams took the field against Mīr Kāsīm with about 1,100 Europeans and 4,000 sepoys. The Nawāb assembled an army 15,000 strong, which included soldiers trained and disciplined on the European model. In spite of this disparity of numbers, the English gained successive victories at Kātwah, Murshidābād, Giriā, Sooty, Udaynalā and Monghyr. Mīr Kāsīm fled to Patna, and after having killed all the English prisoners and a number of his prominent officials, went to Oudh. There he formed a confederacy with Nawāb Shujā-ud-daulah and the Emperor Shāh 'Ālam II with a view to recovering Bengal from the English. The confederate army was, however, defeated by the English general Major Hector Munro at Buxār on 22nd October, 1764. Shāh 'Ālam immediately joined the English camp, and some time later concluded peace with the English. Mīr Kāsīm fled, and led a wandering life till he died in obscurity, near Delhi, in A.D. 1777.

The short but decisive campaign against Mīr Kāsīm has an importance which is generally overlooked. The battle of Plassey was decided more by treachery than by any inherent superiority of English arms, and had the rights of the English in Bengal rested on that battle alone, their conquest of Bengal might justly have been attributed to a political conspiracy rather than to any fair fight. But the defeat of Mīr Kāsīm cannot be explained away by any sudden and unexpected treachery such as had overwhelmed Sirāj-ud-daulah. It was a straight fight between two rival claimants for supremacy, each of whom was fully alive to its possibilities and forewarned of its consequences. Mīr Kāsīm knew quite well that a final contest with the English was the sure outcome of his policy, and he equipped his army and husbanded his resources as best he could. He was not inferior in capacity to an average Indian ruler of the day. His repeated and decisive defeats only demonstrate the inherent weakness of the army and the administrative machinery of Bengal. The confederacy which he brought into being against the English shows an astute diplomacy far in advance of the age, and its failure was again due to the inherent defects of Indian army and State organisation. The engagements with Mīr Kāsīm established the claims of the English as conquerors of Bengal in a much more real sense than did the battle of Plassey. They also reveal that the establishment of British rule in Bengal was due as much at least to the irresistible logic of facts as to the element of chance or accident.

It is, of course, quite true that the battle of Plassey gave the English a firm footing on the soil of Bengal, which they utilised to the full in their final encounter with Mīr Kāsīm. But even

making full allowance for this, we must hold that in the final and decisive campaign the advantages, both political and military, should undoubtedly have been on the side of the Nawāb, and his ignominious failure only betrays the inherent and vital defects in the political fabric of Bengal. The question was no longer whether but when that fabric would collapse.

6. The British as the Ruling Power in Bengal

Immediately after the outbreak of war with Mīr Kāsīm, the English once more proclaimed Mīr Jāfar as the Nawāb and gained important concessions from him. His death, early in 1765, was taken advantage of by the Company to proceed still further and establish their supremacy on a definite basis. The son of Mīr Jāfar, Najm-ud-daulah, was allowed to succeed his father only on the express condition, laid down by the treaty of 20th February, 1765, that the entire management of administration should be left in the hands of a minister, called the Deputy Subahdār, who would be nominated by the English and could not be dismissed without their consent. Thus the supreme control over the administration passed into the hands of the English, while the Nawāb remained merely as a figurehead.

This was the position of affairs when Clive came out as Governor of Bengal for the second time (May, 1765). Several important and intricate problems immediately confronted him. He first made a settlement with the Emperor Shāh 'Ālam II and the Nawāb of Oudh, who had espoused the cause of Mīr Kāsīm and been defeated at Buxār. The prevailing idea among the Company's servants in Bengal was to restore the power of the Emperor so that the English could take full advantage of his name and position in advancing their interests. In pursuance of this policy, Vansittart had already promised Oudh to the Emperor. But Clive definitely gave up this policy and concluded the Treaty of Allahābād. By this he restored Oudh to its Nawāb on payment of fifty lacs of rupees. Only Allahābād and the surrounding tracts were detached from Oudh and handed over to the Emperor Shāh 'Ālam II. In return for these concessions, the Emperor, by a *firman*, formally granted the *Diwānī* of Bengal, Bihār and Orissa to the East India Company on the 12th August, 1765.

The wisdom of the policy of Clive is now generally recognised. Instead of committing the Company to endless wars, which would have been the inevitable result of supporting the pretensions of Shāh 'Ālam II, he created the buffer-state of Oudh, whose ruler

would be induced alike by material interests and sentiments of gratitude to remain friendly to the British. At the same time he gained a legal recognition of the status of the English in Bengal, which counted for much even in those days of anarchy and confusion.

Clive next made an attempt to set his own house in order. The servants of the Company were thoroughly demoralised, and bribery and corruption reigned supreme. The accession of each Nawāb, even when there was a normal succession as in the case of Najm-ud-daulah, was made the occasion of receiving large presents, and the private right of internal trade was abused in all



THE DIWĀNĪ OF BENGAL BEING GRANTED TO CLIVE

possible ways. Clive effectively stopped the system of accepting presents, in spite of strenuous opposition. He also checked the abuses of private trade, but reorganised the salt-trade with a view to distributing its profits among the civil and military servants of the Company. The Directors, however, disapproved of it and the monopoly of the salt-trade was entirely abandoned.

Clive also cut down the allowances (*bāttā*), which the military officers had been illegally enjoying for many years. Here, again, Clive met with vigorous opposition and the officers threatened to resign in a body. But the opposition gradually died down and Clive regulated the *bāttā* or field-allowances by a definite scheme.

Clive left India for good in February, 1767. In less than two years he had reformed the internal administration of the Company's affairs and placed its relation to the Government of Bengal on a definite legal basis. By his victory at Plassey, and subsequent reforms, he laid the foundations of the British supremacy in Bengal. Distinguished alike in war and peace, his name occupies a prominent place in the galaxy of British generals and administrators who carved out a mighty Empire for their motherland. His tact, patience, industry and foresight were of a high order and he always worked with a steady and clear grasp of the ends in view. In him we find a happy combination of high idealism and sound practical common sense.

Clive was succeeded by Verelst and the latter by Cartier (1769), during whose weak administration the evils of Clive's dual Government (in which the English enjoyed the substance and the Nawāb the shadow of power) were fully manifest and the country began to groan under the weight of oppression, corruption and distress, which were aggravated by the terrible famine of 1770. Richard Becher, a servant of the Company, wrote to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors on the 24th May, 1769: "It must give pain to an Englishman to have reason to think that since the accession of the Company to the Diwānī the condition of the people of this country has been worse than it was before; yet I am afraid the fact is undoubted. . . . This fine country, which flourished under the most despotic and arbitrary government, is verging towards ruin." Nothing of particular importance marks this period. With the next governor, Warren Hastings (1772), however, we enter into a new phase of history which will be described in other chapters.

CHAPTER III

GROWTH OF THE BRITISH POWER, 1765–1798

I. Anglo-Marātha Relations

A. The First Anglo-Marātha War

AFTER recovering from the blow of Pānīpat, the Marāthas appeared once more in full force in the north in A.D. 1770 and brought the helpless Delhi Emperor, Shāh 'Ālam II, under their control by agreeing to escort him to his capital in return for certain privileges. Warren Hastings concluded the Treaty of Benares in September, 1773, partly to check the revived pretensions of the Marāthas in the north. But in the meanwhile a terrible calamity had befallen the Marāthas. The young Peshwā Mādhava Rāo I had expired in A.D. 1772, and internal dissensions appeared among the Marāthas, due to the inordinate ambition of the deceased Peshwā's uncle, Raghunāth Rāo or Raghoba, and the weakness of Mādhava Rāo's brother and successor, Nārāyan Rāo. Mādhava Rāo I had been able to check the designs of his uncle and even to conciliate him. But his successor, an inexperienced youth of frivolous habits, could not remain on good terms with him and placed him under arrest. This led Raghoba to organise a conspiracy with a discontented body of infantry, and Nārāyan Rāo was murdered before the eyes of his uncle on the 30th August, 1773.

Raghunāth Rāo was now recognised as the Peshwā, but his authority remained unchallenged only for a few months. A strong party at Poona, under the leadership of a young Brāhmaṇa, Nānā Fadnavis, who had luckily escaped from the fatal field of Pānīpat, began to counteract his measures. A new card was placed in the hands of the confederate Marātha leaders, when in the next year a posthumous son was born to the late Peshwā's wife, Gangā Bāī. They at once recognised the infant as the Peshwā and set up a council of regency in his name. Foiled in his attempts and driven out of the home provinces, Raghunāth Rāo appealed for help to the English at Bombay. Thus, as in the Carnatic and elsewhere in India, internal quarrels among Indian princes and chiefs offered an opportunity to the English to intervene in their affairs.

The English at Bombay were then on peaceful terms with the Marātha government at Poona, but they were induced to espouse the cause of Raghunāth Rāo by the prospect of acquiring certain maritime territories adjoining Bombay, which they calculated would make their position much more secure. In response to Raghunāth Rāo's appeal to them, they concluded with him the Treaty of Surāt on the 7th March, 1775. By this the English agreed to help Raghunāth Rāo with a force of 2,500 men, the cost of which was to be borne by him; in return Raghunāth Rāo undertook to cede to the English Salsette and Bassein with a part of the revenues of the Broach and Surāt districts, and promised not to form any alliance with the enemies of the Company and to include the English in any peace that he concluded with the Poona government. A body of British troops under Colonel Keating had already reached Surāt on the 27th February, 1775. The allied armies of Colonel Keating and Raghunāth Rāo met the Poona troops on the 18th May on the plain of Arras, situated between the river Mahi and the town of Anand, and defeated them.

But the war had been commenced, and the Treaty of Surāt signed, by the Bombay Government, without any orders from the Supreme Council in Calcutta. Warren Hastings himself had no objection to ratifying the Treaty of Surāt, but his opponents, who formed the majority in the Council, were opposed to his view. The Calcutta Council, therefore, soon condemned the action of the Bombay Council as "impolitic, dangerous, unauthorised, and unjust", and wrote to it on the 31st May to recall the Company's troops "unless their safety may be endangered by an instant retreat". A few months later in the same year, it sent Colonel Upton to Poona to negotiate a peace with the Poona regency. Colonel Upton accordingly concluded the Treaty of Purandhar with the Poona authorities on the 1st March, A.D. 1776. By this the Treaty of Surāt was annulled; the retention of Salsette, and the revenues of Broach, by the English was confirmed; the Poona regency agreed to pay twelve lacs of rupees to the English to cover the expenses of their campaign; and the English renounced the cause of Raghoba, who was to live at Kopargāon in Gujarāt on a monthly pension of Rs. 25,000 from the Peshwā's Government.

This treaty did not take effect. The Bombay Government did not like its terms and they gave shelter to Raghoba in direct violation of the treaty and despite the protests of Upton. The Poona leaders also did not fulfil its terms, and in 1777 Nānā Fadnavis received warmly a French adventurer, Chevalier de St. Lubin, and promised to grant the French a port in Western India, which created

suspicions in the minds of the members of the Bombay Council about the designs of the French in South India. The Court of Directors in several despatches upheld the policy and action of the Bombay Government, which re-opened the war and sent a force, consisting of 600 Europeans and 3,300 sepoys, under Colonel Egerton towards Poona in November, 1778. Owing to ill-health Egerton made over the command to Colonel Cockburn in January, 1779. On the 9th January the British troops met a large Marātha army at Telegāon in the Western Ghāts, but soon suffered reverses, which compelled them to sign a humiliating convention at Wadgāon. By it all territories acquired by the Bombay Government since 1773 were to be surrendered, the force arriving from Bengal was to be withdrawn and the Sindhia was to receive a share of the revenues of Broach.

This disgraceful convention was repudiated by the Governor-General, who wrote: "We have already disavowed the convention of Wadgaon. Would to God we could as easily efface the infamy which our national character has sustained." Freed from the obnoxious opposition of his colleagues, Hastings now adopted measures to retrieve the prestige of the Company. A strong army, sent from Bengal under Colonel Goddard, marched right across Central India and took possession of Ahmadābād on the 15th February and captured Bassein on the 11th December, 1780. They met with a reverse in April, 1781, however, while attempting to advance towards Poona and had to fall back. But in the meanwhile, Captain Popham, who had been sent from Bengal by Hastings to support the Rānā of Gohad, an old enemy of the Sindhia, had captured Gwālior by escalade on the 3rd August. General Camac also inflicted a defeat on the Sindhia at Sipri (modern Sivpur) on the 16th February, 1781.

The effect of these victories was to increase the prestige of the English. Mahādājī Sindhia, who had been long aiming at the leadership of the Marātha confederacy and wanted a free hand in Northern India, now changed his attitude and sought to ally himself with the English. He therefore opened negotiations with them and promised, on the 13th October, 1781, that he would effect a treaty between the English and the Poona Government. The Treaty of Salbai was duly signed on the 17th May, 1782, though it was not ratified by Nānā Fadnavis till the 26th February, 1783. By this treaty the English were confirmed in the possession of Salsette, and they recognised Mādhava Rāo Nārāyan as the rightful Peshwā; Raghoba was pensioned off; Sindhia got back all the territories west of the Jumnā; and Hyder

'Ālī, who was not a party to the treaty, had to give up the territories which he had conquered from the Nawāb of Arcot. Thus the treaty established the *status quo ante bellum*. The material gains of the English secured by this treaty were not "very impressive", though they were put to a great financial strain which led Hastings to take recourse to objectionable financial methods. Nevertheless, it marks a turning-point in the history of British supremacy in India. It gave them "peace with the Marāthas for twenty years" and thus left them comparatively free to fight their other enemies like Tipu and the French and to bring the Nizām and the Nawāb of Oudh under their control. But we shall over-emphasise its importance if we say that "it established beyond dispute the dominance of the British as the controlling factor in Indian politics, their subsequent rise in 1818 to the position of a paramount power being an inevitable result of the position gained by the Treaty of Salbai".

As a matter of fact, though Hastings had been able to save the British position in India in the face of an extremely embarrassing situation, it could hardly be regarded as being completely secure. The Company had still to reckon with the jealousy and hostility of the Marāthas and Tipu, and to be on guard against the activities of the powers that had been rising in the Punjab, Nepāl and Burma. Mr. (later Sir John) Macpherson, the senior member of the Council, who acted as the Governor-General for a year and a half till the arrival of Lord Cornwallis, had neither the ability nor the integrity to continue efficiently the policy of his predecessor. Further, clause 34 of Pitt's India Act, 1784, enjoined the Company to follow a policy of non-intervention in Indian politics. Though, owing to the rather insecure position of the Company in India, this policy could not be strictly followed either by Cornwallis or by Shore, yet the period extending from the departure of Hastings till the commencement of Lord Wellesley's administration was one of comparative political inactivity on the part of the English in India.

B. The Marāthas after Salbai

The Marātha confederacy had indeed been greatly weakened by this time through the "mutual distrust and selfish intrigues" of its members, who owned only a loose allegiance to it. But there appeared among the Marāthas some able personalities like Ahalyā Bāī, Mahādājī Sindhia and Nānā Fadnavis. In the words of Sir John Malcolm, whose knowledge of Marātha affairs of the time was based on personal investigations, "the success of Ahalya Baee in the internal administration of her domains was altogether won-

derful.[1] . . . In the most sober view that can be taken of her character, she certainly appears, within her limited sphere, to have been one of the purest and most exemplary rulers that ever existed". Ahalyā Bāī died in 1795, when the government of Indore passed into the hands of Tukojī Holkar, a good soldier though devoid of political ability. Tukojī's death in 1797 was followed by chaos and confusion in the Indore kingdom.

Mahādājī Sindhia was the most outstanding Marātha chief of the period. The Treaty of Salbai recognised him as "as far as related to the British Government an independent prince", but at the same time he "continued to observe, on all other points which referred to his connexion with the Poona Government, the most scrupulous attention to forms". He utilised his new position to extend and consolidate his authority in Northern India. He soon abandoned the old Marātha method of fighting, maintained in his army a number of Rājputs and Muhammadans, and organised it on European scientific methods by employing Benoit de Boigne, a Savoyard (French) military expert, and other European adventurers of various races and classes. With a view to realising his ambitions in the north he went to Delhi, made the titular Emperor, Shāh 'Ālam II, already helpless in the midst of violence, confusion and anarchy, his puppet, and utilised the fiction of his sovereignty to establish Marātha supremacy rapidly in Hindustān. He obtained from the Emperor the office of *Wakil-i-mutluq* for his nominal master, the Peshwā, and himself became the Peshwā's *nāib* or deputy. He also gained the command over the imperial army. In fact, he remained in Northern India as "the nominal slave but the rigid master of the unfortunate Shah Alum, Emperor of Delhi". By 1792 Mahādājī established his ascendancy over the Rājputs and the Jāts and his power in Northern India reached its "meridian splendour". He next thought it necessary to establish his influence at Poona, where Nānā Fadnavis, an astute politician, controlled all affairs, and so proceeded to the south in June, 1792, apparently to pay his respects to the young Peshwā, Mādhava Rāo II. During Mahādājī Sindhia's absence from the north, his neighbour, Tukojī Holkar, challenged his authority but was severely defeated by his trained troops under de Boigne at Lakheri near Ajmer. Before his cherished object could be fulfilled, Sindhia died of fever at Poona on the 12th February, 1794, at the age of sixty-seven. His

[1] Some records originally kept at Maheshwar, the old capital of the Holkars, and recently brought to light (*Proceedings, Indian Historical Records Commission*, December, 1930) by Sardār Rāo Bahādur Kibe, M.A., Deputy Prime Minister, Indore State, "show what a leading part the pious lady Ahalyā Bāi took in the stirring events of the time".

vast possessions and military resources were inherited by his thirteen-year-old nephew and adopted son, Daulat Rāo Sindhia. Grant Duff has justly considered the death of Mahādājī Sindhia, a statesman of no mean order and an able military commander, "as an event of great political significance, both as it affected the Marātha Empire and the other states of India". It sealed the fate of Marātha supremacy in the north, where the English were left comparatively free to build up their dominion. The English must have regarded the success of Mahādājī in the north as opposed to their political interests, because judging "from the incessant perseverance with which he laboured to bring to maturity schemes once formed for his own aggrandisement, had his life been extended, he would in all probability have become a formidable antagonist to the interests of Great Britain, whose rulers were not unacquainted with his active spirit or insatiable ambition". As a matter of fact, we find in the records of the English "various proofs of watchful jealousy" of Mahādājī's movements.

Marātha affairs at the centre now passed under the absolute control of Nānā Fadnavis. One of the objects of Nānā was to recover the lost territories of the Marāthas to the south of the Narmadā. This made a collision with Tipu Sultān of Mysore inevitable. The Marāthas, therefore, concluded a treaty of alliance with the Nizām in July, 1784, and a Marātha army under the command of Hari Pant Phadke started from Poona on the 1st December, 1785. Tipu made some feeble attempts to oppose the invaders, but, apprehending the formation of an alliance between the English and the Marāthas, opened negotiations for peace, which was concluded in April, 1787. Tipu agreed to pay forty-five lacs of rupees, and to make over the districts of Badami, Kittur, and Nargund to the Marāthas, and got back the places which the latter had conquered. But this agreement between Tipu and the Marāthas did not last long, as on the outbreak of hostilities between the English and Tipu (A.D. 1789-1792), the Marāthas and the Nizām formed an offensive and defensive alliance with Cornwallis against the Sultan of Mysore. This triple alliance became for some time, in spite of clause 34 of Pitt's India Act, "a definite factor in Indian politics".

It rested, however, on too insecure a basis to be effective for a long time, as the allies had united together only to serve their respective interests against the aggressions of Tipu and not out of any feeling of sincere attachment towards one another. The Nizām was an old foe of the Marāthas, and as soon as the danger on the part of Tipu had been somewhat lessened, all the Marātha

leaders—the Peshwā, Daulat Rāo Sindhia, Tukojī Holkar and the Rājā of Berar—combined together against him. The Peshwā's claim to *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* over the Nizām served as the immediate cause for war. The Nizām's troops had been trained by the Frenchman, Raymond,[1] and all negotiations having failed, the two parties were driven to "decide their differences by the sword". The Nizām appealed to the English for help, but got nothing from them. He was defeated by the Marāthas at Kharda or Kurdla (fifty-six miles south-east of Ahmadnagar) in March, 1795, and was compelled to conclude a humiliating treaty which subjected him to heavy pecuniary losses and to large territorial concessions. Had Shore intervened, the result of the battle might have been different. His critics point out that the Nizām was entitled to British support on the strength of the treaty of February, 1768, by which the Nizām had placed himself under the protection of the English. But it might be argued in defence of Shore that he was precluded from such intervention by clause 34 of Pitt's India Act. Further, the Marāthas were then at peace with the English, who were not bound by any previous agreement to help the Nizām against a friendly power.

2. Anglo-Mysore Relations

A. The First Anglo-Mysore War

Mysore under Hyder and Tipu was a source of danger to the rising British power in India during the second half of the eighteenth century. While the Carnatic was distracted by wars, and Bengal was passing through political revolutions, Hyder steadily rose to power in Mysore. Originally an adventurer, he entered the service of Nanjrāj, the *Dalwai* or prime minister of Mysore, who had made himself the practical dictator over the titular Hindu ruler of the State. Though uneducated and illiterate, Hyder was endowed with a strong determination, admirable courage, keen intellect and shrewd common sense. Taking advantage of the prevailing distractions in the south, he increased his power and soon supplanted his former patron. He extended his territories by conquering Bednore, Sunda, Sera, Canara, and Guti and by subjugating the petty Poligārs of South India.[2] The rapid rise of Hyder

[1] The Nizām kept "two battalions of female sepoys" who "took part in the battle and behaved no worse than the rest of the army". *Bengal: Past and Present*, 1933.

[2] The eighteenth-century history of India was largely influenced by the rise of adventurers to power: 'Ālīvardī in Bengal, Sa'ādat and Safdar Jang in Oudh, Saif-ud-daulah in the Punjab, and the Nizām-ul-mulk, Hyder and Tipu in South India.

naturally excited the jealousy of the Marāthas, the Nizām and the English. The Marāthas invaded his territories in A.D. 1765 and compelled him to surrender Guti and Savanur and to pay an indemnity of thirty-two lacs of rupees. In November, 1766, the Madras Government agreed to assist the Nizām against Hyder in return for his ceding the Northern Sarkārs. In short, the Marāthas, the Nizām, and the English entered into a triple alliance against Hyder. But the Marāthas, who first attacked Mysore, were soon bought off by the Mysore chief. The Nizām, accompanied by a company of British troops under the command of General Joseph Smith, invaded Mysore in April, 1767, but, influenced by Mahfuz Khān, brother and rival of the pro-British Nawāb Muhammad 'Ālī of the Carnatic, he quickly deserted the English and allied himself with their enemy. It should be noted that the Madras Government failed to manage affairs skilfully, but Smith was able to defeat the new allies at the Pass of Changama and Trinomali in September, 1767. Hyder was soon abandoned by his fickle ally, the Nizām, with whom the Madras Government tactlessly concluded an ill-advised treaty on the 23rd February, 1768. By this the Nizām confirmed his old treaty obligations in as irresponsible a manner as he had broken them; and declaring Hyder a "rebel and usurper" he agreed to assist the English and the Nawāb of the Carnatic in chastising him. This alliance with the vacillating Nizām was of no help to the English, but it needlessly provoked the hostility of Hyder. "You have brought us into such a labyrinth of difficulties," observed the Court of Directors, "that we do not see how we shall be extricated from them." The Court of Directors, then not in favour of the further expansion of British territories in India but eager to preserve what had already been acquired, further wrote: ". . . it is not for the Company to take the part of umpires of Indostan. If it had not been for the imprudent measures you have taken, the country powers would have formed a balance among themselves. We wish to see the Indian princes remain as a check upon one another without our interfering."

In spite of the Nizām's desertion Hyder continued to fight with great vigour. He recovered Mangalore after defeating the Bombay troops, appeared within five miles of Madras in March, 1769, and dictated a peace on the 4th April, 1769, which provided for the exchange of prisoners and mutual restitution of conquests. It was also a defensive alliance, as the English promised to help Hyder in case he was attacked by any other power.

B. The Second Anglo-Mysore War

The terms of the treaty of 1769 were not fulfilled by the Madras Government. When the Marāthas invaded Hyder's territories in 1771, the English did not help him. This naturally offended the Mysore ruler, who remained on the look-out for an opportunity to strike once again. In 1779 he joined in a grand confederacy against the English, which was organised by the discontented Nizām and to which the Marāthas, already at war with the Bombay Government, were a party. The British capture of Mahé, a small French settlement within the jurisdiction of Hyder, added to his resentment. He held that the neutrality of his kingdom had thus been violated, and declared war. Thus, as Hastings said, there was "a war actual or impending in every quarter and with every power in Hindustān". Outside India, also France, Spain, Holland and the revolted American colonies had combined against England, and France sought to utilise this opportunity to regain her lost position in India.

In July, 1780, Hyder, with about 80,000 men and 100 guns, came down upon the plains of the Carnatic "like an avalanche, carrying destruction with him". He defeated an English detachment under Colonel Baillie and in October, 1780, seized Arcot. The situation was indeed a critical one for the Company. In the words used by Sir Alfred Lyall, "the fortunes of the English in India had fallen to their lowest water-mark". But Warren Hastings soon sent to the south Sir Eyre Coote, the victor of Wandīwāsh and then Commander-in-Chief in India and a member of the Supreme Council, "to stand forth and vindicate in his own person the rights and honour of British arms". He also detached the Rājā of Berār, Mahādājī Sindhia and the Nizām from alliance with Hyder. Nothing daunted by these desertions, Hyder continued the war with his usual firmness and vigour, but Sir Eyre Coote defeated him severely at Porto Novo in 1781. The English captured Negapatam in November, 1781, and Trincomali, the best harbour in Ceylon, from the Dutch. An English force under Colonel Braithwaite was, however, defeated by the Mysore troops. Early in 1782 a French squadron under the command of Admiral Suffren appeared in Indian waters, and in the month of February next Du Chemin came with 2,000 men under his command. After some indecisive engagements of the English with the French and the Mysore troops, active hostilities ceased with the commencement of the rainy season. Hyder was not destined to fight any longer. The fatal effects of cancer resulted in his exit from this world at an advanced age

on the 7th December, 1782. On the English side, Coote had retired owing to ill-health, leaving General Stuart in command of the Company's troops. He died at Madras in April, 1783.

Hyder was one of the ablest personalities in the history of India, who rose from obscurity to power during the distractions of the eighteenth century. A completely self-made man, he was endowed with strong determination, admirable courage, a keen intellect and a retentive memory, which more than counterbalanced his lack of the ability to read and write. Cool, sagacious, and intrepid in the field, he was remarkably tactful and vigorous in matters of administration, and had all business of the State transacted before his eyes with regularity and quickness. Easily accessible to all, he had the wonderful capacity of giving attention to various subjects at the same time without being distracted by any one of these. It would be unfair to describe him as an "absolutely unscrupulous" man, who "had no religion, no morals, and no compassion", as Dr. Smith has done. Though he did not strictly follow the external observances of his religion, he had a sincere religious conscience, and Wilks has described him as the "most tolerant' of all Muhammadan princes. Bowring gives a fair estimate of him in the following words: ". . . he was a bold, an original, and an enterprising commander, skilful in tactics and fertile in resources, full of energy and never desponding in defeat. He was singularly faithful to his engagements, and straight-forward in his policy towards the British. Notwithstanding the severity of his internal rule, and the terror which he inspired, his name is always mentioned in Mysore with respect if not with admiration. While the cruelties which he sometimes practised are forgotten, his prowess and success have an abiding place in the memory of the people."

Tipu, as brave and warlike as his father, continued the war against the English. Brigadier Mathews, appointed by the Bombay Government to the supreme command, was captured with all his men by Tipu in 1783. On the 23rd June of the same year news of a peace between the English and the French reached India. Colonel Fullarton captured Coimbatore in November, 1783, and intended to fall upon Tipu's capital, Seringapatam, but he was recalled by the authorities at Madras, where Lord Macartney had been eager for a peace with Tipu since his arrival as Governor and had sent envoys to his camp. Thus the Treaty of Mangalore was concluded in March, 1784, on the basis of mutual restitution of conquests and liberation of the prisoners. Warren Hastings did not like the terms of the treaty in the least and exclaimed, "What a man

is this Lord Macartney! I yet believe that, in spite of the peace, he will effect the loss of the Carnatic."

C. The Third Anglo-Mysore War

Lord Cornwallis (1786–1793) came to India bound by Pitt's India Act to refrain from following a policy of war and conquest, except for purely defensive purposes. But he soon came to realise that it was not possible to follow strictly the injunctions of the said Act, which, as he expressed it, was "attended with the unavoidable inconvenience of our (the Company's) being constantly exposed to the necessity of commencing a war without having previously secured the assistance of efficient allies".[1] Taking into consideration the facts of international politics, he rightly believed that Anglo-French hostility in Europe was bound to have its repercussions in India and that Tipu, allying himself with the French, would surely strike once more against the English. "I look upon a rupture with Tipu", he wrote to Malet, Resident at Poona, in March, 1788, "as a certain and immediate consequence of a war with France, and in that event a vigorous co-operation of the Marāthas would certainly be of the utmost importance to our interests in the country."

As a matter of fact, the Treaty of Mangalore was nothing but a "hollow truce". Tipu also knew that the renewal of hostilities with the English was inevitable, because both were aiming at political supremacy over the Deccan. A ruler like Tipu could hardly remain satisfied with the arrangement of 1784. He tried to enlist for himself the support of France and of Constantinople, and sent envoys to both places in 1787; but he received only "promises of future help and no active assistance for the present".

Certain factors soon led to the third Anglo-Mysore conflict. In 1788 Lord Cornwallis obtained Guntur in the Northern Sarkārs from the Nizām, who in return asked for British help on the strength of the Treaty of Masulipatam, 1768. Cornwallis now took a course of action which amounted to a violation of the Act of 1784 in the spirit if not in the letter. He wrote a letter to the Nizām on the 7th July, 1789, with a view to laying "the foundation of a permanent and powerful co-operation". He deliberately omitted Tipu's name from the letter, which was declared to be as binding "as a treaty in due form could be". Wilks, the historian of Southern India at this time, remarks that "it is highly instructive to observe a

[1] Letter to Malet, 28th February, 1790, Forest, *State Papers about Cornwallis*, Vol. II, p. 10.

statesman, justly extolled for moderate and pacific dispositions, thus indirectly violating a law, enacted for the enforcement of these virtues, by entering into a very intelligible offensive alliance". "The liberal construction of the restrictions of the Act of Parliament had upon this occasion," remarks Sir John Malcolm, "the effect of making the Governor-General pursue a course which was not only questionable in point of faith but which must have been more offensive to Tipoo Sultan and more calculated to produce a war with France than an avowed contract of defensive engagement framed for the express and legitimate purpose of limiting his inordinate ambition."

This was indeed a sufficient provocation to Tipu. But the immediate cause of the war, which had been foreseen both by Tipu and Cornwallis, was the attack on Travancore by the former on the 29th December, 1789. The Rājā of Travancore was an old ally of the Company according to the Treaty of Mangalore and was entitled to the protection of the English. He applied to John Holland, Governor of Madras, for help but the Madras Government paid no heed. Lord Cornwallis, however, considered Tipu's attack on Travancore to be an act of war and severely condemned the conduct of the Madras Government. Both the Nizām and the Marāthas, who apprehended that the growth of Tipu was prejudicial to their interests and were thus not well disposed towards him, entered into a "Triple Alliance" with the English on the 1st June and 4th July, 1790, respectively. The troops of the Marāthas and of the Nizām rendered useful services to the English in the course of the war, as Lord Cornwallis himself admitted.

The Third Anglo-Mysore War was carried on for about two years in three campaigns. The first under Major-General Medows did not produce any decisive result, as Tipu displayed "greater skill in strategy" than Medows. Lord Cornwallis wrote to Henry Dundas of the Board of Control: ". . . we have lost time and our adversary has gained reputation, which are two most valuable things in war." He personally assumed command of the British troops in December, 1790, when he also formed the project of deposing Tipu in favour of the heir of the old Hindu ruling dynasty of Mysore. Marching through Vellore and Ambur to Bangalore, which was captured on the 21st March, 1791, he reached Arikera, about nine miles east of Seringapatam, Tipu's capital, by the 13th May. But on this occasion too Tipu displayed brilliant generalship; and when the rains set in, Cornwallis had to retreat to Mangalore owing to the utter lack of equipment and provisions

for his army. The fighting was resumed in the summer of 1791, and Tipu captured Coimbatore on the 3rd November. But Cornwallis, with the help of an army sent from Bombay, soon occupied the hill-forts that lay in his path towards Seringapatam, arrived near it on the 5th February, 1792, and attacked its outworks. By his military and diplomatic skill Tipu averted a complete disaster, but he realised the impossibility of further resistance.

After some preliminary negotiations, the Treaty of Seringapatam was concluded in March, 1792. Tipu had to surrender half of his dominions, out of which a large portion, stretching from the Kṛishṇā to beyond the Penar river, was given to the Nizām, and a portion to the Marāthas, which extended their territory to the Tuṅgabhadrā. The English acquired Malabar and sovereignty over the Rājā of Coorg, to whom Tipu had to grant independence; Dindigul and the adjoining districts on the south; and the Baramahal district on the east. These were "cessions of considerable importance in adding to the strength and compactness of the Company's territories". Moreover, Tipu had to pay an indemnity of more than £3,000,000 and to send two of his sons as hostages to Cornwallis's camp.

Some writers have criticised Lord Cornwallis for having concluded the treaty with the Sultān of Mysore instead of effecting his destruction, which, in their opinion, could have been easily done. Munro wrote: "Everything is now done by moderation and conciliation. At this rate we shall be Quakers in twenty years more." Thornton regrets that Tipu "should have been granted so favourable terms". But it should be noted that Cornwallis took this step out of some practical considerations. Sickness was spreading among his troops; war with France, and the consequent alliance between Tipu and the French, were apprehended; and the Court of Directors insisted on peace. Further, Cornwallis was not at all eager to occupy the whole kingdom of Mysore, which, in his opinion, would have made it difficult to effect a convenient settlement with the allies.

3. British Relations with Hyderābād and the Carnatic

A. The Nizām of Hyderābād

Like the governors of the other provinces, the Nizām-ul-mulk Asaf Jāh, though theoretically a representative of the Delhi Emperor in the Deccan, had made himself virtually independent of the latter's authority in the reign of Muhammad Shāh. But the authority of his son, Nizām 'Ālī, was menaced by the growing

ambitions of the Marāthas and the Sultāns of Mysore, which led him to court British help. On the 12th November, 1766, he concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with the Madras Council. In the course of the First Anglo-Mysore War, he was temporarily seduced from this alliance by an agent of Hyder 'Ālī, but he soon concluded a peace with the English at Masulipatam on the 23rd February, 1768. According to the treaty of 1766, as revised in 1768, the Company promised to pay an annual tribute of nine lacs of rupees to the Nizām in return for the latter's granting them the Northern Sarkārs. The *sarkār* of Guntur being given for life to the Nizām's brother, Basālat Jang, the amount of tribute was reduced to seven lacs. But in 1779 Rumbold, the tactless governor of Madras, secured the *sarkār* of Guntur directly from Basālat Jang and sought to stop the payment of tribute to the Nizām, who had violated the treaty of 1768 by taking French troops into his service. This was disapproved of by the Governor-General, Warren Hastings, but it served to alienate the Nizām, whose resentment had been already aroused by the English alliance with Raghoba, at a very critical moment. He joined in an anti-English confederacy with Hyder and the Marāthas. Hastings, however, succeeded in detaching the Nizām from the confederates by returning Guntur to Basālat Jang when the Second Anglo-Mysore War had already progressed to the disadvantage of the English.

But after the death of Basālat Jang in 1782, the English demanded the cession of Guntur from the Nizām on the strength of the treaty of 1768. Guntur occupied a position of importance both for the Nizām and the English; for the former it was the only outlet to the sea, and for the latter its possession was necessary to connect their possessions in the north with those in the south. After some hesitation the Nizām surrendered Guntur to the English in 1788 and in return sought their help, according to the treaty of 1768, to recover some of his districts which Tipu had seized. Lord Cornwallis, the then Governor-General, found himself in a delicate position, because the right of the Mysore Sultāns to those very territories had been recognised by the English by two separate treaties concluded with Hyder and Tipu respectively in 1769 and 1785; and also because he was precluded by clause 34 of Pitt's India Act from declaring war against Indian powers or concluding a treaty with that object without being previously attacked. But at the same time he was eager to secure allies in view of the certain war with Tipu. So he wrote a letter to the Nizām on the 7th July, 1789, explaining the treaty of 1768 to suit his motives, and agreeing

to support the Nizām with British troops, which could not be employed against the allies of the English, a list of whom was included, Tipu's name being deliberately excluded from it. Thus the Nizām joined the Triple Alliance of 1790 and fought for the English in the Third Anglo-Mysore War.

As we have already noted, Sir John Shore, in pursuance of the neutrality policy laid down by Pitt's India Act, did not lend assistance to the Nizām against the Marāthas, who severely defeated him at Kharda in March, 1795.

B. The Carnatic

The Carnatic, distracted by the Anglo-French conflicts of the mid-eighteenth century, afterwards suffered terribly from the evils of a demoralised administration, due partly to the disreputable character of its Nawāb, Muhammad 'Ālī, and partly to the vacillating and selfish policy of the Madras Government. "The moral atmosphere of Madras appears at this time," remarks Thornton, "to have been pestilential; corruption revelled unrestrained; and strong indeed must have been the power which could effectually repress it while Mahomet Ali (Muhammad 'Ālī) had purposes to gain and either money or promises to bestow." Ceasing to reside at Arcot, Muhammad 'Ālī spent his days in a magnificent palace at Chepauk, a fishing village in the suburb of Madras, steeped in pleasure and luxury, to meet the extravagant expenses of which he borrowed lavishly from the Company's servants at Madras at exorbitant rates of interest, sometimes rising as high as 36 per cent per annum, and granting them assignments on the land revenues of the Carnatic districts. He was not, declared Burke, "a real potentate", but "a shadow, a dream, an incubus of oppression". The "Nabob of Arcot's Debts", through which the European bond-holders, including some members of the Madras Council, amassed huge fortunes at the expense of the interests of the kingdom, gave rise to serious administrative scandals and so the British Parliament tried to deal with them. But the Board of Control intervened in the matter and ordered that the debts of the Nawāb should be paid out of the revenues of the Carnatic. This decision of the ministry, denounced by Burke and others, dealt a severe blow "at the cause of pure administration in the East". According to an arrangement dated the 2nd December, 1781, the revenues of the Carnatic had been assigned to British control, the Nawāb being given one-sixth for his maintenance. But now that the creditors of the Nawāb clamoured for their money, the Board

of Control ordered the restitution of the revenues to the Nawāb, who went on plunging himself all the deeper into debt.

Thus the relations between Muhammad 'Ālī and the Company were very complicated when Lord Cornwallis came to India as the Company's Governor-General for the first time. On the 24th February, 1787, the English concluded a treaty with the Nawāb, by which they agreed to defend the whole country in return for a subsidy of fifteen lacs of *pagodas* (a coin current in Southern India corresponding at the normal rate of exchange to three and a half rupees). But during the war with Tipu (1790–1792) the Company took into its own hands the entire control of the Carnatic intending "to secure the two states (the Carnatic and Madras)", as Malcolm says, "against the dangers to which they thought them exposed from the mismanagement of the Nawāb's officers". At the close of the war a treaty was concluded on the 12th July, 1792, by which the Carnatic was restored to its Nawāb and at the same time the British subsidy was reduced from fifteen lacs of *pagodas* to nine lacs.

Muhammad 'Ālī died on the 13th October, 1795, and his son and successor, Omdut-ul-Umarā, could not be persuaded by Lord Hobart, Governor of Madras since September, 1794, to modify the treaty of 1792 to the extent of giving to the Company all the territories which had been pledged as security for arrears of pecuniary instalments. The new Nawāb, "perplexed, plagued and intimidated" by his creditors, would not accede to the proposals. The desire of the Madras governor to go to the length of annexing Tinnevelly was not supported by the Governor-General, Sir John Shore. The corruption in the Carnatic Government continued unabated, owing, as Mill aptly expresses it, to "the compound of opposition of the Supreme Government and of the powerful class of individuals whose profit depended upon the misgovernment of the country. . . ."

4. British Relations with Oudh, Benares and Ruhelkhand

A. Warren Hastings' Oudh Policy and the Ruhela War

Since the Anglo-Oudh treaty of 1765, the Company was definitely resolved to maintain friendly relations with Oudh with a view to utilising it as a bulwark against the incursions of the Marāthas or of the Afghāns. Thus when in 1770–1771 the Delhi Emperor, Shāh 'Ālam II, placed himself under Marātha tutelage, Warren Hastings deprived the Emperor of the districts of Korā and

Allahābād and made these over to the Nawāb of Oudh in return for fifty lacs of rupees and an annual subsidy to maintain a garrison of the Company's troops for the Nawāb's protection. This arrangement was ratified by the Treaty of Benares, September, 1773, when Hastings had a conference with the Nawāb.

But this policy of Hastings drew the Company into a war with the Ruhelas. The fertile country of Ruhelkhand, lying at the base of the Himālayas to the north-west of Oudh, with a population of about 6,000,000, the bulk of whom were Hindus, and governed by a confederacy of Ruhela chiefs under the leadership of Hāfiz Rahamat Khān, had been threatened by the Marāthas since 1771. The Nawāb of Oudh also coveted the province of Ruhelkhand and there was no love lost between him and the Afghāns of that tract. But the common Marātha danger led the Ruhelas and Shujā-ud-daulah, the Nawāb of Oudh, to sign a treaty on the 17th June, 1772, in the presence of Sir Robert Barker. It provided that if the Marāthas invaded Ruhelkhand, the Nawāb of Oudh would expel them, for which the Ruhelas would pay him forty lacs of rupees. The Marāthas invaded Ruhelkhand in the spring of 1773, but they were repulsed by the combined British and Oudh troops and could not think of repeating their incursions owing to the disorders at Poona after the death of the Peshwā, Mādhava Rāo I. The Nawāb of Oudh then demanded from the Ruhela leader the payment of the stipulated sum of forty lacs of rupees, which was, however, evaded by the latter. On the strength of the Treaty of Benares (September, 1773), Shujā-ud-daulah demanded, early in February, 1774, the help of the Company to coerce Hāfiz Rahamat Khān. A British army was accordingly sent under the command of Colonel Champion; and the allied British and Oudh troops marched into Ruhelkhand on the 17th April, 1774. Six days later, the decisive battle was fought at Miranpur Katra. The Ruhelas were defeated though, as the British commander observed, they exhibited "great bravery and resolution". Hāfiz Rahamat was killed fighting bravely; about 20,000 Ruhelas were expelled beyond the Ganges; and their province was annexed to the Oudh kingdom, only a fragment of it, together with Rāmpurā, being left in the possession of Faizullah Khān, son of 'Ālī Muhammad Ruhela, the founder of the Ruhela power.

Opinions are sharply divided on the merits and demerits of Hastings' policy in the Ruhela War. It was one of the main points of attack on Hastings in Parliament in 1786. Not only Burke and Macaulay but also most of the older school of historians, like Mill and others, have condemned it in severe terms. In their opinion,

Hastings "deliberately sold the lives and liberties of a free people and condoned horrible atrocities on the part of the armies of the Nawāb of Oudh". But the policy has found defenders in some modern writers, notably in Sir John Strachey, who has tried in his *Hastings and the Rohilla War* to justify it wholly. Though some of the expressions of Burke, Macaulay or Mill may be regarded as unjust invective, the policy of Hastings cannot escape reasonable criticism from certain points of view. One has to note that the expediency of the transaction was doubted by Hastings himself and still more by his Council, and they treated it during its initial stages with vacillation. Hastings might have thought, while concluding the Treaty of Benares, that the occasion for helping the Nawāb of Oudh would never arise; but to be committed to a course of action, without duly weighing the remote consequences involved in it, is not, in the words Mr. P. E. Roberts, "the happiest or most efficient kind of political conduct". It is also difficult to support the view that Hastings was in duty bound to lend assistance to the Nawāb of Oudh as the treaty between the latter and the Ruhelas had been concluded under British guarantee. Sir Robert Barker had merely witnessed the signatures of the two parties and did nothing else regarding it. Further, it is improper to argue, as Sir John Strachey has done, that the Ruhelas deserved expulsion from their province as they had established their rule over its Hindu population only twenty-five years before. It is clear that their title to the province was as good as that of many of the Indian States of the time which were rising on the ruins of the Mughul Empire. We have contemporary evidence, which could not be quite ignored even by Sir John Strachey, to show that the Hindus of Ruhelkhand were well governed and enjoyed prosperity under the Ruhelas; it was the new Oudh rule that proved to be oppressive to them. Even Sir John Strachey has to admit that Hastings' policy was "somewhat cynical". Lastly, the Ruhelas cannot be accused of having in any way offended the English. Sir Alfred Lyall very reasonably observes that "the expedition against the Rohillas was wrong in principle, for they had not provoked us, and the Vezir could only be relied upon to abuse his advantages". The whole transaction smacks of selfish motives, mainly of a mercenary character, and it undoubtedly set a bad precedent. Its nature is clear from what Hastings himself avowed: "The absence of the Marāthas, and the weak state of the Rohillas, promised an easy conquest of them, and I own that such was my idea of the Company's distress at home added to my knowledge of their wants abroad, that I

should have been glad of any occasion to employ their forces, that saves so much of their pay and expenses."

B. The Chait Singh Affair

Mercenary motives led Hastings to commit two more indefensible acts. In one case, he made exorbitant demands on Chait Singh, the Rājā of Benares. Originally a feudatory of the Nawāb of Oudh, Chait Singh placed himself under the overlordship of the Company by a treaty in July, 1775, whereby he agreed to pay an annual tribute of 22½ lacs of rupees to his new masters. But with the outbreak of Anglo-French hostilities in 1778, Hastings demanded from the Rājā an additional sum of five lacs as a war contribution, which he paid. The demand was, however, repeated several times, and the Rājā after pleading for time and exemption complied with it on every occasion. This did not suffice to satisfy Hastings. In 1780 he ordered the Rājā to furnish 2,000 cavalry, reduced at the latter's request to 1,000. The Rājā gathered 500 cavalry and 500 infantry as substitute, and informed Hastings that they were ready for serving the Company; but he received no reply. Hastings had already determined to inflict on him a fine of fifty lacs of rupees. "I was resolved," he said, "to draw from his guilt the means of relief to the Company's distress. . . . In a word I had determined to make him pay largely for his pardon, or to exact a severe vengeance for his past delinquency." To carry out his plans Hastings went in person to Benares and placed the Rājā under arrest. The Rājā submitted quietly; but the indignity inflicted upon him infuriated his soldiers, who rose suddenly, without their master's instigation or his knowledge, and massacred a number of English sepoys with three officers. Hastings retired for his personal safety to Chunār, but soon gathering all the available troops suppressed the rising. Chait Singh justly argued his innocence in regard to complicity in the massacre; but to no effect. He was expelled from his country and found shelter at Gwālior. His kingdom was conferred upon his nephew, who was to pay a tribute of forty lacs, instead of 22½ lacs, to the Company.

Whatever might be said by the modern apologists of Hastings, there is no doubt that his conduct in the Chait Singh affair was "cruel, unjust and oppressive", as Pitt observed at the time of his impeachment. Chait Singh was wrongly described as a mere zamindār, and not a ruling prince, by the defenders of Hastings. Even if they could have proved him to be a mere zamindār, one might very well question the justice of fleecing him and him alone and

not imposing a common tax on all the zamindārs. The treaty of 5th July, 1775, which still regulated the relations between the Rājā and the Company, definitely laid down that "no demand shall be made upon him by the Hon'ble Company, of any kind, or on any pretence whatsoever, nor shall any person be allowed to interfere with his authority, or to disturb the peace of his country". So legally the Rājā was not bound to pay any extra contribution. Forrest makes a gross mis-statement of facts when he says that the Rājā's conduct was "contumacious and refractory and deserving of punishment". As a matter of fact, Chait Singh was all along submissive and his men rose in insurrection without his connivance only when their master had been humiliated. Unbiased writers must accept the reasonable verdict of Sir Alfred Lyall that "Hastings must bear the blame of having provoked the insurrection at Benares" and that there was "a touch of impolitic severity and precipitation about his proceedings against Chait Singh" due to a "certain degree of vindictiveness and private irritation against the Rājā". It is amply clear that the whole transaction was iniquitous from the moral point of view. It was also inexpedient. Dr. V. A. Smith has tried to defend Hastings' exorbitant demands on the ground of expediency in view of the "grave necessities" of the disturbed political situation of the time. But the Governor-General did not make any financial gain, as the Rājā took away with him a portion of his wealth, and the remaining twenty-three lacs was looted by the troops to be divided among themselves. The Company on the contrary was put to the strain of bearing the cost of the military operations that followed. Thus the Court of Directors justly criticised Hastings' policy as "unwarrantable and impolitic". Further, the Company obtained the enhanced tribute of forty lacs from the new Rājā of Benares at a great sacrifice of the interests of the principality, the administration of which became worse under their protégé.

C. The Case of the Begams of Oudh

After the death of Shujā-ud-daulah, a shrewd, industrious and clever administrator, on the 26th January, 1775, his son and successor, Asaf-ud-daulah, unwisely allowed his liabilities to the Company to be increased by entering into a new treaty with them known as the Treaty of Faizābād—particularly binding himself thereby to pay a heavier subsidy for the maintenance of British troops. The administration of Oudh grew more and more corrupt under the new Nawāb, and the subsidy payable to the Company

fell into arrears. The Begams of Oudh, mother and grandmother of the reigning prince, had inherited from the deceased Nawāb extensive *jāgīrs* and immense wealth, which, however, Asaf-ud-daulah, pressed by the Company for money, sought to seize on the ground that he had been unjustly deprived of them. In 1775, on the representations of Middleton, the British Resident in Oudh, the widow of Shujā-ud-daulah gave to her son £300,000, in addition to £250,000 already paid to him, the British Resident and the Council in Calcutta having given a guarantee that no further demands should be made on her in future. Hastings, opposed to his Council at this time, was outvoted. When in 1781 the Nawāb of Oudh, pressed by the British Resident, proposed that he should be permitted to seize the property and wealth of the Begams to clear off his dues to the Company, Hastings had no hesitation in consenting to it and in withdrawing British protection from them. The Nawāb soon began to waver and was afraid, as the Resident remarked, of the "uncommonly violent temper of his female relations"; but Hastings helped to screw up his courage. The Governor-General wrote to Middleton in December, 1781: "You must not allow any negotiations or forbearance, but must prosecute both services until the Begams are at the entire mercy of the Nawāb." British troops were sent to Faizābād, where the Begams lived; and their eunuchs were compelled by imprisonment, starvation and threat, if not actual infliction, of flogging, to surrender the treasure in December, 1782.

The conduct of Hastings on this occasion exceeded all limits of decency and justice. "The employment of personal severities, under the superintendence of British officers, in order to extract money from women and eunuchs," observes Sir Alfred Lyall rightly, "is an ignoble kind of undertaking; . . . to cancel the guarantee and leave the Nawāb to deal with the recalcitrant princes was justifiable; to push him on and actively assist in measures of coercion against women and eunuchs was conduct unworthy and indefensible." There can be no doubt that Hastings was the "moving spirit" in the whole transaction. Hastings argued, and his defenders maintain, that the Begams had forfeited their claim to British protection for their complicity in the affair of Chait Singh. The contention is hardly tenable. The testimony in regard to it is conflicting and "the charge of rebellion was *ex post facto*, made when it was found necessary to present a justification for the whole business".

In his last year of office Hastings made some unsuccessful attempts to reorganise the administration and finances of Oudh.

Under the orders of the Court of Directors, he effected a partial restitution of the *jāgīrs* to the Begams, and removed the British Residency, but established in its place "an agency of the Governor-General" which proved to be a heavier burden on the resources of the State.

D. Policy of Cornwallis and Shore towards Oudh

In fact, Oudh continued to groan under the evils of maladministration and the burden of the Company's financial demands. In the time of Lord Cornwallis, the Nawāb appealed to him to relieve him of the "oppressive pecuniary burden" by withdrawing the Company's troops stationed at Cawnpore and Fatehgarh. After meeting the Nawāb's minister Hyder Beg in a conference, the Governor-General agreed to reduce the subsidies from seventy-four to fifty lacs but objected to the withdrawal of British troops.

Hyder Beg was really an able minister, eager to reform the administration, but with his death in 1794, all hope of reform came to an end. On the death of Asaf-ud-daulah in 1797, Sir John Shore intervened in the case of disputed succession between Wāzīr 'Ālī, whom Asaf-ud-daulah had looked upon as his successor, and Sa'ādat 'Ālī, the deceased Nawāb's eldest brother. He raised the latter to the throne and entered into a treaty with him on the 21st January, 1798. By this the annual subsidy to be paid by the Nawāb was raised to seventy-six lacs of rupees; the fort of Allahābād, described by Marshman as the "military key of the province", was ceded to the Company; the Nawāb bound himself not to hold communications with, or admit into his kingdom, the other Europeans; and Wāzīr 'Ālī was allowed to live at Benares on an annual pension of a lac and a half of rupees. This arrangement, no doubt, greatly enhanced the Company's influence, but in no way served to remove the corruption in the internal government of Oudh. Throughout this province, "there were in all respects embarrassment and disorder. The British subsidy was always in arrear, while the most frightful extortion was practised in the realisation of the revenue. Justice was unknown; the army was a disorderly mass, formidable only to the power whom it professed to serve. The evils of native growth were aggravated by the presence of an extraordinary number of European adventurers, most of whom were as destitute of character and principle as they were of property".

CHAPTER IV

ESTABLISHMENT OF BRITISH ASCENDANCY, 1798–1823

1. Anglo-Marātha Relations and Fall of the Marāthas

A. The Marāthas after Kharda and the Second Anglo-Marātha War

THE victory of the Marāthas at Kharda enhanced their prestige and the influence of Nānā Fadnavis at Poona. But they were not destined to reap any permanent advantage out of it. It was at Kharda that the Marātha chiefs assembled under the authority of the Peshwā for the last time. Soon they spoiled all their chances by unwisely indulging in internal quarrels. The young Peshwā, Mādhava Rāo Nārāyan, grew tired of Nānā's dictatorship, and, in a fit of despair, committed suicide on the 25th October, 1795. The next in succession was Raghoba's son, Bājī Rāo II, a bitter foe of Nānā Fadnavis, whose claims were opposed by the minister. This led to various plots and counter-plots till at last Bājī Rāo II was recognised as the Peshwā and Nānā Fadnavis as his chief minister on the 4th December, 1796. Taking advantage of these dissensions among the Marāthas, the Nizām recovered the territories that he had been compelled to cede to them after his recent defeat at Kharda.

Devoid of military qualities, and fond of intrigue, Bājī Rāo II accentuated the rivalries of the Marātha leaders of the time, by setting one against another. Unfortunately for the Marātha nation, able leaders like Mahādājī Sindhia, Malhār Rāo Holkar and Tukojī Holkar had already left this world for ever. Their descendants, like Daulat Rāo Sindhia, a nephew and adopted son of Mahādājī Sindhia, and Jaswant Rāo Holkar, a natural son of Tukojī, utterly devoid of wisdom, only occupied themselves in mutual quarrels, to the prejudice of national interests, at a time when the Company's policy of non-intervention had given place to one of aggressive imperialism with the arrival of Lord Mornington (subsequently Marquess Wellesley) as Governor-General on the 26th April, 1798.

An imperialist to the tips of his fingers and possessed of experience of Indian affairs as Commissioner of the Board of Control, Wellesley came to guide the destiny of the Company in India at a time when

the political situation in this country was "extremely critical", as he himself said; and the Company was exposed to grave dangers, due largely to Shore's policy of neutrality. Tipu, the "ancient enemy of the Company", had greatly improved his resources, while his spirit of hostility was unabated; the Nizām was "reduced in reputation as well as in real strength" and had welcomed French support, being alienated by the English neutrality in 1795; the power of Daulat Rāo Sindhia "had arrived at a most alarming eminence"; the Rājās of the Malabar region, with the exception of the Rājā of Coorg, were hostile; there was constant apprehension of an invasion of the Indian plains by Zamān Shāh, the ruler of Kābul; and the finances of the Company were in an unsatisfactory condition. The influence of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in Europe added to the gravity of the situation. The French had allied themselves with Tipu, and Napoleon had undertaken an expedition into Egypt with a view to threatening the British position in India.

To save the Company's position in this menacing situation, and to safeguard and further the interests of the British Empire as a whole, Wellesley followed the policy of subsidiary alliances with regard to the Indian powers. Indeed, the defence of England's Empire formed the keynote of Wellesley's policy. His system of subsidiary alliances implied that the Indian powers "were to make no wars and to carry on no negotiations with any other state whatsoever, without the knowledge and consent of the British Government. The greater principalities were each to maintain a native force commanded by British officers for the preservation of the public peace; and they were each to cede certain territories in full sovereignty to meet the yearly charges of this force. The lesser principalities were to pay a tribute to the paramount power. In return the British Government was to protect them, one and all, against foreign enemies of every sort or kind". Only a weak power would submit to such an arrangement, and the Nizām, the feeblest of all the Indian powers, readily accepted it. Some other Indian States were also conquered or mediatised by Wellesley.

The Marāthas had not come into any close contact with the English since Wellesley's accession to office. He had asked them on several occasions to enter his system "of defensive alliance and mutual guarantee" but got no response. "Hitherto," wrote Wellesley in 1800, "either the capricious temper of Bājī Rāo, or some remains of the characteristic jealousy of the nation with regard to foreign relations, have frustrated my object and views." But suddenly the course of affairs, even in Mahārāshtra, took such

a turn as to afford an opportunity to the English to intervene. The shrewd old Marātha statesman, Nānā Fadnavis, who had so long done his best to preserve in some form the solidarity of the Marātha confederacy and had hitherto resisted British interference in Marātha affairs, died at Poona on the 13th March, 1800. "With him," remarked Colonel Palmer, the British Resident at Poona, with prophetic truth, "departed all the wisdom and moderation of the Marātha Government." Though Nānā Fadnavis' attempt to establish hegemony at Poona, and his neglect of the north, have been considered by a modern Marāthī writer as shortcomings in his policy, yet it must be admitted that "he was", as Grant Duff observes, "certainly a great statesman . . . he is entitled to the high praise of having acted with the feelings and sincerity of a patriot". He understood the danger of English intervention in the affairs of the Marāthas and was opposed to any alliance with them. He "respected the English, admired their sincerity; but as political enemies, no one regarded them with more jealousy and alarm". His death meant the removal of the barrier that had checked to a great extent the disruptive activities of the Marātha chiefs. Both Daulat Rāo Sindhia and Jaswant Rāo Holkar now entered upon a fierce struggle with each other for supremacy at Poona, and the weak-minded Peshwā made matters worse by his incessant intrigues. Sindhia at first prevailed, and while he was engaged in fighting against Holkar's troops at Mālwa, the Peshwā murdered Vithujī Holkar, brother of Jaswant Rāo Holkar. This highly incensed Jaswant Rāo Holkar, whose power and position had recently improved, and on October 23rd, he defeated the combined armies of Sindhia and the Peshwā at Poona and captured the city. After running from place to place, the Peshwā took refuge at Bassein. Jaswant Rāo Holkar placed Vināyak Rāo, son of Amrita Rāo, adopted son of Raghoba, on the Peshwā's *masnad*.

The Peshwā had for long declined to accept the Subsidiary Alliance, but now in his helpless situation applied for protection to Wellesley. This was what Wellesley wanted, because it fitted in with his plan of establishing control over the Marāthas. Bājī Rāo II consented to accept the Subsidiary Alliance and signed the Treaty of Bassein on the 31st December, 1802. As provided by this treaty, a subsidiary force, consisting "of not less than 6,000 regular infantry, with the usual proportion of field-artillery and European artillery-men", was to be stationed within the Peshwā's territory in perpetuity; and for its maintenance, territories yielding revenues worth twenty-six lacs of rupees were surrendered by the Peshwā. Bājī Rāo II further agreed not to entertain any European

hostile to the English and subjected his relations with other States to the control of the English. Thus he "sacrificed his independence as the price of protection". A British force under Arthur Wellesley conducted the Peshwā to his capital and restored him to his former position on the 13th May, 1803.

The Treaty of Bassein forms an important landmark in the history of British supremacy in India. "It was without question", to quote Dean Hutton, "a step which changed the footing on which we stood in Western India. It trebled the English responsibilities in an instant." It brought the Company into definite relations with the formal head of the Marātha confederacy, and henceforth it "had either to control the greatest Indian power, or was committed to hostilities with it". But there is no reason to overestimate its importance by holding, as Owen has done, that "the Treaty by its direct and indirect operations gave the Company the Empire of India". The British suzerainty over India was certainly not a foregone conclusion in 1803; a great deal had still to be achieved before it could be thoroughly established. The weak points of the Treaty of Bassein were criticised in England in a contemporary paper entitled *Observations on the Treaty of Bassein*, written by Lord Castlereagh, the successor, in May, 1801, of Dundas as President of the Board of Control. He was right in pointing out that it appeared "hopeless to attempt to govern the Marātha Empire through a feeble and perhaps disaffected Peshwā". He especially attacked that article of the treaty by which the Peshwā had to accept British arbitration in his disputes with other powers, and he had a just apprehension of the tendency of the treaty to involve the English "in the endless and complicated distractions of that turbulent (Marātha) Empire". Wellesley wrongly calculated that after the treaty there existed no reason "to justify an apprehension" of hostility with the Marātha chiefs, though at the same time he realised that even if any war actually broke out the advantages gained by the English as a result of the Treaty of Bassein would help them to meet their opponents successfully.


War was not long in coming. The Treaty of Bassein was, as the Governor-General's brother, Arthur Wellesley, aptly remarked, "a treaty with a cipher (the Peshwā)". It wounded the feelings of the other Marātha leaders, who saw in it an absolute surrender of national independence, and by sinking their mutual jealousies for the time being tried to present a united front to the British. The Peshwā, now repentant of his action, sent them secret messages of encouragement. Daulat Rāo Sindhia and

Raghujī Bhonsle II of Berār at once combined and also tried to win over Jaswant Rāo Holkar to their party. But even at this moment of grave national peril the Marātha chiefs could not act together. Though Sindhia and Raghujī Bhonsle II mobilised their troops, Holkar "retired to Mālwa with the real design of being guided by the issue of events" and took the field when it was too late, and the Gāikwār remained neutral.

Hostilities commenced early in the month of August, 1803. The total strength of the Marātha armies was 250,000 besides 40,000 troops trained by Frenchmen, while the British troops in different parts of India numbered about 55,000. But Wellesley was adequately prepared for the coming war. His measures in Mysore and at Surāt, his treaties with the Gāikwār and Oudh, and, above all, the Treaty of Bassein "afforded the most efficient means of opposing the confederacy with success". The English decided to attack the enemy at all points, and the war was conducted in two main centres, in the Deccan under Arthur Wellesley and in Hindustān under General Lake—and simultaneously in three subsidiary centres in Gujarāt, Bundelkhand and Orissa. The French-trained battalions of the Marāthas did not prove very useful, and the European officers in Sindhia's army mostly deserted him. The Marāthas had certainly committed a mistake in abandoning the harassing tactics of their predecessors and in giving preference to Western methods of fighting for which they had to depend on foreigners. It resulted in quick reverses.

In the Deccan, Arthur Wellesley captured Ahmadnagar, on the Nizām's frontier, on the 12th August, 1803, and on the 23rd September gained a complete victory over the combined troops of Sindhia and Bhonsle at Assaye, situated about forty-five miles north of Aurangābād. Grant Duff described this battle as "a triumph more splendid than any recorded in Deccan history". Burhānpur and Asīrgarh were captured by the English on the 15th October and 21st October respectively. The Bhonsle Rājā's forces were completely defeated at Argāon, about fifty miles east of Burhānpur, on the 29th November, and the English captured the strong fortress of Gāwilgarh on the 15th December, 1803. In Hindustān, also, success attended British arms. Lake captured Delhi and Āgra, and the northern army of the Sindhia was severely routed at the battle of Delhi in the month of September and at Laswarī, in Alwar State, in the month of November. The English gained further successes in Gujarāt, Bundelkhand and Orissa. Thus, in the course of five months, Sindhia and Bhonsle had to own severe defeats and conclude two separate treaties

with the English. By the Treaty of Deogāon, concluded on the 17th December, 1803, the Bhonsle Rājā of Berār ceded to the English the province of Cuttack, including Balāsore, and the whole of his



From V. A. Smith: "The Oxford History of India" (Clarendon Press).

territory west of the river Warda. The English were henceforth to arbitrate if he had any disputes with the Nizām or the Peshwā; and "no European or American or a nation at war with the English,

or any British subject, was to be entertained without the consent of the British Government". On his agreeing to maintain a British Resident at Nāgpur, the Honourable M. Elphinstone was sent there. Sindhia concluded the Treaty of Surji-Arjangāon on the 30th December, by which he gave to the victors all his territories between the Ganges and the Jumnā and his forts and territories to the north of the Rājput principalities of Jaipur, Jodhpur and Gohad. To the westward he ceded to them Ahmadnagar, Broach and all his territories west of the Ajantā Hills. He renounced all his claims on the Mughul Emperor, the Peshwā, the Nizām and on the British Government; agreed not to admit into his service Europeans of enemy countries or British subjects without the consent of the English; and Sir John Malcolm was appointed Resident at his court. By another treaty, concluded on the 27th February, 1804, he entered into a subsidiary alliance, according to which a defence force of 6,000 infantry was to be stationed not in Sindhia's territory, but near its frontier. As a reward for his loyalty to the English, the Nizām got, from the old possessions of the Rājā of Berār, all territories to the south of Narnulla and Gāwilgarh and west of the river Warda, and, from the dominions of Sindhia, districts south of the Ajantā Hills such as Jalnāpur and Gondāpur.

As a result of the Second Anglo-Marātha War, the English secured important advantages in various ways. "With all the sanguine temper of my mind," confessed Wellesley, "I declare that I could not have hoped for a completion of my plans at once so rapid and so secure." The British possessions in Madras and Bengal were linked up and were expanded also in other directions. The titular Mughul Emperor, Shāh 'Ālam II, came under their protection and treaties of alliance were concluded with the States of Jodhpur, Jaipur, Macheri, Bundi and the Jāt kingdom of Bharatpur. The French-trained battalions in the service of the Marāthas were removed. The Nizām and the Peshwā fell more under their influence than before. Munro, a critical writer, asserted: "We are now complete masters of India, and nothing can shake our power, if we take proper measures to confirm it." But Wellesley showed an "almost wilful" error of judgment in believing that the treaties afforded the "only possible security for the permanent tranquillity and prosperity of these valuable and important possessions". The Ministry in England, as is clear from the contemporary despatches of Lord Castlereagh, thought otherwise. The situation in India was rightly diagnosed by Arthur Wellesley, who thought that his brother, the Governor-General, put "a too exacting interpretation on the Treaties of Peace". He wrote

on the 13th May, 1804: "Our enemies are much disgusted, and complain loudly of our conduct and want of faith; and in truth I consider the peace to be by no means secured."

B. War With Holkar

In fact, the peace had already come to an end with the commencement of hostilities (April, 1804) between Holkar, who had so long kept himself aloof from the war, and the English. Holkar pursued the old tactics of the Marāthas and defeated Colonel Monson, who had in an ill-judged manner advanced too far into the plains of Rājputāna, at Mukundarā Pass, thirty miles south of Kotah, and compelled him to retreat to Āgra towards the end of August. Flushed with this success, Holkar marched northward and besieged Delhi from the 8th to the 14th October, but the city was successfully defended by the local British Resident, Lt.-Colonel Ochterlony. A band of Holkar's troops was defeated at Dig on the 13th November and another band, personally commanded by Holkar, was routed by General Lake on the 17th November. But the English soon suffered a serious reverse owing to Lake's failure to take the fortress of Bharatpur early in 1805. The Rājā of Bharatpur, however, concluded a treaty with the English on the 10th April, 1805, and the war might have taken an adverse turn for Holkar but for Wellesley's sudden recall.

For some time past the authorities in England had been rather dissatisfied with the aggressive policy of Wellesley, and his conquests, though brilliant and of far-reaching consequence, "were becoming", it was believed by many, "too large for profitable management" and raised the Company's debts from seventeen millions in 1797 to thirty-one millions in 1806. Further, Wellesley's manners were imperious and overbearing, and he dealt with the home authorities in a rather masterful way, often disregarding their orders and instructions and not informing them of his actions. So long as Wellesley's policy was crowned with success, the home authorities did not interfere. But the news of the disastrous retreat of Monson and the failure of Lake before Bharatpur having reached England, his "war-loving" policy began to be severely condemned by a strong public opinion. Pitt is said to have declared that Wellesley "had acted most imprudently and illegally, and that he could not be suffered to remain in the government". Lord Wellesley resigned his post and sailed for England.

Lord Cornwallis being appointed Governor-General for the second

time at the age of sixty-seven reached Calcutta on the 30th July, 1805, with instructions from Castlereagh to stop aggrandisement and "to bring back things to the state which the legislature had prescribed" by the Acts of 1784 and 1793. But, before anything could be done to reverse the subsidiary treaties, Lord Cornwallis died at Ghāzipur on the 5th October, 1805, and Sir George Barlow, the senior member of the Council, became the acting Governor-General. Barlow carried out the policy of his predecessor. Peace was finally concluded with the Sindhia on the 23rd November, 1805. Gwālior and Gohud were restored to him; he was to claim nothing north of the river Chambal and the Company nothing to the south of it; and the Company pledged itself not to enter into treaties with the chiefs of Rājputāna. Meanwhile Lord Lake had hunted Holkar up to Amritsar, where the latter had appealed to the Sikhs for help, who, however, did not accept his proposals. He thereupon opened negotiations with Lord Lake for peace, which was signed on the 7th January, 1806. Holkar gave up all claims to Tonk, Rāmpurā, Bundi, Kooch, Bundelkhand and places north of the Chambal, but he got back the greater part of his lost territories. Further, in spite of strong protest from Lord Lake, Sir George Barlow published Declaratory Articles whereby Tonk and Rāmpurā were practically surrendered to Holkar and British protection was withdrawn from the other Rājput States. Thus the Rājput States were left to their fate, to be distracted by Marātha inroads into their territories. As an envoy of the Rājā of Jaipur observed, the Company now made "its faith subservient to its convenience".

C. The Third Anglo-Marātha War and the Fall of the Marāthas

With the last quarter of the eighteenth century the Marāthas had begun losing all those elements which are needed for the growth of a power, and so could not profit in the least by the British policy of neutrality in the beginning of the nineteenth century. The political and administrative conditions of all the Marātha States came to be hopelessly confused and gloomy, and their economic condition anything but satisfactory. Jaswant Rāo Holkar secretly assassinated his brother, Kāsī Rāo, and his nephew, Khande Rāo. The course of events, however, so affected his mind that he became insane, and died on the 20th October, 1811. The real ruler was now the deceased Holkar's favourite mistress, Tulsī Bāī, a clever and intelligent woman, who had the support of Balarām Seth, Jaswant Rāo's minister, and of Amir

Khān, the leader of the Central Indian Pathāns. These unworthy men failed to administer the State properly.

So far as Daulat Rāo Sindhia was concerned, the financial resources of his State could not suffice to meet the cost of his army, and his soldiers were permitted to collect money on their own account from the districts. The morale of the army thereby deteriorated and Sindhia could not maintain a strong control over his generals.

Exposed to the inroads of the Pindarīs and the Pathāns, the territory of Raghūjī Bhonsle was in the midst of disorder. So none of the three Marātha chiefs were in a position to oppose the English openly; and the Gāikwār of Barodā manifested no desire to violate the treaty of subsidiary alliance into which he had entered on the 21st April, 1805. Referring to the Marātha princes Prinsep believed that "as far as they were individually concerned, the objects of the settlement of 1805–1806 seem to have been attained; their weakness afforded a security against any one of them meditating a separate hostile enterprise; at the same time the balance that had been established remained unaltered, and the mutual jealousies relied upon as the guarantee against a second coalition were yet unextinguished".

But another trial of strength between the English and the Marāthas took place before the latter finally succumbed. Though apparently friendly, the Marātha chiefs, including even the Peshwā, who had been restored to the *masnad* through the help of the English, nurtured in their heart of hearts feelings of jealousy and hostility against the English, which they could not then openly manifest owing to the distracted condition of their kingdoms, but which might burst forth on the appearance of a favourable opportunity. Largely under the influence of his unscrupulous favourite, Trimbakjī Danglia, Bājī Rāo II engaged in intrigues with a view to leading once more a confederacy of the Marātha chiefs against the English. To settle some disputes between the Peshwā and the Gāikwār, the latter sent to Poona in A.D. 1814 his chief minister, Gangādhar Shāstrī, a friend of the English. Shāstrī was conducted by the Peshwā to Nāsik and was murdered there apparently at the instigation of Trimbakjī. After a good deal of hesitation, Bājī Rāo II surrendered Trimbakjī to Mountstuart Elphinstone, the British Resident at Poona since 1811, who placed him under confinement in the fortress of Thana. But he escaped a year later, it was believed with the connivance of the Peshwā, though there is no definite proof of it. Matters became most threatening by the year 1817. The Peshwā now made serious attempts to organise against the English a confederacy of

the Marātha chiefs and opened negotiations with them as well as with the Pathān chief, Amīr Khān, and the Pindarīs. He also tried to increase the strength and efficiency of his army.

The English did not fail to take prompt measures to check the Peshwā's designs. With the arrival of the Earl of Moira, better known as the Marquess of Hastings (1813–1823), the British policy of neutrality had been thoroughly reversed. The new Governor-General was determined "to render the British Government paramount in effect, if not declaredly so" and to "hold the other States vassals in substance, if not in name. . . ." Mountstuart Elphinstone, instructed by the Governor-General on the 10th May, 1817, to circumscribe the powers of the Peshwā in such a way as to "prevent the evils apprehended from the course of policy pursued by the Court of Poona for several years", induced Bājī Rāo II to sign most reluctantly the Treaty of Poona on the 13th June, 1817. The Peshwā had to renounce the headship of the Marātha confederacy; to commute his claims on the Gāikwār to four lacs of rupees and to promise not to make further demands on him; and to surrender to the English the Konkan and some important strongholds. Daulat Rāo Sindhia was also compelled by the English to sign the Treaty of Gwālior on the 5th November, 1817, by which he bound himself to co-operate with the English to suppress the Pindarīs and gave the Company full liberty to enter into engagements with the States beyond the Chambal. Thus the English could conclude a number of treaties with the Rājput States, so long greatly harassed by Marātha inroads. Meanwhile, internal quarrels about the succession to the kingdom of Nāgpur had given an opportunity to the English to bring that kingdom under their influence. Raghūjī Bhonsle II died on the 22nd March, 1816, and was succeeded by his imbecile son, Parsojī. Parsojī had an able but ambitious cousin, Appa Sāheb, who aspired to the government and wanted as a preparatory measure to secure the regency. The English recognised this on his signing a treaty of subsidiary alliance on the 27th May, 1816. The Treaties of Poona, Gwālior, and Nāgpur added greatly to the influence of the English at the cost of the Marāthas. The first dealt a severe blow at the power and prestige of the Peshwā; the second checked the pretensions of Sindhia over the Rājput States, which fell under British control; and the third cost the Nāgpur State its independence and brought it under the subsidiary system, which had been evaded by Raghūjī Bhonsle II but had been "so long and so earnestly desired by the British Government". The "defensive means" of the English were now greatly improved, and Malcolm observes

that "in the actual condition of India no event could be more fortunate than the subsidiary alliance with Nāgpur".

But none of the Marātha chiefs were sincerely reconciled to the loss of their independence and they had full sympathy with the Peshwā's desire to make himself free from British control. On the very day that Sindhia signed the subsidiary treaty, the Peshwā sacked and burnt the British Residency at Poona and attacked with about 27,000 men a small British army of 2,800 under Colonel Burr at Khirki; but he was completely defeated. Appa Sāheb of Nāgpur and Malhar Rāo Holkar II, son of Jaswant Rāo Holkar, rose in arms against the English. The Nāgpur troops were defeated at Sitābaldi on the 27th November, 1817, and Holkar's forces were routed at Mahidpur by Hislop on the 21st December, 1817. Appa Sāheb fled to the Punjab and then to Jodhpur where he died in A.D. 1840. The districts lying to the north of the Narmadā were annexed to British territories and a minor grandson of Raghūjī Bhonsle II was established as Rājā over the remnant of the state. Holkar was forced to sign the Treaty of Mandasor on the 6th January, 1818, by which he gave up all claims on the Rājput States, ceded to the English all districts south of the Narmadā, agreed to maintain a subsidiary force within this territory, submitted his foreign relations to the arbitration of the British, and recognised Amīr Khān, a mercenary commander, as Nawāb of Tonk. A permanent British Resident was henceforth stationed at Indore.

As for the Peshwā, after his defeat at Khirki, he fought two more battles with the English—at Koregāon on the 1st January, 1818, and at Ashti on the 20th February, 1818. He was defeated in both, his able general Gokhale being killed in the second. Bājī Rāo II at last surrendered to Sir John Malcolm on the 3rd June, 1818. The Peshwāship, which served as the symbol of national unity among the Marāthas even in its worst days, was abolished; Bājī Rāo II was allowed to spend his last days at Bithur near Cawnpore on a pension of eight lacs a year; his dominions were placed under British control; and "British influence and authority spread over the land with magical celerity". Trimbakjī was kept in life-long confinement in the fort of Chunār. The small kingdom of Sātārā, formed out of the Peshwā's dominions, was given to Pratāp Siṁha, a lineal descendant of Shivājī and the formal head of the Marātha Empire. The State of Sātārā did not become the centre of a hostile Marātha confederacy, as Thornton apprehended. As a matter of fact, as Roberts records, "the rule of the new dynasty proved an evil and incompetent one, and Sātārā was one of the States to which subsequently the Doctrine of Lapse was applied by Dalhousie".

D. Causes of the Downfall of the Marāthas

Thus was foiled the last attempt of the Marāthas to build up their political supremacy in India on the ruins of the Mughul Empire. The fabric of the Marātha Empire, which the genius and military ability of Shivājī the Great had brought into existence, and which, after a short period of decline, was revived by Bājī Rāo I, and competed with the English for political supremacy for about forty years, now collapsed most ignominiously. This was primarily due to certain inherent defects in the character of the Marātha State, particularly during the eighteenth century, though there were other factors which accelerated it. In the Marātha State, "there was", Sir J. N. Sarkar asserts, "no attempt at well-thought-out organised communal improvement, spread of education, or unification of the people, either under Shivājī or under the Peshwās. The cohesion of the peoples of the Marātha State was not organic but artificial, accidental and therefore precarious". Another drawback of the Marātha State was its lack of a sound economic policy and satisfactory financial arrangements, without which the political development of a nation becomes impossible. The sterile soil of Mahārāshtra held out no prospects for flourishing agriculture, trade and industries, and the Marātha State had to depend on uncertain and precarious sources of income like *chauth*, which again cost them the sincere co-operation of the other indigenous powers. Further, the revival of the *jāgīr* system after the death of Shivājī introduced a highly disintegrating force into the State; the Marātha *jāgīrdārs*, blind to all but their personal interests, ruined the national cause by plunging their country into intrigues and quarrels. With some exceptions like Shivājī, Bājī Rāo I, Mādhava Rāo I, Malhār Rāo Holkar, Mahādājī Sindhia and Nānā Fadnavis, the Marātha chiefs, particularly those of later times, indulged more in finesse or intrigue than well-calculated statesmanlike action, which produced a disastrous reaction on the destiny of their State, especially when they were confronted with superior British diplomacy during the close of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth. Lastly, the Marāthas of the eighteenth century, while discarding their old tactics of war, could not develop, even under Mahādājī Sindhia and Nānā Fadnavis, a military system organised on the scientific lines of the West. Opposed to them were the English, possessed of an efficient military organisation, based on up-to-date methods and varied experience of European wars. It is indeed a pity that the Marāthas depended upon foreign adventurers "for

a most vital means of self-protection", and thus ultimately lost their independence.

2. Anglo-Mysore Relations

A. The Fourth Anglo-Mysore War

Lord Cornwallis optimistically estimated the results of the war with Tipu in his time by saying: "We have effectively crippled our enemy, without making our friends too formidable."

But the hope of a lasting peace was soon belied. A man like Tipu could never accept for long the humiliation that he had



E. N. A.

FORT OF SERINGAPATAM, SHOWING THE SALLY-PORT GATE, WHERE TIPU SULTĀN WAS KILLED

suffered at the hands of the English, against whom he nursed a deep resentment. "Instead of sinking under his misfortunes, he exerted," writes Malcolm, "all his activity to repair the ravages of war. He began to add to the fortifications of his capital—to remount his cavalry—to recruit and discipline his infantry—to punish his refractory tributaries, and to encourage the cultivation of his country, which was soon restored to its former prosperity." France was then involved in a deadly war with England in Europe; and as an astute diplomat, Tipu tried to secure the alliance of France against the English in India. He enlisted himself


as a member of the Jacobin Club and permitted nine Frenchmen in his service to elect "citizen Ripaud", a Lieutenant in the French navy, as their President, to hoist the flag of the recently established French Republic and to plant a Tree of Liberty at Seringapatam. With a view to securing allies for himself in the contemplated conflict, Tipu also sent emissaries to Arabia, Kābul, Constantinople, Versailles and Mauritius. The French governor of the Isle of France, Monsieur Malartic, welcomed the envoys and proposals of Tipu, and published a proclamation inviting volunteers to come forward to help Tipu in expelling the English from India. As a result of this, some Frenchmen landed at Mangalore in April, 1798.

Lord Wellesley on his arrival at Madras on the 26th April, 1798, quickly realised the hostile intentions of Tipu and at once determined to wage war on him, overruling the timid suggestions of the Madras Council. He held in his Minute of 12th August, 1798, that "the act of Tippo's ambassadors, ratified by himself, and accompanied by the landing of a French force in his country is a public, unqualified and unambiguous declaration of war; aggravated by an avowal, that the object of the war is neither expansion, reparation, nor security, but the total destruction of the British Government in India. To attempt to misunderstand an insult and injury of such a complexion would argue a consciousness either of weakness or of fear". Besides other preparations for the war, Wellesley tried to revive the Triple Alliance of 1790. The Nizām at once concluded a subsidiary alliance with the English on the 1st September, 1798, but the Marāthas gave rather vague replies to the Governor-General's overtures. Nevertheless, to show the "disinterestedness of the British Government to every branch of the Triple Alliance", Wellesley engaged to give the Peshwā a share in the conquests of the war.

This war against Tipu was of a very short duration, but quite decisive. He was defeated by Stuart at Sedaseer, forty-five miles west of Seringapatam, on the 5th March, 1799, and again on the 27th March by General Harris at Malvelly, thirty miles east of Seringapatam. Tipu then retired to Seringapatam, which was captured by the English on the 4th May. The Mysore Sultān died while gallantly defending his metropolis, which was, however, plundered by the English troops. Thus fell a leading Indian power and one of the most inveterate and dreadful foes of the English.

Mysore was at the disposal of the English. The members of Tipu's family were interned at Vellore. They were suspected of being involved in the abortive mutiny of the sepoys at Vellore

THE PARTITION OF MYSORE



From Roberts' "India under Wellesley" (G. Bell & Sons, Ltd.)

in 1806 and were deported to Calcutta. As a sort of diplomatic move, Wellesley offered the districts of Soonda and Harponelly, lying in the north-west of the Mysore kingdom, to the Marāthas, who, however, refused to accept these. To the Nizām was given

the territory to the north-east near his dominion, that is, the districts of Gooty and Gurramkonda and a part of the district of Chiteldrug except its fort. The English took for themselves Kanara on the west; Wynaad in the south-east; the districts of Coimbatore and Daraporam; two tracts on the east; and the town and island of Seringapatam. A boy of the old Hindu reigning dynasty of Mysore was given the rest of the kingdom. This new State of Mysore became virtually a dependency of the English. A subsidiary treaty, which the minor ruler had to accept, provided for the maintenance of a protecting British force within the kingdom. A subsidy was to be paid by its ruler which could be increased by the Governor-General in time of war; and the Governor-General was further empowered to take over the entire internal administration of the country if he was dissatisfied on any account with its government. This arrangement, Wellesley hoped, would enable him "to command the whole resources of the Rājā's territory". The Governor-General "acted wisely", in Thornton's opinion, "in not making Mysore ostensibly a British possession. He acted no less wisely in making it substantially so". Because of misgovernment, Lord William Bentinck brought Mysore under the direct administration of the Company, and it remained so till 1881, when Lord Ripon restored the royal family to power.

The settlement of Mysore, as effected by Lord Wellesley, secured for the Company substantial territorial, economic, commercial and military advantages. It extended the Company's dominion "from sea to sea across the base of the peninsula", encompassing the new kingdom of Mysore on all sides except in the north. When in 1800 the Nizām transferred his acquisitions from Mysore to the Company, this kingdom "was entirely encircled by the Pax Britannica". This achievement of the Governor-General was enthusiastically applauded in England; he was elevated to the rank of Marquis in the peerage of Ireland and General Harris was made a baron.

B. Estimate of Tipu

Tipu is, in many respects, a remarkable personality in Indian history. A man of sound moral character, free from the prevailing vices of his class, he had an intense faith in God. He was fairly well educated, could speak fluently Persian, Kanarese and Urdu, and had a valuable library. A valiant soldier and a tactful general, Tipu was a diplomat of no mean order. This is proved by his clear perception of the fact that England and not any Indian power was the enemy; by his study of politics, particularly

the relations between England and France in Europe; by the embassies he sent to France and other places; and the correspondence that he carried on with Zamān Shāh of Kābul. He placed independence above everything else, and lost his life in trying to preserve it. Unlike many of his Indian contemporaries, Tipu was an able and industrious ruler. Some of his English contemporaries, like Edward Moore and Major Dirom, were favourably impressed with his administration and have unhesitatingly stated that he enjoyed sufficient popularity in his kingdom. Even Sir John Shore observes that "the peasantry of his dominions are protected and their labours encouraged and rewarded". Some writers, old[1] as well as modern,[2] have wrongly described Tipu as a cruel and sanguinary tyrant, an oppressive despot, and a furious fanatic. He cannot be held guilty of systematic cruelty, and, as Major Dirom remarks, "his cruelties were in general inflicted only on those whom he considered as his enemies". Also he was not a fierce bigot. The discovery and study of Tipu's Shrīngherī Letters prove that he knew "how to placate Hindu opinion, and religious intolerance was not the cause of his ruin". Though a pious Muslim, he did not attempt any wholesale conversion of his Hindu subjects, as Wilks' account would lead us to believe; but he forced it only on those recalcitrant Hindus on whose allegiance he could not rely. In one respect, he compares unfavourably with his father; politically he was less sagacious and practical than the latter. He often tried to introduce useless innovations in the name of reform. "A restless spirit of innovation, and a wish to have everything to originate from himself, was," wrote Thomas Munro, "the predominant feature of his character."

3. Disappearance of the French Menace

The fall of Tipu was a source of immense relief to the English, who were much worried by French intrigues. Tipu was indeed, as the Governor-General's brother, the Duke of Wellington, observed, "the certain ally of the French in India". As a matter of fact, the battle of Wandīwāsh did not finally shatter the ambitions of the French in India. There still remained a French peril throughout the rest of the eighteenth century. The French now tried to pursue their ambitious designs by establishing their influence in the courts of Indian powers like the Nizām, the Sultān of Mysore and the Marāthas. They joined their

[1] Kirkpatrick, Wilks, Rennell and others.
[2] Bowring, Roberts and Dean Hutton.

armies, and incited them against the English. Thus in 1777 St. Lubin negotiated a treaty with Nānā Fadnavis with a view to stirring up the Marāthas against the English, and the French considered an alliance with Hyder 'Ālī to be necessary "for regaining the ascendancy which they have lost in India and to despoil their rival of it". Disgusted by English neutrality at the battle of Kharda, the Nizām sought French help, and maintained a trained body of 14,000 men under a French commander, named François Raymond, who had organised a definitely "anti-British, pro-French and pro-Tipu" party in the Hyderābād court. Daulat Rāo Sindhia also maintained in his northern armies 40,000 disciplined men under Perron, a French general, whose influence over the Sindhia was so great that Wellesley could without much exaggeration say that he had built a French State on the banks of the Jumnā. We have already noted the nature of Franco-Mysore relations, which were undoubtedly antagonistic to English interests.

The French further tried to utilise the opportunities afforded by wars in America and Europe to regain what they had lost in India. Thus when the War of American Independence broke out, besides allying themselves with the revolted colonies, they sent, in 1782, three thousand men under Bussy and a fleet under Admiral Suffren to help Hyder 'Ālī; but Bussy's expedition was unable to further French interests. Again Hyder's son sought the French alliance when England was engaged in a deadly war with revolutionary France. Though on the outbreak of the Revolutionary Wars the French possessions in India were seized by the English, the Egyptian campaign of Napoleon, and the projects of the French to establish their influence in Egypt and then undermine the British position in India, were sources of deep anxiety to the English officers in India.

It did not take a long time for Wellesley, who possessed penetrating insight and a clear vision, to realise the nature of the French peril. He took immediate steps to remove it. Besides trying to destroy French influence in Indian courts and armies and disbanding the European-trained armies of the Nizām, he planned expeditions against the Isle of France, as from the beginning of the Revolutionary Wars French privateers used it as a base to prey upon English shipping in the Indian Ocean; but they could not be carried into effect owing to the refusal of Admiral Rainier, commander of the British squadron, to co-operate with him. He also contemplated the capture of Batavia, the capital of the Dutch East Indies. In response to an order from home, he sent an expedition to the Red Sea under the command of Sir

David Baird in 1801. The French at Alexandria had already capitulated before Baird's party reached Cairo. Wellesley did not restore to the French their settlements in India after the Peace of Amiens, which was but a temporary truce of thirteen months.

The French still persisted in their anti-English intrigues in India. Decaen, the newly-appointed Captain-General of the French in India, tried fruitlessly to secure Indian allies and also encouraged French privateers to capture British vessels in the Indian seas. The English were, however, finally freed from the French menace by the year 1814–1815. This synchronised with the attempt of Lord Hastings to establish British paramountcy in India.

4. Hyderābād

We have seen that after his defeat at Kharda, the Nizām in utter disgust turned to the French for support and freely admitted Frenchmen into his court and army. When Lord Wellesley arrived in India, Frenchmen "of the most virulent principles of Jacobinism", as Wellesley himself said, dominated the Nizām.

But Wellesley was determined to exterminate French influence and intrigues in India and to extend British control over the Indian powers. Circumstances favoured his policy. The Nizām had been somewhat pacified by British assistance given him during the rebellion of his son 'Ālī Jāh in 1797; he had by this time become suspicious of the growing French influence; and his minister Mīr Ālam, a friend of the English, had been urging him to form an amicable settlement with the English. Wellesley's first step was to persuade the Nizām to conclude a subsidiary treaty on the 1st September, 1798, which provided for the maintenance and payment of a force of six battalions by the Nizām, the subordination of his external relations to the control of the English, and the expulsion of European officers belonging to other nationalities from his territory. The French-trained troops of the Nizām were disbanded by Malcolm and Kirkpatrick, and he proved to be a sincere ally of the Company in its war against Tipu, for which, as we have already noted, he was rewarded with portions of the Mysore kingdom. As the treaty of 1798 was of a temporary nature, a "perpetual and general defensive alliance" was formed between the English and the Nizām on the 12th October, 1800, whereby the subsidiary force was increased, for the maintenance of which the Nizām surrendered to the English all the territories he had got as spoils of the Mysore Wars in 1792 and 1798. He also agreed

not to enter into political relations with other powers without the permission of the English. Nizām 'Ālī died in 1803, and his successor, Sikandar Jāh, had no hesitation in confirming all the previous treaties with the English. By a treaty concluded in the time of Lord Hastings, on the 12th December, 1822, readjustment of territories was effected, and the Nizām was exempted from the payment of arrears of tribute to the Peshwā.

The subsidiary alliance guaranteed protection to the Hyderābād State against external aggression; but it produced some disastrous consequences in its internal administration. As a natural sequel to the habit of dependence on another power, the Hyderābād rulers of this period lost all initiative for good and efficient government, and their country became subject to various disruptive forces, as was also the case with many other provinces of contemporary India, like Bengal, Oudh and the Carnatic, while the kingdom of Tipu, who was not a subsidiary ruler, was in a flourishing condition. "Conceive of a country," observed the Duke of Wellington, "in every village of which there are from twenty to thirty horsemen, who have been dismissed from the service of the State, and who have no means of living except by plunder. In this country there is no law, no civil government . . . no inhabitant can, or will, remain to cultivate, unless he is protected by an armed force stationed in the village. This is the outline of the state of the countries of the Peshwā and the Nizām."

5. The Carnatic

The existence of dual government in the Carnatic, no less disastrous and oppressive to its people than the dual government of Bengal, could certainly not be tolerated by Lord Wellesley, a man of strong determination and highly imperialistic instincts. To bring the Carnatic under the supreme control of the Company by cutting out this "festering sore" seemed to him to be an almost imperative need for the extension of his favourite principle, which he thus enunciated later on: "The Company with relation to its territory in India must be viewed in the capacity of a sovereign power." But "the method he employed was unfortunate and laid him open to the charge of sophistical dealing". Certain documents discovered at Seringapatam proved, according to the Governor-General, that both Muhammad 'Ālī and Omdut-ul-Umarā, who died on the 15th July, 1801, carried on secret and treasonable correspondence with Tipu Sultān. He declared that they had thus "placed themselves in the condition of public enemies" and had forfeited their right to

the throne of the Carnatic. He ignored the claim of 'Ālī Husain, son of the deceased Nawāb, to his father's territory, and on the 25th July, 1801, concluded a treaty with 'Āzīm-ud-daulah, a nephew of Omdut-ul-Umarā, who was thereby installed as the nominal Nawāb of the Carnatic. He was guaranteed a pension of one-fifth of its revenues, and the entire civil and military administration of the province was taken over by the Company. The assumption of the Carnatic government was declared by Wellesley as "perhaps the most salutary and useful measure which has been adopted since the acquisition of the *Dewanny* (*Diwānī*) of Bengal"; and writers like Thornton, Owen, and some others, have tried to vindicate his policy in every way. But it earned Mill's severe criticism. The documents in question did not prove the treachery of the Carnatic Nawābs. Wellesley could have frankly declared what his object was, and could have given effect to it in a more straightforward manner.

6. Tanjore and Surāt

The rulers of Tanjore and Surāt were also compelled by Wellesley to surrender their administrative powers to the Company, and to remain content with "empty titles" and "guaranteed pensions". As for Tanjore, a Marātha principality founded by Shivājī's father, Shāhjī, a disputed succession gave Wellesley an opportunity to intervene in its affairs and thus persuade its ruler to conclude a subsidiary treaty on the 25th October, 1799. By this treaty the whole civil and military administration of this kingdom passed to the Company in return for a pension of £40,000 per annum. A similar fate befell the principality of Surāt. Since 1759 the Company had undertaken its defence on behalf of the Mughul Emperor, while its Nawāb retained the civil administration. But the Nawābs of Surāt were unable to pay all the sums required by the Company for the expenses of the garrison it maintained in that State. When the old Nawāb of Surāt died on the 8th January, 1799, Lord Wellesley, in a high-handed manner, forced his brother and legitimate successor, to surrender the whole administration of the territory to the Company in March, 1800. Thus Wellesley committed, in the opinion of Mill, "the most unceremonious act of dethronement which the English had yet performed, as the victim was the weakest and most obscure". Beveridge unhesitatingly declares that "the whole proceeding was characterised by tyranny and injustice".

7. The Fate of Oudh

Loss of independence was the price which the kingdom of Oudh paid for her long-continued internal bankruptcy, in the time of Wellesley. The Governor-General was convinced that, for the effective security of the north-western frontier, Oudh must be brought definitely under British control. In his private letter to John Lumsden, the Company's Resident at Oudh, he expressed his determination to take possession of the Doāb with a view to strengthening the Company's north-western frontier; to substitute for the Nawāb's troops "an increased number of the Company's regiments of infantry and cavalry, to be relieved from time to time and to be paid by His Excellency (the Nawāb); and to dislodge from Oudh every European excepting the Company's servants". The immediate execution of these projects was obstructed by an unfortunate incident at Benares, where, on the 14th January, 1799, Wāzīr 'Ālī, bitterly resentful of his position, massacred several Englishmen, including Mr. Cherry, the British Resident. He was in fact trying to organise a widespread conspiracy against the Company, had confederates in Bihār and Bengal, and even sought to secure the help of Zamān Shāh of Kābul, who threatened an invasion of Hindustān. But he was captured by a British force and sent to Fort William, where he spent his days in confinement till his death in A.D. 1817.

It was not possible for Wellesley to charge the Nawāb of Oudh, who had all along been faithful to the Company, with treason or insubordination, as he had done in the case of the ruler of the Carnatic. But he had a convenient pretext, in the threat of Zamān Shāh to invade Hindustān, for demanding from the Nawāb of Oudh the disbandment of his own army and the increase of the Company's forces. After some resistance, the Nawāb, under pressure from the British Resident, Colonel Scott, announced his intention to abdicate. Considering this proposal to be an excellent means for the establishment of "the sole and exclusive authority of the Company within the province of Oudh and its dependencies", the Governor-General wrote to the Court of Directors that it was his intention "to profit by the event to the utmost practicable extent". But when Wellesley sought to exclude the Nawāb's sons from succession to the *masnad* of Oudh, the Nawāb withdrew his announcement of abdication. This made the Governor-General furious. He declared himself "extremely disgusted at the duplicity and insincerity which mark the conduct of the Nawāb-Vazir on the present occasion", and now presented to the Nawāb a draft treaty

which considerably increased the number of Company's troops and the amount of the subsidy that was to be paid. The Nawāb advanced some reasonable objections on the strength of former treaties; but Wellesley rejected these and forced him to submit to his demands. This was not enough to satisfy the Governor-General. He again compelled the Nawāb to conclude a treaty on the 10th November, 1801, by which the latter had to surrender the rich and valuable tracts of Rohilkhand and the Lower Doāb, that is, the territories lying between the Ganges and the Jumnā, covering almost half of his dominions. Thus Oudh was encircled by British territory except on the north; and the British possessions now confronted Sindhia along the entire line of his dominions in Northern India. These were indeed advantages of great importance for the Company. "The rectification of our military frontier, and the territorial isolation of the Nabob (Nawāb)," as Owen rightly says, "were not only parts of a larger scheme, but in themselves measures of obvious importance, especially at such a crisis."

Wellesley's treatment of Oudh has been condemned not only by Mill but also by most of the other historians Even Dr. H. H. Wilson admits that the negotiations with the Nawāb were carried on in an objectionable manner. Sir Alfred Lyall, not indeed always a hostile critic of Wellesley, considers that, in his dealings with Oudh, Wellesley "subordinated the feelings and interests of his ally to paramount considerations of British policy in a manner that showed very little patience, forbearance, or generosity". The Court of Directors also condemned it. British intervention did not at once bring peace and good government to the kingdom. The evils of administration were aggravated here, as in the other States which had accepted subsidiary alliances, till the kingdom was annexed subsequently on the charge of misgovernment. It may be said that the subsidiary treaties of Wellesley in a sense prepared the ground for Dalhousie's annexations in certain cases.

8. Anglo-Gurkhā Relations and the Nepāl War (1814–1816)

Taking advantage of internal struggles among the old ruling clans of the Nepāl valley, the Gurkhās, a tribe of the Western Himālayas, conquered it in A.D. 1768. They gradually built up a powerful State possessing considerable military strength and naturally seeking outlets for expansion. Their attempts at a northern push being checked by the great Chinese Empire, they advanced towards the south, and during the early nineteenth

century they extended their dominion as far as the River Tista on the east and the Sutlej on the west, so that they were then "in actual possession of the whole of the strong country which skirts the northern frontier of Hindustān". With the occupation of the Gorakhpur district by the Company in 1801, the territories of the Gurkhās in the Tarāi became conterminous with the uncertain and ill-defined northern frontier of the British dominion, and the border districts became subject to the incessant inroads of the Gurkhās. Sir George Barlow remonstrated without any effect, and in the time of Lord Minto the Gurkhās conquered Butwal, lying north of what is now known as the Basti district, and Sheoraj, farther to the east. These were regained by the English without open hostilities. But the conflicting interests of the Gurkhās and the English made an appeal to arms inevitable.

An unprovoked attack by the Gurkhās on three police-stations in Butwal in the month of May, 1814, was followed in October by a declaration of war against them by the Governor-General, Lord Hastings. Lord Hastings himself planned the campaign. He decided to attack the enemy simultaneously at four different points along the entire line of the frontier from the Sutlej to the Kosi, and also tried "to corrupt the fidelity of the Nepālese Government". But to vanquish the hardy Nepālese did not prove to be a very easy task, on account of their peculiar tactics and brilliant qualities as soldiers, the lack of knowledge on the part of the British soldiers of the geographical difficulties of the mountainous region, and the incompetence of the British generals with the exception of Ochterlony. So the British campaign of 1814–1815 was attended with reverses. Major-Generals Marley and John Sullivan Wood, who were required to advance towards the Nepāl capital from Patna and Gorakhpur respectively, retreated after some unsuccessful attempts; General Gillespie lost his life through his "indiscreet daring" in assaulting the mountain-fortress of Kalanga; and Major-General Martindell was defeated before the stronghold of Jaitak. But these losses of the English were more than retrieved when Colonels Nicolls and Gardner captured Almora in Kumāon in April, 1815, and General Ochterlony compelled the brave Gurkhā leader, Amar Singh Thapa, to surrender the fort of Malaon on the 15th May, 1815. In view of the hopelessness of further resistance, the Gurkhās signed a treaty at Sagauli on the 28th November, 1815.

Under the influence of the war party in Nepāl, its Government hesitated to ratify the treaty and hostilities began again. Ochterlony, now in supreme command of the British troops, advanced within fifty miles of the capital of Nepāl and defeated the Nepālese at

Makwanpur on the 28th February, 1816. This led the Nepāl Government to ratify the treaty early in March next. In accordance with this the Nepālese gave up their claims to places in the lowlands along their southern frontier, ceded to the English the districts of Garhwāl and Kumāon on the west of Nepāl, withdrew from Sikkim, and agreed to receive a British Resident at Katmandu. These were indeed important gains for the English. The north-west frontier of their dominions now reached the mountains. They obtained sites for important hill-stations and summer capitals like Simla, Mussoorie, Almora, Ranikhet, Landour and Naini Tāl; and also greater facilities for communications with the regions of Central Asia. The Nepāl Government has ever since remained true to its alliance with the English. By a treaty with the Rājā of Sikkim, dated the 10th February, 1817, a tract ceded by the Nepālese was given to him, and this created a barrier between the eastern frontier of Nepāl and Bhutān.

9. Suppression of the Pindarī and Pathān Hordes, and Extension of British Paramountcy over Rājputāna and Central India

While the principal Indian powers were falling one by one before the growing British supremacy, Central India remained steeped in utter confusion and anarchy due to the turbulence and nefarious activities of predatory hordes like the Pindarīs and the Pathāns. In Rājputāna it was also partly due to the feudal rivalries among its different states, and partly to the ravages associated with the Marātha penetration into it during the second half of the eighteenth century. The continuance of this state of things over a wide area could not be tolerated by the English at a time when they were trying to establish their paramountcy over India. So after the close of the Nepāl war, Lord Hastings turned to deal with these disturbed regions, particularly because the Pindarīs had recently carried their raids into British territory and were also enlisted as mercenaries in the armies of the hostile Marātha chiefs.

A. The Pindarī War

The Pindarīs[1] were a horde of cruel marauders, who from their headquarters in Central India ravaged and plundered the neighbouring

[1] "Many different conjectures have been offered as to the etymology of the term Pindarry. The most popular one among the natives is that they derived it from their dissolute habits leading them constantly to resort to the shops of the sellers of an intoxicating drink termed Pinda." (Malcolm, *Memoir of Central India*, Vol. I, p. 433.)

regions as well as some distant areas. They were heard of towards the close of the seventeenth century during the Mughul-Marātha wars in the Deccan. The general political disorders of the eighteenth century led them to take to organised plundering and robbery as a profession, just as the failure of the Dual Government and the consequent disorders in Bengal led to the rise and prevalence of widespread dacoities in that province for the greater part of the second half of the eighteenth century. The Pindarīs were employed as auxiliary forces in the Marātha armies and enjoyed the protection of Marātha chiefs like Sindhia and Holkar. In 1794 Sindhia granted them some settlements in Mālwa near the Narmadā. We get an idea of their organisation from contemporary English writers. One of them, Sir John Malcolm, writes: "The Pindarries, who had risen, like masses of putrefaction in animal matter, out of the corruption of weak and expiring States, had fortunately none of those bonds of union which unite men in adversity. They had neither the tie of religion nor of national feeling. They were men of all lands and all religions. They had been brought together less by despair than by deeming the life of a plunderer, in the actual state of India, as one of small hazard, but great indulgence. . . . The Pindarries, when they came to a rich country, had neither the means nor inclination, like the Tartars, to whom also they have been compared, to settle and repose. Like swarms of locusts, acting from instinct, they destroyed and left waste whatever province they visited." They generally avoided pitched battles; and plunder was their principal object, for which they perpetrated horrible cruelties on all whom they could get hold of. "They avoid fighting," wrote Captain Sydenham in a memorandum on the Pindarīs drawn up in 1809, "for they come to plunder, not to fight." Under their powerful leaders, Hiru, Buran, Chitu, Wasil Muhammad and Karim Khān, they extended their depredations far and wide. In 1812 they harried the British districts of Mirzāpur and Shāhābād. During 1815–1816 they devastated the Nizām's dominions and early in 1816 wantonly plundered the Northern Sarkārs.

But Lord Hastings had by this time formed a strong determination to suppress them, for which he received in September, 1816, the sanction of the Court of Directors. He was shrewd enough to come to an understanding with the principal Indian powers, before he launched his operations for the final extermination of the Pindarīs towards the close of 1817. He effected careful and vigorous military preparations with a view to rounding them up from all sides—on the north and east from Bengal, on the west

from Gujarāt and on the south from the Deccan. He assembled together a large army of 113,000 men and 300 guns and divided it into two parts—the northern force of four divisions being placed under his personal command and the Deccan force of five divisions under the command of Thomas Hislop, who had Sir John Malcolm as his principal lieutenant. By the end of 1817 the British troops succeeded in expelling the Pindarīs from Mālwa and across the Chambal, and by the close of January, 1818, they were practically exterminated. Karim Khān, one of their powerful leaders, surrendered to Sir John Malcolm on the 18th February, 1818, and was given the small estate of Gawshpur in the United Provinces. Wasil Muhammad, who had taken refuge with Sindhia, was handed over by the Marātha chief to the English and died while in captivity at Ghāzīpur. Chitu was chased from place to place until he was devoured by a tiger in a jungle near Asīrgarh. Thus Malcolm wrote about five years later: ". . . the Pindaries are so effectually destroyed that their name is almost forgotten." Most of the survivors "mingled with the rest of the population", and some became "active improving farmers".

B. Suppression of the Pathāns

Many Pathāns at this time took to the habits of a predatory horde like the Pindarīs. "They commanded," notes Prinsep, a contemporary writer, "forces of a different description from those of the Pindaree chiefs. . . . Indeed, the grand difference between the two classes was, that the Pathans were banded together for the purpose of preying on Governments and powerful chiefs: to this end their force moved about with the materials of regular battles and sieges, so as to work on the fears of princes and men in power, extorting contributions and other advantages from them, by such intimidation as an efficient army could only impress: while the object of the Pindarees was universal plunder". They became powerful under their leaders, Muhammad Shāh Khān and Amīr Khān, and served as military adventurers under some of the Rājput and Marātha chiefs of the time. From about 1799 Amīr Khān became intimately associated with Holkar's government. Amīr Khān became more formidable when, after the death of Muhammad Shāh Khān in 1814, the latter's troops joined him; and his depredations and plunders were carried on with greater force. The Company's Government decided to detach this powerful Pathān chief from the other predatory bands, and, after some negotiations, persuaded him to come to terms on the

9th November, 1817. He was recognised as the Nawāb of Tonk by the English and also by Holkar. The suppression of the Pindarīs and the alliance with Amīr Khān relieved India of a terrible pest, subversive of political order, public peace and social tranquillity.

C. Extension of British Paramountcy over Rājputāna and Central India

The Governor-Generalship of Lord Hastings also witnessed the establishment of British influence over the Rājput States and some minor states of Central India. Rājputāna had indeed a tragic history in the eighteenth century. The lords of Rājasthān had generally speaking lost the heroism and chivalry of their ancestors; and their land, distracted by dynastic quarrels (particularly between Jaipur and Jodhpur) and pseudo-chivalry, became a prey to external aggressions of the Marāthas, the Pindarīs and the Pathāns. These inroads resulted in anarchy, plunder, economic ruin and moral degradation and "ended only with the total ruin and humiliation of this noble race (the Rājputs)". Utterly bankrupt, the historic land of Rājasthān readily acknowledged British supremacy at a time when the English had vanquished the leading Indian powers.

Rājput alliance had been a potential factor in the consolidation of Mughul rule in India; the Marāthas under the third Peshwā failed to utilise it for their *Hindu-Pād-Pādshāhī;* and its value was realised by Lord Hastings even when the Rājputs had become "a played-out race". The Governor-General was satisfied that an alliance with the Rājput States would give "immense strategic advantages for the Company's military and political positions in Central India", and would place at the disposal of the Company "the resources of the Rājput country, for defensive and offensive purposes, against the internal as well as external enemies of the Company". So with the sanction of the home authorities he opened negotiations with the following Rājput States, which, one by one, entered into treaties of "defensive alliance, perpetual friendship, protection and subordinate co-operation" with the Company: the State of Kotah, then under the able guidance of Zalim Singh, on the 26th December, 1817; Udaipur on the 16th January, 1818, Bundi on the 10th February, 1818; Kishangarh, near Ajmer, and Bikāner, in March, 1818; Jaipur on the 2nd April, 1818; the three kingdoms of Pratāpgarh, Banswārā and Dungarpur, branches of the Udaipur house and situated on the border of Gujarāt, on the 5th October, 5th

December, and 11th December, 1818, respectively; Jaisalmer on the 12th December, 1818; and Sirohi in 1823.

Thus the Rājput States, who were, as Lord Hastings himself said, "natural allies" of the Company, sacrificed their independence for protection and accepted British paramountcy. It is difficult to agree with Prinsep that the "good government and tranquillity" of Rājputāna were "the exclusive aims" of the Company in interfering in its affairs. In fact, the guiding considerations of Lord Hastings in his relations with the Rājput States were political "expediency and convenience" and strategic advantages.

The Nawāb of Bhopal entered into a treaty of "defensive and subordinate alliance" with the Company, and Jaorā being created an independent entity by the Treaty of Mandasor with the Holkar was given to Ghafur Khān, son-in-law of Amīr Khān, Nawāb of Tonk, in return for the help he rendered to Sir John Malcolm. The minor States of Mālwa and Bundelkhand also acknowledged British supremacy. A band of able British officers effected the work of reconstruction and administrative consolidation in these States: Elphinstone in the Western Deccan, Munro in Madras, Malcolm in Central India, and Metcalfe, Tod and Ochterlony in Rājputāna. Students of Indian history have special reason to be grateful to most of them for the valuable works they have left behind, particularly Tod's *Rājasthān* and Malcolm's *Memoir of Central India*.

Thus the close of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century saw the fall of those Indian powers which arose or revived on the decline of the Mughul Empire and contended for political supremacy; and as a result of a number of political and military transactions, the British Government became the paramount power over a dominion extending from the Himālayas to Cape Comorin and from the Sutlej to the Brahmaputra. Clive sowed the seed of the British Empire in India; Warren Hastings preserved it against hostile forces; Wellesley reared it; and Lord Hastings reaped the harvest. Delhi, Oudh, Mysore, Hyderābād, the Carnatic, Surāt and Tanjore passed under British control, for all practical purposes, in the time of Wellesley. Lord Hastings pushed further the bounds of British imperialism. He shattered the Marātha power beyond any hope of recovery and extinguished the Peshwāship, established British control over Central India, and persuaded the weak and harassed Rājput States to barter away their independence for British protection. Another significant step taken by him was the formal abolition of the fiction of the Mughul Government. Mughul supremacy

had ceased to exist in fact more than half a century earlier. All the attempts of the Emperor Shāh 'Ālam II to restore it proved futile; and he had to spend his days in pitiable circumstances, sometimes as a wanderer seeking help hither and thither and sometimes at Delhi amidst the ruins of its ancient greatness. His name and personality were utilised for their own purposes by the Marāthas, the English, and probably also by the French. Warren Hastings stopped the payment of the Bengal tribute to the Emperor on the ground that he had placed himself under the protection of the Marāthas; and his successors gradually declared the Company's freedom from obligations to the descendant of the Great Mughuls. After Delhi had come under British control in 1803, Shāh 'Ālam II lived virtually as a pensioner of the Company till he closed his eyes for ever in 1806. His successor, Ākbar II, was asked by Lord Hastings to give up all ceremonial "implying supremacy over the Company's dominions" and it was not long before the titular dignity of the Mughul Rāj finally disappeared.

CHAPTER V

EXPANSION OF THE BRITISH DOMINION BEYOND THE BRAHMAPUTRA AND THE SUTLEJ, 1824–1856

1. Factors in the Political History of this Period

REFERRING to the achievements of Lord Hastings, who left India on the 1st January, 1823, Prinsep, a contemporary writer, observed: "The struggle which has thus ended in the universal establishment of British influence, is particularly important and worthy of attention, as it promises to be the *last* we shall ever have to maintain with the native powers of India." But this optimistic prophecy did not turn out to be wholly true. There is no doubt that by the year 1823 the greater part of India, extending from the Sutlej to the Brahmaputra and from the Himālayas to Cape Comorin, fell under British control. But there were beyond the western and eastern limits already reached by the British arms, powers whose activities had been a source of great anxiety to the Mughuls and whose subjugation was indispensably necessary for the rising British power before it could establish an all-India Empire on a firm and secure basis. In short, an Indian Empire, without effective control over the western and eastern frontiers of the country, was an idle dream. This was proved by the subsequent conflicts of the English with the Sikhs, the Sindhis, the Pathān and Baloch tribes of the north-west frontier, and the Afghāns beyond the Khyber Pass, and with the Burmese and the Assamese to the east of the Brahmaputra. Further, the growth of the new political authority inevitably gave rise to varied problems. It clashed with the interests of some who continued to nurse against it a feeling of discontent. This was aggravated by the Company's policy of annexation and led to a violent outburst in the Revolt of 1857–1859, when British supremacy in India was put to a severe test. The foreign policy of the Company during this period received a new orientation. Sir Alfred Lyall observes: "As the expansion of our dominion carried us so much nearer to foreign Asiatic countries, our rapid approach to the geographical limits of India proper discovered for us fresh complications and we were now on the brink of collision

with new races." Hitherto the Company's external policy had been influenced by French projects and ambitions in the Near and Middle East and in India. The French menace disappeared with the fall of Napoleon, but Russia now stepped into the place of France. The expansion of Russia in Asia, and her various ambitious enterprises in the East, proved to be the dominating factor in the foreign policy of the East India Company in the post-Waterloo period.

2. The Eastern Frontier and the Burmese Wars

A. The First Anglo-Burmese War

When Lord Hastings left India, Mr. John Adam, a senior member of the Council, acted as Governor-General till the arrival of Lord Amherst, who took charge of his office on coming to India in August, 1823. The most important event of the new Governor-General's regime was the First Anglo-Burmese War.

The English had had commercial intercourse with Burma since the seventeenth century. But the growth of their Indian dominion, and at the same time the establishment of the sway of a Tibeto-Chinese race over Arākān, Pegu and Tenāsserim, situated south of Chittāgong, during the second half of the eighteenth century, brought the two powers into political relations in the nineteenth century. About 1750 a Burman chief named Ālomprā conquered the province of Pegu from the Tailangas in the delta of the Irrāwaddy and established there a strong monarchy. His successors, notably Bodawpaya who reigned from 1779 to 1819 and was followed by Hpagyidoa, extended the kingdom in different directions. The Burmese seized Tenāsserim from Siam in 1766; subjugated the hitherto independent kingdom of Arākān in 1784, and conquered Manipur, near the Surma valley, in 1813.

The advance of the Burmese towards the eastern frontier of the Company's dominion, which continued to remain "very ill-defined and variable", made an Anglo-Burmese conflict inevitable. But being engaged seriously in other parts of India, the Calcutta Government tried at first to prevent an immediate rupture by sending envoys to Burma—Captain Symes in 1795 and again in 1802; Captain Cox in 1797; and Captain Canning in 1803, 1809, 1811. The envoys were not treated well and the missions proved unsuccessful. The refusal of the Company's Government to comply with Burmese demands for the surrender of fugitives who, fleeing from the territories conquered by the Burmese, took shelter on the British border and from their new base made inroads into

Burmese territories, served to render relations more strained. Thus when the English were engaged in suppressing the Pindarīs, the King of Avā sent a letter to Lord Hastings demanding the surrender of Chittāgong, Dacca, Murshidābād and Cāssimbāzār, which in medieval times paid tribute to the ruler of Arākān. The Pindarī menace was over before Hastings received this letter. The Governor-General returned it to the Burmese king with the comment that it was perhaps a forgery.

But the Burmese commanders soon conquered Assam in 1821–1822 and thus came directly in contact with the ill-defined British frontier on the north-east. They further captured in September, 1823, the Shāhpurī island, near Chittāgong, belonging to the Company, drove away the British outposts from that island to Dudpatli and made preparations for an attack on the Company's territories in Bengal. This was too much for the English to bear, and Lord Amherst, the Governor-General, declared war on the 24th February, 1824. The Burmese had the best means of defence in the physical features of their country, "which was one vast expanse of forest and morass, laced longitudinally by mountain ranges and the valleys of the Irrāwāddy, Sittang and Salween". Further, though in open fighting the Burmese soldiers were a poor match for the trained British troops, yet they were expert in quickly preparing stockades of timber and in "throwing up earth-works and sinking rifle-pits". The British plan was to attack Rangoon by sea, and they sent an expedition under General Sir Archibald Campbell, with 11,000 men, mostly recruited from Madras, and with ships under Captain Marryat, the novelist.

The British troops were able to expel the Burmese from Assam, but Bandulā, the ablest of the Burmese generals who had advanced to invade Bengal, repelled a British detachment at Rāmu on the Chittāgong frontier. This could not, however, prevent a British attack on Rangoon, which was captured by Campbell on the 11th May, 1824. Without resisting the invaders, the Burmese fled into the jungles of Pegu carrying with them all kinds of supplies. The British troops were put to great hardships for lack of provisions. Their difficulties were aggravated by the unhealthiness of the place due to the rains. Their sufferings were terrible till the close of the rainy season. In the meanwhile, Bandulā had been recalled to relieve the Burmese and had arrived before Rangoon on the 1st December with 60,000 men. He was, however, defeated on the 15th December and retreated to Donābew, where he held out bravely till the beginning of April, 1825, when he was killed by a chance shot. This was indeed a terrible loss to the Burmese.

Campbell occupied Prome, the capital of Lower Burma, on the 25th April and spent the rainy season there. After some futile negotiations for peace, fighting recommenced towards the end of 1825. The British troops having baffled all the opposition of the Burmese marched to Yandāboo, within sixty miles of the Burmese capital. On the 24th February, 1826, the Burmese concluded a treaty, the terms of which, as dictated by Campbell, provided for the payment of a crore of rupees as war indemnity by the King of Avā; the absolute surrender by him of the provinces of Arākān and Tenāsserim; abstention of the Burmese from interference of any kind in Assam, Cāchār and Jaintiā; their recognition of Manipur as an independent State; the conclusion of a commercial treaty "upon principles of reciprocal advantages"; and the admission of a British Resident at Avā, a Burmese envoy being allowed to come to Calcutta. A commercial treaty of a rather unsatisfactory nature was concluded on the 23rd November, 1826; and a British Resident was not accepted until 1830. From 1830 to 1840, the Residency was held successively by Major Burney and Colonel Benson. King Hpagyidoa, being seized with melancholia, was deposed in May, 1837, in favour of his brother Tharrawaddy and was kept in confinement till he expired.

There is no doubt that the English secured important advantages out of the First Anglo-Burmese War. They deprived the Burmese of the greater part of their sea-coast, and Assam, Cāchār and Manipur became practically their protectorates. But this cost them much in men and money, owing largely to the inefficiency and blunders both of the Governor-General, who being a man of mediocre abilities could not pursue a strong and consistent policy, and of the generals, who did not possess sufficient initiative to act promptly according to the needs of the situation. But for the timely despatch of reinforcements in men and provisions by Sir Thomas Munro, the Governor of Madras, the British troops in Burma would have been subject to greater hardships and the whole expedition might have been a failure. Though ultimately defeated, the Burmese soldiers, who, as Phayre admits, "fought under conditions which rendered victory . . . impossible" for them, deserve credit for the manner in which they tried bravely to resist the invaders and the skill they displayed in building stockades. A writer competent in such matters has asserted that "the position and defences at Donoobew, as a field-work, would have done credit to the most scientific engineer".

The early reverses and difficulties of the British in Burma gave rise to a conviction in certain quarters that the British dominion

was faced with impending ruin. This resulted in risings in some places. In Bharatpur, the claim of the minor son of a deceased ruler, who had been placed on the throne with the consent of Sir David Ochterlony, the British Resident at Delhi, was contested by his cousin, Durjan Sal. Lord Amherst at first followed a policy of non-intervention, and disapproved of the conduct of Sir David Ochterlony in trying to enforce his decision at the point of the sword, which led to the latter's resignation and the appointment of Sir Charles Metcalfe in his place. Sir David Ochterlony, an old man in bad health, soon died. The new Resident, Sir Charles Metcalfe, urged the necessity of vindicating the prestige of the British Government by opposing the pretensions of the usurper and won over the Governor-General to his view. An expedition was eventually sent under Lord Combermere, who in January, 1826, stormed the fortress of Bharatpur, which had resisted the attacks of Lord Lake in 1805. Durjan Sal was deported. Another disturbance that demands notice was the mutiny of the Sepoys at Bārrāckpore, which "was only quelled after the mutinous regiments had been fired upon by the British artillery and the parade-ground made a shambles".

B. The Second Anglo-Burmese War

Something more was needed even after the gains of the First Anglo-Burmese War to establish effective British control on the eastern frontier of India. The new King of Burma, Tharrawaddy (1837–1845), refused to consider the Treaty of Yandāboo to be binding on him, and technically his action was "within the Burmese constitution, whereby all existing rights lapsed at a new King's accession until he chose to confirm them". But this was opposed to British interests, which were affected also in other ways. The British Residents at the court of Avā did not receive courteous treatment, for which reason the Residency had to be finally withdrawn in 1840, and British merchants, who had settled on the southern coast of Burma after the treaty of 1826, complained of oppression at the hands of the Governor of Rangoon. The merchants asked the Calcutta Government to intervene in the matter in order to redress their grievances. Lord Dalhousie sent a frigate under Commodore Lambert to Pagan, the new King of Burma (1845–1852), who had succeeded to the throne after his father, Tharrawaddy, had been put under restraint on the ground of his insanity, to demand compensation for the losses of the British merchants and to ask for the removal of the governor of Rangoon.

If the Governor-General sincerely desired a peaceful settlement, his object was not fulfilled by the despatch of a Commodore, which has rightly been considered to be an unnecessarily provocative measure. Dalhousie himself observed later on that "these commodores are too combustible for negotiations".

The King of Burma, inclined to avoid war, gave a courteous reply to Lambert's demands, removed the old governor and sent a new officer to settle the matter peacefully. But when a deputation of some senior naval officers sent by Lambert to the new governor was refused admission on the pretext that he was asleep, the British Commodore felt insulted, declared the port of Rangoon to be in a state of blockade and seized a ship of the Burmese king's. At this the Burmese batteries opened fire on the British frigate and the British Commodore returned the fire.

It appears from some documents that Lambert acted contrary to the Governor-General's orders and the latter censured his precipitancy. But he did not disavow the Commodore's act but rather "accepted the responsibility" for it and sent an ultimatum to the Burmese Government demanding compensation and an indemnity of £100,000, to be paid by the 1st April, 1852. At the same time, vigorous preparations were made under his personal supervision for the impending conflict with the Burmese so that the blunders of the First Anglo-Burmese War might be avoided. His ultimatum received no reply, and on the day it expired, 1st April, 1852, British forces under General Godwin, a veteran of the First Anglo-Burmese War, and Admiral Austen, reached Rangoon. Martabān fell quickly; the famous pagoda of Rangoon was stormed on the 14th April; and Bassein, situated on the north-west corner of the Irrāwaddy delta, was captured about a month later. Dalhousie went to Rangoon in September; Prome was occupied in October and Pegu in November. The Governor-General had no desire to advance into Upper Burma but stipulated that the conquests in the lower part of the country should be recognised by the King of Burma by a formal agreement On the refusal of the King to conclude such a treaty, he annexed Pegu or Lower Burma by a proclamation on the 20th December, 1852.

By the annexation of Pegu the eastern frontier of the British Indian Empire was extended up to the banks of the Salween. British control was established over the whole of the eastern coast of the Bay of Bengal, and access to the sea was closed to the attenuated Burmese kingdom. Major (afterwards Sir) Arthur Phayre was appointed Commissioner of the newly acquired British province extending as far north as Myede, fifty miles beyond

Prome, and with the co-operation of Captain (afterwards General) Fytche he tried to introduce necessary administrative reforms.

3. British Relations with the Sikhs and Annexation of the Punjab

A. Rise of the Sikh Power

The Sikh struggle for independence from 1708 to 1716 under the temporal leadership of Bāndā came to a disastrous end by the year 1716. Bāndā was tortured to death and his followers were subjected to relentless persecution at the hands of the Mughuls. But the repression could not kill, out and out, the military spirit of the Khālsā. Rather, the growing weakness of the Delhi Empire gave the Sikhs an opportunity to reorganise themselves. The invasion of Nādir Shāh in 1739, and the first three Abdālī inroads (1748–1752), by enfeebling Mughul hold on the Punjab and throwing this province into confusion, enabled the Sikhs to enrich themselves and to enhance their military power as well as political influence. In course of the next few years they "passed through a series of reverses to complete victory". They baffled all the attempts of the Abdālī invader to crush them, and defied him even after his victory at Pānīpat. When he left Lahore for his home on the 12th December, 1762, the Sikhs pursued him, hung about his army and harassed it in every way. Their aggressions were aggravated through the inefficiency of the Abdālī's lieutenants in the Punjab, over which they began to dominate, and they occupied Lahore in February, 1764. "The whole country from the Jhilam to the Satlaj was partitioned among the Sikh chiefs and their followers, as the plains of Sarhind had been in the previous year." They assembled at Amritsar and proclaimed the sway of their commonwealth and faith by striking coins to the effect that Guru Govind had obtained from Nānak *degh*, *tegh*, *fateh*, or grace, power and rapid victory. After the final retirement of Ahmad Shāh Abdālī from India in 1767, the Sikhs wrested his Indian conquests from his weak successor, Tīmūr Shāh; and by the year 1773, Sikh sway extended from Shāhrānpur in the east to Attock in the west, and from Multān in the south to Kangrā and Jammu in the north.

The independence of the Sikhs was thus realised, and they formed themselves into twelve *misls* or confederacies: the Bhangi, the Kanheya, the Sukerchakia, the Nakai, the Fyzullapuria, the Ahluwalia, the Ramgarhia, the Dalewalia, the Karora Singhia, the Nishanwala, the Sahid and Nihang, and the Phulkia. This

organisation of the Sikhs has been described as "theocratic confederate feudalism". But with the disappearance of a common enemy, jealousies and discords appeared among the leaders of the Sikh *misls*, who began to pursue a policy of self-aggrandisement at a time when British imperialism was rapidly expanding over India. To organise the Sikhs into a national monarchy on the destruction of feudalism was the work of a man of destiny, Ranjit Singh, whose rise must be briefly surveyed before we study the relations between the Sikhs and the English.

B. Ranjit Singh

Ranjit Singh was born on the 2nd November, 1780. He was the son of Māhā Singh, the leader of the Sukerchakia *misl*, by his wife of the Jhind family. Unlike Shivājī, Ranjit spent his early life amidst uninspiring surroundings. He was but a boy of twelve when his father died in 1792; and he was then the head only of a small confederacy with a little territory and very limited military resources, while there were many other superior chiefs. But the Indian invasions of Zamān Shāh of Kābul, during 1793–1798, exercised a decisive influence on his career. In return for the conspicuous services that Zamān Shāh received from Ranjit, he appointed him governor of Lahore at the age of nineteen, with the title of Rājā, in A.D. 1798. This grant of office by an Afghān ruler, against whose ambitious ancestor, Ahmad Shāh Abdālī, the Sikhs had fought stubbornly for mastery over the Punjab, marked the beginning of an "astonishingly successful military career", whose exploits resulted in the extinction of Afghān supremacy in the Punjab and the building up of a strong Sikh national monarchy. Ranjit threw off the Afghān yoke before long, and, taking advantage of the differences and quarrels among the chiefs of the Trans-Sutlej *misls*, gradually absorbed them into his kingdom. In 1805 Holkar, pursued by Lord Lake, sought Ranjit's help; but the Sikh chief did not comply with his request. Ranjit Singh was relieved of this new menace by the conclusion of the Treaty of Lahore on the 1st January, 1806, which excluded Holkar from the Punjab and left Ranjit Singh free to carry on his conquests north of the Sutlej.

But Ranjit Singh aimed at supremacy over all the Sikhs. He "laboured", writes Cunningham, "with more or less of intelligent design, to give unity and coherence to diverse atoms and scattered elements, to mould the increasing Sikh nation into a well-ordered state, or commonwealth, as Govind had developed a


sect into a people, and had given application and purpose to the general institutions of Nānak". The realisation of this aim required the establishment of Ranjit Singh's control over the Cis-Sutlej States lying between that river and the Jumnā. The chronic disorders and discords among these Cis-Sutlej States brought upon them Marātha aggressions resulting in the establishment of Marātha influence in the Cis-Sutlej Sikh country after Mahādājī Sindhia's treaty of 1785 with the Sikhs. But subsequently the British succeeded in driving out Sindhia and in bringing the Cis-Sutlej States informally under their protection. Neither the Marāthas nor the English had any sound claim upon them, but in those days of disorder the best claim was "that of the sword".

The rapid successes of Ranjit Singh made his intervention in the affairs of the Cis-Sutlej States inevitable. Quarrels among the local Sikh chiefs, and an appeal for his help by some of them, gave him the pretext for undertaking Cis-Sutlej expeditions in 1806 and 1807 and occupying Ludhiānā. This extension of Ranjit's influence was not liked by some of the Sikh chiefs, who waited upon Mr. Seton, the British Resident at Delhi, in March, 1808, soliciting British help against Ranjit Singh. Their appeal passed unheeded.

But for strategic and diplomatic reasons, the English soon thought it necessary to check Ranjit Singh's eastern advance to the Jumnā. They could not, however, resort to force at once, because it would have been prejudicial to their interests to antagonise a power in the north-west of India in view of the possibility of a French invasion of the country in alliance with the Turks and the Persians. Lord Minto took recourse to diplomacy. With the double object of resisting Ranjit's advance and enlisting his friendship against an apprehended French invasion, he sent Metcalfe on a mission to the Sikh king to negotiate for an offensive and defensive alliance against the French, if they should ever invade India through Persia. Calculating that the British Government stood badly in need of his friendship, Ranjit conquered as much of the Cis-Sutlej territory as he could; and also boldly demanded from the English acknowledgment of his sovereignty over all the Sikh States as the price of the proposed alliance. But in the meanwhile the danger of Napoleon's invasion of India had disappeared owing to his engagement in the Peninsular War, and relations between Turkey and England had improved after the conclusion of the Treaty of the Dardanelles by these powers in January, A.D. 1809.

Encouraged by this change in the political situation, the British Government decided not to purchase Ranjit's alliance at such a

high cost, but "to oppose the extension on the Indian side of the Sutlej of an ambitious military power which would be substituted upon our (British) frontier for a confederacy of friendly chiefs rendered grateful by our protection and interested in our cause". A body of troops was sent under David Ochterlony to enforce the demands of the English. The fear of British arms, and the apprehension that the jealous Sikh States on the east of Sutlej would throw themselves under British protection, led Ranjit to sign a treaty of "perpetual friendship" with the English at Amritsar on the 25th April, 1809. By this treaty, Ranjit's activities



ZAMZAMA

The gun employed at the siege of Multān

were confined to the right side of the Sutlej, and the Cis-Sutlej States came definitely under British protection. The British frontier was extended from the Jumnā to the Sutlej and English troops were stationed at Ludhiānā. Thus Ranjit had to give up the most cherished ideal of his life—that of undisputed mastery over all the Sikhs. Ranjit's "failure to absorb the Cis-Sutlej States was", remarks his latest biographer, "a tragedy of Sikh militant nationalism and the success of the Cis-Sutlej States with the aid of the British Government marked the disruption of the great creation of Guru Govind Singh".

Ranjit's ambition for eastern expansion being thus foiled, it sought outlets in the north, the north-west and the west. He

was successful in his conflicts with the Gurkhās from 1809 to 1811 and captured the Kangrā district. On the 13th July, 1813, he severely defeated the Afghāns at Haidāru and captured Attock, the key to the frontier, which he arranged to have strongly garrisoned. Driven from Afghānistān the Afghān king, Shāh Shujā, sought shelter at Lahore (1813–1814), when Ranjit took from him the world-famous diamond the Koh-i-nūr. Shāh Shujā succeeded in escaping from Lahore in April, 1815, and retired to Ludhiānā within the British sphere of influence. After several attempts, Ranjit captured Multān in 1818 and occupied Kāshmīr in 1819. Peshāwār also became his dependency in 1823. Thus by the year 1824 the largest part of the Indus valley was included within Ranjit's dominions.

With a view to utilising the growing Sikh kingdom as a buffer state against the suspected Russian designs on India, Lord William Bentinck met Ranjit Singh at Rooper on the Sutlej in October, 1831, and managed to get the treaty of alliance with him renewed. On the 6th May, 1834, the citadel of Peshāwār was captured by the Sikh general Hari Singh Naola (Nalwa) and Peshāwār passed formally under Sikh control. But the further ambitions of Ranjit with regard to the Afghāns were restrained by the English. The kingdom of Sindh also felt the impact of Sikh expansion. As a matter of fact, the occupation of Sindh was important to Ranjit as it would increase the compactness of his dominions, because Sindh and the Punjab were "provinces of the Indus as Bengal and Bihār are provinces of the Ganges". But here too he was forestalled and checked by the English. Nevertheless, Ranjit succeeded in establishing a kingdom large in extent and rich in fame, before he died on the 27th June, 1839, at the age of fifty-nine.

Ranjit Singh is one of the most important personalities in the history of modern India. Though his physical appearance was not particularly handsome and an attack of small-pox deprived him of sight in the left eye, he had delightful manners and address and inspiring features. He was, writes Cunningham, "assiduous in his devotions; he honoured men of reputed sanctity, and enabled them to practise an enlarged charity; he attributed every success to the favour of God, and he styled himself and his people collectively the 'Khalsa' or Commonwealth of Govind".

A born ruler of men, Ranjit is entitled to fame chiefly for his success in effecting the marvellous transformation of the warring Sikh States into a compact national monarchy, though his ideal of Pan-Sikhism could not be realised owing to the intervention of the British on behalf of the Cis-Sutlej States. One of his biographers,

Sir Lepel Griffin, observes: "We only succeed in establishing him as a hero, as a ruler of men and as worthy of a pedestal in that innermost shrine where history honours the few human beings to whom may be indisputably assigned the palm of greatness, if we free our minds of prejudice and, discounting conventional virtue, only regard those rare qualities which raise a man supreme above his fellows. Then we shall at once allow that, although sharing in full measure the commonplace and worse vices of his time and education, he yet ruled the country which his military genius had conquered with vigour of will and an ability which placed him in the front rank of the statesmen of the century." Victor Jacquemont, a French traveller to Ranjit's court, described him as "an extraordinary man—a Bonaparte in miniature". Ranjit fully realised the need of a strong army for the task which he had set before himself and so radically changed the feudal levies of the Sikh chiefs, "brave indeed, but ignorant of war as an art", into a strong and efficient national army, which was thoroughly under his command, and which, according to Hunter, "for steadiness and religious fervour has had no parallel since the 'Ironsides' of Oliver Cromwell". The initiative for army reform came from Ranjit himself, and the bulk of his army was formed by the Sikhs. Though he was assisted in this work by European officers of various nationalities like Allard, Ventura, Court, Avitabile, and others, some of whom had experience of the Napoleonic wars in Europe, his army did not become denationalised, and he always maintained a strict control over it. His artillery was very efficient.

Though a great conqueror, Ranjit was not stern by nature but, on the other hand, showed kindness and consideration towards his fallen foes. Baron Carl von Hügel, a German traveller who visited Ranjit's court in 1835, tells us that he never "wantonly imbued his hands in blood. Never perhaps was so large an empire founded by one man with so little criminality". Ranjit was indeed a strong ruler with absolute control over his government, but he was not a tyrant "obsessed by the idea of over-centralisation". In his government "subordinate rights" were preserved; and his civil administration was far from being unduly severe, though it lacked certain features of a well-organised administration like elaborate laws, a fixed judiciary, or an efficient police. A contemporary British officer reports: "In a territory compactly situated, he has applied himself to those improvements which spring only from great minds and here we find despotism without its rigours, a despot without cruelty and a system of government far beyond the native institutions of the East, though far from the civilisation

of Europe." Manufactures and trade flourished in Ranjit's kingdom. English writers have praised the Sikh king for his "statesman-like recognition of the strength of the East India Company, the reliance he placed upon British promises, and his loyalty to his plighted word", in which respect he differed both from Hyder and Tipu. But it is noted by some critics that he displayed a lack of intrepidity and bold statesmanship in his dealings with the English. He created a Sikh kingdom but took no steps to prevent British dominion, of which he had a presentiment when he said "*sab lāl ho jāyegā*"; he chose instead the line of least resistance.

C. The First Anglo-Sikh War

The structure of the Sikh military monarchy built up by Ranjit was not destined to last long. As is the case with such systems, its continuance or growth depended on the guidance of a strong personality, particularly in view of the rapid march of British imperialism in India at that time. The Sikhs were at the height of their power at the time of Ranjit's exit from this world; but "then it exploded", as General Sir J. H. Gordon puts it, "disappearing in fierce but fading flames". As a matter of fact, the death of Ranjit was the signal for the beginning of anarchy and confusion within his dominions, which, being prolonged, greatly weakened the Sikh power and ultimately led to its submission to the English. One weak ruler after another was deposed in quick succession till in 1843 Dalip Singh, a minor, was acknowledged as king with his mother, Rānī Jhindān, as Regent. The struggles and convulsions of the period caused the collapse of the central civil government and resulted in the ascendancy of the Khālsā army through its delegates the *Panchayets* or Committees of five. Unrestrained by any strong authority, the army grew ungovernable and furious, and became the virtual dictator of the State. Unable to control the army or to defy it openly, the Lahore Darbār in its intense anxiety to get rid of this terrible incubus devised the plan of inducing it to invade British territory, in the belief that it would either be totally destroyed in the course of its war with the English or its "super-abundant energies" would be exhausted in a career of conquest. Thus the position was that the Sikh cause was almost doomed before the war broke out owing to the half-heartedness of its leaders; and the English, as Roberts points out, fought "against a fine army without a general, or, at any rate, without one supreme controlling mind".

Besides the activities of the Darbār, some provocative acts on the

part of the English, which served to convince the Sikh army of the desire of "their colossal neighbour" to take their country and destroy their independence, egged it on to enter upon a war. The English sent bodies of troops towards the Sutlej; during 1844 and 1845 they were preparing boats at Bombay with the object of constructing bridges across the Sutlej; troops were equipped in the newly-conquered territory of Sind for an attack on Multān; and the various garrisons in the north-west districts were being gradually strengthened. To the Sikh army, all this was "held to denote", writes Cunningham, "a campaign, not of defence, but of aggression".

Thus the Sikh army's apprehensions of a British attack on the Sikh territory, at a time when the East India Company had been definitely pursuing a policy of annexation, were not unfounded. The Khālsā crossed the Sutlej unopposed on the 11th December, 1845, not through any lack of preparations on the part of the English, whose army in the frontier districts had been already reinforced, and had increased to 40,000 men and 100 guns, but owing to the personal misconceptions and negligence of Major Broadfoot, the British commander at Ferozepore. The Governor-General, Sir Henry (afterwards Lord) Hardinge, promptly rose to the occasion. He issued a proclamation of war on the 13th December, 1845, and declared all Sikh possessions on the left bank of the Sutlej confiscated and annexed to the British dominions. The first battle, fought at Mudki, situated twenty miles to the south-east of Ferozepore, between the combined Ambālā and Ludhiānā branches of the British troops under the command of Sir Hugh Gough and the Sikh army under Lāl Singh, was sharp and bloody. The brave Sikh infantry vigorously charged the Sepoys and European soldiers, who at first reeled before the accurate fire of the enemy. But the supineness of Lāl Singh at a critical moment spoiled the chances of the Sikhs, who were in the end defeated with heavy losses. The English casualties were also heavy: 657 of their soldiers were wounded and 215, including Major-General Sir Robert Sale, the defender of Jalalābād, and Major-General Sir John McCaskill, were killed. The British army next attacked the Sikh entrenchments at Feroze Shāh (Firuzshuhur), about twelve miles from the Sutlej, on the 21st December, 1845. The Sikhs offered a stubborn and formidable resistance and repulsed battalion after battalion by furious firing. The English were indeed faced with a grave situation. "During that night of horrors," the Commander-in-Chief wrote later, "we were in a critical and perilous state." But the brave Sikh warriors were again betrayed by their

general, Tej Singh, who left the field all of a sudden. Thus the Sikhs ultimately gave up the battle, to the immense relief of their adversaries, and retreated across the Sutlej. "Had a guiding mind directed the movements of the Sikh army," observes Malleson, "nothing could have saved the exhausted British." The losses on both sides were heavy. On the English side 694 men were killed, including 103 officers, and 1,721 were wounded; and the Sikhs lost 8,000 men and 73 guns.

After their victory at Feroze Shāh, the British army remained somewhat "paralyzed" for some time waiting for guns, ammunition and stores from Delhi, when the Sikhs again crossed the Sutlej under Ranjur Singh Majhithia in January, 1846, and attacked the frontier station of Ludhiānā. Sir Harry Smith (afterwards governor of Cape Colony), who was sent to check the advance of the Khalsa, was defeated in a skirmish at Buddewal on the 21st January. Reinforced by additional troops, he defeated the Sikhs, in spite of their brave resistance, at Āliwal, to the west of Ludhiānā, on the 28th January, 1846. The vanquished army was deprived of sixty-seven guns and was driven across the Sutlej. The final battle took place at Sobrāon on the Sutlej, where the main body of the Sikh army was strongly entrenched. Here also the Sikh soldiers showed wonderful steadfastness and resolution and fought from the early dawn of the 10th February "with the valour of heroes, the enthusiasm of crusaders, and the desperation of zealots sworn to conquer the enemy or die sword in hand." But all this proved to be of no avail, owing to the half-heartedness and treachery of almost all the Sikh generals with the honourable exception of Shām Singh; and by about one p.m. the Sikhs were defeated and their formidable entrenchments were stormed by the British army. A large number of Sikhs were slaughtered by the infuriated British soldiers, while crossing the Sutlej; on the English side 320 were killed and 2,083 were wounded.

The victory of the English at Sobrāon was of a decisive nature. They were relieved of the danger from "the bravest and steadiest enemy ever encountered in India" which almost shook to the very base the edifice of British dominion in the Upper Provinces. As a reward for these brilliant victories of great significance, the authorities in England, justly jubilant over the fall of the Sikhs, conferred peerages on the Governor-General, Sir Henry Hardinge, and the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Hugh Gough; and freely distributed honours and favours among all ranks.

The Governor-General with the victorious British army crossed the Sutlej by a bridge of boats on the 13th February and occupied

Lahore on the 20th February. The Sikhs, now utterly prostrate, had no alternative but to submit to any arrangement that Lord Hardinge might impose on them. He, however, shrank from complete annexation of the Punjab in view of the necessity of greater forces for this purpose than what he had at his disposal; and he also abstained from the expedient of subsidiary alliance in consideration of the future disadvantages of this course. He dictated a treaty to the vanquished Sikhs in their own capital on the 9th March, 1846. By it the Sikhs were required to cede to the British all territories to the left of the Sutlej, together with the extensive Jullundur Doāb, lying between the Sutlej and the Beas. A heavy war indemnity amounting to one and a half crores of rupees was to be paid by the Lahore Darbār, partly in cash and partly by giving to the British the hill districts between the Beas and the Indus including Kāshmīr and Hazarā. The Sikh army was reduced to 25 battalions of infantry and 12,000 cavalry, and 36 guns, besides those already captured, were surrendered to the English. The Sikhs were prevented from employing any British, European or American subject, and from changing the limits of their territory, without the consent of the British Government. The minor Dalip Singh was recognised as the Mahārājā with Rānī Jhindān as his regent and Lāl Singh as the chief minister. The Governor-General agreed not to interfere in the internal administration of the Lahore State. But it was provided that a British force, sufficient to protect the person of the Mahārājā, should be stationed at Lahore till the close of the year 1846; and Henry Lawrence was appointed British Resident there. To reduce the Lahore State in size, Kāshmīr was sold by the English to Golāb Singh, a *sardār* of the Lahore Darbār, in return for one million sterling, by a separate treaty concluded with him at Amritsar on the 16th March. This arrangement, remarks Cunningham, "was a dexterous one, if reference be only had to the policy of reducing the power of the Sikhs; but the transaction scarcely seems worthy of the British name and greatness, and the objections become stronger when it is considered that Golāb Singh had agreed to pay sixty-eight lacs of rupees as a fine to his paramount authority before the war broke out, and that the custom of the East as well as of the West requires the feudatory to aid his lord in foreign war and domestic strife. Golāb Singh ought thus to have paid the deficient million of money as a Lahore subject, instead of being put in possession of Lahore provinces as an independent prince".

The outbreak of some disorders, particularly an insurrection against Golāb Singh at the instigation of Lāl Singh, who was

dismissed for this offence, led to a revision of the original Lahore treaty on the 16th December, 1846, in such a manner as served to bring the Punjab under the more effective control of the English. It transferred the Lahore administration to the hands of a Council of Regency of eight Sikh *sardārs*, who were to act under the virtual dictatorship of the British Resident. A British force was to be maintained at Lahore, the Government of which was to pay twenty-two lacs of rupees for its expenses. It was laid down that the new arrangements were to continue till the Mahārājā attained his majority on the 4th September, 1854, or till such period as the Governor-General and the Lahore Darbār might think necessary. The British Resident, Sir Henry Lawrence, sailed for England with Lord Hardinge on the 18th January, 1848; and his office, being held, for a brief interval, by his brother Sir John (afterwards Lord) Lawrence, was given to Sir Frederick Currie on the 6th April, 1848.

D. The Second Anglo-Sikh War and Annexation of the Punjab

Lord Hardinge's arrangements in the Punjab with the Sikh chiefs lacked any "prospects of permanence". The defeat of the Sikh army did not mean the extinction of national aspirations among the Sikh people, who had behind them traditions of brilliant achievements and had so recently opposed the English with grim determination. They justly attributed their humiliation to the treachery of their leaders and chafed under the ascendancy of the English in the Punjab. The removal of the Queen-mother, Rānī Jhindān, from Lahore, on a charge of conspiracy against the British Resident, added to their discontent. A violent outburst in the shape of a national rising was imminent. Another trial of strength between the disaffected Sikhs and their victorious adversaries was inevitable, and it occurred very soon, the immediate occasion being supplied by an incident in the city of Multān.

Diwān Mulrāj, governor of Multān, was in financial trouble through a fall in the revenue-collection in his district, and on being pressed by the Lahore Darbār for a payment of one million sterling, as the price of his office, he resigned in anger in March, 1848. The Lahore Darbār appointed Sardār Khān Singh in his place and sent him to take charge of Multān in the company of two young British officers, Vans Agnew of the Civil Service and Lieutenant Anderson of the Bombay European Regiment. These two officers were murdered on the 20th April. It was believed that the crime was committed at the instigation of Mulrāj, who made preparations

for resisting the English. The Commander-in-Chief, Lord Gough, and the Governor-General, Lord Dalhousie, did not adopt any immediate measures to suppress the rising but decided to wait till the cold weather. Their policy was approved by the home authorities but was subjected to much criticism in other quarters. It is, however, true that there were political motives behind their action. Besides taking into consideration the difficulties of distant campaigns and the movement of troops during the hot weather and the rains, they wanted to gauge the strength of the Lahore Government and its ability to quell the disturbance, which it was technically bound to do, and also not to risk much in trying only to reduce it when there were sufficient indications of a widespread Multān rising. Despite the "wait and see" policy of the Supreme Government, a young British lieutenant named Herbert Edwardes, who was employed under the Sikh Council of Regency, and the British Resident, Currie, made some unsuccessful attempts to suppress the rising and besiege Multān. Sher Singh, son of Chatter Singh, the Sikh governor of the Hazarā district, unwisely sent by the British Resident to join the besieging troops at Multān, went over to the side of Mulrāj on the 14th September, 1848. The activities of Rānī Jhindān added fuel to the fire of Sikh discontent, and the veteran Sikh leaders began to rally round Sher Singh. Thus the Multān revolt soon assumed the nature of a Sikh national movement, and the inevitable Second Anglo-Sikh War began. The Sikhs had this time won over their old foes, the Afghāns, to their cause by holding out to them the city of Peshāwār as a bait.

By this time Lord Dalhousie had resolved to meet openly the Sikh national challenge. He declared on the 10th October, 1848: "Unwarned by precedent, uninfluenced by example, the Sikh nation has called for war, and on my word, sirs, they shall have it with a vengeance." Lord Gough crossed the Rāvī with a British army on the 16th November and had an indecisive engagement with Sher Singh at Rāmnagar on the Chenāb. The Sikhs then entrenched themselves in a stronger position at Chiliānwālā, where a terrible battle was fought on the 13th January, 1849. The Sikhs "of all arms" fought desperately, and contested the field bravely. The British at last won a "Pyrrhic" victory at a high cost. Of their soldiers 602 were killed and 1,651 were wounded, and the colours of three regiments and four of their guns were captured. The Sikhs lost some brave soldiers and twelve guns. Better success, however, attended English arms at Multān, the citadel of which was stormed on the 22nd January, 1849. Mulrāj, after being tried by a military court, was transported for life beyond the seas, where he soon

expired. The news of British losses at Chiliānwālā gave rise to bitter criticisms against Lord Gough, both in India and England, and the Court of Directors appointed Sir Charles Napier to supersede him. But before the latter reached India, Lord Gough had been able to inflict a crushing defeat on the Sikhs and their Afghān allies, on the 21st February, 1849, at Gujarāt, a town near the Chenāb, where they had shifted themselves from their strong entrenched position at Chiliānwālā, owing to lack of supplies. In the battle of Gujarāt, which "was essentially an artillery action and is known as the battle of the guns", the Sikh soldiers fought as before with resolute courage but were defeated through lack of efficient leadership. "No troops could have fought better," remarks Malleson, "than the Sikhs fought, no army could have been worse led." The Sikhs suffered immense losses and their defeat was complete, leaving no chance of further resistance. The British loss was comparatively small. Only 69 were killed and 670 wounded; and their victory was decisive. The battle of Gujarāt, observed the Governor-General, "must ever be regarded as one of the most memorable in the annals of British warfare in India; memorable alike from the greatness of the occasion, and from the brilliant and decisive issue of the encounter". On the 12th March, Sher Singh, Chatter Singh and all the Sikh chiefs and soldiers laid down their arms, and the Afghāns were chased by Sir Walter Gilbert to the Khyber Pass and Kābul.

It was no longer possible for the Sikhs to preserve their independence. On the 30th March, 1849, Lord Dalhousie, on his own responsibility, annexed the Punjab by a proclamation, against the wishes of Sir Henry Lawrence and Lord Ellenborough and also of the Cabinet. He declared: "However contrary it may be to our past views and to our present views, annexation of the Punjab is the most advantageous policy for us to pursue. I firmly believe we shall not succeed in establishing a friendly Sikh power." There is no doubt that the Governor-General's bold policy secured a valuable advantage to the British Empire in India by pushing its frontiers to "the natural limits of India, the base of the mountains of Afghānistān". The unfortunate young Dalip Singh had to suffer for the sins of others, and had to rest content with a pension of five lacs of rupees a year. Sent to England with his mother, Rānī Jhindān, he ultimately embraced Christianity and lived for a time as an English landowner in Norfolk. He subsequently came back to the Punjab and returned to his old faith but not to his old position. Rānī Jhindān died in London.

The success of arms in establishing British political supremacy in the Punjab was supplemented by the administrative measures

of a band of able British officers like Sir Henry Lawrence, his brother John Lawrence, Herbert Edwardes, John Nicholson, Richard Temple, and many others, who, under the supervision of the Governor-General, introduced reforms in various branches of administration, such as the army, the police, justice, land revenue, industry, agriculture, etc. The Governor-General at first constituted a Board of three, consisting of Sir Henry Lawrence, as its President, his brother, John Lawrence, and Charles G. Mansel, who had to make room for Robert Montgomery in 1851. But in 1853 the Board was abolished, Sir Henry Lawrence was sent to Rājputāna as agent to the Governor-General, and John Lawrence was made the first Chief Commissioner of the Punjab. The Sikhs henceforth became loyal to the British Empire and served its cause faithfully during the Second Anglo-Burmese War and the Revolt of 1857–1859.

4. Afghānistān and the Company

A. The Durrānī Menace and British North-West Frontier Policy

From 1757, or more definitely from the year 1765—when, after the English victory at Buxār (22nd October, 1764), the defence of Oudh, situated on the north-west frontier of Bihār, became a matter of vital necessity and fixed policy to the English in Bengal—till the close of the eighteenth century, the dread of Durrānī invasion constantly haunted the minds of British statesmen in India. The Company's Government in Calcutta apprehended an Afghān dash upon Oudh and then upon Bengal. As a matter of fact, a collision between the Afghāns, aiming at political supremacy in Hindustān on the wreck of the Mughul Empire, and the English, trying for the same object, lay almost in the logic of history, as was the case with the Marātha-Afghān clash of 1761. It was fortunate for the English that Ahmad Shāh Abdālī, after his victory at Pānīpat, was prevented from pushing further east owing to troubles at home. There was an ebb-tide in the fortunes of the Durrānīs after the death of Ahmad Shāh Abdālī in June, 1773, and his weak and indolent son and successor, Tīmūr Shāh (1773–1793), could not pursue the vigorous policy of his predecessor.

But Tīmūr's fifth son and successor, Zamān Shāh, who ascended the throne of Kābul in May, 1793, was an able and ambitious ruler. After having suppressed the forces of disorder at home, he advanced to Lahore in 1798 and cherished the dream of invading the interior of Hindustān like Nādir Shāh and Ahmad Shāh Abdālī. Though the project of Zamān Shāh was treated "very lightly" by some of

his contemporaries, and most of the modern writers have pointed out the impossibility of its then being carried into effect in view of the changed political circumstances, the Company's Government in Bengal could not consider "the idea of an invasion from Cabul as a mere visionary danger". Zamān Shāh received invitations from Tipu Sultān, Wāzīr 'Ālī, then trying to organise a conspiracy against the Company, and Nāsir-ul-mulk, the discontented Nawāb of Bengal. In fact, the prospect of Zamān Shāh's invasion of Hindustān "kept the British Indian Empire in a chronic state of unrest" during the administrations of Sir John Shore and Lord Wellesley. Dundas, President of the Board of Control, being confirmed "in the belief of his (Zamān Shāh's) hostile designs", instructed Lord Wellesley "to keep a very watchful eye upon the motions of that Prince, whose talents, military force, and pecuniary resources, afford to him the means of being a formidable opponent". The Governor-General maintained a large British force in Oudh, under Sir J. Craig, to protect that kingdom against the apprehended Afghān invasion, and claimed to have averted it by sending two missions in 1799 to Persia, whose relations with Afghānistān were then strained. The first mission was that of Mehdi 'Ālī Khān, a naturalised Persian then acting as the Company's Resident at Bushire, and the next that of Captain John Malcolm. Persian friendship was also necessary for the English, to counteract the Asiatic designs of France; and the missions of Wellesley proved successful from both points of view. The Persian pressure compelled Zamān Shāh to return from Lahore to Peshāwār, to the immense relief of the English. This is clear from Lord Wellesley's letter to the Secret Committee in London, dated the 28th September, 1801. Harassed by revolts at home, due chiefly to the strife between the Sadozāis (members of the royal family) and the Barakzāis under Payendah Khān and his eldest son, Fateh Khān, Zamān Shāh was ultimately overthrown and blinded and fled to Bukhārā, then to Herāt and finally to India, where at Ludhiānā he survived for many years under pathetic conditions as a pensioner of the British Government, which had once been so much perturbed by the threat of his invasion.

B. Chronic Troubles in Afghānistān after Zamān Shāh

The removal of Zamān Shāh was followed by a period of chronic troubles and disorder in the kingdom of Afghānistān. His brother, Mahmūd Shāh, the next ruler (1800–1803), became a puppet in the hands of the Barakzāi chief, Fateh Khān, and proved himself

utterly incompetent to suppress disorders in Kābul. In 1803 Shujā Mīrzā, a grandson of Ahmad Shāh Durrānī, seized the throne of Kābul. But Shāh Shujā also proved himself incapable of establishing an efficient rule. "His resources were limited, and his qualities were of too negative a character to render him equal to the demands of such stirring times. He wanted judgment; and above all, he wanted money." By the middle of the year 1809, he was defeated by the Barakzāis, the partisans of Mahmūd Shāh, who was thus restored to the throne of Afghānistān. After some fruitless attempts "to splinter up his broken fortune" Shāh Shujā reached Ludhiānā in 1816 to remain there under British protection like his brother, Zamān Shāh. Mahmūd Shāh, a tool in the hands of the Barakzāis, gradually grew impatient of their control, and caused their leader, Fateh Khān, to be killed most cruelly in 1818. This made the Barakzāis furious, and they in the course of a few years brought under their control the whole country of Afghānistān, except Herāt, where Mahmūd Shāh and his son, Kāmrān, found refuge and acknowledged the suzerainty of Persia. Kāmrān continued to hold Herāt after the death of Mahmūd in 1829.

C. Dost Muhammad

In the meanwhile, Dost Muhammad, an able member of the Barakzāi clan, had made himself king of Kābul in 1826 and had been proclaimed Amīr with all the necessary formalities. More courageous and active than his contemporaries, Dost Muhammad frustrated an attempt of Shāh Shujā to regain Kābul in 1833 with the support of Ranjit; but about the same time Peshāwār was captured by the Sikhs owing to the support they received from Dost Muhammad's brother, Sultān Muhammad Khān. In fact, Dost Muhammad's position was beset with dangers on all sides. "On the north there were revolts in Balkh; on the south one of his brothers was holding out against him at Kandāhār; on the east he was harassed by Ranjit Singh at Peshāwār with Shāh Shujā and the British Government in the background; on the west there was Mahmūd Shāh and Kāmrān at Herāt, with Persia plotting behind and Russia lurking in the distance." All this naturally made Dost Muhammad eager for friendship with the English. Thus after the arrival of Lord Auckland (1836–1842), as the Governor-General of India in March, 1836, Dost Muhammad sent him a congratulatory letter in the month of May and sought British help against the Sikhs and Persia. But the Governor-General declared the unwillingness of the British Government to interfere in the affairs of other States.

To put diplomatic pressure on the British Government, the Amīr of Afghānistān made overtures to Persia and Russia.

The course of European politics exercised at this time, as it had done before, since the middle of the eighteenth century, a profound influence on the history of Asia. From the early years of the nineteenth century, Russia was actuated by designs of expansion in the East, for which she concluded the Treaty of Gulistān with Persia in 1813. For the time being England succeeded in detaching Persia from her friendship with Russia, and signed the Treaty of Teheran with the former on the 25th November, 1814, according to which "all alliances between Persia and European nations hostile to Great Britain were made null and void, and all European armies were to be prevented from entering Persia, if hostile to Great Britain". But in the course of a few years, the new Shāh of Persia, Muhammad Mīrzā, son of 'Ābbās Mīrzā, who had died in the autumn of 1833, turned out to be a friend of Russia, and Russian influence became predominant at the Persian court. Russia, "making a cat's-paw of Persia", instigated the Shāh to besiege Herāt (November, 1837, to September, 1838), which occupied a position of strategic importance from the standpoint of the interests of the British Indian Empire. "Near Herat," writes Sir T. H. Holdich, "there exists the only break in the otherwise continuous and formidable wall of mountains which traverse Asia from the Bering Strait to the Caspian Sea. Near Herat it is possible to pass from the Russian outposts . . . to India without encountering any formidable altitude—and this is possible nowhere else." The heroic defence of the Afghāns, aided by the courageous efforts of a young British officer, Eldred Pottinger, who was then travelling in Afghānistān, baffled the Persian attempt on Herāt. It served, however, to deepen the ever-increasing British anxiety about Russian ambitions in Asia.

D. The First Anglo-Afghān War

It would undoubtedly have been difficult for Russia to realise her Asiatic ambitions from distant Moscow, and to advance on the frontier of the British Indian Empire by traversing the frowning plateau of Afghānistān and then by defeating the trained army of the Punjab, whose ruler was a British ally. Nevertheless the movements of Russia alarmed British statesmen. They largely influenced Lord William Bentinck's policy towards the Amīrs of Sind and created much uneasiness in the mind of Lord Auckland, especially when the Amīr

of Afghānistān, annoyed with the English for their refusal of help against the Sikhs, had begun negotiations with Persia and Russia. This "Russophobia" also deeply stirred the Whig Cabinet of Lord Melbourne in England. The enterprising Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston, saw in Russian designs "imminent peril to the security and tranquillity" of the Indian Empire, and goaded on the Government of India to take effective steps to checkmate them. The Secret Committee of the Court of Directors wrote to the Governor-General on the 25th June, 1836, to "judge as to what steps it may be proper and desirable . . . to take to watch more closely, than has hitherto been attempted, the progress of events in Afghānistān and to counteract the progress of Russian influence in a quarter which, from its proximity to our Indian possessions, could not fail, if it were once established, to act injuriously on the system of our alliances and possibly to interfere even with the tranquillity of our own territory. The mode of dealing with this very important question, whether by despatching a confidential agent to Dost Muhammad of Kābul merely to watch the progress of events, or to enter into relations with this chief, either of a political or merely, in the first instance, of a commercial character, we confide to your discretion, as well as the adoption of any other measures that may appear to you desirable in order to counteract Russian advances in that quarter, should you be satisfied from the information received from your agents on the frontier, or hereafter from Mr. McNeill, on his arrival in Persia, that the time has arrived at which it would be right for you to interfere decidedly in the affairs of Afghānistān. Such an interference would doubtless be requisite, either to prevent the extension of Persian dominion in that quarter, or to raise a timely barrier against the impending encroachments of Russian influence".

On the strength of this despatch, the Governor-General sent Alexander Burnes from Bombay to Kābul in November, 1836, under the pretence of a commercial mission, but in reality, as Burnes himself says, "to see into affairs and judge of what was to be done hereafter". Burnes reached Kābul on the 20th September, 1837. Dost Muhammad, who obviously preferred the friendship of the English to that of the Russians, expressed his willingness to accept British overtures, provided the British Government agreed to put pressure on Ranjit Singh to restore Peshāwār to him. Burnes also recommended an alliance with the Amīr. But Lord Auckland and his two secretaries, William Macnaghten and John Colvin, turned a deaf ear to his suggestion. The hope of an Anglo-Afghān alliance was thus destroyed, and Burnes' mission having failed, he

left Kābul on the 26th April, 1838. Disappointed in securing British friendship, the Amīr naturally sought Perso-Russian alliance, and the Russian envoy, Viktevitch, who had been hitherto treated "in a scurvy and discouraging manner", was received by him with much favour.

Lord Auckland, who had so recently pleaded the doctrine of non-intervention in the affairs of other States when Dost Muhammad solicited British help in the recovery of Peshāwār from the Sikhs now felt no scruple in taking steps to depose Dost Muhammad and to restore the exiled Shāh Shujā to the throne of Kābul with the help of Ranjit Singh. To carry this resolve into effect, he sent Macnaghten, Secretary to the Government, to Lahore, and a Tripartite Treaty was signed between Shāh Shujā, Ranjit Singh and the English on the 26th June, 1838. A war of the English with Afghānistān was a logical outcome of this step. On the 1st October, 1838, the Governor-General issued from Simla a manifesto by way of an official justification of the intended war, in which, as Herbert Edwardes writes, "the views and conduct of Dost Muhammad were misrepresented with a hardihood which a Russian statesman might have envied". "Lies were heaped upon lies" in the Simla manifesto. The Governor-General's remark about Dost Muhammad's "unprovoked attack upon our ancient ally" has been aptly compared by Trotter "for truthfulness with the wolf's complaint in the fable against the lamb".

Lord Auckland's policy is indefensible from all points of view. As an independent ruler of Afghānistān, Dost Muhammad had every right to enlist Perso-Russian alliance on his side however prejudicial it might be to British interests. It should also be noted that Dost Muhammad decided to accept Perso-Russian alliance after the failure of his efforts to secure British friendship. "We had ourselves," observes Kaye justly, "alienated the friendship of the Barakzye Sirdars. They had thrown themselves into the arms of the Persian King, only because we had thrust them off." Further, the poor excuse of Perso-Russian aggression as a danger to British interests ceased to have any force whatsoever after the withdrawal of the Persians from Herāt in September, 1838; this "cut from under the feet of Lord Auckland all grounds of justification and rendered the expedition across the Indus at once a folly and a crime". Politically considered, the Governor-General's policy was ill-advised and inexpedient. Dost Muhammad, whom he wanted to depose, was an efficient ruler having sufficient control over the unruly Afghān tribesmen, whereas his nominee, Shāh Shujā, though possessed of some capacity, had hitherto met with nothing but failure, and

had no prospect of gaining popularity among the Muslims of Afghānistān by being reinstated through the assistance of the Sikhs, the old enemies of the Afghāns, and of the Christian British power. Shāh Shujā was a man "whom the people of Afghānistān had repeatedly, in emphatic, scriptural language, spued out for these Barukzye (Barakzāi) chiefs, who, whatever may have been the defects of their Government, had contrived to maintain themselves in security and their country in peace, with a vigour and a constancy unknown to the luckless Suddozye Princes". In short, the Afghān war was launched, as Kaye pointed out, "in defiance of every consideration of political and military expediency; and there were those who, arguing the matter on higher grounds than those of mere expediency, pronounced the certainty of its failure, because there was a canker of injustice at the core. It was, indeed, an experiment on the forbearance alike of God and of man; and, therefore, though it might dawn in success and triumph, it was sure to set in failure and disgrace". Among the many contemporary critics of Lord Auckland's policy, the Duke of Wellington wrote to Mr. Tucker that "the consequence of crossing the Indus, once, to settle a Government in Afghānistān, will be a perennial march into that country". His remark was prophetic.

Regardless of these considerations, Lord Auckland, largely influenced by his private advisers, John Colvin and W. H. Macnaghten, passed orders to assemble "the army of the Indus" to invade the kingdom of Dost Muhammad. Owing to Ranjit Singh's objection to the passage of the British troops through his kingdom, and certain other reasons, it was arranged that the main British force under the command of Sir John Keane and Sir Willoughby Cotton, accompanied by Shāh Shujā, would advance from Ferozepore to Kābul by way of Bahawālpur, Sind, Baluchistān, and the Bolān and Khojāk Passes over a distance of one thousand miles, while the Sikh army, accompanied by Colonel Wade and Shāh Shujā's son, Tīmūr, would march from the Punjab through Peshāwār and the Khyber Pass. As Dr. Smith observes, "the plan violated all the conditions of sound strategy, and was that of a lunatic rather than of a sane statesman". Further, the march through Sind meant a gross violation of the treaties of 1832 with the Amīrs of Sind. The British army was considerably reduced in numbers through lack of water supply and provisions before it reached Qandahār. Sir W. H. Macnaghten accompanied the expedition in charge of its political affairs with Sir Alexander Burnes as his principal lieutenant.

The allies at first gained successes. Under the supreme command

of Sir John Keane, they occupied Qandahār in April, 1839, stormed Ghaznī on the 23rd July, and Kābul fell into their hands on the 3rd August, 1839, when Dost Muhammad evacuated it. Shāh Shujā was triumphantly enthroned in Kābul without any welcome, or even a "common salaam", from the people. "It was," remarks Kaye, "more like a funeral procession than the entry of the King into the capital of his restored dominions." For a while the British arms seemed to have received additional lustre. But by the end of the year 1841, "that lustre, such as it was, had been lamentably besmirched".

Serious dangers were lurking in the situation. Restored by force of British arms and Sikh help, Shāh Shujā failed to evoke national sympathy and support; and "it was necessary still to hedge in the throne with a quickset of British bayonets" even after Dost Muhammad had surrendered himself in 1840 and had been sent to Calcutta as a prisoner. But the British army was maintained in Afghānistān at a huge cost, entailing a heavy drain on the resources of India; and its presence there increased the prices of the articles of common consumption, which affected the rich as well as the poor people. The popular discontent at foreign domination was aggravated by lapses on the part of the British troops, stationed in the land of the freedom-loving Afghāns. In fact, the system of government imposed on the Afghāns "was becoming a curse to the whole nation".

When Shāh Shujā was not accepted by the nation, it would have been wiser for the British to withdraw with him. Considering the dangers of the situation in Afghānistān, the Court of Directors wisely suggested "the entire abandonment of the country, and a frank confession of complete failure". But Macnaghten, who fondly believed that British prospects were "brightening in every direction" and that everything was "*couleur de rose*", considered the proposal of withdrawal as "an unparalleled political atrocity" and rejected it. Lord Auckland also would not agree to confess the absolute failure of his policy and took recourse to half-measures, which were at once risky and discreditable. The British army of occupation was retained in Afghānistān and an attempt was made to economise by reducing the subsidies of the tribal chiefs of eastern Afghānistān, which alone had so long tempted them to adhere to the English. As a natural result of this "misplaced economy", the chiefs broke out in insurrection in different parts. Two other serious mistakes were committed by the Governor-General. His appointment of General Elphinstone, an elderly invalid, to succeed Cotton in April, 1841, as the commander of the

army in Kābul, against the desire of the Commander-in-Chief, who preferred Nott, the commander at Qandahār, was a calamitous step. It was also unwise on his part to permit Shāh Shujā to use the citadel of Kābul, known as the Bala Hissār, for his seraglio, while the troops were badly placed in ill-fortified cantonments outside the city at a distance from the commissariat stores. Further, Sikh help for the British ceased to be forthcoming owing to the prevailing disorders in the Punjab, after the death of their friend, Ranjit Singh, on the 27th June, 1839.

Disturbances broke out by the autumn of 1841. On the 2nd November a howling mob pulled Alexander Burnes out of his house, murdered him, his brother Charles, and also Lieutenant William Broadfoot. The English officers, civil as well as military, and the troops betrayed a regrettable lack of promptness and ability, and thus allowed "the little fire" to grow "by sufferance into a wide conflagration", under the leadership of Akbar Khān, son of Dost Muhammad. They quarrelled among themselves and failed to realise the formidable nature of the outbreak. "There appears to have been," comments Thornton, a contemporary writer "an almost unanimous determination to shut the ears against all intimations of danger, and indulge in a luxurious dream of safety equal to that within the Marātha ditch." On hearing of these disasters, Lord Auckland was greatly perturbed. He realised rather too late the folly of wrestling "against the universal opinion, national and religious", and became eager "to consider in what manner all that belongs to India may be most immediately and most honourably withdrawn from the country". The feeble General Elphinstone allowed the stores depots to be captured by the insurgents without striking a blow; and Macnaghten, the irresolute British political officer in Afghānistān, fearing to be starved out, concluded a humiliating treaty with Akbar Khān on the 11th December. It was agreed that the British forces should evacuate Kābul as soon as possible, that Dost Muhammad should return to Kābul, and that Shāh Shujā should either remain in Afghānistān on a pension or should go to India with the British army. But Macnaghten, far from being sincerely disposed to observe these terms, entered within a few days into objectionable negotiations with the rival Ghizālī and Qizilbāshī chiefs. He was paid back in his own coin for this unwise act, as these chiefs betrayed him, inveigled him into an interview with Akbar Khān on the 23rd December, and slew him with one of his companions, Captain Trevor; his two other companions, Lawrence and Mackenzie, got off with their lives but were made prisoners.

Macnaghten's successor, Major Eldred Pottinger, wanted to break off all negotiations with the Afghāns and either to occupy the Bala Hissār and hold out till help came or to proceed to Jalalābād which was bravely defended by Sale. But Elphinstone and other military officers, who had not the courage to stand and vindicate their national honour, disregarded his suggestions and stooped to make more concessions. They surrendered guns, muskets and ordnance stores and ratified the treaty on the 1st January, 1842. On the 6th January, the "crouching, drooping and dispirited" British troops and camp-followers, 16,500 men in all, set out on their return journey towards India, struggling through the stinging snow of the winter and a constant shower of bullets from the Afghāns, whose fanatical rage Akbar Khān was unable to check. Within a few days the women and children and some officers, including Pottinger, Lawrence and Elphinstone, were given to Akbar Khān as hostages. But the slaughter of British troops continued and on the 10th January only about a quarter of the force was left. In the pithy phrase of Roberts, "the retreat became a rout, the rout a massacre." Thus considerably thinned, the retiring troops made the last desperate stand at the Pass of Jagdalak on the 11th January only to lose twelve of their officers. Of the 16,500 men that had started from Kābul a week before, all were destroyed excepting 120 prisoners under Akbar Khān, and only one, Dr. Brydon, reached Jalalābād, severely wounded and utterly exhausted, on the 13th January, to narrate the painful story of the tragic retreat.[1] The gallant defence of Qandahār by Nott and Rawlinson, and of Jalalābād by Sale and Broadfoot, may be considered as the only streak of light in the enveloping darkness of disaster. Naturally shocked and mortified by these calamities, Lord Auckland tried to conceal his lack of foresight by describing the terrible catastrophe in the General Order issued on the 31st January as "a partial reverse", which afforded "a new occasion for displaying the stability and vigour of the British power, and the admirable spirit and valour of the British-Indian army". He made some ill-fated efforts to retrieve British prestige, but was soon compelled to leave his office, and Lord Ellenborough (1842–1844) took charge of it on the 28th February, 1842.

[1] There is, however, a reference in Macdonald's letter, dated the 17th June, 1842, to an account in the Journal of the Serjeant of the 37th Native Infantry, who was an eye-witness of the events that happened from the date of the departure of Elphinstone's force from Kābul till its final destruction, and made his escape to Jalalābād. "It is a far better account than Brydon's, who seems scarcely yet to have recovered his reason, which in his fright he certainly lost for the time being." *J.I.H.*, August, 1933.

There is no doubt that the Afghān War was an unjust proceeding on the part of the Company's Government in India, and as such it merited, in the opinion of some writers, the "tremendous Nemesis" which overtook it. Kaye significantly observes: ". . . the wisdom of our statesmen is but foolishness, and the might of our armies is but weakness when the curse of God is sitting heavily upon an unholy cause." Further, the feeble and unwise manner in which it was conducted made its failure inevitable. In critically examining the causes of the British reverses and disasters in connection with the Afghān War, Captain Trotter remarks that "the utter collapse of that (Lord Auckland's) policy, baleful, lawless, and blundering as it was, sprang mainly from the choice of agents ill-fitted for their work. Macnaghten's cheery trustfulness, Elphinstone's bodily and mental decay, Shelton's stupid wilfulness, chronic dissensions between the civil and military powers, Sale's withholding of timely succour, all conspired with Lord Auckland's half-measures and ill-timed economies, to work out the dramatic Nemesis of an enterprise begun in folly and wrong-doing".

E. Lord Ellenborough (1842–1844) *and Afghān Affairs*

In view of the overwhelming disaster of the late Afghān War, Lord Ellenborough declared in a letter to the Commander-in-Chief, written on the 15th March, 1842, that the British Government would no longer "peril its armies and with its armies the Indian Empire" to support the Tripartite Treaty, but would aim at the establishment of its military reputation "by the infliction of some signal and decisive blow upon the Afghāns". He changed this resolution, however, on hearing the news of General England's defeat at Hakalzāi and Palmer's surrender of Ghaznī, and ordered the immediate withdrawal of the British troops that still remained in Afghānistān, without thinking any longer of reprisals or of releasing the prisoners. This order fell on the army, as Outram recorded, "like a thunder-clap" and raised a storm of indignation both in England and India. Shāh Shujā had meanwhile been murdered. Both Nott and Pollock showed no disposition to retire but maintained their positions, pleading want of transport as a reason for their hesitation to withdraw. Lord Ellenborough at last "discovered a way to maintain a particularly empty show of consistency, and at the same time to satisfy the universal demand for the decisive reconquest of Kābul and recovery of the prisoners as a preliminary to withdrawal". On the 4th July

he sent letters to Nott and Pollock repeating the order for withdrawal from Afghānistān, but at the same time gave Nott wide discretion to retire to India, not by the Bolān Pass, but by Ghaznī and Kābul through the Khyber, and also ordered Pollock to act in concert with Nott in this matter of retreat. It is clear that the Governor-General thus threw the responsibility for decision on the generals, who, however, accepted it without any hesitation. On the 20th August, Pollock started from Jalalābād with 8,000 of his choice troops; defeated the Afghāns at Jagdalak on the 8th September and at Tezin on the 13th September, reached Kābul on the 15th September and once more hoisted the British flag at the Bala Hissār. On the 17th September he joined Nott, who had already destroyed the town and fortifications of Ghaznī on the 6th September and had, according to the instructions of Lord Ellenborough, carried away the "so-called gates of Somnāth", which Sultān Mahmūd was supposed to have carried off in the eleventh century. The English prisoners were rescued; but "the glory of the avenging army at Kābul was marred by acts of barbarity" when it blew up the great bāzār of Kābul with gunpowder and the city was ruthlessly sacked, many inoffensive people being subjected to great suffering, before it was evacuated on the 12th October. The returning army was welcomed by the Governor-General at Ferozepore with "triumphal arches and histrionic paeans of victory". In a proclamation issued from Simla on the 10th October, though it was dated the 1st October, Lord Ellenborough denounced in strong language the policy of his predecessor and expressed his willingness "to recognise any government approved by the Afghāns themselves, which shall appear desirous and capable of maintaining friendly relations with neighbouring States". In another bombastic proclamation, addressed to the princes, chiefs and people of India, the Governor-General announced: "Our victorious army bears the gates of the temple of Somnāth in triumph from Afghānistān and the despoiled tomb of Sultān Mahomed looks upon the ruins of Ghaznee. The insult of 800 years is avenged."

The unwisdom and uselessness of the second proclamation can hardly be doubted. "The folly of the thing," observes Kaye, "was past all denial. It was a folly, too, of the most senseless kind, for it was calculated to please none and to offend many." It wounded the feelings of the Muslims; and the Hindus remained indifferent about the gates, which, as the antiquarians rightly held, had been built much later than the eleventh century "of no wood more precious than deal or deodar". The Governor-

General's "glorious trophy of a successful war" was in the end consigned to a lumber-room in the fort of Āgra, and he made himself subject to ridicule and censure, though he was powerfully supported by the Duke of Wellington and Lord Hardinge. Dost Muhammad was allowed to reoccupy his throne unconditionally, and he held it till his death, at the age of eighty, in 1863. His friendly attitude towards the English and opposition to Persia showed that the "whole disastrous episode", which cost no less than 20,000 human lives and fifteen millions of money, was "entirely superfluous".

5. The Annexation of Sind

The Afghān War was very closely connected with the conquest of Sind, which followed it. Sind embraced the lower valley of the Indus and was included within the empire of Ahmad Shāh Durrānī. But, during the closing years of the eighteenth century, it owed only a nominal allegiance to Afghānistān and was governed in practical independence by the Mīrs or Amīrs of the Tālpurā tribe, which, coming originally from Baluchistān, had overthrown the last of the Kalorās in A.D. 1783. The three important branches of the Tālpurā chiefs were seated at Hyderābād, Khairpur and Mīrpur.

The English had had commercial interests in Sind for a long time; a factory established by them at Thātta in 1758 was abandoned in 1775 and their commercial mission to the Tālpurā Mīrs in 1799 produced no important result. With a view to excluding French influence from Sind, the British Government concluded a treaty with the Amīrs of Sind in 1809, which was renewed in 1820. The journey of Alexander Burnes in 1831 up the river Indus on his way to Lahore disclosed to the English the importance of Sind from the political as well as commercial point of view, and since then its absorption into the growing British Empire had been only a question of time. "Alas," observed a Seiad, "Sind is now gone since the English have seen the river." As we shall see, this proved wholly true as a prophetic prediction.

Sind had an ambitious neighbour in the Sikh ruler, Ranjit Singh, who coveted it as a natural sphere of expansion for his empire. But his attempts were thwarted by his friends, the English, who in their turn lost no opportunity of increasing their influence over that territory. Thus in 1831 Lord William Bentinck opposed Ranjit Singh's proposal for a partition of Sind. But the Amīrs of Sind had to conclude a treaty with the British Government, rather reluctantly, on the 20th April, 1832, which provided that "the rivers and roads" of Sind should be opened to the

"merchants and traders of Hindoostan", but that no "military stores" and "armed vessels or boats" should come through these. As a sort of precaution against the apprehended absorption of their territory by the British, the Amīrs took care to include another stipulation to the effect that "the two contracting powers bind themselves never to look with the eye of covetousness on the possessions of each other". This treaty was renewed in 1834. Up to 1838 Ranjit Singh often contemplated the incorporation of Sind into his empire, but was thwarted by the English, who now with a view to strengthening the ties by which the Amīrs of Sind were "connected with the British Empire", proceeded to extort from them favourable terms as a reward for their protection against Sikh aggression. By a treaty concluded on the 20th April, 1838, Lord Auckland forced on them an accredited British Resident. In fact, Sind soon fell out of the frying-pan into the fire. Sikh ambition in regard to it could not be realised, but it was to pay a high price for the uncalled-for British protection by being deprived of its independence through questionable means adopted by British officers.

On the outbreak of the First Anglo-Afghān War, the English, in violation of the treaty of 1832, took an armed force through Sind, and informed the Amīrs that "while the present exigency lasts . . . the article of the treaty (of 1832) prohibiting the use of the Indus for the conveyance of military stores must necessarily be suspended". Greater humiliation and loss were inflicted on the Amīrs when Lord Auckland demanded from them a heavy sum as a price for unsolicited British mediation in effecting a commutation of the pecuniary demands of Shāh Shujā on Sind. The Amīrs, who had stopped the payment of any tribute to Shāh Shujā during his thirty years' exile and had also been granted an exemption by Shāh Shujā in 1833 from all claims, naturally hesitated to comply with Lord Auckland's demand. But they were given a warning to the effect that the British Government had the "power to crush and annihilate them, and . . . will not hesitate to call it into action, should it appear requisite, however remotely, for either the integrity or safety" of the Empire, or its frontiers. The Amīrs had no other option but to submit to the Governor-General's exaction. Further, the threat of Sir John Keane's march on the capital of Sind compelled them to accept fresh terms from Lord Auckland in February, 1839, by which they were bound to pay a sum of three lacs of rupees per annum for the maintenance of a British force in their territories, and Sind was "formally placed under British protection". This treaty was

again revised by Lord Auckland and his advisers in their own way and was sent back for final signature to the Amīrs, who "objected, implored and finally gave way, by affixing their seals to the revised documents".

A worse fate was, however, in store for Sind. She had been intimidated and coerced by Lord Auckland; but his successor went further and imposed on her the yoke of British authority by sheer force. During the critical years of the disastrous Afghān War, the province had been utilised as a base of operations by the British Government, and its Amīrs had remained steadfastly loyal to their agreements with the English. But far from being duly rewarded for their attachment, the Amīrs were unjustly charged with disaffection and hostility against the British Government by Lord Ellenborough, who sought a convenient pretext to give effect to his design of annexing Sind. To make matters easy for himself, the new Governor-General removed Major James Outram, the Resident at Hyderābād, who had some experience of local affairs, and sent to Sind Sir Charles Napier with full civil and military powers as a representative of the Governor-General. Sir Charles Napier, a hot-headed and impulsive officer, acted on "the theory that the annexation of Sind would be a very beneficent piece of rascality for which it was his business to find an excuse—a robbery to be plausibly effected". He took it for granted that the vague charges against the Amīrs had been proved, and, besides arbitrarily interfering in a succession quarrel at Khairpur, dictated a new treaty by which the Amīrs were required to cede certain important territories in lieu of the tribute of three lacs, to provide fuel for British vessels navigating the Indus, and to give up the right of coining money in favour of the British Government. He did not stop with these demands, which amounted to an absolute surrender of national independence by the Amīrs, but acted as if Sind had already become a part of the British Empire and "as though the right of the Governor-General of British India to parcel it out at his pleasure was unquestioned and unquestionable; and, moreover, as if it were desired to exercise this right in a manner as offensive as possible to those who were to suffer privation from the exercise". Thus before the acceptance of a fresh treaty by the Amīrs, he occupied the territory in question, and issued proclamations in strong language. Further, while talking of treaties, he sought to intimidate the Amīrs by marching upon Imāmgarh, a famous desert fortress lying between Khairpur and Hyderābād, without formally declaring war, and destroying it early in January, 1843.

These high-handed acts of Napier sorely tried the patience of

the warlike Baluchis, and in a state of excitement they attacked the British Residency on the 15th February, 1843, whereupon Outram, who had returned to Sind as a British Commissioner, fled for refuge to a steamer. Thus war was now openly declared. A Baluchi army of about 22,000 men was defeated on the 17th February at Miāni, a few miles from Hyderābād, by Napier fighting with 2,800 men and 12 guns. This was followed by the immediate submission of some of the Amīrs, but Sher Muhammad, "the Lion of Mīrpur", still held out bravely. He was, however, thoroughly vanquished on the 24th March at Dabo, six miles from Hyderābād, whereupon Napier occupied Mīrpur on the 27th March, Amarkot on the 4th April and conveyed the news of his victory to Lord Ellenborough in the punning message, "Peccavi", i.e. "I have Sind". Sher Muhammad was driven out of Sind in June and the war came to a close. Sind was formally annexed to the British Empire in August, 1843, and the Amīrs were exiled. Napier unhesitatingly accepted £70,000 as his share of the prize money, while Outram, in spite of being a man of comparatively small resources, did not take his own share amounting to £3,000 but gave it to some charitable institutions. Outram, in fact, had no liking for Napier's policy and wrote to him: "I am sick of policy; I will not say yours is the best, but undoubtedly it is the shortest—that of the sword. Oh, how I wish you had drawn it in a better cause!"

The policy of Lord Ellenborough, and the high-handed acts of Sir Charles Napier, with regard to Sind, have been justly condemned by most writers. There is no doubt that they acted on purely imperialistic motives and resorted to highly objectionable means, by cynical violations of treaty obligations, to reduce the Amīrs, who had inflicted no injury on the British, to a state of vassalage. "If the Afghān episode," observes Innes, "is the most disastrous in our annals, that of Sind is morally even less excusable." While trying to defend the policy by various laboured arguments, which are at once irrational and unhistorical, Napier has admitted in his Diary: "We have no right to seize Sind, yet we shall do so, and a very advantageous, useful, humane piece of rascality it will be." Strangely enough, the Court of Directors, while condemning the policy of annexing Sind, did nothing to undo the wrong. Napier was appointed the first Governor of Sind, and he tried hard during his rule of four years to consolidate British authority in the province.

CHAPTER VI

THE COMPANY AND THE MINOR INDIAN STATES (1774–1858)

1. Early Relations, 1774–1823

THE rapid strides with which British imperialism had advanced in India since at least the time of Wellesley, if not earlier, inevitably affected the destiny of the Indian States that had arisen on the ruins of the Mughul Empire. Their relations with the Company's Government varied according to changing political conditions and the personal views and ambitions of the Governors-General; but the "conviction which developed with Wellesley and continued up to our own time, that the government of the whole of India directly or indirectly by the British is part of a preordained system" had a considerable influence in shaping British policy towards the Indian States. Warren Hastings, confronted with the task of safeguarding British territories against the encroachments of the Marāthas, and the militant rulers of Mysore, adopted the policy of a "*Ring-Fence*", that is, sought to guard the frontiers of the neighbouring States by way of precaution. But some of his transactions, such as his demands on Chait Singh of Benares and the Begams of Oudh, and conduct towards Faizullā Khān of Rāmpur, involved breach of treaties or betrayed a lack of moral scruples. The subsidiary treaties of Lord Wellesley established in fact British predominance over some of the Indian States. But in theory these States did not thereby become subject to British paramountcy as they retained their independence in matters of internal administration. All the treaties of Wellesley, except that with Mysore, were negotiated on terms of equality. Being, however, dependent on the Company for self-protection, States like Oudh, the Carnatic and Tanjore began to suffer from all the evils of "double government" like those which had distracted Bengal since 1765. It was Lord Hastings who transformed the treaties of "reciprocity and mutual amity" into those of "subordinate co-operation", and established British paramountcy over most of the Indian States by compelling them to surrender their sovereign rights of making war or peace and negotiating agreements with other powers. Formally, these States retained

internal sovereignty, but in actual practice they were subject to frequent interference in the affairs of internal government by British Residents, the quality and amount of this interference varying with the difference in "personality and temperament" of the officers concerned. Lord Hastings was not, however, "an annexationist".

2. Relations between 1823 and 1858

The period intervening between the departure of Lord Hastings and the outbreak of the Revolt saw the weight of British influence falling more heavily on the Indian States, owing on the one hand to the growing executive and controlling authority of the British Residents in the sphere of internal administration of these States, and on the other to the frank enunciation of the policy of annexation by the British Government. This policy of annexation, formulated by the Court of Directors as early as 1834, and more clearly emphasised by them in 1841, was applied vigorously in the time of Lord Dalhousie. It was the outcome of two motives on the part of the Company's Government, namely those of extending British political influence by incorporating new territories into the Empire and of securing greater facilities for the transport of merchandise and the collection of revenues. Both were intended to tighten the hold of British Paramountcy over India.

Lord William Bentinck was tied to the policy of "let alone" by the authorities in England, when he came to India. But he departed from it drastically in some cases and his masters also enunciated the policy of annexation in the course of a few years. Thus in 1831 he took over the administration of Mysore, which had been misgoverned by Rājā Kṛishṇa Udaiyar and consequently fell into disorder; the Rājā was pensioned off and the Mysore administration remained in the hands of the British Government till 1881. Bentinck also absorbed some other States into the British Empire. The principality of Cāchār, where the royal line had come to an end on the death of its last ruler, was annexed in August, 1832, as the British Government did not accept as valid the claims of any candidate for the vacant throne. The lands of the Rājā of Jaintiā in Assam were incorporated in the British Empire in March, 1835, as the new ruler refused to accept the stringent terms imposed on him. Viraraja the younger, king of Coorg, was accused of monstrous cruelties towards his subjects and secret conspiracy against the British. Although these charges were not supported by any positive evidence, and later proved to be mostly unwarranted or false, British forces were sent to Coorg and it was annexed by a formal

proclamation dated the 7th May, 1834. Thus minor Indian States were annexed on pretexts which will not stand any serious examination. Lord Auckland, whose energies were preoccupied with the Afghān War, could not pay much attention to the States, but he annexed the territory of the Nawāb of Karnul, in Madras, on suspicion of his hostile designs against the British Government.

His successor, Lord Ellenborough, had to deal with a formidable outbreak in Gwālior. At the close of the Marātha War of 1817–1819, Gwālior had remained under Daulat Rāo Sindhia as the most powerful Indian military State south of the Sutlej. Daulat Rāo died in 1827, when one of his youthful relatives, Jankojī Rāo Sindhia, was installed as the Rājā with an ambitious woman, Mahārānī Baiza Bāī, widow of Daulat Rāo Sindhia, as the regent. The weakness of the new ruler, and the activities of the regent, gave rise to various intrigues and disorders in the State, which did not end even when the latter was expelled in 1833. In the midst of these troubles Jankojī died in 1843 without issue. A minor named Jayajī Rāo was then raised to the *Gadi*; but intrigues and counter-intrigues quickly multiplied, especially through the machinations of two rival parties over the selection of a regent for the boy king. The Governor-General's candidate, Kṛishṇa Rāo Kadam, the Māmā Saheb or the maternal-uncle of the deceased ruler, was removed from office by the youthful widow of the late ruler, who preferred the appointment of Khasgi-wālā. As is natural during civil strife in a State, the Gwālior army, 40,000 strong, became restless, which caused anxiety in the mind of the Governor-General. The latter feared that the combination of this army with the Khālsā army, about 70,000 strong, in the Punjab, where also a civil war was about to break out after the assassination of Sher Singh, would prove to be a serious menace to the British Government. Haunted by this fear, Lord Ellenborough assumed a dictatorial attitude, and even though the Gwālior authorities accepted all his demands, which were unjust and unreasonable in the extreme, he personally led an army into the territory of Sindhia. Not unnaturally, the Gwālior troops keenly resented this insult to their master, and advanced to oppose the British forces. But they were defeated on the 29th December, 1843, in two engagements—one at Mahārājpur, north of Gwālior, by Sir Hugh Gough, and the other at Paniar, by General Grey. Gwālior, now reduced definitely to the status of a protected State, was placed under a Council of Regency, which was to manage its affairs during the minority of the Mahārājā subject to the control of a British Resident. The army was cut down to 9,000 men and a

British contingent of 10,000 men was placed there. Curiously enough, during the Revolt, the Gwālior army under the command of Dinkar Rāo, minister of the State, supported the English, while the Company's contingent there rose against them.

The Governor-Generalship of Lord Dalhousie was marked by a stupendous growth of the British Empire at the expense of many of the Indian States. Lord Dalhousie annexed a large number of States in pursuance of what is known as the "Doctrine of Lapse", which means that, on the failure of natural heirs, the sovereignty of the "dependent" States, of those created by the British Government, or held on a subordinate tenure, lapsed to the Paramount Power, a position which, it was agreed, the British Government had acquired after the fall of the Mughul Empire; it also did not acknowledge the right of those States to adopt heirs, which had been a long-standing practice among the Hindus, without the consent of the suzerain authority. The doctrine did not apply to "protected *allies*". Referring to the glaring abuses in the government of some of the Indian States, the Governor-General declared that the British Government "in the exercise of a wise and sound policy is bound not to put aside or neglect such rightful opportunities of acquiring territory or revenue as may from time to time present themselves, whether they arise from the lapse of subordinate states by the failure of all heirs of every description whatsoever, or from the failure of heirs natural where the succession can be sustained only by the sanction of the government being given to the ceremony of adoption, according to Hindu law. The government is bound, in duty as well as in policy, to act on every such occasion with the purest integrity, and in the most scrupulous observance of good faith. When even a shadow of doubt can be shown, the claim should at once be abandoned". It is true that the principle applicable to adoption, and the policy of annexation, were not invented by Lord Dalhousie. Both of these had been asserted by the Court of Directors earlier since 1834 and had been applied in some cases. We have already noted earlier instances of annexation; as for the "Doctrine of Lapse" it had already been applied to Mandavī in 1839, to Kolābā and Jalāūn in 1840, and to Surāt in 1842. But there is no doubt that Lord Dalhousie advocated and applied the principles most vigorously. "There was," observes Innes, "fully adequate precedent for every one of his annexations. But his predecessors had acted on the general principle of avoiding annexation if it could be avoided; Dalhousie acted on the general principle of annexing if he could do so legitimately."

The States that were absorbed into the British Empire according

to the Doctrine of Lapse were Sātārā in 1848, Jaitpur and Sambalpur, in Baghat, a Cis-Sutlej hill State, in 1850, Udaipur in 1852, Nāgpur in 1853, and Jhansī in 1854. It should be noted that the distinction between "dependent" States and "protected allies" was very subtle; and it is doubtful if all these States could be rightly regarded as "dependent" ones. The kingdom of Sātārā was a British creation in the sense that, after the fall of the Peshwā in 1818, it had been given by Lord Hastings to a member of the house of Shivājī. In 1839 the Rājā was deposed on a charge of misgovernment and his brother was raised to the *Gadi*. The latter having no issue adopted a son, before his death in 1848, without consulting the Governor-General or the British Resident. Lord Dalhousie, supported by all his leading colleagues, considered this adoption to be invalid and declared that the State of Sātārā lapsed to the sovereign power. The Court of Directors also agreed with his view as "being in accordance with the general law and custom of India". Nāgpur also had fallen under British control in 1818, but Hastings had bestowed it on a member of the old ruling house. The Rājā died in 1853, leaving no lineal descendants or adopted son. Dalhousie annexed it on the ground of its being a creation of the Company. Whatever might have been the legal position of Sātārā and Nāgpur in relation to the British Government, it is clear that Dalhousie's motives in annexing them were purely imperialistic. It has been admitted even by Lee-Warner, a strong apologist of Dalhousie, who writes that with regard to Sātārā and Nāgpur "imperial considerations weighed with him . . . they were placed right across the main lines of communication between Bombay and Madras and Bombay and Calcutta". Further, the disposal of the State funds and treasures of Nāgpur by public auction, which has been characterised by Kaye in his *Sepoy War* as "spoliation of the palace", was certainly an undignified and tactless measure. Jhansī, a district of Bundelkhand, was given to the English by the Peshwā in 1818, and the English placed a ruler on its throne on terms of "subordinate co-operation". On the death of its last ruler in November, 1853, leaving no issue but only an adopted son, Dalhousie annexed it. A part of Sikkim, about 1,676 square miles, was taken over by the Company in 1850 as a punishment on its chief for capturing the representative of the British Government and ill-treating two British subjects. Sambalpur was annexed to the British Empire in 1850 on the death of its ruler Nārāyan Singh without any heir. Lord Dalhousie's decision with regard to Baghat and Udaipur was reversed by Lord Canning; and the Court of Directors did not approve of his proposal

for the annexation of Karauli in Rājputāna, on the ground that it was a "protected ally" and not a "dependent" State.

The principle of lapse was also applied to sweep away the titles and pensions of the rulers of some States, on the ground that "appearances without the reality of authority were sure to shake Native confidence" in the "good faith" of the Company. Thus on the death of the Nawāb of the Carnatic in 1853, Lord Dalhousie decided not to recognise any one as his successor. Similarly, when the Rājā of Tanjore died in 1855, leaving behind him only two daughters and sixteen widows, the Governor-General abolished the Rājāship of this State for good. He wanted also to abolish the title of the nominal Delhi Emperor, in which, however, he was not supported by the Court of Directors. On the death of the ex-Peshwā, Bājī Rāo II, in 1853, the pension of eight hundred thousand rupees, which had been granted to him by Sir John Malcolm, was not allowed by Lord Dalhousie to be paid to his adopted son, Dundu Pant, later on known as Nānā Sāheb, on the ground that the pension had been a personal allowance of his adoptive father and so could not pass on to his successor. This measure has been described by Kaye as "harsh" and by Arnold as "grasping". The Nizām of Hyderābād in the Deccan was in arrears with the payment of a British contingent, which he was not actually obliged to maintain by the terms of his treaty with the British. Dalhousie nevertheless coerced him into making territorial cessions for the regular payment of the "Hyderābād Contingent". By an arrangement made in May, 1853, the cotton-producing province of Berar was given to the Company in lieu of the subsidy.

Besides conquest and lapse, the maxim of "the good of the governed" was also enunciated by the British Government in annexing some States whose administrations were "fraught with suffering to millions". The case of Oudh is the most typical example of the application of this maxim. Since Lord Wellesley's treaty of 1801, Oudh had been kept as a "protected feudatory State" with control over internal administration. It was indeed an unwise arrangement, under which the ruler of Oudh was invested with responsibility without power, and its natural consequence was that the administration of the State degenerated terribly, to the great suffering of its people. The British Government realised the evils of Oudh administration, and successive Governors-General, especially Lord William Bentinck and Lord Hardinge, warned its ruler; but none did anything to remedy the fundamental defect of the sub-

sidiary system, which by guaranteeing British protection to the ruler of Oudh made him unmindful of the real interests of the State and saved him from "justifiable revolt on the part of his subjects". The growing deplorable situation in Oudh, to which the attention of the British Government was drawn, more clearly than before, by Colonel Sleeman, Resident in Oudh from 1848 to 1854, and his successor, Colonel Outram, both of whom were opposed to the policy of lapse, convinced the Governor-General of the necessity of the adoption of a bolder policy with regard to Oudh. The existence of the ill-governed State of Oudh, almost in the centre of the rapidly expanding British Empire in India, could not but appear to the architects of the latter as a gross anachronism, which should be removed as quickly as possible to facilitate their own task. There could be no better or more convenient pretext than to hold out the prospect of good government, for the absorption of a kingdom whose subjection to British control dates back to the time of Warren Hastings. Lord Dalhousie was inclined to solve the Oudh problem not by annexing it but by merely taking over its administration and by allowing its ruler to retain only his palace, rank and titles. But the Court of Directors ordered its complete annexation, which was formally proclaimed by Outram on the 13th February, 1856. Wāzīd 'Ālī Shāh, the last ruler of Oudh, was deported to Calcutta, where he had to spend his last days on an annual pension of twelve lacs of rupees.

The annexation of Oudh was an instance of territorial aggrandisement which was "not warranted by international law", as Dalhousie himself expressed it in his letter to Sir George Couper, dated 15th December, 1855. It should be noted that for the misgovernment of Oudh, which was utilised as the ground for its annexation by the Company, then eager to consolidate its possessions in India, the responsibility lay mainly on the English, who had thrust upon that kingdom the impolitic arrangement of the subsidiary system and had unceasingly interfered in its affairs. "The facts furnished by every writer on Oudh affairs, all testify," Sir Henry Lawrence stated, "to the same point, that British interference with that province has been as prejudicial to its court and people as it has been disgraceful to the British name." Further, no consideration was shown for the unflinching loyalty of the ruling house of Oudh to the British Government. It has also been held by some that the annexation of Oudh meant a "gross violation of national faith" involving disregard of an old treaty. In 1837 Lord Auckland had concluded an agreement with the ruler of Oudh, which bound him either to introduce reforms or

to make over the administration to the British Government while retaining the sovereignty. Though this treaty was not sanctioned by the Court of Directors, Lord Auckland intimated to the Oudh ruler the disallowance of only one clause of it and, somehow or other, "the treaty was actually included in a subsequent Government publication and was referred to as still in force by succeeding Governors-General". When the Court of Directors decided on annexing Oudh, the British Government suddenly informed the ruler of Oudh that the treaty of 1837 was "a dead letter".

CHAPTER VII

THE INDIAN REVOLT OF 1857–59

1. Presages of the Revolt

THE rapid expansion of the British dominion in India, attended as it was by changes in the administrative system and modes of existence to which the people had been accustomed through long ages, disturbed the placid currents of Indian life and produced commotions in different parts of the country. Mention may be made, in this connection, of the Bareilly rising of A.D. 1816; the Cole outbreak of 1831–1832, and other minor risings in Chota Nāgpur and Palāmu; the Muslim movements like the Ferazee disturbances at Barāsat (Bengal) in 1831 under the leadership of Syed Ahmad and his disciple, Meer Niser 'Ālī or Titto Meer, and later in 1847 at Faridpur (Bengal) under the guidance of Deedoo Meer; the Moplah outbreaks in 1849, 1851, 1852, and 1855; and the Santāl insurrection of 1855–1857. These risings testify to the general ferment in the British Empire in India, the last and the most severe being the Revolt of 1857–1859, which shook its mighty fabric to its very foundations.

2. Causes of the Revolt

The Revolt was the outcome of the changing conditions of the time; and its causes may be conveniently summed up under four heads—political, economic and social, religious, and military. The political causes had their origin in Dalhousie's policy of annexation, the doctrine of lapse or escheat, and the projected removal of the descendants of the Great Mughul from their ancestral palace to the Qutb, near Delhi. All this naturally gave rise to considerable uneasiness and suspicion in the minds of the old ruling princes, Muslim as well as Hindu. The annexation of Oudh, and the idea of doing away with the bedimmed splendour that still surrounded the Mughul Emperor, wounded Muslim sentiments; and the refusal to continue the pension of the ex-Peshwā, Bājī Rāo II, to his adopted son, Nānā Sāheb, agitated some Hindu minds. As a

matter of fact, some of the discontented rulers and their friends were conspiring against the Company's government even before the Revolt. The more important among them were Ahmad Ullah, an adviser of the ex-King of Oudh; Nānā Sāheb; Nānā Sāheb's nephew, Rāo Sāheb, and his retainers, Tāntiā Topi and 'Azīmullah Khān; the Rānī of Jhansī; Kunwār Singh, the Rājput chief of Jagadishpur in Bihār, who had been deprived of his estates by the Board of Revenue; and Fīrūz Shāh, a relation of the Mughul Emperor, Bahādur Shāh.

The expropriation of some landlords by the British Government, and the growing unemployment among the followers and retainers of the dispossessed princes, gave rise to acute economic grievances and social unrest in different parts of the country. The resumption of rent-free tenures by Bentinck no doubt secured for the State increased revenue but at the same time it reduced many of the dispossessed landlords to a state of indigence. During the five years before the outbreak of the Revolt, the Inam Commission at Bombay, appointed by Lord Dalhousie to investigate the titles of landowners, confiscated some 20,000 estates in the Deccan, without considering for a moment that such a drastic measure was sure to create complications in the economic condition of the country. In Oudh especially, there prevailed terrible bitterness of feeling, particularly after Sir James Outram was succeeded as its Chief Commissioner by Coverly Jackson, a man of unsympathetic attitude and overbearing disposition. The King's stipendiaries and officials ceased to have their allowances and pensions; his capital was occupied by the new Chief Commissioner; and the disbandment of his army deprived the professional soldiers of their means of livelihood. All these converted Oudh, "the loyalty of whose inhabitants to the British had become proverbial, into a hot-bed of discontent and of intrigue". Matters were to some extent improved by the recall of Jackson and the appointment of Henry Lawrence; but discontent could not be completely allayed.

The conservative sections of the Indian population were alarmed by the rapid spread of Western civilisation in India during the closing years of the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth. They saw in inventions like the railway and the telegraph, in the extension of Western education, in the abolition of practices like *Satī* and infanticide, in the protection of the civil rights of converts from Hinduism by the Religious Disabilities Act of 1856, in the legalisation of widow remarriage by the Hindu Widows Remarriage Act of 1856, and in the unwarranted aggressive spirit of some Christian missionaries,

attempts on the part of the Government to destroy their social polity, to westernise their land at the cost of their time-honoured customs and practices and to convert India to Christianity. The activities of the Wahhābī sect must have contributed to inflame the feelings of the Muslims.

Thus several factors generated fumes of discontent in different parts of the country, the bursting of which into a devouring flame would not, however, have been possible if the Sepoy Army had remained, as before, loyal to the Company. "In the control of the Sepoy Army lay," observes Innes "the crux of the position." But, for several reasons, the attitude of the Sepoys towards the Company had become by this time far from friendly. Frequent engagement in prolonged campaigns in distant lands, which the Sepoys disliked, had severely tried their loyalty. Some regiments of Sepoys had already mutinied on four occasions, during the thirteen years preceding the outbreak of 1857, as their demands for extra allowances for fighting in remote regions had not been met by the Company's government: the 34th N.I. in 1844, the 22nd N.I. in 1849, the 66th N.I. in 1850 and the 38th N.I. in 1852. Further, the discipline of the Sepoy Army, especially of the Bengal Division, had been rapidly deteriorating, owing largely to the defective policy of the Government which unwisely transferred able military officers from the field to political jobs and retained the rule of promotion by seniority, irrespective of any consideration of age or efficiency. General Godwin, for example, commanded in the Second Burmese War at the age of seventy. The so-called "Bengal Army" was recruited not in Bengal proper, but from high-caste men in Oudh and the North-Western Provinces. Being very sensitive about their caste privileges they were not easily amenable to discipline and also shared the general suspicion as to the westernising and Christianising policy of the Government. The feeling of discontent was intensified by Lord Canning's General Service Enlistment Act ordering all recruits to the Bengal Army to be ready for service both within and outside India. The disparity in numbers between European and Indian troops had become glaring during the recent years; thus at the time of Lord Dalhousie's departure from India, the former numbered 45,322 and the latter 233,000. The distribution of the troops was also defective. Places of strategic importance like Delhi and Allahābād were wholly held by the Sepoys; and between Calcutta and Allahābād there was only one British regiment at Dināpore near Patna. Again, England was then engaged in several extra-Indian wars like the Crimean War, the Persian War and the Chinese War, which sorely taxed her resources. A belief was engendered in the

minds of the Sepoys that England was in a critical situation and that, the British Army in India being so small, the safety of her Indian Empire depended on the Sepoys. "A consciousness of power," wrote the Commissioner of Meerut, "had grown up in the army which could only be exorcised by mutiny, and the cry of the cartridge brought the latent spirit of revolt into action." The introduction of the Enfield rifle, the cartridges for which were greased with animal fat, was indeed an ill-considered measure. It set the spark that enkindled the embers of discontent, which was being fanned sedulously among the army by Nānā Sāheb, the partisans of the King of Oudh, the Rānī of Jhansī and a few others. There were some grounds for the belief of the Sepoy Army that the grease was made from cow or pig fat, obnoxious to both the Hindus and the Muslims. "On this inflammable material," writes Atchison, "the too true story of the cartridges fell as a spark on dry timber," and the whole country from the Sutlej to the Narmadā was ablaze.

3. The Outbreak of the Revolt and Its Suppression

The first signs of unrest appeared early in 1857 at Bārrāckpore and Berhampore in Bengal; they were, however, quickly suppressed and the culprits were punished. But the Sepoys broke out into open revolt at Meerut on the 10th May, 1857, swarmed into the prisons, released their imprisoned comrades, murdered a few European officers and burnt their houses. General Hewitt, the incapable commanding officer at Meerut, although he had 2,200 European troops under him, took no steps to suppress the mutineers, who galloped the next morning to Delhi, where not a single British regiment was stationed at that time, and brought it under their control. They massacred many Europeans and destroyed their houses. Two signallers in the telegraph office, outside the city, warned the authorities in the Punjab in time by sending them a telegraphic message. Lieutenant Willoughby, the officer in charge of the magazine, defended it for a few days with his eight brave companions, but at last finding himself overwhelmed he blew it up. This caused great losses to the mutineers, who, however, soon occupied the palace and proclaimed the aged nominal king, Bahādur Shāh II, whose name still conjured up to many the vanished glories of the once mighty Mughul Empire, Emperor of Hindustān. The loss of Delhi, which had fallen into British hands as a result of much hard fighting and diplomacy, dealt a severe blow to the prestige of the British Empire.

There was a comparative respite of about three weeks, during which Sir John Lawrence, the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, managed to keep that province tranquil. But before any attempt could be made to recover Delhi, insurrections broke out by the first week of June in almost all the upper Gangetic provinces and parts of Central India—at Nāsirābād in Rājputāna, at Bareilly in Rohilkhand, at Cawnpore, at Lucknow in Oudh, at Benares and in certain parts of Bihār. The Bihār movement under the leadership of Kunwār Singh of Jagadishpur near Arrah was put down by William Tayler, Commissioner of the Patna Division, and Major Vincent Eyre of the Bengal Artillery. The Benares outbreak was suppressed by Colonel Neill of the 1st Madras Fusiliers, who put to death all the mutineers who could be captured; and in the surrounding districts that were placed under martial law by the Governor-General, "rebels, suspects, and even disorderly boys were executed by infuriated officers and unofficial British Residents, who volunteered to serve as hangmen". The famous fort of Allahābād, defended bravely by Captain Brasyer with a small Sikh force, was relieved on the 11th June by Neill. The mutineers became very active at Cawnpore, Delhi and Lucknow. But, fortunately for the English, the regions south of the Narmadā were not on the whole affected by the revolt. Lord Elphinstone preserved comparative tranquillity in the Bombay Presidency, though an Indian regiment mutinied at Kolhapur, and George Lawrence was able to keep Rājputāna quiet. The Punjab and particularly its Sikh chiefs, Gulāb Singh of Kāshmīr, and many zamindārs and Indian officers, remained loyal to the Company. Valuable services were rendered by some famous Indian rulers and statesmen, like Sindhia and his minister, Sir Dinkar Rāo, Sir Salar Jang, the minister of Hyderābād, the Begam of Bhopāl and Sir Jang Bahādur, the able minister of Nepāl, to arrest the spread of the movement. In the opinion of Innes, Sindhia's loyalty "saved India for the British"; and Holmes, well known for his important work on the history of the Indian Mutiny, has described Sir Salar Jang as "a man whose name deserves to be ever mentioned by Englishmen with gratitude and admiration".

The mutineers at Cawnpore were led by Nānā Sāheb, who had been living at Bithur near Cawnpore and had proclaimed himself as Peshwā. They invested the British entrenchments, which had been hurriedly constructed, in a manner too inadequate for effective defence, by Sir Hugh Wheeler, the seventy-five-years-old commander of that station. From the 8th till the 26th of June, the invested garrison, consisting of about four hundred men capable

of bearing arms and a number of women and children, defended themselves bravely in the midst of dreadful suffering and privation. They surrendered on the 27th, being given assurances of safe conduct to Allahābād. But as the deluded British garrison were leaving the place in boats, a murderous fire was opened on them with the result that most of the men were massacred at the river-side, only four being able to escape. Two hundred and eleven women and children were confined in a building, known as the Bibigarh, where they were mercilessly put to death on the 15th July, by orders of Nānā Sāheb and his friend, Tāntiā Topi, and their bodies were flung into a well. It is difficult to say definitely how far these atrocities were perpetrated as a reprisal for the repressive measures of British and Sikh soldiers at Benares and Allahābād. The results of the Cawnpore massacre were very lamentable. It aroused a burning desire for revenge in the minds of Englishmen, both in India and England, and led the Company's troops to perpetrate acts that have left very unpleasant memories. An avenging British force, under Neill and Havelock, reached Cawnpore one day after the tragic incident. The city was occupied by the mutinous Gwālior contingent on the 27th and 28th November, but Sir Colin Campbell recovered it on the 6th December.

The recovery of Delhi, the important rallying centre of the insurgents, could not but engage the serious attention of the British Government. On the 8th June a relieving British force from Ambālā, joined by a party from Meerut, defeated a mutinous army at Badli Sari and took up a position on the famous Ridge overlooking the city of Delhi. Additional reinforcements, including a number of Sikhs, were sent from the Punjab by Sir John Lawrence, under a brave officer named Nicholson, to join the British troops on the outskirts of Delhi. Nicholson frustrated an attempt of the opposing force to intercept his advance, and assisted by Sir Archdale Wilson, Baird Smith and Neville Chamberlain, delivered a vigorous assault on the mutineers. On the 14th September, the Kāshmīr Gate was blown up, and the city and the palace were captured after six days' desperate fighting. Nicholson received a mortal wound. The city was sacked by British soldiers, and in the process many of its innocent male citizens were slaughtered. The *Bombay Telegraph* reported: "All the city people found within the walls when our troops entered were bayoneted on the spot; and the number was considerable, as you may suppose when I tell you that in some houses forty or fifty persons were hiding." The titular Delhi Emperor, Bahādur Shāh II, was arrested at the tomb of Humāyūn by Lt. Hodson, a fierce cavalry officer, and his sons and a grandson

surrendered to Hodson as prisoners of war. Bahādur Shāh II was deported to Rangoon, where he spent his last years in exile, till he died in 1862, at the age of eighty-seven. The princes were shot down by Hodson, who had persuaded himself that they had been guilty of murdering Englishmen and women and that they would be rescued by a mob before he could take them to a place of safety. Thus came to an end the Mughul imperial dynasty. There is no doubt that Hodson's act was "most uncalled-for". The charges against the victims were not proved by any definite evidence, nor was any attempt made by the crowd to save them. Malleson observes that "a more brutal or a more unnecessary outrage was never committed. It was a blunder as well as a crime".

At Lucknow, the revolt broke out on the 30th May, and Sir Henry Lawrence, who had succeeded Mr. Jackson as Chief Commissioner, retired at the beginning of July to the Residency, with all the Europeans and Christians and about 700 loyal sepoys, and held out there only for a few days, as he was shortly afterwards killed by the bursting of a shell. The command of the besieged garrison then fell on Brigadier Inglis, who bravely defended the place against numerous assaults until Havelock and Outram fought their way at the point of the bayonet into the Residency on the 25th September with much-needed reinforcements. General Neill, who had "the energy of one of the most determined characters ever bestowed on man", died at this time at Lucknow. Inglis, Havelock and Outram could not make their way out with the besieged garrison. Their final relief was effected by the middle of November by Sir Colin Campbell (afterwards Lord Clyde), who came from England as Commander-in-Chief. Sir Colin Campbell took vigorous action to suppress the risings in Oudh and Rohilkhand. With the valuable help of Jang Bahādur of Nepāl, who joined him at the head of a powerful Gurkhā contingent, he finally brought Lucknow under British control on the 21st March, 1858. But the Tālukdārs of Oudh had been infuriated by a singularly injudicious proclamation, issued by Canning at the end of March to the effect that the lands of all the Tālukdārs were liable to forfeiture "except those of six specifically mentioned and of others who could prove their loyalty". They carried on a guerilla warfare. The capture of Bareilly in Rohilkhand in the month of May greatly disheartened them and they were thoroughly vanquished by the end of the year. Many of the insurgents fled across the British frontier to Nepāl, to perish there miserably.

Meanwhile, the insurgents in Central India had found an able leader in Tāntiā Topi, a Marātha Brāhmana, who with the mutinous

Gwālior contingent, 20,000 strong, crossed the Jumnā at Kalpi, joined the troops of Nānā Sāheb, and repulsed General Windham, who had been left in charge of Cawnpore. But he was defeated, and driven out, on the 6th December, 1857, by Sir Colin Campbell. Tāntiā Topi then joined Rānī Lakshmī Bāī of Jhansī and carried on a desperate fight in Central India. Meanwhile Sir Hugh Rose had been conducting successful campaigns in Bundelkhand, the southernmost centre of the rising. Marching from his base of operations at Mhow early in January, 1858, he relieved the garrison at Saugor, captured Hatgarh early in February, defeated Tāntiā Topi on the Betwā River, and stormed Jhansī on the 3rd April. Leaving the fort of Jhansī during the night of the 4th April, the Rānī went with a few followers to Kalpi, which also was captured by the English on the 22nd May. The indomitable Rānī and Tāntiā Topi then marched to Gwālior, and drove out Sindhia to Āgra. This prince had remained loyal but his army now deserted him. Nānā Sāheb was proclaimed as the Peshwā. Realising the danger of a Marātha rising, Sir Hugh Rose took prompt measures to check the activities of the Rānī and Tāntiā. He recovered Gwālior after defeating the insurgents at Morar and Kotah. The Rānī of Jhansī, dressed in male attire as a *sowār*, was killed in one of these battles on the 17th June, 1858. Tāntiā Topi, chased from place to place, was given up to the English, early in April, 1859, by Mān Singh, a feudatory of Sindhia, and was hanged on charges of rebellion and murder and not for complicity in the massacre of Cawnpore, as is often stated. Nānā Sāheb was driven into the jungles of Nepāl and is said to have died there. Thus ended the episode of the Revolt, and Canning proclaimed peace throughout India. Many people, both in India and England, demanded the pursuit of a "ruthless and indiscriminate policy of vengeance". Even Nicholson spoke for legalising "the flaying alive, impalement, or burning of the murderers of the women and children at Delhi". But Canning, uninfluenced by this clamour, judged the matter with statesmanlike prudence and cool judgment, and arranged for the proper trial and punishment of those only who were really guilty. For this he was described, in derision, as "Clemency Canning"; but it must be admitted that the Governor-General's policy was wise and expedient and he was right in opposing measures whose only effect would have been to add to the bitterness of feeling between the rulers and the ruled.

4. Causes of the Failure of the Revolt

The Revolt, though an outbreak of a formidable nature, was bound to fail owing to the defective equipment and organization of the insurgents. Firstly, their military equipment was inferior to that of the English; for example, their old muzzle-loaders were outranged by the newly invented breech-loaders of the English troops. Secondly, while many of the insurgents failed to understand the significance of contemporary scientific improvements and even dreaded them, the English fully utilised these advantages for their own benefit. Thus with control over a widespread telegraph system and postal communications, the latter were able to receive and exchange information from different parts of the country and to modify their course of action according to the needs of the situation. Thirdly, the English were fortunate enough to secure the loyalty of most of the feudatory chiefs, with the exception of the Rānī of Jhansī, the Begam of Oudh and some minor chiefs; and, as has already been pointed out, they received invaluable assistance from men like Sir Dinkar Rāo of Gwālior, Sir Salar Jang of Hyderābād, Jang Bahādur of Nepāl, and the Sikhs. In the north-west, Dost Muhammad remained friendly. Fourthly, the insurgents could not secure the unstinted and universal support of the civil population in all parts of the country, many of whom were alienated by the confusion and disorder which followed the risings and involved them in considerable suffering and loss. Lastly, there was a comparative lack of efficient leadership among the insurgents, while the British cause was ably served by a number of wise and brave leaders like Lawrence, Outram, Havelock, Nicholson, Neill and Edwardes.

5. Nature and Effect of the Revolt

The Revolt was not a thoroughly organised national movement or "a war of independence", as James Outram, a contemporary, believed it to have been, or as it has been represented by some modern writers. It was in the main a military outbreak, which was taken advantage of by certain discontented princes and landlords, whose interests had been affected by the new political order. The last-mentioned factor gave it in certain areas the character of a popular rising and constituted a menace to the British Empire for several months, particularly in Oudh and Rohilkhand. It was never all-Indian in character, but was localised, restricted and

poorly organised. Only one of the three provincial armies mutinied; and all the Indian sepoys did not rise against the British Government. As we have already noted, important Indian princes and chiefs sided with the English; and of the thousands of landlords, recently dispossessed of their property, only the Tālukdārs of Oudh actively helped the insurgents. There was no leader of outstanding ability among the mutineers, except the heroic figure of the Rānī of Jhansī, whom Sir Hugh Gough esteemed as "the best and bravest military leader of the rebels". Further, the movement was marked by absence of cohesion and unity of purpose among the different sections of the insurgents. Unfortunately, it was characterised by a disregard of the rules of civilised warfare on both sides, and "was fought with peculiar savagery". If the mutineers were guilty of terrible enormities the British troops also on occasions tarnished the fair name of their country by a severity that was hardly tempered by good sense or moderation.

For more reasons than one, the Revolt marks a turning-point in the history of India. In a sense it demonstrated that the hold of the Company on India was still rather weak, and its lessons continued to influence British administration in India for several generations. "I wish," remarked the late Lord Cromer, "the young generation of the English would read, mark, learn and inwardly digest the history of the Indian Mutiny; it abounds in lessons and warnings." It directly produced three important changes in the system of administration and the policy of the Government.

Firstly, the control of the Indian Government was finally assumed by the Crown, in spite of protests from the Company. An Act for the Better Government of India was passed on the 2nd August, 1858, which provided that "India shall be governed by, and in the name of the Sovereign through one of the principal Secretaries of State, assisted by a council of fifteen members". At the same time the Governor-General received the new title of Viceroy. This was, however, "rather a formal than a substantial change", because the Crown had been steadily increasing its control over the affairs of the Company since the latter had become a territorial power in India, and the actual control had been exercised so long by the President of the Board of Control, who was a Minister of the Crown. The Directors had functioned as a mere advisory council.

The assumption of the government of India by the Sovereign of Great Britain was announced by Lord Canning at a darbār at

Allahābād in a Proclamation issued on 1st November, 1858, in the name of the Queen. The Queen's Proclamation, described as the Magna Charta of the Indian people, confirmed the treaties and engagements of the East India Company with the Indian princes; promised to respect the rights, dignity and honour of the native princes and to pay due regard to the ancient rights, usages and customs of India; disclaimed all desire for the extension of British territorial possessions in India through "encroachment on those of others"; granted a general amnesty to "all offenders, save and except those who have been, and shall be convicted of having directly taken part in the murder of British subjects"; proclaimed a policy of justice, benevolence and religious toleration, enjoining the Government to "abstain from all interference with the religious belief or worship" of the subjects; and declared that all "of whatever race or creed, may be freely and impartially admitted to offices in our service, the duties of which they may be qualified, by their education, ability and integrity, duly to discharge".

Secondly, the army, which took the initiative in the outbreak, was thoroughly reorganised; and, for the next fifty years, "the idea of division and counterpoise" dominated British military policy in India. The Presidency armies were kept entirely separate till 1893; the European element in them was strengthened, and placed in sole charge of some essential services; and the number of European soldiers was increased. The Commission on Indian Army Organisation of 1879 observed: "The lessons taught by the Mutiny have led to the maintenance of two great principles, of retaining in the country an irresistible force of British troops and keeping the artillery in the hands of Europeans."

Thirdly, the British Government now took up a new attitude towards the Indian States. These States had henceforth to recognise the paramountcy of the British Crown and were to be considered as parts of a *single charge*.

One indirect effect of the Revolt is clearly seen in the birth and rise of extremism in Indian politics. The excesses of the movement engendered a feeling of hostility in the minds of some Indians as well as some Englishmen in India, which, being aggravated by the growing racial discrimination between the two, has been influencing political thought and administrative policy in India in modern times. Russell, the *Times* Correspondent in India, rightly observed in his *Diary* that "the mutinies have produced too much hatred and ill-feeling between the two races to render any mere change of the rulers a remedy for the evils which

affect India, of which those angry sentiments are the most serious exposition. . . . Many years must elapse ere the evil passions excited by these disturbances expire; perhaps confidence will never be restored; and, if so, our reign in India will be maintained at the cost of suffering which it is fearful to contemplate".

CHAPTER VIII

ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANISATION UP TO THE REVOLT

1. The Central Administration

The virtual acquisition of the kingdom of Bengal by the East India Company raised important problems. Could a private corporation be allowed to rule over vast territories without any supervision of Parliament? Was a constitution designed for carrying on trade and commerce equally suitable for the administration of an oriental Empire? These were the questions that agitated politicians and statesmen in England. They were made party issues in Parliament and were also further complicated by the personal interests which were bound up with them. It is beyond the scope of the present work to trace the history of this interesting problem and its effect upon the parliamentary history of England. Suffice it to say that after a great deal of discussion, frequently characterised by vehement denunciations and personal recriminations, Parliament appointed a Select Committee and a Secret Committee, and at last in 1773 passed the famous Regulating Act which introduced Parliamentary supervision over the Company and modified its constitution both in England and in India.

The Act restricted the power of vote in the Court of Proprietors by raising the qualification for the same from £500 to £1,000. The twenty-four Directors, who had been hitherto elected each year, were henceforth to be elected for four years, one fourth of their number retiring each year.

The Act provided that "the Directors should lay before the Treasury all correspondence from India dealing with the revenues; and before a Secretary of State everything dealing with civil or military administration". Thus the first definite step was taken for providing Parliamentary control over the affairs of the Company. By a Supplementary Act, passed in 1781, all dispatches proposed to be sent to India were to be shown to a Secretary of State.

As regards the administration in India, the main provisions of the Act were as follows:

The Government of Bengal was vested in a Governor-General and a Council of four members. The votes of the majority were

to prevail, the President having a casting vote in case of equality of votes. The first Governor-General, Warren Hastings, and the Councillors, Clavering, Monson, Barwell and Philip Francis, were named in the Act and appointed for five years (the term was further extended by Supplementary Acts). Their successors were to be appointed by the Company. The Governor-General in Council could control the subordinate Presidencies of Bombay and Madras in matters relating to war and peace. Further, the Act authorised the Crown to establish, by royal charter, a Supreme Court of Justice consisting of a Chief Justice and three puisne judges.

The Regulating Act was in force from 1773 to 1784 and thus covered almost the entire administration of Warren Hastings as Governor-General. The effects of the Act may, therefore, be best studied in detail in the events of that period. In general, it may be remarked that the Act broke down almost as soon as it was put to a practical test. The subordination of the Governor-General to a majority of the Council introduced weakness and vacillation in the Central Government, which might have proved fatal to British rule in India. The supervision over subordinate Presidencies was an extremely difficult task, and its impracticable character was demonstrated by the events of the First Anglo-Marātha War. The establishment of the Supreme Court led to endless complications as its jurisdiction was not properly defined, and it naturally came into conflict with the existing courts of law. In England also the ministerial control over the actions of the Directors proved illusory in many notable instances. The whole position has been beautifully summed up in the following sentence:

"It had neither given the State a definite control over the Company, nor the directors a definite control over their servants, nor the Governor-General a definite control over his Council, nor the Calcutta Presidency a definite control over Madras and Bombay."

Immediately after the inauguration of the new regime on 26th October, 1774, Warren Hastings was confronted with the opposition of the majority in his Council. The attitude of the new Councillors was far from friendly from the beginning, and they attacked the Governor-General's policy on various points. Francis, who came to India with a preconceived notion that the administration was honeycombed with abuses and needed radical reforms, was the leading spirit of the opposition against the Governor-General. The virulent and persistent attacks of the Councillors made Hastings powerless in his Council for a few years till the death of Monson on 25th September, 1777, and severely

affected his prestige, with the result that charges of bribery and defalcation were brought against him by his enemies.

This is strikingly illustrated by the case of Nanda Kumār, a Brāhmaṇa of high rank, who had held an important position in the Nawāb's Government (p. 661). On 11th March, 1775, Nanda Kumār, whom Hastings had offended by depriving him of his house and by showing special favour to his foe, Mohan Prasād, the executor of an Indian banker, charged Hastings with taking presents, worth many lacs, among them Rs. 3,54,105 from Muny Begam, the widow of Mīr Jāfar, for placing her in control of the Nawāb's household. It is very difficult to say definitely whether the charges were true. Hastings unwisely refused to meet the charges and to be put on trial before his Council, with one as prosecutor whom he detested most and considered to be "the basest of mankind". But the Councillors, full of suspicion and dislike for the Governor-General, concluded that the charges against him were true and that he should pay the money into the Company's treasury. In 1776 the law officers of the Company in England declared that these charges, even on the *ex parte* case before them, were false.

Meanwhile, in the month of May, 1775, Mohan Prasād charged Nanda Kumār with forgery in connection with a will executed five years before. He was tried by the Supreme Court and a jury, found guilty, sentenced to death and hanged.

There is no doubt that Nanda Kumār did not receive a fair trial and there was a "miscarriage of justice" at least in respect of the capital punishment inflicted on him. Sir James Stephen states that "if he had to depend upon the evidence called for the prosecution, he would not have convicted the prisoner". Again the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over the indigenous population was doubtful, and the fact is that "the English law making forgery a capital crime was not operative in India till many years after Nanda Kumār's alleged forgery had been committed". Further, the judges took the unusual course of themselves cross-examining the defence witnesses "and that somewhat severely".

It is sometimes said that the execution of Nanda Kumār "was a judicial murder". It was openly asserted by some at that time that Mohan Prasād was a creature of Hastings, who influenced the judicial decision against the accused. Nanda Kumār wrote to Clavering that he was the victim of a conspiracy between the Governor-General-in-Council and the Supreme Court. But it should be noted that Impey was not the only judge who tried the case and there were also his colleagues and the jury; and that there is no positive evidence to prove Hastings' conspiracy with Impey, with

whom he was not always on good terms. The conduct of the Council in not trying to save Nanda Kumār seems to be rather mysterious. Francis suggested the idea of appealing for a reprieve, but it was opposed by Clavering and Monson. "It casts," observes Roberts, "the darkest and most sinister shadow over the reputation of the men who used him for their own purpose and then callously and contemptuously flung him to the wolves."

In the course of a few years the glaring defects of the Regulating Act became apparent, and fresh attempts were made to devise suitable remedies. The matter was brought to a head in 1783, when the Company was obliged to approach Parliament for financial relief. Burke only voiced the general opinion when he claimed that the relief and reformation of the Company must go together.

The first proposal for reform advocated by Dundas came to nothing. The bill introduced by Fox was passed in the House of Commons after a long and acrimonious debate, but was defeated in the Lords mainly as a result of the intervention of King George III. Pitt succeeded Fox and introduced a new bill in January, 1784, and it was passed in August of the same year.

Pitt's India Act established six "Commissioners for the affairs of India", viz. a Secretary of State, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and four Privy Councillors appointed by the King. The body, known popularly as the Board of Control, was to exercise an effective supervision over the Board of Directors. They had access to all the papers of the Company and no dispatches other than those that were purely commercial could be sent without their approval. The power of the Court of Proprietors was considerably reduced, as they could not annul or suspend any resolution of the Board of Directors which was approved by the Commissioners. These Commissioners were also empowered to send urgent or secret orders through a Secret Committee of the Directors, the approval of the latter being of course a mere formality. The supreme authority thus passed into the hands of the Commissioners, and the Directors retained only their patronage, *viz.* the right to appoint and dismiss their own servants.

Important changes were at the same time introduced in the Indian administration. The members of the Governor-General's Council were reduced to three and only the covenanted servants of the Company were made eligible for these posts. The control of the Governor-General in Council over the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay was clearly defined and rendered more effective. By a supplementary bill, passed in 1786, the Governor-General was

authorised in special cases to act against the majority of the Council, and also to hold the office of Commander-in-Chief.

The constitution set up by Pitt's India Act did not undergo any fundamental change during the existence of the Company's rule in India. We may therefore pass in rapid review the minor changes that occurred between 1786 and 1858. It may be noted that legislative changes during this period were always associated with the renewal of the Company's Charter in 1793, 1813, 1833 and 1853.

As regards the Home Government, the most notable changes were in regard to the Board of Control. Its powers were gradually concentrated in the hands of the President, who thereby virtually became the Cabinet Minister for India.

The Charter Act of 1813 abolished the monopoly of the Company's Indian trade and laid down "the undoubted sovereignty of the Crown" in and over the possessions of the East India Company. The Charter Act of 1833 abolished the trading activities of the Company and henceforth it became a purely administrative body under the Crown.

In India, the powers of the Governor-General over the subordinate Presidencies were further enlarged by the Charter Act of 1793, which enabled him to proceed in person to Madras and Bombay and exercise the same authority over their administration as in Bengal. The Charter Act of 1833 not only gave the Governor-General and Council the superintendence, direction and control over the subordinate Presidencies, but also took away from the latter all powers of making laws, and concentrated all legislative authority in the former. Henceforth, with certain necessary exceptions, the Governor-General and Council could make laws and regulations for all persons, whether British or Indian, and for all courts of justice, whether established by His Majesty's charters or otherwise.

In order to enable the Council to discharge these important functions efficiently, a new member with expert knowledge of law was added to it. The Law Member must not be a servant of the Company and could speak and vote only at meetings of the Council which discussed legislative business.

In order to emphasise the superior role which the Governor-General and Council would play over all the Company's possessions in India, the supreme authority in the country was henceforth designated as the Governor-General of India in Council. The Governor-General in Council also constituted the Government of Bengal, and the Act permitted a member of the Council to be appointed Deputy-Governor of the Province.

The Charter Act of 1853 introduced further changes. The number of Directors was reduced to eighteen, of whom three (later six) were to be appointed by the Crown. It took away from them the power of patronage by instituting an open competitive examination for the recruitment of civil servants. The salary of the President of the Board of Control was made equal to that of a Secretary of State, and the approval of the Crown was necessary for all appointments of Councillors, both central and provincial.

As regards the Government of India, the most important changes concerned its legislative function. The Law Member was made an ordinary member of the Governor-General's Council and no law could be enacted without the assent of the Governor-General. The Council itself was enlarged for legislative purposes by the addition of six new members, called "legislative councillors". These included four nominees of the four provincial Governments (Bengal, Bombay, Madras and the North-Western Provinces) and the Chief Justice and a puisne Judge of the Supreme Court. The nominated members must be civil servants of at least ten years' standing. A Law Commission was appointed in London for the codification of Indian laws, and it ultimately led to the enactment of the Penal Code, the Criminal Procedure Code, and the Civil Procedure Code.

The changes made by the successive Charter Acts merely sought to carry to its logical conclusion the process that had been begun by North's Regulating Act and Pitt's India Act, viz. gradual transference of power and authority from the Company to the Crown. The relation between the two was, throughout this period, a complicated one, and depended to a large extent upon the personality of the President of the Board and his influence with the Cabinet. In addition to initiative, direction and control, a strong President could coerce the Directors into submission in almost every matter, but the latter always possessed, to a large extent, the power of resisting and putting obstacles in his way. The right of recalling the Governor-General was always an important instrument in their hands, and no President would lightly risk their determined hostility and desperate resistance. But the inevitable chain of events pointed to the extinction of the Company as the only logical end. After the Charter Act of 1833 the main privilege and justification for the existence of the Company was the appointment of civil servants—a powerful patronage which could hardly be transferred to the Cabinet without danger to British democracy. With the institution of competitive examination for the recruitment of civil servants, this last vestige of effective

power was gone, and the way was made clear for the abolition of the Company and the transfer of its powers to the Crown. This end was already visualised by many and must have shortly been realised in the ordinary course even if the Revolt had not suddenly brought it about in an abrupt manner.

2. Provincial Administration

Bengal, the First Phase (1765–1793)

Although the Company was granted the *Diwānī* of Bengal, Bihār and Orissa in 1765, the actual collection of revenue was left till 1772 in the hands of two Nāib-Diwāns, Muhammad Rezā Khān in Bengal and Shitab Rāy in Bihār. Out of the revenues collected, the Company had to pay twenty-six lacs to the Emperor, as stipulated in the Treaty of Allāhābād, and thirty-two lacs (originally fifty-three lacs) to the Nawāb of Bengal for the expenses of the administration, retaining the surplus for their own use. This is the famous system of Dual Government associated with the name of Clive.

The result of this system was disastrous both to the Company as well as to the people of Bengal, while the servants of the Company and the Nāib-Diwāns amassed great wealth. The Company's authorities at home were fully alive to the abuses of the system and in 1772 appointed Hastings Governor of Bengal with full powers to reform the administration.

Hastings abolished the Dual Government and carried into effect the declared policy of the Company to "stand forth as the Diwān". In reality, however, he did much more than simply exercise the powers of the Diwān, i.e. collection of revenue by his own agents. He made the Company responsible for almost the entire civil administration of the province.

He abolished the posts of the Nāib-Diwāns and removed the treasury to Calcutta. The minority of the Nawāb made the transition easy. He appointed, as the guardian of the Nawāb, Muny Begam, originally a dancing girl, on whom he could fully rely. The annual allowance of the Nawāb was at the same time reduced to sixteen lacs. These and similar other measures transferred the real power and authority in the administration from the hands of the Nawāb to those of the Company, and Calcutta became henceforth the real seat of government instead of Murshidābād.

After thus having assumed the powers of government, Hastings set himself to evolve a system of administration. The task, however,

proved a most formidable one. The administrative machinery of the Company, so long intended solely for commercial pursuits, had to be adjusted to an altogether different purpose, and the hopeless fabric of the Nawāb's Government could scarcely supply any solid foundation for a new structure. Besides, the morale of the Company's Indian servants was very low, and a tradition of public service had yet to be built up. The ignorance of the language of the people and of their laws, manners and customs added to the difficulty of the task. No wonder, therefore, that the British authorities in Bengal had to pass through long and weary processes and to engage in tedious and bitter experiments in order to find a solution to the stupendous problems that confronted them. The twenty years (1772–1793) that covered the administration of Hastings and Cornwallis may be regarded as the first eventful chapter in the history of Indo-British administration in Bengal. After numerous experiments, some definite principles were formulated towards the close of this period, and they formed the foundation of the mighty structure of the British-Indian administration which we see around us to-day. It would be convenient, therefore, to begin with this period and study the gradual evolution of this administrative system, mainly under the two heads, the administration of revenue and the administration of justice.

A. The Administration of Revenue

The main sources of revenue at this period were:

(*a*) Land-revenue
(*b*) Monopoly of salt and opium trade
and (*c*) Customs, tolls, excise, etc., called *Sair*.

Of these the first was undoubtedly the most important and demands our chief attention. As already noted above, the land-revenue was collected up to 1772 by the two Nāib-Diwāns. This was almost inevitable at the beginning, as the British entirely lacked the knowledge of revenue matters. In order to remove this deficiency "supervisors" were appointed to study the method of collecting the revenue and obtain a knowledge of the local customs and usages in this respect. The requisite knowledge was, however, confined to the zamindārs, who collected the revenues from the ryots, and the Qānūngoes or officers in charge of records. None of these were willing to communicate the information to the British officials and so the appointment of supervisors bore but little fruit.

In 1772 the posts of the Nāib-Diwāns were abolished and the revenue administration was placed under the direct control of the Governor and Council, who thus formed a Board of Revenue. The lands were farmed out by public auction and the assessment was made for a period of five years. A Collector and an Indian Diwān were appointed in each district to supervise the revenue administration.

The result of the system was disastrous from every point of view. Unprincipled speculators made rash bids and succeeded in ousting the zamindārs in most cases, but they soon found themselves unable to collect the stipulated revenue. Having no permanent interest in the land, they oppressed the ryots in order to exact as much as possible during the period of their tenure. In spite of this, they were heavily in arrears and were imprisoned by the Collectors for failure to make the stipulated payment. Thus the zamindārs, farmers and ryots, all suffered, while the Company also incurred serious losses.

In 1773 a new experiment was tried. A Committee of Revenue, consisting of two members of the Board and three senior servants of the Company, was established in Calcutta. The post of the European Collector was abolished, and the revenue administration of each district was placed under an Indian Diwān. Six Provincial Councils were established, and arrangements were made for occasional inspection by special Commissioners.

The change did not improve matters much, so that when the five years' settlement expired the Company adopted the method of annual assessment by public auction, but special instructions were issued to the Provincial Councils to give preference to the zamindārs in making these annual settlements of land revenue.

In 1781 a new plan was adopted for the administration of revenue. The essence of the new plan was to centralise the whole business of revenue collection in Calcutta. A new Committee of Revenue was set up, consisting of four members assisted by a Diwān. The Provincial Councils were abolished, and although European Collectors were reappointed in each district, they had no real powers and were merely figureheads.

The scheme suffered from all the evils and abuses of over-centralisation and soon broke down. In 1786 a rational scheme was adopted. Districts were now organised into regular fiscal units, and the Collector in each district was made responsible for settling the revenue and collecting it. At first the whole province was divided into thirty-five districts, but in 1787 the number was reduced to twenty-three. The Committee of Revenue was now reconstituted as a Board of Revenue with a member of the Council

as its President. The duties of the Board were clearly defined and consisted mainly in "controlling and advising the collectors and sanctioning their settlement". A new officer, Chief Sheristādār, was appointed to deal with the detailed records of land-tenure and land-revenue, so that the requisite knowledge might be available to the Government, instead of remaining a secret monopoly of the Qānūngoes.

The system of annual settlement continued till the beginning of A.D. 1790. It was obviously a temporary expedient and recognised as such, but had to be continued as the requisite data had to be collected before embarking upon a system of a more permanent character. The problem was further complicated by the varying theories about the ownership of land. The different views on this subject were crystallised into the opposing theories of Grant and Shore, two senior servants of the Company, who had specially applied themselves to the thorny question of land-revenue. Shore maintained that the zamindārs were the proprietors of the land and were only liable to pay a customary revenue to the Government. Grant, on the other hand, was of opinion that the proprietary right of the land was vested in the Government, and they had unrestricted rights to make settlements with anybody, zamindār or farmer, on any terms they liked. The authorities in England adopted Shore's views, and accordingly instructed Cornwallis to make settlement with the zamindārs, as far as practicable. The settlement was to be made at first for a period of ten years only, but with a definite idea of making it ultimately permanent.

In pursuance of these instructions, Cornwallis appointed Shore President of the Board of Revenue, and some steps were taken with a view to making a long-term settlement. The necessary preliminaries were not completed till 1790, but during this interval Cornwallis' views underwent an important change. Instead of a provisional settlement for ten years to be ultimately made permanent, he decided upon launching immediately a plan of permanent settlement. His views were opposed by most of his advisers, including both Shore and Grant. Grant naturally wanted to postpone an irrevocable measure of this type till a further and exhaustive study of the records was made to decide the question of the proprietary right of the land. Shore wanted to postpone it till a proper survey could enable the Government to make the perpetual assessment on a sound and equitable basis.

Cornwallis, on the other hand, maintained that enough material was already in the possession of the Government to decide the issue, both as regards the theoretical aspect of the question, as

well as the more practical one, viz. fixing the total amount of the revenue to be demanded from zamindārs. He further held that at present revenue matters were taking so much of the time and energy of the Government that nothing but a permanent measure of this type would enable them to devote the proper share of attention to the more important duties of the Government like administration and justice. Among the beneficent effects of a permanent settlement of land Cornwallis laid particular stress upon the encouragement it would give the zamindārs not only to develop their lands but also to reclaim waste lands which extended at that time over a large portion of the whole province.

On the 10th February, 1790, Cornwallis announced the settlement of land-revenue for ten years, to be made permanent if approved by the Court of Directors. The approval of the Directors reached Cornwallis in 1793, and on 22nd March of that year the Decennial Settlement was declared permanent. Its effect was to make the zamindārs permanent owners of the land, subject to the payment of a fixed annual revenue to the Government.

A thorny problem was thus solved after various experiments had been tried for more than twenty-five years. As to the justice and equity of this solution and its ultimate effect upon the country, opinions have always differed, as they differ even to-day. There is no doubt that it ultimately, but not without many years of suffering, created a class of loyal land-holders who formed a stable element in the State, and a steady source of a fixed amount of revenue. But it deprived the Government of the benefit of a gradually expanding income from the land, which forms the most valuable source of revenue in Bengal. Further, while it fully conceded the claims of the zamindārs, it altogether ignored those of the cultivators, who were placed absolutely at the tender mercies of the zamindārs. Cornwallis certainly issued regulations to limit and control the authority of the zamindār over his tenants, but these bore little fruit, and further legislation became necessary to remedy this grave defect of the Permanent Settlement.

A few words may be said regarding the other sources of revenue referred to above.

The revenues of salt and opium were at first managed by the system of auction, as in the case of land-revenue, the settlement being made with the highest bidder. In 1780 the manufacture of salt was directly taken up by the Government and a small establishment was set up to manage it under the control of the Supreme Council. The *Sair* revenue was managed by the same agency as the land-revenue.

B. The Administration of Justice

In India the administration of civil justice was closely associated with the management of revenue, and the grant of *Diwānī* rights in 1765 comprised both these functions. As in the case of revenue, repeated experiments were made before a definite system of administration of justice was evolved. These experiments were closely connected with, and may be said to form almost an essential part of, those in connection with the land-revenue. In any case, both passed through the same process of evolution, and the judicial system at each stage during this experimental period can only be understood with reference to the system of revenue administration.

The question was first definitely taken up in 1772. Two courts were established in each district, the Diwānī Adālat with a civil and the Faujdārī Adālat with a criminal jurisdiction. In addition to these, two superior courts were established in Calcutta, viz. Sadar Diwānī Adālat, as a court of appeal in civil cases, and Sadar Nizāmat Adālat for revising and confirming sentences. The Diwānī Adālat in each district was in charge of the Collector, and the Sadar Diwānī Adālat was presided over by the President and members of Council. The criminal courts remained in charge of Indian judges, according to old customs and precedents, but the Collectors and the Council exercised some control respectively over the district courts and the Sadar Nizāmat Adālat.

The changes in the system of revenue administration in 1773, 1781 and 1786 brought about corresponding changes in the administration of justice. In 1774 the district courts were placed in charge of Indian officers called Āmils. 'An appeal lay from their decision to the Provincial Councils and, in important cases, from them to the Sadar Diwānī Adālat.

In 1775 the Sadar Nizāmat Adālat was transferred to Murshidābād and placed in charge of the Nāib-Nāzim. A Faujdār was appointed in each district to bring criminals to justice.

In 1780 the judicial powers of the six Provincial Councils were transferred to six courts of Diwānī Adālat each presided over by a covenanted servant of the Company. In 1781 the number of these courts was increased to eighteen and all civil cases were tried by them. In other words, the old district courts under European supervision were revived. But except in four districts, where the Collector presided over these courts, they were placed under separate judges. Their decision was final up to 1,000 rupees, but where the amount in dispute was larger, an appeal lay to the

Sadar Diwānī Adālat. At the same time the Faujdārī system of 1775 was abolished and the powers and duties of the Faujdārs were transferred to the judges of the district courts. The criminals were, however, tried in the Faujdārī or criminal courts under Indian judges, under the ultimate control of the Nāib-Nāzim at Murshidābād.

In the meanwhile a new element had been introduced by the establishment of the Supreme Court in Calcutta, in 1774, by virtue of the Regulating Act. This court, established by the Crown and consisting of a Chief Justice and three Puisne Judges, was vested with jurisdiction over British subjects only, but in practice it led to enormous difficulties. The court claimed, and actually did exercise, jurisdiction over all persons, and not only ignored the authority of the Company's courts but even entertained cases against the judges and officers of these courts for acts done in their official capacity. The legal principles and procedure which they followed were foreign to India and extremely vexatious. The Select Committee very truly observed that "the court has been generally terrible to the natives and has distracted the government of the Company". The pretensions of the Supreme Court reached their climax in the famous Cosijurā Case, which brought the matter to a head. A judge of the Supreme Court issued a writ against a zamindār, the Rājā of Cosijurā, but the Supreme Council denied the right of the Supreme Court to exercise jurisdiction over a zamindār, as he was neither a British subject nor a servant of a British subject. Accordingly when the officers of the Supreme Court proceeded to arrest the zamindār, the Council sent sepoys to arrest them. There was thus an almost open war between the highest executive and judicial authorities in Bengal. But a final catastrophe was averted by an ingenious device of Hastings'. He appointed Impey, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, as President of the Sadar Diwānī Adālat, with a high salary, and the tension was immediately relieved.

This procedure, which is usually regarded as a bribe to Impey, was open to serious objections. One of the avowed objects for creating the Supreme Court was to have any complaints against the Company's servants dealt with by an independent tribunal. This object obviously could not be fulfilled so long as the head of the Supreme Court held office, with high emoluments, at the pleasure of the Governor-General and Council. The only relieving feature in this otherwise dark picture is that, apart from putting an end to the deadlock, it made the Sadar Diwānī Adālat, the highest appellate court in the province, a much more efficient

institution than it could ever have been under the presidency of the Governor-General, who had little time, and perhaps less knowledge of law, to enable him to discharge the duties of the high office in a satisfactory manner.

But this arrangement was upset by the Home authorities. Impey had to refund the salary and was impeached. A new Statute passed in 1781 defined more clearly the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, exempting from it the official acts of the Governor-General and Council, the zamindārs or farmers, and all matters concerning revenue collection.

During the period of Cornwallis' administration, important changes were made in all branches of administration, including the judicial system. In 1787 the district courts were again placed under the Collectors except in Dacca, Patna and Murshidābād. The Collectors were vested with the powers of a magistrate and could try criminal cases within certain limits. The more important criminal cases were tried, as before, in district criminal courts and Sadar Nizāmat Adālat. The Collectors could not deal with revenue cases, which were transferred to the Board of Revenue.

Further changes were introduced in 1790. The experiment of making the Board of Revenue responsible for revenue cases proved a failure, and new local courts were instituted in each district under the Collector for trying these cases. Most far-reaching changes were made in the administration of criminal justice. The Sadar Nizāmat Adālat was again removed from Murshidābād to Calcutta (it had been done once before by Hastings) and in the place of a Muhammadan judge it was presided over by the Governor-General and Council, assisted by experts in Indian laws. The district criminal courts were abolished and their place was taken by four courts of circuit, established at Calcutta, Murshidābād, Patna and Dacca. These courts were presided over by two servants of the Company, assisted by Indian experts, and they were to tour through the area of their jurisdictions twice every year. The powers of the Collectors, as magistrates, were further increased. They were made responsible for the custody of the prisoners and execution of the sentences passed on them by the four provincial criminal courts.

The famous Cornwallis Code of May, 1793, partly by defining the changes already made and partly by introducing new ones, ushered in the system which formed the steel frame of British-Indian administration. The changes proceeded on two principles. First, the necessity of reducing the multifarious duties of the Collector, which gave him almost unlimited authority and made

him the sole representative of British authority in a district. Accordingly the Collector was divested of all judicial and magisterial powers, which devolved upon a new class of officers called Judges. The separate revenue courts for each district as well as the judicial powers of the Board of Revenue were abolished and the Judge tried all civil cases.

In addition to the twenty-three district courts and three city courts in Patna, Dacca and Murshidābād a large number of courts of lower grade were also set up to cope with the business. The lowest court was that of Munsiffs which could try cases up to 50 rupees. Next was that of the Registrars, a class of officials attached to the Zilā courts, who could try cases up to 200 rupees. From the decisions of all these courts an appeal lay to the district court.

The four provincial courts of circuit set up in 1790 were reorganised. Each of them now contained three, instead of two, English judges, and not only served as criminal courts of circuit as before, but also heard appeals from the decisions of the district judges. From them appeals lay in more important cases to the Sadar Diwānī Adālat in Calcutta. In order to curb the authority of the Collectors still further and to protect Indians from oppression at their hands, the Collectors and all the officers of the Government were "made amenable to the courts for acts done in their official capacities", and even Government itself in case of any dispute with its subjects over property had to "submit its rights to be tried in these courts under the existing laws and regulations".

The second principle on which Cornwallis proceeded was to divest the Indians of any real authority or responsibility in matters of administration. He had already deprived them of any real power in the administration of criminal justice, over which they had formerly supreme and almost absolute control. He now deprived the zamindārs of the power and responsibility of maintaining peace within their jurisdiction. They were forced to disband their police forces, and their duties were entrusted to a number of Darogās in every district, each working within a defined area under the direct supervision of the Magistrate.

The net result of the changes introduced by Cornwallis was to divide the entire administrative work in a district between two European officers, one acting as a Collector of revenue, and the other as a Judge and Magistrate. Indians were deliberately excluded from offices involving trust and responsibility.

Bengal, the Second Phase (1793–1828)

For a period of thirty-five years the system of Cornwallis was adopted as the guiding principle, and the Government were merely engaged in remedying the defects that gradually forced themselves on their attention. In connection with the Permanent Settlement, the main difficulties were about the regular collection of the stipulated dues. These fell heavily in arrears, with the consequence that lands were frequently sold and the ideas of a stable revenue and a loyal contented class of zamindārs were not realised to any considerable extent. Another defect of the Act was the insufficient protection it gave to the tenants against the oppression of the zamindārs. The establishment of the law-courts was expected to give the tenants the needed relief, but in practice it proved futile. In the absence of any regular survey of land and a definite record about the tenure of lands the law-courts could afford but little relief.

But even the protection of the courts soon proved illusory. For the law-suits multiplied so rapidly that the courts were unable to cope with them. The proverbial law's delay proved so serious in this instance that justice was practically denied, for, in the ordinary course, a case was not expected to be decided during the life-time of a man. Lastly, crimes increased enormously and there was no security of life and property.

It is needless to describe in detail the various measures taken by the successive Governors-General to cope with these serious evils. It will suffice to indicate the main lines of policy adopted by them.

As regards the Permanent Settlement, attempts were made to compile records of tenure and the Regulation VII of 1819 clearly defined the rights of the various classes of tenants. Greater power was given to the zamindār to collect rents from his tenants and he was made liable to arrest on failure of the annual rent. To cope with the enormous increase in law-suits, the number of district judges was increased, the number and the powers of the lower courts were enhanced, and Indians were appointed as Munsiffs (with larger powers than those of 1793) and Sadar Amīns to try civil cases within a prescribed limit. As regards criminal cases, the magistrate's power to try them was enlarged and he was authorised to delegate it to his assistants. The Collectors were again empowered to try certain classes of revenue cases, and a few selected among them were vested with the powers of magistrates. Suitable changes were made in the procedure of the

provincial appellate courts, so that appeal cases might be tried even when the judges were on circuit. The number of judges in these courts was increased from three to four. The Sadar Diwānī Adālat was entirely reconstituted. Instead of the Governor-General and Council, three judges were placed in charge of it, and their number was gradually increased to five. In 1797 an appeal from the decision of this body to the King in Council was permitted in cases where the amount in dispute was over £5,000.

In order to maintain law and order, an efficient police system was organised both in large towns as well as in the headquarters of every district. They worked under the supervision of four Police Superintendents, stationed in Calcutta, Dacca, Patna and Murshidābād.

Bengal, the Third Phase (1829–1858)

The first radical change in the system of Cornwallis was effected by Lord William Bentinck in 1829. The new scheme of administration centred round a class of officials called Commissioners, each of whom was placed in charge of a division comprising several districts. The Provincial courts of appeal and the posts of Superintendents of Police were abolished and their duties were transferred to the Commissioner. In addition to these, he had to supervise the work of the Collectors, magistrates and judges of the districts under him. Experience, however, soon proved that these tasks were too much for a single individual, and as a result of the re-shufflings made in 1831 and 1837, the duties of the sessions judge were transferred to the district judge, and the latter was relieved of his magisterial functions by the creation of new posts for that purpose. Thus the district administration was carried on by the judge, the Collector, and the magistrate, with assistants, belonging to the covenanted Civil Service, under the supervision of the Divisional Commissioner.

Another important feature of the change was to entrust Indians with a larger share in administrative work. For this purpose Deputy-Magistrates and Deputy-Collectors were recruited from among them, and, for hearing civil cases, a new post of Principal Sadar Amīn was created, from whose decisions, in certain cases, an appeal lay directly to the Sadar Diwānī Adālat of Calcutta and not to the District Judge as was hitherto the practice.

Lord William Bentinck also created the posts of Joint Magistrates and placed them in charge of sub-divisions. Gradually the Deputy Magistrates were also appointed as sub-divisional officers.

The most notable change in the administration of Bengal took

place in 1854. Up to that year the Governor-General and Council were also responsible for the administration of Bengal, and naturally the local needs of Bengal yielded in importance to the greater imperial issues that almost always confronted that body. By the Charter Act of 1853 Bengal, Bihār, Orissa and Assam were placed in charge of a Lieutenant Governor, and Mr. F. J. Halliday was appointed to this post on 28th April, 1854.

Madras

In Madras, as in Bengal, the chief administrative problem was the collection of land-revenue, which was the main source of the income of the State. Unlike Bengal, however, the British territories in Madras were acquired in different times from different powers, and had different laws and usages. The administration of land-revenue had, therefore, to be based on different principles in order to suit the local needs.

In general two different systems were adopted. In the *Jāgīr* area and Northern Sarkārs each village was owned by a number of Mirasdārs, who possessed heritable shares, and the principal persons among them had long been accustomed to act as the representatives of the village. Accordingly settlement of the whole village was made with a committee of the principal Mirasdārs in return for a lump sum.

An altogether different system prevailed in Baramahal, which was conquered from Tipu in 1792. Here the village headman collected dues from each cultivator, and paid them to the State. Alexander Read and Thomas Munro studied the details of this system and gradually evolved what is known as the *ryotwārī* settlement. The essence of the system, which was not fully developed till 1855, is that the settlement is made with small farmers who enjoy all rights in the land subject to the payment of a fixed revenue which is collected by the State directly by its own servants. The settlement is made and renewed for specified periods, usually thirty years, during which the ryot is not liable to be ousted from the land or to pay any additional charge. In this settlement the Government share is limited to half the net value of the crop.

The two systems described above were usually adopted, and applied to territories added from time to time by conquest or cessions. But the *ryotwārī* system found greater favour, especially as the *Mirasdārī* gave scope for the principal people to exert oppression upon the rest of the villagers.

After the introduction of the Permanent Settlement in Bengal, the system was also introduced in Madras. The Poligārs in Madras, who corresponded to the zamindārs of Bengal, were more like feudal chiefs with military retainers, exercising extensive judicial and executive authority within their jurisdiction. The settlement was made with them in perpetuity, on the lines followed in Bengal, and they were deprived of their military and judicial powers. So far the experiment was on the whole a success. But there were many parts of Madras which had no Poligārs and here the Government tried to obviate the difficulty by creating a new class of zamindārs. A number of villages were grouped into a fairly large estate and it was then sold by auction to the highest bidder. The result was extremely unsatisfactory and the system was gradually dropped, at first in favour of the *Mirasdārī* and ultimately in favour of the *ryotwārī* system.

The *ryotwārī* system soon came to be the recognised form of settlement. But the *Zamindārī* system prevailed in about a fourth part of the province, and the *Mirasdārī*, though officially abandoned, prevails in a few isolated areas.

Along with the Permanent Settlement, the judicial system of Cornwallis was also introduced in Madras. The evolution of the administrative machinery followed here nearly the same course as in Bengal. The province was divided into a number of districts, and each district into Tāluks. At first the District Judge was also vested with magisterial and police authorities but these functions were soon transferred to the Collector. Gradually the office of the Collector became a very important one, and in addition to the duties of a Bengal Collector, he had important functions in connection with the assessment and collection of land-revenue.

Other Parts of British India

The system of administration evolved in Bengal was similarly extended to other parts of British India and need not be described in detail. As regards land-settlements, the *ryotwārī* system was adopted in Bombay, and in the Upper Provinces, roughly corresponding to the modern United Provinces, the settlement was made with the village community and resembled the *Mirasdārī* system of Madras. The village community does not necessarily mean a collective ownership of all the villagers, but usually that of a group of persons more or less closely connected, who were responsible both jointly and severally for the payment of the revenue, fixed for periods of thirty years. The names of Mountstuart Elphinstone

and James Thomason are associated with the evolution of the system in Bombay and the U.P. respectively.

The system of the U.P. was adopted in the Punjab with slight modifications, and in both these provinces steps were taken to safeguard the interests of cultivators who were not members of the village community. In practice, a cultivator who occupied a holding continuously for twelve years was deemed to possess permanent and heritable right in it, subject to the payment of a judicially fixed rent. This right was legally recognised by the Punjab Tenancy Act of 1868. The Oudh Tenancy Act, passed in the same year, did not proceed so far, but it granted occupancy rights to nearly one-fifth of the cultivators and introduced more equitable principles in respect of compensation for improvements and increases of rents.

The judicial system of Bengal was extended to Benares, Oudh and the Doāb respectively in 1795, 1803 and 1804. On account of the great distance from Calcutta separate courts of Sadar Diwānī Adālat and Sadar Nizāmat Adālat were set up in Allahābād in 1831.

As regards Bombay, the regulations of 1799 set up a system of judicial administration like that of Bengal, but it was revised in 1827 under Mountstuart Elphinstone. The new scheme set up Zilā courts presided over by one judge from whose decision an appeal lay to the Sadar Diwānī Adālat. Smaller cases were tried by lower courts in charge of Indians. Thus Elphinstone forestalled to some extent the reforms of Bentinck which were introduced all over British India, generally on the lines adopted in Bengal.

Supreme Courts

Reference has already been made to the establishment of a Supreme Court in Calcutta, and its early history. In 1797 the number of judges was reduced to three. A Supreme Court, with similar powers, constitution and jurisdiction, was set up in Madras in 1801 and in Bombay in 1823.

In 1853, the jurisdiction of these courts was limited to (*a*) British-born subjects, (*b*) persons residing within the boundaries of the three cities or having any dwelling-house and servants therein, and (*c*) all persons who were directly or indirectly in the service of the Company.

The law followed by these courts was the English law of 1726 as subsequently modified expressly with reference to India and the Regulations made by the Indian Government. But as regards

inheritance, succession and contract, Hindu laws and usages were to be applied to the Hindus, and Muslim laws and usages to Muslims.

An appeal lay from the decisions of these courts to the King-in-Council where the amount in dispute was above Rs. 4,000 (Rs. 3,000 in Bombay). The Statute of 1833 transferred the entire appellate jurisdiction of the King-in-Council to the newly constituted Judicial Committee of the Privy Council which consisted of the President, the Lord Chancellor and other members, including two who held judgeships in the British dominions beyond the sea.

Finally we may refer to the two most notable landmarks in the judicial administration of India, viz. the codification of laws and the establishment of High Courts, the foundation of which was laid during the administration of the Company though the completion had to be deferred till India passed under the Crown.

The idea of a systematic code of law in place of varying laws and usages is traceable to an early period of British history. No less than five different bodies of statute law were in force in the British dominions, and the position was always regarded as extremely unsatisfactory. The Charter Act of 1833 provided for their consolidation and codification, and accordingly a Law Commission was appointed in the year 1834. Macaulay, the leading spirit of the Commission, prepared a draft of the Indian Penal Code, but little was done after his departure, and the Commission was finally abolished.

The Charter Act of 1853 led to the appointment of a new Commission. It submitted plans for the creation of High Courts by the amalgamation of the Supreme Court and Sadar Diwānī Adālat and also for a uniform code of civil and criminal procedure applicable to these High Courts and inferior courts of British India.

The recommendations were accepted and in 1861 the Indian High Courts Act authorised the establishment of a High Court in each of the following towns, namely Calcutta, Bombay and Madras in place of the old Supreme Court and the Sadar Diwānī Adālat, which thus disappeared after nearly ninety years. In pursuance of the same policy, a High Court was established in Allahābād and a Chief Court in the Punjab in 1866.

Macaulay's Penal Code was revised and passed into law in 1860, and a Code of Civil Procedure and a Code of Criminal Procedure were promulgated respectively in 1859 and 1861.

CHAPTER IX

TRADE AND INDUSTRY,[1] 1757–1857

One of the most important facts in the history of India during the first century of British rule is the decay of her flourishing trade and industry. In order to understand properly the extent to which British rule was a contributory cause of this decay it is necessary to begin with Bengal, the part of India where British rule was first effectively established.

Reference has already been made to the activities of European trading companies in Bengal. The Portuguese had developed an extensive foreign commerce in Bengal in the early seventeenth century, but their trade in the eighteenth century was practically negligible. The Danes had never had any important trade in Bengal. The French commerce in Bengal was also very small until Dupleix was appointed Intendant of Chandernagore, but with his transfer to Pondicherry in 1741 the French trade rapidly declined. The Dutch and the British alone carried on a flourishing trade in Bengal during the first half of the eighteenth century. After the acquisition of political authority in Bengal by the British East India Company, the Dutch were ousted from the field and the English Company enjoyed the monopoly of foreign commerce in Bengal. As already noted above, the Charter Act of 1813 abolished the monopoly of the Company's Indian trade, and the Charter Act of 1833 finally put an end to the commercial activities of the Company.

The volume of inland and foreign trade of Bengal, other than that carried on by the European Companies, was also very large during the first half of the eighteenth century. The Hindu, Armenian and Muhammadan merchants carried on a brisk trade with other parts of India and with Turkey, Arabia, Persia and even Tibet. The balance of foreign trade was, however, always in favour of Bengal, and the surplus value of its exports had to be

[1] In view of the controversial nature of the subject, I have thought it safe to follow the authority of Dr. J. C. Sinha, who has made a critical study of the subject in the light of materials not available to preceding writers. The facts stated in this chapter are mostly taken from Dr. Sinha's book, *Economic Annals of Bengal* (Macmillan, 1927).

paid for in gold. As a matter of fact, during the period 1708–1756, bullion formed nearly three-fourths of the value of total imports to Bengal.

The most important articles of export from Bengal were cotton and silk piece-goods, raw silk, sugar, salt, jute, saltpetre and opium. The fine cotton cloths, especially the Dacca muslin, were in great demand all over the world. Bengal cotton goods were exported in large quantities by the European Companies and went overland to Ispahan and by sea to the markets of Basra, Mocha and Jedda. The Dutch exported annually three-quarters of a million pounds of Cāssimbāzār raw silk either to Japan or to Holland in the middle of the seventeenth century, and a large quantity was exported to Central Asia. Even in 'Ālīvardī Khān's time, nearly seventy lacs of rupees' worth of raw silk was entered in the Customs Office books at Murshidābād exclusive of the European investments.

Bengal was the chief centre of the sugar industry and exported large quantities of the commodity even in the middle of the eighteenth century. Down to the year 1756, a considerable trade in Bengal sugar was carried on with Madras, the Malabar coast, Bombay, Surāt, Sind, Muscat, the Persian Gulf, Mocha and Jedda. The jute industry of Bengal also began to develop in the middle of the eighteenth century.

An eminent English authority has observed that even in the year 1756 there was a large volume of trade flowing to Bengal from "the coast of Coromandel and Malabar, the Gulf of Persia and the Red Sea, nay even Manilla, China and the coast of Africa". Thus down to the eve of British rule there was a rich and prosperous trade in Bengal due to its flourishing agricultural and manufacturing industries.

The battle of Plassey was, however, a great turning-point, not only in the political but also in the economic history of Bengal. Apart from the resulting misrule and confusion, which had an adverse effect upon trade and industry, several causes directly operated in impoverishing the country and ruining its rich and prosperous trade and industry.

1. To begin with, there was the large economic drain. Mīr Jāfar and Mīr Kāsim had to pay enormous sums of money to the Company and its servants for gaining the throne of Bengal. During 1757–1765 it amounted to more than five millions sterling. From 1765 when the Company received the *Diwānī*, the surplus revenue of Bengal was invested in purchasing the articles exported from India by the English East India Company. By 1780, when this drain of wealth finally ceased, its amount had exceeded ten millions. There were, besides, exports of bullion to China, and the huge

private fortunes of the servants of the Company, a substantial part of which must have found its way, in some shape or other, to England. It has been estimated that the total drain from Bengal to England during the period 1757 to 1780 amounted to about thirty-eight million pounds sterling. It is immaterial whether this wealth was transferred in the form of bullion or in the shape of articles of export in exchange for which Bengal received nothing. The fact remains that Bengal became poorer in the course of twenty-three years by nearly sixty crores of rupees (which was equivalent to three hundred crores of 1900, the purchasing power of the rupee being then at least five times as high). This heavy drain must have greatly impoverished the province, and crippled its capital wealth to the serious detriment of its trade and industry.

2. Abuse of *Dastaks*. In 1656, the East India Company obtained from Prince Shujā, the governor of Bengal, exemption from payment of the usual customs duty of 2½ per cent in return for an annual payment of Rs. 3,000. Murshid Qulī Jāfar Khān having refused to make this concession, the English Company obtained a fresh Charter from the Emperor Farrukhsiyar in 1717, renewing the same privileges. The Nawāb, however, stipulated and the Company agreed, that the Company's passports or *dastaks* could not be used for internal trade, and that they should cover the cases of only such articles as were either imported, or intended to be exported, by sea.

But the concession was abused in two ways. In the first place the servants of the Company used the *dastaks* for their private trade, and secondly the *dastaks* were sold to Indian merchants to enable them to evade the customs duty. In spite of the vigilance of Murshid Qulī and 'Ālīvardī, the abuses became very extensive, and were subsequently complained of by Sirāj-ud-daulah. With the accession of Mīr Jāfar, these abuses became widely prevalent, and the servants of the Company also claimed exemption from the payment of duties in respect of inland trade. Mīr Jāfar made piteous complaints to the English Governor in Calcutta, but with no success. The result was that the Company's servants monopolised the inland trade of Bengal and amassed huge fortunes, while the Nawāb lost a large amount of revenue and the Indian traders were ruined by this unfair competition. In addition to this, the servants of the Company made unjust and illegal profit by oppressing the poor people. About them Mīr Kāsim wrote to the Company's Governor in 1762: "They forcibly take away the goods . . . for a fourth part of their value; and by way of violence and oppressions, they oblige the ryots to give five rupees for goods which are worth but one rupee." Official documents of the Company confirm this state

of things, and add that those who refused the unjust demands of the Company's servants were "flogged or confined".

Mīr Kāsim protested against these iniquities more vigorously than his predecessor, and when the Council refused to grant any redress, he abolished the inland duties altogether, so that all the traders should be on an equal footing. As we have seen above, this led to his quarrel with the English and cost him his throne.

3. Virtual monopoly enjoyed by the Company. The oppressions of the Company's servants soon took a new turn. In order to ensure a regular and abundant supply of cotton goods, the Company entered into forward contracts with the weavers to supply stipulated quantities of cloth at fixed dates. This became a new source of oppression in the hands of their servants. Armed with the authority of the Company, they forced the poor weavers, on pains of flogging, to sign most iniquitous bonds. The latter were paid for their goods much less than their usual price, sometimes even less than the cost of materials, while they were forbidden to work for any other party on pain of corporal punishment. A similar policy was adopted towards the workers in raw silk.

The story is current in Bengal that, in order to avoid being forced to weave for the Company, many weavers used to cut off their own thumbs. This story is perhaps merely a popular invention, but there is not the slightest doubt about the great misery and oppression suffered by the poor weavers at this time at the hands of the Company's servants. Verelst, writing in 1767, refers to the unusual scarcity of weavers, a great number of whom deserted their profession. Thus the monopolistic control of the Company, and the misconduct of its servants, paved the way for the ruin of cotton and silk weaving, the two flourishing industries of Bengal. Cornwallis made an earnest effort to revive the trade by stopping the two evils, but almost irreparable mischief had already been done.

4. English competition. The ruin of the weavers in Bengal was completed by the unfair competition of manufacturers in England. As soon as cotton and silk goods exported by the East India Company became popular in England, the jealous British manufacturers wanted to kill the industry by legislation. By the two laws passed by Parliament in 1700 and 1720, cotton and silk goods imported from India "could not be worn or otherwise used in England". There was, however, a great demand for these things in other European countries, and hence all the goods imported by the Company to England used to be exported to various other countries of Europe. But on account of the hostilities between England and other European powers, first during the War of American

Independence and again during the Napoleonic wars, this re-export of Indian goods suffered a severe setback, and in 1779 there was a sudden fall in the import of cotton goods from Bengal. Further, on a memorial of the British calico printers in 1780, the Court of Directors agreed to stop the importation of printed cotton goods from Bengal for a term of four years.

Artificial restriction of imports by legislation gave a fillip to the cotton industry of England. By a series of inventions, the English cotton manufacturers improved the quality of their goods, and the Court of Directors observed in their letter of 20th August, 1788, that the duty and freight on the Company's imports had already enabled the English manufacturers to undersell Indian cotton goods in the British market. Hence the Company followed the policy of importing raw materials, viz. cotton, in place of manufactured goods. Next, they exported Manchester cotton goods to Bengal. With the perfection of the power loom, Manchester began to produce immense quantities of cheap cotton goods, and soon they flooded the markets of India. The average value of cotton goods annually exported from England was about £1,200,000 between 1786 and 1790. By 1809 it had increased to £18,400,000. Its subsequent progress was still more phenomenal.

Thus, at the very moment when the efforts of Cornwallis and the end of European war might have revived Bengal's cotton industry, it was killed by the application of power-spinning and power-weaving to the manufacture of cotton goods in England. No attempt was made to protect the Bengal industry from inevitable ruin either by legislation or by the introduction of improved methods.

Thus within half a century of the battle of Plassey, the phenomenal prosperity of Bengal suffered a serious setback from which it has not recovered even to-day. The circumstances under which the flourishing industries of Bengal were ruined, and the inland trade passed into the hands of a privileged class, almost completely crushed out of Bengal even the very spirit of trade and industry. The lack of capital, caused by the enormous drain of wealth, and the unsettled condition of the country owing to the misrule of the early period of British supremacy, made the revival of trade and industry well-nigh impossible. At the same time, the Permanent Settlement gave an impetus to agriculture and investment of capital in land. Thus while the loss of industry drove the poor people more and more to agriculture, the available capital was sunk mostly in land. The trade of the country passed into the hands of Europeans, who gradually built up their own system of commerce and banking in which people of the soil had little share.

In a word, we find here the genesis of the entire economic system which prevails to-day in Bengal.

What has been said of Bengal in respect of trade and industry, applies in a general way to the rest of India. The general impression that India has never been an industrial country is misleading in the extreme. Indian arts and crafts have been an important contributory factor to her immense wealth from time immemorial. "Even at a much later period," so runs the Industrial Commission Report, "when the merchant adventurers from the West made their first appearance in India, the industrial development of this country was, at any rate, not inferior to that of the more advanced European nations." The finished products of Indian industry as well as her natural products such as pearl, perfumes, dye-stuff, spices, sugar, opium, etc., were exported to distant countries and she imported gold, copper, zinc, tin, lead, wine, horses, etc. But there was always an excess of exports over imports, which meant necessarily the influx of a large quantity of gold. In the first century Pliny bitterly complained of the drain of gold from the Roman Empire caused by the use of Indian luxuries. A similar complaint was made in the eighteenth century even by Englishmen.

The chief industry in India was the weaving of cotton, silk and wool. Outside Bengal, Lucknow, Ahmādābād, Nāgpur and Madurā were important centres of cotton industry, and fine shawls were manufactured in the Punjab and Kāshmīr. Brass, copper and bell-metal wares were manufactured all over India, some of the notable centres being Benares, Tanjore, Poona, Nāsik and Ahmadābād. Jewellery, stone-carving, filigree work in gold and silver, and artistic work in marble, sandalwood, ivory and glass formed other important industries. In addition, there were various other miscellaneous arts and crafts such as tannery, perfumery, paper-making, etc.

The carrying trade was also largely in the hands of the Indians. Down to the beginning of the nineteenth century A.D. the ship-building industry was more developed in India than in England. Like the Indian textile industry, it roused the jealousy of English manufacturers and its progress and development were restricted by legislation.

As in Bengal, the decay of trade and industry in the rest of India set in towards the close of the eighteenth century and its ruin was well-nigh complete by the middle of the nineteenth.

The prominent causes of the decay were the same as those operating in Bengal: the policy of the British Parliament, the competition of cheap goods produced by machinery, and the

unwillingness or inability of the Indian Government to protect or encourage Indian arts and crafts. The extent to which the policy of the British Government in India was responsible for the decay of her trade and industry is a debatable point. Some writers think that it was the Industrial Revolution in England, with the application of power-spinning and power-weaving to the production of cotton goods, which ruined Indian manufacture of cotton goods, and it was impossible for the ruling authorities to make any successful effort to protect the industry, as they were quite unable to offset the enormous disparity between power and hand manufacture. Rushbrook Williams, who holds the above view, further adds: "Those who would blame the British authorities for not taking steps to protect Indian cotton manufactures against the new and overwhelming advantages enjoyed by the power-driven British industry, are obliged to assume that contemporary statesmen regarded these problems from a purely modern standpoint."

On the other hand, eminent writers, both Indian and English, have pointed out that the Industrial Revolution in England was itself "a consequence of the plundered wealth of India", and that not only did the British authorities not take any step to protect the declining Indian industries but they actually threw obstacles in their way, and at least in some cases, discouraged Indian manufactures in order to promote those of England.

As to the last remark of Rushbrook Williams, it is necessary to remember that even as early as 1700 (and ever since), British statesmen had enough idea of the modern economic system to protect English industry by legislation from Indian competition. That similar steps were not taken to protect Indian industry, cannot, therefore, be explained by lack of statesmanship, and may, not unreasonably, be attributed to the desire on the part of the ruling authorities to promote English industry at the cost of Indian. One can, of course, entertain reasonable doubts about the success of any attempt to stem the tide of English competition. But it is a hypothetical question and raises important issues which cannot be discussed here. The broad fact remains that, during the first half of the nineteenth century, India lost the proud position of supremacy in the trade and industry of the world, which she had been occupying for well-nigh two thousand years, and was gradually transformed into a plantation for the production of raw materials and a dumping-ground for the cheap manufactured goods from the West. All the while the Government responsible for the welfare of its teeming millions looked on and did not take adequate steps to avert the calamity.

CHAPTER X

THE DAWN OF NEW INDIA

1. The New India and Rājā Rāmmohan Roy

IN SPITE of political convulsions and economic retrogression the first century of British rule in India (1757–1858) is in certain respects a memorable epoch in her history. The period witnessed a remarkable outburst of intellectual activity in India and a radical transformation in her social and religious ideas. As a result of all these, India passed from the "medieval" to the "modern" age.

The impetus to these changes came from the introduction of English education. Through this channel came the liberal ideas of the West which stirred the people and roused them from the slumber of ages. A critical outlook on the past and new aspirations for the future marked the new awakening. Reason and judgment took the place of faith and belief; superstition yielded to science; immobility was replaced by progress, and a zeal for reform of proved abuses overpowered age-long apathy and inertia, and a complacent acquiescence in whatever was current in society. The traditional meaning of the *Śāstras* was subjected to critical examination and new conceptions of morality and religion remodelled the orthodox beliefs and habits.

This great change affected at first only a small group of persons, but gradually the ideas spread among larger sections of the people, and ultimately their influence reached, in greater or less degree, even the masses.

The new spirit of this age is strikingly illustrated by the life and career of Rājā Rāmmohan Roy, a remarkable personality, the centenary of whose death (1833) was recently celebrated all over India.

The Rājā began his reforming activity by preaching the unity of God, and assailing the prevalent Hindu belief in many gods and the worship of their images with elaborate rituals. He tried to demonstrate that his views were in accordance with the old and true scriptures of the Hindus, and that the modern deviations from them are due to superstitions of a later age without any moral and religious sanction behind them. Rāmmohan's views stirred Hindu society to its depths, and bitter controversies followed.

Rāmmohan published Bengali translations of ancient scriptures in order to defend his thesis, and carried on the contest, almost single-handed, by the publication of a large number of Bengali tracts. Towards the close of his life he founded, in 1828, an organisation for furthering his religious views. This organisation ultimately developed into the Brāhma Samāj and will be dealt with in a later section. An indirect result of his campaign was the impetus given to the development of Bengali prose literature and Bengali journalism.

Rāmmohan was a great pioneer of English education. Not only did he himself found institutions for that purpose, but he always lent a helping hand to others who endeavoured to do so.[1]

Rāmmohan's reforming activity was also directed against the social abuses of Hindu society, notably the rigours of caste and the degrading position of women. The part he played in abolishing the self-immolation of widows will be described later on. He also endeavoured to ameliorate the condition of helpless widows in various ways, notably by changing the Hindu laws of inheritance about women and giving them proper education. He was opposed to polygamy and various other abuses in the social system of Bengal. He also advocated re-marriage of widows under specified circumstances. His ideals of womanhood and of man's duty towards them, preached in forceful language in various tracts, were far ahead of his age and were inspired by the memories of the golden age of India. On the whole he struck the true keynote of social reform in India by upholding the cause of women and denouncing the rigours of caste rules, the two main lines on which all social reforms have proceeded since.

In the field of Indian politics also, Rājā Rāmmohan was the prophet of the new age. He laid down the lines for political agitation in a constitutional manner which ultimately led to the birth of the Indian National Congress half a century later. His views on political problems are surprisingly modern, and in essential features represent the high-water mark of Indian political thought of the nineteenth century.

The basic principles of Rāmmohan's politics were "love of freedom, amounting to the strongest passion of his soul", and a sincere belief that the people of India have the same capability for improvement as any other civilised people. The political ideals of the Rājā are thus described by his English biographer:

"The prospect of an educated India, of an India approximating to European standards of culture, seems to have never been long absent from Rāmmohan's mind; and he did, however vaguely,

[1] See page 817.

claim in advance for his countrymen the political rights which progress in civilisation inevitably involves. Here, again, Rāmmohan stands forth as the tribune and prophet of New India."

Reference may be made to some concrete views of the Rājā to illustrate the currents of political thought of the day.

The Rājā was a great champion of the liberty of the Press. Ever since 1799 there had been a strict censorship on the publication of journals. In 1817 Lord Hastings abolished the censorship, but laid down regulations, which, among other things, prohibited the discussion of certain matters. Mr. Adam, who acted as Governor-General after the resignation of Lord Hastings, issued ordinances prohibiting the publication of newspapers or other periodicals without a Government licence. Rājā Rāmmohan presented petitions against the new Press Regulations both to the Supreme Court and to the King-in-Council. The petitions were rejected but they form a "noble landmark in the progress of Indian culture". We may again quote from his English biography: "The appeal is one of the noblest pieces of English to which Rāmmohan put his hand. Its stately periods and not less stately thought recall the eloquence of the great orators of a century ago. In language and style for ever associated with the glorious vindication of liberty, it invokes against the arbitrary exercise of British power the principles and traditions which are distinctive of British history." Rāmmohan's labours bore fruit, though he was not destined to witness it. In 1835 Sir Charles Metcalfe removed all restrictions on the Press.

The Rājā similarly drew up petitions against the Jury Act of 1827. The provisions of the Act and the grounds of the Rājā's objection thereto may be gathered from the following extract:

"In his famous Jury Bill, Mr. Wynn, the late President of the Board of Control, has, by introducing religious distinctions into the judicial system of this country, not only afforded just grounds for dissatisfaction among the natives in general, but has excited much alarm in the breast of every one conversant with political principles. Any natives, either Hindu or Muhammadan, are rendered by this Bill subject to judicial trial by Christians either European or native, while Christians, including native converts, are exempted from the degradation of being tried either by a Hindu or Mussulman juror, however high he may stand in the estimation of society. This Bill also denies both to Hindus and Muhammadans the honour of a seat on the Grand Jury even in the trial of fellow-Hindus or Mussulmans. This is the sum total of Mr. Wynn's late Jury Bill, of which we bitterly complain."

The Rājā had a clear grasp of the political machinery by which India was ruled and fully realised the importance of presenting India's case before the Home authorities when the question of the renewal of the Company's Charter in 1833 was being considered by Parliament. This was one of his main objects in undertaking the voyage to England. He was invited to give evidence before the Select Committee of the House of Commons, and although he declined to appear in person, he submitted his considered views in the form of several "communications to the Board of Control". These documents enable us to gather the view-point of Rājā Rāmmohan and of the advanced Indian thinkers of his time, on the burning questions of the day.

The Rājā strongly championed the cause of the peasants. He pointed out that under the Permanent Settlement, the zamindārs had increased their wealth, but the exorbitantly high rents exacted from their tenants had made the lot of the ryots a miserable one. He advocated a reduction of the rent to be paid by the tenants by means of a corresponding reduction in the revenue payable by the zamindārs. The consequent loss of revenue, he suggested, should be met by a tax upon luxuries or by employing low-salaried Indians as collectors, instead of high-salaried Europeans. The Rājā favoured the Permanent Settlement but he rightly urged that the Government should fix the maximum rent to be paid by each cultivator.

Among the other measures advocated by the Rājā may be mentioned the Indianisation of the British-Indian army, trial by jury, separation of the offices of judge and magistrate, codification of civil and criminal laws, consultation with the Indian leaders before enactment of new laws, and the substitution of English for Persian as the official language of the courts of law.

A careful perusal of the above fully justifies the claim that "Rāmmohan Roy laid the foundation of all the principal movements for the elevation of the Indians" which characterise the nineteenth century. His English biographer truly remarks that the Rājā "presents a most instructive and inspiring study for the new India of which he is the type and pioneer. . . . He embodies the new spirit . . . its freedom of enquiry, its thirst for science, its large human sympathy, its pure and sifted ethics, along with its reverent but not uncritical regard for the past and prudent . . . disinclination towards revolt".

2. Introduction of English Education

While the British took over the administration of Bengal, all higher education was confined to a study of classical Sanskrit, Arabic and Persian in *tols* and *madrāsās*. Vernaculars were sadly neglected, and neither natural science nor subjects like Mathematics, History, Political Philosophy, Economics or Geography formed part of the curriculum. Grammar, Classic Literature, Logic, Philosophy, Law and Religious Texts formed the main elements of higher study, while elementary education, imparted in *pāthsālās* and *maktabs*, consisted of the three R's and religious myths and legends. As to the world outside India, and the great strides Europe had made since the Renaissance, Indians had little knowledge and less interest. In matters of education and intellectual progress India was passing through a period analogous to the Middle Ages of Europe.

The British Government at first took but little interest in the development of education. Warren Hastings encouraged the revival of Indian learning and to him we owe the foundation of the Calcutta Madrāsā (1781). Inspired by the same spirit, Sir William Jones founded the Asiatic Society of Bengal in Calcutta, in 1784, and a Sanskrit College was established at Benares by the Resident Jonathan Duncan in 1792. But there was no proposal or even a remote suggestion of establishing a system of education under Government supervision or control.

The idea of setting up a network of schools for teaching English was first mooted by Charles Grant, a Civil Servant of the Company. He rightly held that the social abuses and the moral degradation of the people were "the results of dense and widespread ignorance, and could be removed only by education, first of all by education in English". Grant, on his return to England, tried to persuade the House of Commons and the Court of Directors to his view, but without success.

What Grant failed to do through Government, the Christian missionaries undertook to accomplish in Madras and Bengal. Among these noble bands of workers to whom India owes the beginning of English education, one name stands foremost, that of William Carey. Originally a shoe-maker by profession, he became a Baptist Missionary in later life, and came to Calcutta in 1793. Missionary schools had already been established in Madras with Government support, but Carey and his friends, although denied any such help, in the beginning, set up schools and published Bengali translations of the Bible. Thus they laid the foundations of English education

and Bengali prose literature. It is along lines laid down by them that intellectual development has taken place in subsequent times.

Carey's example was followed by other missionaries and liberal Indians, the most notable among them being David Hare and Rājā Rāmmohan Roy. These two were mainly instrumental in establishing several English schools, including the Hindu College which afterwards developed into the Presidency College.

Government could not altogether ignore the new spirit. At the time of the renewal of the Company's Charter in 1813, Parliament asked the Company to take measures for the "introduction of useful knowledge and religious and moral improvements", and further directed that "a sum of not less than a lac of rupees should be set apart each year, and applied to the revival and improvement of literature and the encouragement of the learned natives of India, and for the introduction and promotion of a knowledge of the sciences among the inhabitants of the British territories in India". Unfortunately no immediate or important results followed. It was not until 1823 that a Committee of Public Instruction was appointed in Bengal, and then steps were taken to establish a Sanskrit College in Calcutta. Against this a spirited protest was made by Rājā Rāmmohan Roy in the form of a petition to the Governor-General, Lord Amherst. This historic document admirably sums up the views held by advanced and progressive minds of the time Referring to the proposed Sanskrit College the Rājā remarks, "The pupils will here acquire what was known two thousand years ago, with the addition of vain and empty subtleties. . . ." "The Sanskrit system of education," continues the document, "would be the best calculated to keep this country in darkness if such had been the policy of the British legislature. But as the improvement of the native population is the object of the Government, it will consequently promote a more liberal and enlightened system of instruction, embracing mathematics, natural philosophy, chemistry and anatomy, with other useful sciences which may be accomplished with the sum proposed, by employing a few gentlemen of talents and learning educated in Europe, and providing a College furnished with the necessary books, instruments and other apparatus."

The petition brings into prominent relief the divergent views of the Government on the one hand and advanced thinkers, both Indian and European, on the other. While the Committee of Public Instruction spent its resources in printing Sanskrit, Arabic and Persian works and maintaining the Sanskrit College and the Madrāsā, the missionaries, helped by liberal Indians, set up

schools and colleges for education on Western lines and established a School-Book Society for selling English books. The prevailing spirit of the time is clearly indicated by the fact, noted by Trevelyan, that "upwards of 31,000 English books were sold by the School-Book Society in the course of two years, while the Committee did not dispose of Arabic and Sanskrit volumes enough in three years to pay the expense of keeping them for two months, to say nothing of the printing expenses".

The new ideas soon made their influence felt even in the Committee of Public Instruction. It was gradually divided into two parties known popularly as the "Orientalists" and the "Anglicists" or the English party. The latter held that public funds should henceforth be devoted only to the imparting of liberal education on Western lines through the medium of English. Although this could naturally reach only a limited number of pupils, it was argued that ultimately this knowledge would spread through them to the masses by means of vernacular literature. This is the famous "filtration theory" advocated by the "Anglicists".

The appointment of the famous missionary, Alexander Duff, on the Committee of Public Instruction strengthened the hands of the English party and it scored its first triumph when Lord William Bentinck established the Medical College in Calcutta. The appointment, in 1834, of Thomas Babington Macaulay, the new Law Member, as President of the Committee completed the discomfiture of the Orientalist party. By his vehement denunciation of classical Indian learning and eloquent pleadings in favour of Western education he carried Bentinck with him and on 7th March, 1835, the Council decided that henceforth the available public funds should be spent on English education. The existing oriental institutions like the Sanskrit College and the Madrāsā were to continue, but fresh awards of stipends to students of these institutions and the publication of classical texts must cease. The funds thus released were to be spent "in imparting to the native population a knowledge of English literature and science through the medium of the English language".

The cause of English education was still further advanced by the regulation introduced by the first Lord Hardinge that all public services were to be filled by an open competitive examination held by the Council of Education (the successor of the Committee of Public Instruction), preference being given to the knowledge of English. Virtually English education was made the only passport to higher appointments available to the Indians, and hence its popularity and rapid progress were equally assured.

The chief defect of the system, as it was worked out in Bengal, was the disproportionate attention paid to the English education of the middle-class gentry as against the education of the masses through vernacular schools. William Adam, who was appointed by Bentinck's Government to investigate the condition of indigenous education, wrote a valuable report on the subject. He described the miserable condition of the vernacular schools and the widespread ignorance and superstition prevailing among the masses. But Government relied on the "filtration theory", and little was done to improve the system of primary education for the masses.

This evil, however, was not so acute outside Bengal. In Bombay, Madras and the North-Western Provinces English education developed on similar lines, thanks either to the enterprise of the missionaries or the initiative taken by the Government. But there was less keenness for English education and naturally more attention was paid to the improvement of indigenous schools and the spread of education through the vernaculars.

The advantages of English education were reaped mostly by the middle-class Hindus. The Hindu aristocracy and the Muslim community generally held aloof from it. But although confined to a few, English education produced memorable results. It not only qualified Indians for taking their share in the administration of their country, but it also inspired them with those liberal ideas which were sweeping over England and led to such momentous measures as the Catholic Emancipation Act (1829), the Reform Bill (1832), the Abolition of Slavery (1833), and the New Poor Law (1834). Unfortunately some grave defects characterised the new system of education from the very beginning. In the first place it was too literary, and, secondly, it was entirely divorced from religious and moral instruction. The first may be ascribed to a great extent to the personality of Macaulay, and the second was entirely due to the peculiar circumstance that the Government had to steer clear of the Christian zeal of the missionaries on the one hand, and the deep-rooted religious ideas of the Hindus and Muslims on the other. Their decision not to interfere in religious matters in any way was, in the circumstances, a wise one.

Although the beginnings of English education on a sound basis are to be traced to the momentous decision of 1835, the evolution of a comprehensive and co-ordinated system of education had to wait for nearly twenty years till the next revision of the Charter. A Parliamentary Committee was appointed on that occasion to examine the whole subject. The result was the memorable Despatch of Sir Charles Wood, President of the Board of Control, dated 19th July,

1854, which laid the foundations on which the educational system in British India has since developed.

The most characteristic feature of the new scheme was the creation of a properly co-ordinated system of education from the lowest to the highest stage. There was to be an adequate number of efficient teaching institutions such as primary schools, higher schools, and colleges, each leading to the next higher step. A regular system of scholarships was instituted to enable meritorious students to prosecute the higher course of study, and educational institutions founded by private efforts were to be helped by grants from Government funds.

In order to carry out the above objects, a special Department of Education was to be created in each province and an adequate system of inspection would be provided for by the appointment of a sufficient number of inspectors.

For co-ordinating higher education a University should be established in each Presidency town. It would be mainly an Examining Body on the model of the London University. But while the higher teaching would be chiefly imparted through colleges, the University might institute Professorships in Law, Civil Engineering, Vernaculars and Classical languages.

Stress was laid upon the importance of mass education, female education, improvement of the vernaculars and the training of teachers. Every district was to have schools "whose object should be not to train highly a few youths, but to provide more opportunities than now exist for the acquisition of such an improved education as will make those that possess it more useful members of society in every condition of life".

Finally it was definitely laid down that the vernaculars should be the medium of instruction. "It is neither our aim nor desire", so runs the Despatch, "to substitute the English language for the Vernacular dialects of the country. . . . It is indispensable, therefore, that in any general system of education the study of them should be assiduously attended to, and any acquaintance with improved European knowledge which is to be communicated to the great mass of the people can only be conveyed to them through one or other of these Vernacular languages."

As regards religious instruction in the Government institutions, the Despatch clearly lays down that as these "were founded for the benefit of the whole population of India . . . the education conveyed in them should be exclusively secular".

Lord Dalhousie lost no time in giving effect to the policy outlined in the Despatch. Within a few years Departments of Public

Instruction were established in all the provinces. The first University in India, that of Calcutta, was founded in 1857, and between 1857 and 1887 four new Universities, at Bombay, Madras, Lahore and Allahābād, were added. But before any substantial progress could be made, the great Revolt broke out and the government of the East India Company came to an end.

3. The Government and Social Reform

From the very beginning the British Government in India assumed a policy of benevolent neutrality in religious and social matters. In spite of strong pressure they refused to encourage, far less actively help, the religious propaganda of the Christian missionaries in India. The same policy induced them to dissociate religious instruction from the educational institutions maintained by the Government.

On the other hand the British Government not only tolerated all the rites and customs of the Indians, but sometimes even went so far as to evoke the criticism that they honoured and encouraged them by their favour. Two specific instances may be quoted. Under the Hindu law, a convert to Christianity forfeited his inheritance and was subject to other disabilities, and this was sanctioned by the British Government. Again, extreme deference was shown by the Government to many Hindu festivals and religious ceremonies, and on some of these occasions there was even a display of troops and firing of salutes.

This benevolent attitude was, however, shortly given up. A law passed in 1832, supplemented by another in 1850, removed all disabilities due to change of religion, and instructions were issued by the President of the Board of Control in 1833 that Government should cease to show any special favour or respect to Indian religious ceremonies. These instructions, including others requiring the abolition of the pilgrim tax and official control of temple endowments, were enforced by Lord Auckland.

But even the policy of benevolent neutrality was bound to come into conflict with the humane and progressive ideas that animated liberal Englishmen. In spite of their repeatedly declared policy of not interfering with the social and religious practices of the Indians, English rulers were impelled by considerations of humanity to co-operate with advanced Indian reformers in removing some gross evils which prevailed in Hindu society under the sanction of religion or long-standing usage.

The first to be attacked was the curious practice of infanticide.

It was a long-standing custom among certain Hindus to throw a child into the sea at the mouth of the Ganges, in fulfilment of religious vows. A childless woman, for example, praying for progeny, would take a vow that if she had more than one child, one would be offered to Mother Ganges. Although not very widely prevalent, this inhumanity was too glaring to be ignored by anyone whose feelings were not totally blunted by religious superstition.

Another form of infanticide was far more widely spread, especially among the Rājputs, Jāts and Mewāts in Central and Western India. Here, the difficulty of marrying girls led the parents to kill them, while infants, by refusing proper nourishment, or sometimes even poisoning the nipples of the mothers' breasts. Enlightened and philanthropic British officers tried to stop this practice by persuasion, but this proved unsuccessful.

Ultimately laws had to be passed prohibiting both these forms of infanticide. Bengal Regulation XXI of 1795 and Regulation VI of 1802 dealt respectively with the second and first forms of infanticide, declaring both as murder.

But even the legislation of 1795, extended to newly added provinces by another Regulation in 1804, failed to remove at once the gross abuse of secret murder of girls, as by the very nature of the case it could often avoid detection. The practice, however, slowly died out, as a result of the influence of Western education and Western ideas.

The reforms of these abuses were followed by the suppression of another horrid custom. This was the so-called "Suttee" (*Satī*). The word means a chaste and virtuous woman but has by a curious process been applied to the practice of burning chaste women along with the dead bodies of their husbands.

Among primitive peoples of many lands there was a belief that life after death is more or less a continuation of the present life and subject to the same material needs. Accordingly a man needs his wife and attendants in the other world, and so the death of a king or a leading chief was followed by the immolation, either voluntary or forcible, of his wives, concubines, attendants and servants, so that they might keep company with their deceased lord and serve him in the same way as on earth. This custom prevailed in India, China, Babylonia and many other countries, and its traces linger in Japan where the death of the ruler is sometimes followed by the *Hara-kiri* or suicide of devoted subjects.

The burning of the wife is in one aspect the last remnant of this widely spread primitive custom. It must have been prevalent in

India from a very early period, and Greek writers have preserved detailed accounts of a case that occurred in the fourth century B.C. But still it was not enjoined as a sacred religious duty until centuries later. The practice is not referred to in the earliest law-books, and is merely permitted as an option to widows in later books. It is only towards the close of the Ancient period, or perhaps even later, that the practice was definitely enjoined as a religious duty. The last stage in this tragic drama was reached when the scriptures laid down self-immolation on the funeral pyre of her husband as the only meritorious course that a virtuous woman could follow. Not only would such a woman enjoy eternal bliss in heaven along with her husband, but her action would expiate the sins of three generations of her husband's family, both on his father's and mother's side.

Such hopes and encouragements both to the victim and her natural protectors produced the inevitable consequences, and every year hundreds of women met with a cruel death in the name of religion. In many cases the material interests of the male relations, added to religious faith, induced them to persuade, sometimes even to force, the unhappy victim to the tragic course. Sometimes opium and other drugs were used to benumb the senses of the woman, so that she might be easily persuaded to adopt the fatal resolve. Cases are on record when the woman fleeing from the first touch of fire was again forcibly placed upon the funeral pyre. To prevent such incidents the male relations often took care to cover the body of the widow with wood, leaves and straw and then pressed it down by means of two bamboos before setting fire to the pyre. At the same time the thunderous noise of the crowd mingled with sounds of drums ensured that the cries of agony from the wretched girl would not be heard by any spectator.

The very fact that such practices could endure for centuries among an intelligent and cultured people, illustrates in a striking manner how faith in a supermundane existence, instead of enlightening and purifying the ideas and sentiments of man, at times warps his judgment and paralyses his noble instincts and human feelings.

It is gratifying to note that enlightened Mughul rulers like Akbar not only raised their voice in protest but also took effective steps to prevent the obnoxious practice. But the absence of an organised and sustained effort led to no permanent result. From the early days of British rule both officials and missionaries appealed to the Government to stop this baleful custom, and an agitation was set on foot in England to force the hands of the authorities at home. But hampered by their declared policy of *laissez-faire* in matters

of religion, and afraid to offend the religious susceptibilities of a large class of subjects which might ultimately affect the military, the British Government in India long hesitated to take any decisive step. The Supreme Court, however, refused to tolerate it within the precincts of Calcutta, and the Dutch, the Danes and the French prohibited it respectively in Chinsurā, Serāmpur and Chandernagore.

The Government at first instructed its officers to take no further step than dissuading the intended victims by gentle persuasion. In 1789 the Collector of Shāhābād referred the matter to Lord Cornwallis in the following words: "The rites and superstitions of the Hindu religion should be allowed with the most unqualified tolerance, but a practice at which human nature shudders I cannot permit without particular instructions." In reply he was told that his action must be "confined to dissuasion and must not extend to coercive measures or to any exertion of official powers".

The letter of the Collector and the reply thereto typify the early official attitude on the question. When a similar letter was written by the Magistrate of the Bihār district in 1805, Lord Wellesley referred it to the Court of Nizāmat Adālat. On the basis of the replies received, the Government framed regulations on the subject in 1812 and supplemented them by others in 1815 and 1817. The net result of these regulations was to prevent the burning of widows who were either of tender age, or were pregnant or had infant children. They also made it criminal to compel a woman to burn herself or to drug or intoxicate her for that purpose.

These regulations bore but little fruit and reliable evidence shows that in the districts round Calcutta alone the number of "Satīs" averaged more than five hundred each year. British officials were never tired of urging upon the attention of the Government the necessity of abolishing the practice altogether. The Government, however, was unable to take its courage in both hands and preferred to rely upon the gradual enlightenment of Indian opinion for the ultimate abolition of the practice.

The signs of this progressive spirit were not lacking. Thanks to the unwearied efforts of Rājā Rāmmohan Roy enlightened Indian opinion gradually asserted itself. When the orthodox Hindus protested against the regulations of 1817 and sent a petition to the Government for their repeal, a counter-petition was submitted by the Rājā and his coadjutors. After describing the horrors of the "Suttee" in vivid terms, they declared that "all these instances are murders, according to every Shāstra as well as to the common sense of all nations". To educate public opinion Rājā Rāmmohan

wrote a pamphlet on the subject and organised a vigilance committee in order to ensure that the Government regulations were followed in each instance. The Rājā was bitterly opposed by orthodox Hindus under the leadership of Rājā Rādhā Kānta Deb. Feelings at last ran so high that even Rājā Rāmmohan's life was threatened.

When things had reached this acute stage, Lord William Bentinck was appointed Governor-General and was instructed by the Home authorities to consider definite measures for the immediate or gradual abolition of *Satī*. After carefully studying the situation he decided to abolish it immediately. His zeal for reform was not shared by many. Even Rājā Rāmmohan advised caution, believing that immediate abolition might cause great discontent and excitement. Bentinck's ardent desires for reform, however, brooked no delay. On 4th December, 1829, was passed the famous Regulation XVII which declared *Satī* illegal and punishable by courts. Not only the persons who used inducement or compulsion of any kind, but even those who were associated in any way with the voluntary act of a *Satī* were to be regarded as criminals.

As expected, Bentinck's measures evoked loud protest. A largely-signed petition of remonstrance was presented to the Governor-General, and an appeal was made to the authorities in England. To counteract these measures Rājā Rāmmohan sent a congratulatory petition to the Governor-General, signed by 300 residents of Calcutta. One of the reasons which induced him to visit England was to thwart any attempt to have the new Regulation repealed by the Privy Council. Rāmmohan's attempts were crowned with success. The new Regulation was upheld by the Home authorities and thus the inhuman practice was at last definitely brought to an end. Bentinck's efforts were nobly supplemented by the first Lord Hardinge, who was mainly instrumental in suppressing *Satī* and infanticide in the Indian States.

Another great reform standing to the credit of Lord William Bentinck is the suppression of the organised bands of *Thugs*. These secret assemblages of criminals had peculiar modes of initiating their members, who, travelling in disguise, murdered helpless travellers, mostly by strangulation with a handkerchief or scarf used as a noose. Although the members were recruited from both Hindus and Muslims, the Thugs were reputed to be devotees of the goddess Kālī, and carried on their heinous trade of murder under the mistaken belief that it had the sanction of the goddess. The organisation spread almost all over India and there are reasons to believe that they secured active help from certain chiefs, landholders and merchants. Sir William Sleeman and a number of able

officers were specially selected to crush the organisation, and Bentinck passed a series of special acts to regulate their proceedings. More than three thousand Thugs were caught during 1831–1837, and as a result of these vigorous measures India was soon rid of this great scourge.

A momentous reform, which created, however, very little sensation, was the abolition of slavery by Act V of 1843. Contrary to the general popular belief, slavery was a very ancient institution in this country, and even in 1843 "there were many millions of slaves in India". Still the Act which "refused to recognise slavery as a legal status" and thereby automatically set the slaves free without any compensation to the owners provoked neither opposition nor excitement. This is an evidence of the high moral tone infused by Western education and liberal English tradition. The abolition of State lotteries in the Presidency towns about the same time furnishes one more instance of the liberal spirit that actuated the Government of the day. An attempt was made to justify them on the ground that the proceeds were spent on local improvements, but the serious objection to the practice on moral grounds prevailed against any idea of pecuniary gain.

To the first Lord Hardinge's Government belongs the credit of taking steps to stop the human sacrifices practised by the Khonds in Orissa under the erroneous belief that thereby the fertility of the land was increased. Although the results achieved during Hardinge's Governor-Generalship were not very satisfactory, the cruel and atrocious practices were definitely stamped out by the energetic efforts of Campbell and other officers specially appointed for the purpose during 1847 to 1854.

PART III

Book II

MODERN INDIA

CHAPTER I

POLITICAL RELATIONS, 1858–1905

1. Afghānistān and the North-West Frontier

THE period from 1858, when the Government of India began to be conducted in the name of the Sovereign of England, to 1937, when "provincial autonomy" was inaugurated under the reformed constitution of 1935, marks a distinct epoch in Indian history. The age is capable of a twofold division, viz., the Era of Imperialism (1858–1905) and the Epoch of Reforms (1905–1937). A noticeable feature of the age was the control exercised by one of the British Sovereign's principal Secretaries of State over Indian administration. Nowhere was this more apparent than in foreign policy. Indeed it would be hardly any exaggeration to say that from 1858 onwards the foreign policy of India was dictated in large measure by European conditions and formed a part of the foreign policy of the British Government in Whitehall in London.

Regarding the North-West Frontier, the policy was for long years based on the relations between England and Russia. After the first Afghān War there was a revival of friendly feeling between the two countries. In 1844 the Russian Emperor Nicholas I visited Queen Victoria and an understanding was arrived at in respect of Central Asia. The basis of the agreement was that the *khanates* (principalities) of Bukhārā, Khiva, and Samarqānd should be left "as a neutral zone between the two empires in order to preserve them from a dangerous contact".

These friendly relations were, however, rudely disturbed by the Crimean War, and Russia, foiled in south-eastern Europe, resumed her forward policy in Central Asia. The rapid progress of Russia towards the border of Afghānistān was a cause of alarm and anxiety to the British Government. The conquest of the Punjab and Sind had extended the British possessions up to the hills of Afghānistān, and that country alone now stood between the advanced Russian outposts and the British empire in India. But unhappily affairs in Afghānistān about that time proved unfavourable to the British.

After the conclusion of the First Afghān War, the relations between the British Government and Dost Muhammad, the Amīr of Kābul, were, on the whole, friendly. When the Persians threatened Herāt and Qandahār, the Amīr made overtures for help to the British, and a treaty was concluded in 1855. By this treaty the Indian Government undertook not to violate the territory of the Amīr, and the latter agreed to be "the friend of the friends and enemy of the enemies of the Honourable East India Company".

The friendship was put to the test in 1856 when the Persians again besieged Herāt. The British not only helped the Amīr with money and arms, but also declared war against Persia, and sent a force from Bombay. The Persians came to terms in 1857.

The friendly feeling was first disturbed in 1862 when Dost Muhammad became aggressive and attacked Herāt, then held by an independent Chief. The Government of India disapproved of this action and recalled its Muslim agent who had been installed in Kābul since 1857. Dost Muhammad paid no heed to the protest and succeeded in conquering Herāt in 1863.

Shortly after this Dost Muhammad died at the age of eighty, and the inevitable struggle for succession broke out among his sixteen sons. For five years Afghānistān became a scene of fratricidal wars, with all the attendant evils of discord, disunion and partition of territories. At last in 1868 Sher 'Ālī, the third son of the late Amīr and his chosen successor, defeated all his rivals and united the whole of Afghānistān under his rule.

The position of the British during this period was one of extreme difficulty. Sir John Lawrence (Governor-General, 1864–69) adopted a policy of strict neutrality, and logically followed the principle that the relations of the British Government are with the actual rulers of Afghānistān. Accordingly he refused help to the several contending brothers who asked for it, and recognised each of them in turn as soon as he established himself in Kābul. Sher 'Ālī had thrice approached the British Government for help and was thrice refused. As soon, however, as he proved successful in the contest, Lawrence recognised him and sent him money which enabled him finally to consolidate his position.

The policy followed by Lawrence has been characterised by some as one of "masterly inactivity", but it has been severely condemned by others. His policy of neutrality was dictated by the fear that if he took up the cause of one rival, the other was sure to seek the aid of Russia or Persia. Against this it is pointed out that this contingency was almost inevitable whether the British Government interfered or not. It is, however, overlooked

that the neutrality of the British would legitimately entitle them to prevent any interference from outside if and when it did occur, whereas if Lawrence actively backed up one candidate he could hardly, with justice or reason, prevent Russia or Persia from supporting another. In any case it must be admitted that he succeeded in isolating the Afghān Civil War, and prevented any international complication.

The critics of Lawrence no doubt imply that if he had actively supported a rival candidate and enabled him to win the throne, the British could have easily secured a firm footing in Afghānistān, and effectively stopped for ever the Russian influence in that quarter. The experience of the First Afghān War was, however, entirely against any such anticipation, and Lawrence might, after all, have backed the wrong horse and atoned heavily for it. With this serious danger in view, and the almost inevitable complication of a Russian war, Lawrence might well be excused if he chose to follow a more cautious policy. It was one of those enterprises where success would make it an act of far-sighted statesmanship, and failure brand it as a rash and foolish adventure.

That the result of Lawrence's policy proved to be disadvantageous to the British nobody can deny. Sher 'Ālī, the new Amīr, could not be expected to have a friendly attitude towards a power which refused to come to his help in the most critical moments of his life. Sher 'Ālī could easily realise, what was no doubt the plain truth, "that the English had looked to nothing but their own interests". He bitterly commented that "Whosesoever side they see strongest for the time being, they turn to him as their friend".

It was precisely during this period of Afghān turmoil that the Russians resumed their aggressive imperialism in Central Asia. In 1864 they made the first forward move. In 1866 Bukhārā was reduced to the position of a dependency. In the very next year was created the new province of Russian Turkestān with headquarters at Tashkhend, about a thousand miles from their former base at Orenburg. In 1868 Samarqānd was added to Russian possessions and five years later Khiva followed suit.

The rapid progress of Russia towards Afghānistān could not but be a cause of alarm and anxiety to the British. Their first endeavour was therefore to placate the new Amīr whom the recent events had so much alienated from the British. Lawrence sent arms and money in 1868 and the subsidy was continued by Lord Mayo (1869–72). How far these methods would have succeeded in regaining the friendship of the Amīr, it is difficult to say. But the Russian advance constituted a serious menace to Afghānistān, and hence the Amīr was

anxious to secure the support of the English. A rapprochement between the two parties was thus rendered easy, and had the English acted with tact and statesmanship they might have completely won over the Amīr to their side. Unfortunately, English diplomacy failed miserably at this critical moment, and instead of winning the friendship of the Amīr, drove him into the arms of Russia.

A meeting which was held at Ambala in 1869 between the Amīr and Lord Mayo offered splendid opportunities for a lasting friendship. The Amīr would have conceded all English demands in return for an English guarantee that they would support him against Russia, and would acknowledge no one as Amīr of Afghānistān except himself and his descendants. Instead of giving these specific assurances, Lord Mayo merely said in a letter to the Amīr that the Government of India would "view with severe displeasure any attempts on the part of your rivals to disturb your position" and that it would "further endeavour . . . to strengthen the Government of Your Highness".

The admirers of Mayo have represented the meeting at Ambala as a great success and pretended to believe that Sher 'Ālī was won over to the side of the British. But Sher 'Ālī was too shrewd not to perceive the difference between a specific guarantee and a general assurance of the kind contained in Lord Mayo's letter. In any case, being alarmed by the Russian occupation of Khiva he sent an Agent to Lord Northbrook, the next Governor-General, in 1873, asking for specific assurance in writing that if Russia or any of its protected or dependent States invaded the Amīr's territories, the British Government would not only help the Amīr with arms and money, but also send troops to his aid if necessary.

Lord Northbrook (1872–76) took a wise view of the situation and was willing to accede to the Amīr's request. Five years earlier, an Indian Viceroy would have probably given such a guarantee on his own responsibility, referring his action for ratification to the Secretary of State. But the establishment of the direct telegraph line between India and London introduced a great change in the relations between the Governor-General and the Secretary of State. So in a telegram to the Secretary of State, dated 24th July, 1873, he proposed to assure the Amīr "that if he unreservedly accepts and acts on our advice in all external relations, we will help him with money, arms and troops if necessary to expel unprovoked invasion. We to be the judge of the necessity".

The proposal was, however, rejected by the Secretary of State, as the ministry of Gladstone was unwilling to have a rupture with

Russia, and did not view the Russian expansion in Central Asia as dangerous to the safety and security of either Afghānistān or India. Under the instructions of the Home Government, Lord Northbrook could only assure the Amīr that "we shall maintain our settled policy in Afghānistān". The Amīr naturally interpreted it as unwillingness on the part of the English to afford him protection against Russia.

Two other events occurred about this time which further alienated the Amīr. The British Government unwisely accepted the task of arbitrating between the claims of Persia and Afghānistān over the boundaries in Seistān. As the decision of the British went in some details against Afghānistān the Amīr resented it as an act of injustice. In the second place, when the Amīr chose his son 'Abdullah Jān as heir apparent and communicated his decision to the Government of India, Lord Northbrook refused to recognise him as such, and the Amīr was convinced that 'Abdullah Jān would receive no more support from the British than he himself had obtained in fighting his rivals for the throne.

Utterly disgusted at the attitude of the English, the Amīr naturally longed for a good understanding with the Russians, and they eagerly seized the opportunity. Although they admitted that Afghānistān was beyond their sphere of interest, they carried on correspondence with the Amīr and tried to ingratiate themselves into his favour. The Russian correspondence gradually increased and its bearers, treated by the Amīr as agents of the Russian Government, were almost always present in Kābul.

In the meantime there was a change in the Home Government. In 1874 Disraeli succeeded Gladstone, and Lord Salisbury became the Secretary of State for India. Two years later Northbrook was succeeded by Lord Lytton (1876-80) as Viceroy. The Russo-Turkish war of 1877 strained the relations between Russia and England and a war between the two appeared almost inevitable. The pendulum now swung violently in the opposite direction. The new Cabinet at once decided to keep a firm hold on Afghān affairs to prevent the influence of Russia in that region.

The first measure they adopted was the annexation of Quetta. It occupied a strategic position on the frontier, as it controlled the route to Qandahār, and could turn the flank of an army invading India through the Khyber Pass. A treaty was concluded with the Khān of Kalat, and Quetta was occupied in 1877.

The second objective of the new Cabinet was the establishment of a British agent at Herāt, so that the Government might be constantly supplied with accurate information regarding the

Russian movements on the frontier. Lord Northbrook, who continued as Viceroy till 1876, and the majority of his Council, were opposed to the policy. They thought the Amīr was sure to refuse it and the result would be another war. Lord Salisbury insisted on his view. Lord Northbrook thereupon resigned his viceroyalty, and Lord Lytton was appointed Viceroy to carry out the new policy. The Amīr was offered the terms he asked for in 1873, but nevertheless he refused to accept any British Mission. He pointed out that in that case he could hardly refuse to accept a similar mission from the Russians.

In the meantime the Amīr's relations with Russia grew more intimate. In June, 1878, the Russian Governor-General sent his officer, Stolietoff, to the Amīr with a draft treaty which conceded the terms which the Amīr had asked of the British in 1873, and Lord Lytton was ready to offer in 1878. The despatch of the envoy was accompanied by that of three columns of troops from Tashkhend towards the Afghān frontier. Stolietoff was ordered by the Amīr not to enter Afghānistān, but he ignored the orders and reached Kābul on the 22nd July. There he negotiated a treaty with the Amīr, offering him guarantee against foreign attack.

The reception of the Russian envoy in Kābul made the relations between the Amīr and the British Government acute. With the previous approval of the Home Government, Lytton informed the Amīr that an English envoy would be sent to Kābul. The mission was actually despatched through the Khyber Pass, but it was stopped near 'Ālī Masjid on 21st September. On 2nd November Lytton sent an ultimatum to the Amīr, threatening war if the latter did not reply, accepting the mission, by the 20th. The Amīr now appealed to Russia for help. But in the meantime the Treaty of Berlin had settled the European question, and the Russians could not fight the English without violating that treaty and losing all the advantages they had secured by it. So Kaufmann, the Russian Governor-General, advised Sher 'Āli to make peace with the British. Sher 'Ālī had been encouraged by the Russians to provoke the hostility of the British, but was deserted by them at the critical moment.

On 20th November the British troops invaded Afghānistān. The Kurram Pass was forced by Roberts, and Qandahār was occupied by General Stewart. In December, Sher 'Ālī retired to Turkestān and died shortly after. His son, Ya'kūb, opened negotiations with the British and on 26th May, 1879, the Treaty of Gandamak was concluded.

The treaty was extremely favourable to the British and

conceded all their demands. The Amīr agreed to the establishment of a permanent British envoy at Kābul, and to conduct his foreign policy on the advice of the Viceroy. He also ceded the districts of Kurram, Pishin, and Sibi to the British.

In accordance with the terms of the treaty, Cavagnari, the British Agent, reached Kābul on 24th July. But he was murdered by mutinous troops on 3rd September. To what extent, if any, the Amīr himself was implicated in this plot has never been determined. There is no doubt that Cavagnari displayed lamentable lack of tact in his handling of affairs, and there is equally little doubt that the Amīr desired his withdrawal.

The foul murder led to the revival of hostilities. Roberts occupied Kābul on 7th October. Although the Amīr had joined the British, he was thought unfit to rule and was removed to India. Negotiations were opened with Sher 'Ālī's nephew, 'Abdur Rahmān, who was a refugee in Samarqānd under Russian protection.

But before the negotiations were brought to a close, the Government of Lord Beaconsfield was succeeded by that of Gladstone. The new Government decided to reverse the whole Afghān policy of their predecessors and even to evacuate the districts ceded by the Treaty of Gandamak. Lord Ripon (1880–84) was accordingly sent as Viceroy to carry out the new policy.

Shortly after the arrival of Lord Ripon (8th June, 1880) the British troops in Qandahār were severely defeated by Ayūb Khān, son of Sher 'Ālī, at Maiwand (July, 1880). Roberts made his famous march from Kābul to Qandahār and completely defeated Ayūb's army. In this he was substantially helped by 'Abdur Rahmān.

Lord Ripon, after studying the situation in India, decided to continue his predecessor's policy and entered into a treaty with 'Abdur Rahmān. The new Amīr agreed, in return for an annual subsidy, to have his foreign policy controlled by the Government of India. The districts ceded by the Treaty of Gandamak were retained by the British.

The Second Afghān War was the outcome of the desire of two rival powers, Russia and England, to establish their influence in Afghānistān. The English statesmen were afraid of a Russian invasion of India through Afghānistān. Whether this menace was a real one may be seriously doubted. There is, however, no doubt that Russia, with a friendly Afghānistān, could bring sufficient pressure on the British, and could not only keep them engaged in the critical time of a European war, but might even use their position as a lever for extorting concessions from the British in Europe. Afghānistān was thus a mere pawn in the European

game, and poor Sher 'Ālī was a victim of circumstances for which he was not responsible, and over which he had no control. Strange as it may seem, the Treaty of Berlin was the direct cause of the downfall of Sher 'Ālī.

The Afghān policy of both England and Russia was dictated purely by motives of self-interest, based on an aggressive imperial policy. The forward policy of Lytton and Salisbury can be justified from this point of view alone, as it achieved the main object of British diplomacy, by securing a firm footing in Afghānistān for the British, and removing the Russian menace of including that country within their sphere of influence.

The Russian forward policy received a severe setback by the establishment of the British influence in Afghānistān. But, as if to make up for the lost ground, the Russians now pushed forward their outposts. The fears of the British Government were always allayed by the Russian Foreign Office by profuse professions of pacific intentions, and the aggressive acts were explained as unauthorised acts of local officials or as due to local necessities. At last, when in 1884 Merv was added to Russian possessions, the British entered most emphatic protests. The only result was the acceptance by the Russians of a proposal to delimit the Russo-Afghān boundaries. The Commissioners were appointed on both sides, but those of Russia delayed matters on one pretext or another. In the meantime, the Russian forces were occupying the disputed territories in order to convert their claims into accomplished facts.

The climax was reached on 30th March, 1885, when the Russians drove off the Afghāns from Panjdeh and occupied it. Even the pacific Government of Gladstone was roused to the frenzy of war. Mobilisation was ordered and a vote of credit for military preparations was moved in Parliament. The war which appeared almost inevitable was averted by the dexterity of Gladstone. The two nations at last came to terms. The Russians retained Panjdeh, but the Zulfikār Pass was given to the Amīr.

After this amicable settlement, the relations between Russia and the British Government improved. In 1886 the Commission for delimitation of boundaries concluded its labours and the Russo-Afghān boundary from the Oxus to the Zulfikār Pass was formally laid down. For six years uninterrupted peace followed. But in 1892 disputes again broke out over the Russian claim over the whole of the Pāmirs. At last an agreement was reached in 1895, and the boundary-line in this region was formally fixed up. This brought to an end for the time being the long-standing rivalry between England and Russia over Asiatic empires. The English kept a

firm hold on Afghānistān, and Russia directed her energy further towards the east.

Henceforth for several years the North-West Frontier policy of India was confined to relations with Afghānistān. The main problem was the position of the wild hill-tribes, which lived in the regions lying between Afghān and British territories and owed allegiance to neither. In pursuance of what has been termed the "Forward Policy", the British Government desired to extend its power over them, so that the frontier of British India might be pushed far beyond the Indus. After some difficulties the two Governments came to an understanding regarding their spheres of influence. The Afghān Boundary Commission under Sir Mortimer Durand formally laid down the boundary-line. The Amīr's subsidy was raised from twelve to eighteen lakhs a year, and he agreed not to interfere with the tribes on the Indian side of the frontier line.

The next problem was to deal effectively with these tribes. This proved no easy task, and punitive expeditions were necessary to quell the turbulent clansmen. A formal protectorate was declared over Chitral and Gilgit in 1893, but two years later the British Officer sent to Chitral to help one of the rival candidates for the throne, was besieged by a large number of tribes who had declared *Jihad* or holy war against the British. The siege lasted for a month and a half, until a relieving army proceeded from Gilgit and another by way of the Malakand Pass. Again in 1897 there was a serious outbreak of hostilities. A large number of tribes, including the Mohmands and the Afridis, rose in revolt, and regular military expeditions, notably the Tirah campaign, were necessary to put them down.

To prevent the recurrence of these outbreaks strategic roads and railways were built in the frontier districts and a redistribution of troops was made to cope with them more effectively and expeditiously. The frontier districts were separated from the Punjab and created into a North-West Frontier Province ruled over by a Chief Commissioner, immediately under the Governor-General, and subsequently by a Governor.

These measures have not proved successful in keeping the region quiet and free from disturbances. Occasional raids into British territory and other disturbances by the hill tribes have come to be a permanent feature, and recently the British Government had to resort to bombing from aeroplanes to strike terror into them. In the light of these subsequent events we can appreciate the wisdom of Amīr 'Abdur Rahmān when he described the probable

results of the British forward policy in the following terms, in a letter written to Lord Lansdowne (1888–94):

> "If you should cut them (the hill tribes) out of my dominions they will neither be of any use to you nor to me. You will always be engaged in fighting or other trouble with them and they will always go on plundering. As long as your Government is strong and in peace, you will be able to keep them quiet by a strong hand, but if at any time a foreign enemy appear on the borders of India these frontier tribes will be your worst enemies."

The advocates of the forward policy on the other hand support the intrusion of the British into these hill territories, as it gives them a better line of defence than the River Indus against any invasion from the west. This is perhaps correct from a strictly military point of view. But the enormous trouble and expense involved can be justified only if there is a real danger of a serious invasion from the west. Such danger was undoubtedly very remote when the policy was first adopted. But in the light of later events which no one could then have foreseen the threat could not be described as altogether an imaginary one.

2. Annexation of Upper Burma

As a result of two wars the British had occupied Arākān, Tenāsserim and Pegu in Lower Burma. The old Burmese dynasty was ruling in Upper Burma, and a British Resident was stationed in Māndālay, where the capital was removed in 1857. Trade was opened with Upper Burma, and English rights were safeguarded by two treaties in 1862 and 1867.

The relations between the two Governments were, however, never cordial. The loss of Lower Burma was a source of irritation to the Burmese king, Mindon, while his medieval idea of royal prestige was irritating to the British. According to the Burmese custom, the British Resident, when attending court, had to remove his shoes and kneel before the king. In 1876 the Viceroy objected to this, but Mindon would not yield. The result was that the British Residents ceased to visit the king and in consequence British influence at the Burmese court declined to some extent.

Mindon's successor, Thibaw, was a weak and vicious king. He signalised his accession by the massacre of eighty princes and princesses whom he feared as possible rivals. The British Resident protested, but was curtly reminded by the court that Burma was a sovereign power. The Chief Commissioner of Pegu recommended

the withdrawal of the Resident, but the Government of India refused. Thibaw repeated the massacre in 1884. There was an outcry in the name of humanity, and public meetings held in Rangoon urged upon the Indian Government immediate annexation of Upper Burma. It is to be noted, however, that the Burmese population did not attend these meetings, which were really arranged by the English and Chinese merchants, whose main interest was trade. The Government of India took no notice of these events, and were content to let Burmese affairs alone.

A new element was, however, added about this time in North-Eastern politics. France had established a colonial empire in the Far East. In 1884 she possessed Cochin-China and Tonkin, and was pushing towards Upper Burma. The Burmese Government was anxious for the friendship of France. In 1885 a trade treaty was signed between the two powers and the French secretly promised to allow importation of arms into Burma through Tonkin. A French Consul was stationed at Māndālay, and there were semi-official negotiations for opening a French bank at the city, starting a railway, and securing the management of royal monopolies.

The peaceful penetration of the French alarmed the British Government, but they could do nothing as they had no *casus belli* or ostensible ground for interference. This was, however, supplied by a foolish action of Thibaw's. An English firm—the Bombay-Burma Trading Corporation—doing timber business in Upper Burma was accused on some flimsy charges, and, by an *ex parte* judgment, was condemned to pay a fine of £230,000. The underlying motive was to hand over the forests to a French Syndicate after ousting the British Company.

This grave provocation moved the Government of India, which demanded that the case should be referred to the arbitration of the Viceroy. This the Burmese king refused. Unfortunately for him, the French at this moment suffered serious reverses in Tonkin and withdrew from Upper Burma. The French ambassador in London repudiated the semi-official negotiations of the French Consul at Māndālay. The British seized this golden opportunity and struck hard. An ultimatum was sent to King Thibaw asking him to submit to the following terms:

(1) A permanent Resident should be stationed at Māndālay, and he should have free access to the king without degrading ceremonies like taking off shoes and kneeling down.
(2) The foreign policy of Burma should be controlled by the British.

(3) The case of the Bombay-Burma Trading Corporation should be submitted to the arbitration of the Viceroy.
(4) The Burmese Government should assist British trade with Yunnan.

Thibaw's rejection of the ultimatum on 9th November, 1885, led to the British invasion. Within twenty days Māndālay was occupied and Thibaw found himself a prisoner in his own palace. But the fall of the capital did not mean the fall of the kingdom. A sort of guerilla warfare was maintained by bands of robbers and disbanded soldiers. It took five years to pacify and consolidate the kingdom of Upper Burma, and another six years to bring under effective control the areas ruled over by border tribes such as the Shāns and the Chins. The conquered territories, added to Lower Burma, formed the new Province of Burma with headquarters at Rangoon.

The case of Burma affords an interesting parallel to that of Afghānistān on the opposite frontier. In both British policy was dictated by the fear that another first-class European power, Russia or France, would establish political influence in an Asiatic State bordering on British territories. The rulers of these States defied the English in the hope of obtaining aid from the rival European power, and in both cases they were disappointed at the critical moment. Only the geographical and ethnical factors made the sequel different. Burma was added to British India, but the high and rugged mountain ranges of Afghānistān and the fierce warlike Pathāns made the thorough conquest of that country a more formidable task.

3. The Indian States

The relations of the British Government with the Indian States underwent a great change after the assumption of the Government by the Crown. Before that the relations were neither uniform nor well-defined. The first defect was indeed inevitable, because different States had concluded different types of treaty at different times and in different circumstances. As regards the second, the policy of a growing power like the British was naturally modified from time to time in consequence of various circumstances and influences. Much also depended upon the personal factor. Wellesley, Lord Hastings, and Dalhousie, as we have already seen, adopted a far more aggressive attitude than others, although no new policy was formulated by the Company during their regime.

The result was a state of uncertainty and perplexity in the Indian States. They did not know exactly where they stood. Theoretically their existence as a separate political entity was guaranteed by treaties, and many of them enjoyed an independent status, subject only to certain specified restrictions. In practice, however, many States were annexed by the British (such as Oudh, Sātārā, Nāgpur, Jhānsī, and the Carnatic) and in many others (such as Bharatpur, Mysore, and Gwālior) the British had not only interfered with the internal administration, but either deposed or definitely lowered the status of the Chiefs.

In 1841 the Court of Directors definitely adopted the policy "of abandoning no just and honourable accession of territory or revenue", and Dalhousie carried this policy to its extreme limit. The outbreak of the Revolt served as a lurid comment on this policy, and when the Government was transferred to the Crown, an entire re-orientation of policy towards the Native States took place. Like many other changes in British India, this new relation was only slowly and gradually evolved, partly by written declaration of policy, but mainly by precedents and conventions.

The new policy was heralded by a definite pledge in the Queen's proclamation that "We desire no extension of our present territorial possessions". This declaration would not perhaps have solved the problem, were it not accompanied by other steps to ensure its faithful observance. The two main grounds for recent annexations were (1) failure of natural heirs, and (2) misgovernment of native rulers. Means had to be devised to deal with them before the policy of non-annexation could be carried into practice.

The first offered a simple solution, and it was readily adopted. In 1860 *sanads* were granted to princes by which, on failure of natural heirs, the Hindu chiefs were authorised to adopt sons, and the Muslim chiefs to regulate their succession in any manner sanctioned by the Muslim law. These "Sanads of adoption", as they were called, guaranteed the perpetuity of States.

As regards misgovernment, matters were more complex, and obviously could not be dealt with by any fixed rule. To judge from the actual events that took place after 1858, it appears that the new policy was to punish the ruler for misgovernment, and, if necessary, to depose him, but not to annex the State for his misdeeds. A corollary to this new policy was to interfere in the internal administration before misgovernment could reach such proportions as would justify more drastic measures. A few concrete instances will explain the trend of the new policy.

The most important case is that of Malhār Rāo Gāikwār. He

was guilty of gross misgovernment, and Colonel Phayre, the Resident, exposed the abuses of his administration. Thereupon the Gāikwār is alleged to have made an attempt to poison the Resident by mixing diamond dust with his food (November, 1874). Lord Northbrook had the Gāikwār arrested in January, 1875, and appointed a Commission for his trial. The Commission included three Indians and three Englishmen, and was presided over by the Chief Justice of Bengal. The Commission were divided in their opinion. The three Englishmen held the Gāikwār guilty of the charge, but the three eminent Indian members—the Mahārājās of Gwālior and Jaipur, and Sir Dinkar Rāo—were of opinion that the charge was not proved. The Government of India accordingly acquitted the Gāikwār of the charge of attempted murder, but deposed him for "his notorious misconduct, his gross misgovernment of the State, and his evident incapacity to carry into effect necessary reforms".

A new Gāikwār was installed on the throne. The choice fell upon a boy named Sayajī Rāo who was distantly connected with the ruling family. Arrangements were made for the proper education and training of the boy, and Sir T. Mādhava Rāo ably administered the State during his minority. The boy who was thus called to the throne became one of the most enlightened rulers of India, and under his paternal guidance Barodā became one of the most progressive States in the whole of India. He died in January, 1939.

The case of Manipur affords another illustration of the new policy. In 1890 the Rājā of Manipur was deposed at the instigation of his brother, the *Senāpati* or Commander-in-Chief. The British Government recognised the new ruler, but decided to banish the *Senāpati*. Mr. Quinton, the Chief Commissioner of Assām, proceeded for this purpose to Manipur with a small escort (March, 1891). The *Senāpati* opposed him, and there was some fighting. At last an interview was arranged between him and Mr. Quinton, but the British officers were treacherously attacked, and Mr. Quinton, with four members of his staff, was captured. One of them was speared and the rest were beheaded by the public executioner. A strong British force was sent to avenge this foul murder. The *Senāpati* and the new Rājā were captured and executed. A boy Rājā was set up, and during his minority the State was administered by the Political Agent.

The cases of Barodā and Manipur afford a striking contrast to those of Oudh, the Punjab, Coorg, and many other States which were annexed, for similar reasons, during the rule of the

East India Company. They show the readiness of the Paramount Government not only to intervene, but, if necessary, to take adequate steps for remedying the state of things, in cases of disputed succession, misgovernment, internal rebellion, etc. On the other hand they have equally demonstrated their unwillingness to annex the Indian States.

A desire to maintain the separate existence of the States is also clearly manifest from the example of Mysore. As already noted, the State was placed under British administration in 1831. After fifty years of British rule the State was restored to its lawful ruler (1881). This "rendition of Mysore" is fully in keeping with, and is a striking demonstration of, the new policy towards the Indian States.

These illustrations definitely prove that annexation of Indian States may now be regarded as a thing of the past, and neither failure of natural heirs, nor misgovernment on the part of any ruler, need constitute any danger to the existence of a State. So far the Indian States have undoubtedly benefited by the change of government from the Company to the Crown. But corresponding with this increase in security and stability, there has been a steady decrease in their status. This was partly inevitable and partly the result of a deliberate policy.

The States in 1858 numbered nearly six hundred. More than five hundred of these were petty principalities whose relations with the British Government were never clearly defined in writing. As to the rest, such relations were defined by treaties. But the treaty-rights were substantially different in the cases of different States, and accordingly they stood in varying degrees of subjection to the Imperial authority. Certain States like Hyderābād had at first entered into treaties with the Company on equal terms, and subsequently parted with some definite rights (e.g. control of foreign policy) and entered into some definite obligations (supply of a specified force). It was obvious that, barring these matters, it was, in theory, absolutely independent of any British control.

In the case of the Rājput States the treaties provided that the rulers should not maintain any relations with any foreign power, and should help the Company, in times of war, with all the resources of their States, but that they should exercise absolute power within their own territories.

These States obviously stood on a very different footing from others like Mysore, Barodā, or Oudh, where the treaties definitely authorised the British to interfere in internal matters. But even in these cases, the relations were defined by treaties, as between

two independent powers, rather than by agreements imposed by a paramount power upon its subordinate State.

The policy of the Government under the Crown has been to ignore these differences in the status of Indian States, and to uphold in theory and practice the paramountcy of the British Crown over all alike. This will be clearly manifest to anyone who studies the attitude of the British Government towards the Indian States since 1858.

The most direct enunciation of this new policy is to be found in the Act of 1876 by which Queen Victoria assumed the title of "Empress of India" with effect from 1st January, 1877. This at once brought the Indian States within the British Empire, and, legally speaking, the rulers and the people of the States were henceforth to be classed as vassals of the British Sovereign. In theory, at least, the change was really very great. The status of these States in the days of the East India Company has been discussed above. This was fully recognised by the Crown in the famous proclamation of 1858 as the following passage will show:

> "We hereby announce to the native princes of India, that all treaties and engagements made with them by or under the authority of the East India Company are by us accepted, and will be scrupulously maintained, and we look for the like observance on their part.
>
> "We desire no extension of our present territorial possessions; and while we will permit no aggression upon our dominions or our rights to be attempted with impunity, we shall sanction no encroachment on those of others.
>
> "We shall respect the rights, dignity and honour of native princes as our own; and we desire that they, as well as our own subjects, should enjoy that prosperity and social advancement which can only be secured by internal peace and good government."

It is obvious from the above that even after the assumption of the Indian Government by the Crown, the Indian States were recognised as independent sovereign States, and regarded as allies of the British Government rather than their subjects. But the Act of 1876 entirely changed this aspect, and made the Sovereign of England the suzerain of Indian States as well. Henceforth the British stood forth frankly as the Paramount Power, a position which in practice they had been assuming for some time past.

The new status is very clearly indicated in the Instrument of

Transfer setting forth the conditions under which Mysore was restored to its Indian rulers in 1881. A comparison of this document with the Treaty of Seringapatam by which Wellesley defined the position of the newly created Hindu kingdom of Mysore is both interesting and instructive.

In the Treaty of Seringapatam it was laid down that "the friends and enemies of either of the contracting parties should be considered as the friends and enemies of both". In the Instrument of Transfer the ruler of Mysore was required to "remain faithful in allegiance and subordination to Her Majesty".

This frank assumption of the paramount authority is supplemented by a series of provisions in the Instrument of Transfer which are entirely wanting in the Treaty of Seringapatam. By these the Government of Mysore was to co-operate with the British in matters of administration such as "the telegraphs and railways, the manufacture of salt and opium, the extradition of criminals, and the use of the currency of British India".

There is one new provision in the Instrument which demands special consideration. It is a definite declaration that no succession in the Government of Mysore was to be valid so long as it was not recognised by the Governor-General-in-Council. While the Crown had made a great concession to the demands of the Indian States by legalising adoption, it was more than counter-balanced by this new theory of succession. The Company had claimed to control succession in the States only in case of the death of a ruler without leaving any heir. The theory enunciated in the Instrument, however, is that no succession in an Indian State is valid until it is sanctioned by the British Government. That this is now the accepted policy of the Government is proved by declarations of both the Government of India and the Secretary of State. The former wrote in 1884: "The succession to a Native State is invalid until it receives in some form the sanction of the British authorities." The latter reiterated it in 1891 in the following terms: "Every succession must be recognised by the British Government, and no succession is valid until recognition has been given." Thus in theory there is an interregnum on the death of a ruler of an Indian State and even a son cannot succeed until his claim is approved by the British Government.

The theory of paramountcy over the Indian States also serves as the basis and justification of the claim of the British Government to interfere in their internal affairs whenever it is necessary to do so for ensuring good government. As the Paramount Power they have undertaken the responsibility of maintaining a high

level of administration in the States. Previously the Company would let a State alone so long as it was loyal, and would not interfere in its internal administration, save that in extreme cases of misgovernment they would most probably annex it permanently. Under the Crown a State, besides being loyal, has to maintain a high standard of administration, and failure to do this would lead to the interference of the Paramount Authority. In addition to the cases of Barodā and Manipur discussed above, reference may be made to interference in recent times in the States of Hyderābād, Kāshmīr and Alwār.

The new policy was very lucidly stated by Lord Reading in connection with the interference in the Nizām's State:

"The right of the British Government to intervene in the internal affairs of Indian States is another instance of the consequences necessarily involved in the supremacy of the British Crown. The British Government have indeed shown again and again that they have no desire to exercise this right without grave reason. But the internal, no less than the external, security which the Ruling Princes enjoy is due ultimately to the protecting power of the British Government, and where imperial interests are concerned, or the general welfare of the people of a State is seriously and grievously affected by the action of its Government, it is with the Paramount Power that the ultimate responsibility of taking remedial action, if necessary, must lie. The varying degrees of internal sovereignty which the Rulers enjoy are all subject to the due exercise by the Paramount Power of this responsibility."

CHAPTER II

WHITEHALL AND THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA (1858–1905)

India under the Crown

1. The Home Government

THE Act of 1858 put an end to the dual authority exercised by the Board of Control, or rather its President, and the Court of Directors. A parliamentary minister, the Secretary of State for India, was now invested with the powers of supreme control over the Government of India. In view of the general ignorance of English politicians about India, and partly, no doubt, in order to control the exercise of such large powers and patronage by a single individual, a Council was set up to advise the Secretary of State. The Council of India included men of Indian experience. In order to give them independence in the exercise of their duty the members were appointed "during good behaviour". They were given specific powers, and their consent was needed for the appropriation and expenditure of the Indian revenue, and for the appointment of ordinary members of the Viceroy's Council. The Secretary of State was not, however, absolutely subject to his Council, and could act on his own authority in urgent and secret matters. It was, however hoped that the Council would have an effective share in the determination of policy.

But it was soon apparent that the Secretary of State was in a position to ignore his Council on all vital matters. The position was legalised by the Act of 1869, which took away most of the powers of the Council, and further provided that its members were to hold office only for a period of ten years, renewable at the pleasure of the Secretary of State. The change was clearly pointed out by Sir Charles Dilke in the House of Commons: "At the time the Council was appointed the idea was to curb the power of the Secretary of State; that feeling had passed away, and it was now recognised on all hands that the Council should be a consultative and not a controlling body."

The Secretary of State, like other ministers, was responsible to the British Parliament. But here, again, English politicians

generally speaking possessed so poor a knowledge of Indian affairs, and took so little interest in them, that parliamentary control over the Secretary of State for India scarcely ever became a reality.

In practice, therefore, if not in law, the Secretary of State possessed unlimited authority over the Government of India. This had its natural reaction on the relations between the Home Government at Whitehall and the Government in India.

To a superficial observer the Act of 1858 meant nothing more to the Indian Government than a mere change of master. In reality, however, it brought about striking changes.

The concentration of the powers of the Court of Directors and the Board of Control in the hands of a minister of State led to important consequences. To serve two masters may be an irksome business, but it had its obvious advantages. Fully cognisant of the eternal rivalry between the two, a shrewd and able Governor-General could, and often did, play one against the other, and had his own way. Besides, the same rivalry between the authorities stood in the way of their formulating a strong and vigorous policy to which the Indian Government did not subscribe. Further, a minister of State was always likely to be a person of far greater weight than the President of the Board of Control. In the present instance, the Secretary of State, as we have seen above, exercised his large powers practically without any control and could naturally exercise a greater degree of influence. Besides, the Act of 1858 vested the Council of India with large powers over the financial policy of the Government of India. These powers gradually fell into the hands of the Secretary of State and enabled him to exercise an effective control over the Viceroy and his Council.

But in addition to legislative enactments, other factors were at work to enhance the powers of the Secretary of State. The establishment of a direct telegraph line between England and India in 1870 was an event of far-reaching importance. The delay in communication was a great advantage to the Government of India in so far as it of necessity left the initiation of policy in urgent matters to its own hands, and enabled it to confront the Secretary of State with accomplished facts. But all this was bound to change when the Secretary of State had to be kept constantly informed of the course of events in India, and was in a position to issue immediate orders. Henceforth the Secretary of State exercised a far more effective control over the administration of India than was the case before, and the Viceroy really tended to be a mere "agent" of the Secretary of State.

2. The Indian Government

When the Crown took the Government of India into its own hands in 1858, the supreme legislative and executive authority in India, as we have seen above, was vested in the Governor-General-in-Council. For executive powers it was composed of the Governor-General, the four ordinary members (three officials of ten years' standing and one barrister), and the Commander-in-Chief, who was an extraordinary member. For legislative purposes six members had been added to this body in 1853.

The change of 1853 marks the modest beginning of a parliamentary system in India, and as such deserves special notice. As Cowell observed: "Discussion became oral instead of in writing; Bills were referred to Select Committees instead of to a single member; and legislative business was conducted in public instead of in secret."

There were, however, two grave defects in the Legislative Council. No Indian element was associated with it, and its knowledge of the local conditions outside Bengal was not adequate for making laws for other provinces.

The first of these defects was forcibly realised by many at the time of the Revolt of 1857–59. "The terrible events of the Mutiny brought home to men's minds the dangers arising from the entire exclusion of Indians from association with the legislation of the country." Enlightened Indians like Sir Syed Ahmad pointed out the twofold character of this danger. On the one hand it deprived the people of the means of entering any protest against any unpopular measure, while on the other hand the Government had no opportunity of explaining their aims and intentions, which were consequently misunderstood. Even English politicians endorsed the same view. In his able Minute of 1860, Sir Bartle Frere advocated the need of including Indians in the Legislative Council, in order to do away with "the perilous experiment of continuing to legislate for millions of people with few means of knowing, except by rebellion, whether the laws suit them or not".

Apart from these inherent defects of the existing Legislative Council, difficulties soon arose which threatened to alter the whole structure of the Indian Government. These have been ably summed up in the following lines:

"Contrary to the intentions of the framers of the Act of 1853, it (the Legislative Council) had developed into 'an Anglo-Indian House of Commons' questioning the Executive and its acts, and

forcing it to lay even confidential papers before it. It had refused to submit legislative projects to the Secretary of State before their consideration in the Council, and had refused to pass any legislation required by the Secretary of State (or the Court of Directors before 1858); on the other hand it asserted its right of independent legislation."

The spirit of independence displayed by the Legislative Council from the very beginning disturbed its author, Sir Charles Wood, the President of the Board of Control. "I do not look upon it," said he, "as some of the young Indians do, as the nucleus and beginning of a constitutional parliament in India." But Dalhousie pointed out that he had not "conceded to the Legislative Council any greater power than the law clearly confers upon it". It has been very aptly observed that Wood "was neither the first nor the last legislator to fail in limiting the consequences of a Bill to his intentions".

The state of things soon underwent a change. The Indian Councils Act of 1861 constituted the next landmark in the evolution of Legislative Councils in this country. It added a fifth ordinary non-official member to the Executive Council, and the power of the Secretary of State to appoint the Commander-in-Chief as an extraordinary member was continued. The powers of the Governor-General were considerably enlarged. With the sanction of his Council he could exercise all the executive powers of the Governor-General-in-Council. Further, the Act empowered him to make rules and orders for the transaction of the business of the Council. Lord Canning used this authority to introduce what is now known as the Portfolio System. By this system, which is virtually even now in force, each member was placed in charge of one or more Departments, and could finally dispose of minor matters in that department on his own authority, and matters of greater importance in consultation with the Viceroy, only the questions of general policy being referred to the Council for decision. In view of the large increase in business such a system was almost inevitable, but it resulted in a considerable diminution of the importance of the Council, and a corresponding increase in the power and influence of the Viceroy.

The legislative provisions of the Act of 1861 were far more important. For the purpose of making laws the Viceroy's Council was enlarged by the addition of "not less than six nor more than twelve additional members", of whom not less than half should be non-official members. These additional members were to be nominated by the Governor-General for two years.

The function of this Council was strictly limited to legislation, and the Act expressly forbade the transaction of any other business. It was empowered "to make laws and regulations for all persons whether British or native, foreigners or others, and for all places and things whatever within the said territories, and for all servants of the Government of India (afterwards extended to all British subjects) within the dominions of princes and States in alliance with Her Majesty".

This wide legislative power was subject, however, to several restrictions. In the first place the previous sanction of the Governor-General was necessary for introducing any legislation concerning certain specified subjects, such as Public Debt, Public Revenue, Indian religious rites, Military discipline and Policy towards Indian States.

Secondly, no laws could be made which infringed the authority of the Home Government or violated the provisions of certain Acts made by the Parliament.

Thirdly, the Governor-General had not only the power of vetoing any law passed by the Council, but was authorised, in cases of emergency, to issue ordinances which should have the same authority as any law passed by the Council.

Lastly, any Act passed by the Council might be disallowed by Her Majesty.

The Act of 1861 restored to the Governments of Bombay and Madras the power of making "laws and regulations" for the peace and good government of these Presidencies, subject, of course, to the same restrictions as put upon the Governor-General's Council. In addition, the Provincial Councils had to obtain previous sanction of the Governor-General before making regulations on such all-India subjects as currency, copyright, posts and telegraphs, Penal Code, etc. For the purpose of legislation the Executive Council of the Governor was enlarged by the addition of the Advocate-General, and "not less than four nor more than eight" members, nominated by the Governor, of whom at least half should be non-official members.

The Act authorised the Governor-General-in-Council to create similar Legislative Councils not only in the remaining provinces such as Bengal, the North-Western Provinces (now the United Provinces), and the Punjab, but also in new provinces, if any, which it was empowered to constitute. In pursuance of this a Legislative Council was established in the three provinces, in 1862, 1886 and 1898 respectively.

It must be admitted that the Act of 1861 was retrograde in

many respects, and deprived the Legislative Council of any independent power. It ceased to exercise any control or check upon the Executive, and even its legislative functions were circumscribed by too many restrictions. But in spite of all its defects the Indian Councils Act of 1861 must always be regarded as a memorable one. It gave the framework to the Government of India which it has retained up till now, and all the subsequent changes have been made within that framework. It ushered in one of the great developments that distinguish the subsequent reforms of administration in this country, viz., the admission of Indians into the higher Councils of the Government. Although not expressly provided for in the Act, there was no definition of the non-official element of the Legislative Council, which accordingly could include Indians. Dalhousie had urged the inclusion of Indians in the Council created by the Act of 1853, but without success. Evidently the Revolt of 1857–59 changed the views at home in this respect, and in 1862 Canning nominated the Mahārājā of Patiālā, the Rājā of Benares, and Sir Dinkar Rāo to the newly constituted Legislative Council.

It is not necessary to describe in detail the various legislative measures during the thirty years that followed (1861–1891). Among the notable changes may be mentioned the considerable increase of legislative authority both of the Viceroy and his Council. By the Indian Councils Act of 1870, the Governor-General-in-Council was empowered to pass regulations without reference to the Legislative Council. The same Act also repeated and more clearly defined the power of the Viceroy to override the decisions of the majority of his Council and to adopt and carry into execution or suspend or reject, even against the opinion of the majority, any measure affecting "the safety, tranquillity or interests of the British possessions in India, or any part thereof".

The Act of 1874 provided for the addition of a sixth ordinary member to the Viceroy's Council, "the member for Public Works".

The same period of thirty years, however, witnessed the first great national movement in India and the foundation of the Indian National Congress, to which detailed reference will be made later. The newly-roused political consciousness of the Indians manifested itself in demands for constitutional rights formulated by the Congress. The Congress put in the forefront of its programme the reform of the Legislative Councils, both local and central, especially on the following lines:

1. The establishment of councils in provinces, other than Bengal, Bombay and Madras.

2. The expansion of the councils with a large proportion of elected members.
3. Grant of additional powers to the councils, especially the right of discussing the Budget and of eliciting information by means of interpellations.

To meet these demands, at least partially, Lord Dufferin suggested some measures to the Home Government which led to the Indian Councils Act of 1892, another great landmark in the history of constitutional development in India.

By this Act the number of additional members, both in the Supreme and local Councils, was slightly increased, the maximum being fixed at sixteen in the case of the Supreme Council, twenty in the case of Bombay, Madras, and Bengal, and fifteen for the North-Western Provinces and Oudh, where a Legislative Council had been established in 1886. The increase was much below the expectations not only of the Congress, but even of many English politicians who sympathised with the political aspirations of the Indians.

Far more important was, however, the change in the mode of appointing these members. The principle of election demanded by the Congress was not directly conceded. But the Act authorised the Governor-General-in-Council to prescribe the method of appointing the additional members, and the Government members explained, in the course of the discussion of the Bill in the House of Commons, that under this clause it would be possible for the Governor-General to provide for the election of additional members. As a matter of fact, Lord Lansdowne (1888–94) utilised this power in having eight members of the local councils elected by Municipalities, District Boards, Chambers of Commerce, Universities, etc., and four members of the Supreme Council elected by the non-official members of the local councils.

The Act of 1892 also conceded to the members of the Legislative Councils the right of discussing the Budget and asking questions on matters of public interest.

Although the Act of 1892 fell far short of the demands made by the Indian National Congress, it was a great advance upon the existing state of things. By conceding the principle of election, and giving the Legislative Councils some control over the Executive, it paved the way for further reforms on these lines which were destined to place in the hands of Indians a large measure of control over the administration of the country.

CHAPTER III

INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION, 1858–1905

1. Recruitment for the Public Services

THE assumption of the direct administration of India by the Crown led to great changes both in the spirit and details of internal administration. The administrative machinery was gradually organised with a thoroughness not possible under the Company's regime, and the administrative principles and political ideals of England were applied to a large extent. The Indian administration became more efficient and more up-to-date. The old rivalry and jealousy between the Company and the Board of Control disappeared, and the unitary control of Parliament was established.

But the picture has its dark side also. During the old regime the periodical renewal of the Charter of the East India Company afforded an opportunity for Parliament to scrutinise affairs in India with a jealous eye. But as soon as the Secretary of State was put in sole charge of India, it ceased to evoke that interest. Theoretically, no doubt, the House of Commons was responsible for the administration of India, but few persons took an interest in matters affecting this country. In the days of the Company, a Select Committee was appointed by Parliament to report on the administration. They went thoroughly into the whole subject, exposed abuses, and suggested remedies which were frequently adopted in the new Charter. But now the Secretary submitted an annual report before the whole House. Every member was supposed to take interest in it, but as often happens, everybody's business became nobody's business.

Its effect on the large increase in the powers of the Secretary of State has been referred to above, but the internal administration of India was also profoundly affected by it. The Indian officials were now responsible only to the Secretary of State, and, so long as they could satisfy him, had not to fear any other authority. The Secretary could hardly exercise any effective control over the details of administration from such a distance, but he had to defend the actions of the officials as the ultimate responsibility devolved upon him. The result was the growth of an all-powerful

Bureaucracy in India headed by the members of the Superior Indian Civil Service. This service soon became a powerful corporation, and its members became—in the words of Blunt—"the practical owners of India, irremovable, irresponsible, and amenable to no authority but that of their fellow members". The members of this service were no doubt very able, and, generally speaking, honest men. But the position in which they found themselves invested them with a superiority complex, and a wide gulf was created between the rulers and the ruled. That sympathy and mutual understanding between the two, which lie at the root of all good administration, were at a discount.

Unfortunately other causes were at work to accentuate the isolation of the higher British officials. In the days of the Company English officials mixed freely with Indians, and there was a genuine good feeling and often friendship between them. The dark horrors of the Revolt generated a feeling of aversion towards Indians in the minds of the British. Perhaps this feeling would have been weakened in the normal course, and might have ultimately disappeared. But steam navigation, the Suez Canal, the telegraph and the overland route, all served to bring the British in closer touch with their home. They were no longer exiles in a foreign land, but in direct and constant touch with their own country. Gradually an English society grew up in big towns. All these factors did away with the necessity of making friends with Indians, and the British official led a more and more exclusive life so far as the Indian people were concerned. His time was divided between his office and club and he had hardly any social intercourse with Indians. In spite of long residence in India, he remained to all intents and purposes a foreigner, and knew little of their feelings, sentiments and aspirations. Blunt very correctly observed that "the Anglo-Indian official of the Company's days loved India in a way no Queen's official dreams of doing now; and loving it, he served it better".

The Indians naturally concluded that this state of things could only be improved by the appointment of a larger number of Indians in the public offices. The Charter Act of 1833 legalised the appointment of Indians even to the highest offices of State. But the provisions in the Act of 1793, still unrepealed, laid down that "none but covenanted servants of the Company could hold any office with a salary of more than £800 a year". Thus no Indian could fill any high post unless he were a regular official who had entered into covenant with the East India Company, or, after 1858, with the Secretary of State. Formerly these officers were

nominated partly by the Directors and partly by the Board of Control, and after nomination they received a training for two years at the East India College at Haileybury. The system of open competitive examination for these appointments was introduced in 1853 and re-affirmed in 1858. The competition was open to all natural-born subjects of Her Majesty, whether European or Indian. The maximum age for admission was at first twenty-three. In 1859 it was lowered to twenty-two, and the selected candidates were to remain on probation in England for a year. In 1866 the maximum age was still further lowered to twenty-one, and the probationers had to go through a special course of training at an approved University for two years.

It was extremely difficult for Indians to pass this examination. The journey to England was not only expensive and unfamiliar, but, in the case of the Hindus, was frowned upon by the more orthodox leaders of the community. To compete with English boys in an examination conducted through the medium of English in an English University was indeed a formidable task. It is no wonder, therefore, that comparatively few Indians were successful.

The repercussion of this state of things on the political movement in India will be discussed in a later chapter. The British Government also realised the inadequacy of the Indian element in the Superior Civil Service. In 1870 an Act was passed authorising the appointment of Indians to the higher offices without any examination, but effect was given to this only in 1879 under circumstances to be related later (p. 891).

The rules adopted in 1879 ordained "that a proportion not exceeding one-sixth of the total number of covenanted Civil Servants appointed in any year by the Secretary of State should be natives selected in India by the local governments subject to the approval of the Governor-General-in-Council". These officers were called "Statutory Civil Servants" and were recruited from "young men of good family and social position possessed of fair abilities and education". The system was, however, subject to the same defects from which all systems of nomination were bound to suffer. Indians themselves preferred open competitive examination. But in order to give Indians a fair and equitable chance, they recommended that there should be simultaneous examinations both in England and India. For the same reason they were against the lowering of the maximum age of admission below twenty-one as it would adversely affect the Indian candidates who were to be examined in a foreign tongue. The lowering of the maximum age-limit to nineteen in 1877 was regarded as a deliberate attempt to

shut out Indians, and led to that agitation which culminated in the Congress movement. The Congress vigorously took up the question of simultaneous examinations and employment of Indians in larger numbers.

In 1886 Lord Dufferin appointed a "Public Services Commission" to investigate the problem. The Commission rejected the idea of simultaneous examinations for covenanted service, and advised the abolition of the Statutory Civil Service. They proposed that a number of posts hitherto reserved for covenanted service should be thrown open to a local service to be called the Provincial Civil Service, which would be separately recruited in every province either by promotion from lower ranks or by direct recruitment. The terms Covenanted and Uncovenanted were replaced by Imperial and Provincial, and below the latter would be a Subordinate Civil Service.

These recommendations were accepted. The Covenanted Civil Service was henceforth known as the "Civil Service of India", and the Provincial Service was called after the particular province, as, for example, the Bengal Civil Service. A list was prepared of posts reserved for the Civil Service of India, but open to the new Provincial Service, and local governments were empowered to appoint an Indian to any such "listed post". In other branches of administration, such as Education, Police, Public Works and Medical departments, too, there were similar divisions into Imperial, Provincial, and Subordinate services. The first was mainly filled by Englishmen, and the other two almost exclusively by Indians.

This system remained in being with slight changes till the end of British rule. It improved the standard of service, but failed to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the Indians for employment in larger numbers in higher offices of State.

In 1893, the House of Commons passed a resolution in favour of simultaneous examinations in England and India for the Indian Civil Service. The resolution was forwarded by the Secretary of State to the Government of India for opinion. Lord Lansdowne's Government, after consulting Provincial Governments, definitely opposed the principle of the resolution. "They maintained that material reduction of the European staff then employed was incompatible with the safety of the British rule. The system of unrestricted competition in examination would not only dangerously weaken the British element in the Civil Service, but would also practically exclude from the service Muhammadans, Sikhs and other races, accustomed to rule by tradition, and possessed of

exceptional strength of character, but deficient in literary education." Nothing came of the proposal, and more than a quarter of a century had elapsed before any step was taken in this direction.

2. Local Self-Government

From time immemorial ideas of local self-government prevailed in India to a far greater extent than anywhere else in the world. The villages and towns were small States in miniature where all the local needs for sanitation, communication, the judiciary and the police were served by assemblies of the people themselves with a chief executive officer.

During the turmoil that followed in the wake of the dissolution of the Mughul Empire, these self-governing organisations almost entirely disappeared from towns and greatly decayed in villages. The British Government tried to keep up the village assemblies wherever they were in working order, and revived them in places where they were wanting. But they were confronted with the task of evolving a definite system of local government both for the vast rural areas as well as for towns.

To begin with, the Government adopted no definite system in the administration of local affairs in the rural areas. They worked through the existing institutions or improvised others as the need was felt. In Bengal regulations were passed in 1816 and 1819 authorising the Government to levy money for the maintenance of ferries and the repair and construction of roads, bridges and drains. In administering the fund so raised, Government were advised by local Committees, with the Magistrate as Secretary, which they appointed in each district.

Outside Bengal, the necessary amount was raised by imposing a cess or small percentage on land revenue. In 1869 the matter was put on a definite basis in Bombay by means of legislation. It provided for expenditure on public works by legalising the cesses and set up committees for the administration of funds. not only for the district as a whole but also for its subdivisions.

A great stimulus was given to the development of local self-government by the Government of India's Resolution of 1870. Within a year, Acts were passed in various provinces on the lines of that of the Bombay Government. Existing cesses were legalised and even increased. For the administration of the funds, Committees were set up for the district as a whole, but not for smaller areas as in Bombay. These Committees were all nominated by the

Government and controlled by them. They consisted of both officials and non-officials and had an official Chairman.

In Bengal the cess was imposed for the first time by the new Act and a great hue and cry was raised that it was a violation of the Permanent Settlement. The Government partly yielded and decided to restrict the cess only to the amount required for the roads. Thus the road-cess, as it was called in Bengal, could not be diverted to purposes of primary education as was done in other provinces.

The system introduced in 1871 was no doubt a distinct improvement upon the existing situation. Much was done to improve the communications, sanitation and education of the localities. But there were several grave defects. The Committees were entirely dominated by officialdom, and popular wishes and feelings had no scope in them. Besides, the area served by them was too large, and the private members had very inadequate knowledge of, and consequently little interest in, the local affairs of a large part of the area.

Lord Ripon made an earnest endeavour to remove these defects and to introduce a real element of local self-government somewhat on the lines of English law. His ideas were laid down in the shape of a Government Resolution in May, 1882. The two essential features of this new plan were:

(1) The sub-division, not the district, should be the maximum area served by one Committee or local board, with primary boards, under it, serving very small areas, so that each member of it might possess knowledge of, and interest in, its affairs.
(2) The local boards should consist of a large majority of elected non-official members, and be presided over by a non-official Chairman.

Here was a real beginning of self-government. But unfortunately the principles underlying this resolution were not fully given effect in many of the provinces. The legislation that followed differed in different provinces. In the Central Provinces the Chairman became non-official and the principle of election was adopted to a certain extent. In other provinces the old system was continued, and only a small number of members were elected. Everywhere the district continued to be the area of the local boards. In Bengal alone an attempt was made to carry Lord Ripon's principles to the fullest extent, but the Bill introduced for the purpose was vetoed by the Secretary of State. Under the Act finally passed in 1885 the District

Boards continued to function under the chairmanship of the District Magistrates.

The ground for the great departure from the principles of the Resolution of May, 1882, was everywhere the demand for efficiency. To a certain extent this was perhaps achieved. But the value of these new principles lay in a quite different direction. Their author, Lord Ripon, stated it quite clearly in the following words:

"It is not primarily with a view to improvement in administration that the measure is put forward and supported. It is chiefly desirable as a measure of political and popular education."

The liberal views of Ripon were not, unfortunately, shared by either the local governments or the authorities in England. The high hopes raised in the minds of the Indians were thus dashed to the ground. But the Congress took up this question and pressed it upon the Government year after year.

Municipalities

Up to the time of Lord Ripon the local administration of towns, like that of rural areas, was not conducted on any uniform or definite principle. In big towns there was a municipal Committee nominated by the Government with the District Magistrate as Chairman. Their power of taxation for meeting local needs was based in some cases on legislative enactments, but in others on local usage and customs. In most cases the Government had complete control over the administration, though in a few areas the limit of Government interference was prescribed by law.

Lord Ripon's Resolution of May, 1882, aimed at the introduction of principles of self-government in municipal administration as in the case of rural Boards. He proposed that while the ultimate supervision, control, and superintendence should be left in the hands of the Government, the actual municipal administration should be entrusted to the elected representatives of the people. Under a non-official Chairman, the people should be trained to govern themselves through their own representatives. He further proposed that the police charges should be met by the Government, and the municipalities should busy themselves with education, sanitation, provision of light, roads and drinking water and such other objects of public utility.

Lord Ripon's ideals were realised to a large extent. Acts were passed for the various provinces, providing for the compulsory election of a large proportion—varying from one-half to three-quarters—of municipal Commissioners. The Acts also provided for

the election of a Chairman. This was, however, only a permissive clause, and the power was not actually granted in many cases. Even where such power was granted, the district officer was often elected as the Chairman. In course of time, however, non-official Chairmen became the rule rather than the exception.

Thus Lord Ripon made a real beginning in the direction of local self-government in modern India. His ideas were not given full effect, but he sowed the seeds which ultimately germinated in a real development of local self-government.

Presidency Towns

The development of self-government in the three Presidency towns of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras requires separate treatment. Being the earliest seats of British authority in India, the history of their local government goes back to a much earlier period, and shows an evolution of a very different character from that of the other towns of British India.

Towards the close of the eighteenth century, a Parliamentary Statute authorised the Governor-General to appoint justices of the peace in these towns. They provided for sanitation and the police, and were empowered to levy rates on owners and occupiers of houses for meeting the necessary expenditure.

The arrangement was inadequate and unsatisfactory, and two Acts were passed in 1856 for the conservancy and improvement of the towns and for the better assessment and collection of rates. Three Commissioners were appointed in each town, and in the Act for Calcutta special provisions were made for gas-lighting and the construction of sewers.

From this time the development in the three towns followed different lines, and we may treat them separately.

Calcutta

The new arrangement proving ineffective, the justices of the peace were again vested with general control, but the executive power was left in the hands of a Chairman appointed by the Government. The Chairman was also made the Commissioner of Police. Under such a strong executive authority great improvements were made, and Sir Stewart Hogg laid the foundations of a proper system of drainage and water supply.

The constitution, however, did not work well. The relation between the executive and the large number of justices of the

peace was not clearly defined, and there was constant conflict between the two. By an Act of 1876 the Corporation of Calcutta was reconstituted. It consisted of seventy-two members, two-thirds of whom were elected by rate-payers. In 1882 the number of elected members was raised to fifty, and the jurisdiction of the Municipality was extended by the addition of suburban areas.

The progressive development of the principles of self-government in the administration of the city of Calcutta was suddenly checked by Lord Curzon. By an Act passed in 1899 the number of members directly elected by the rate-payers was reduced to half the total strength, and the Chairman, nominated by the Government, was vested with large independent powers. The Corporation could only fix the rate of assessment and lay down the general policy. In the details of administration the only check upon the Chairman was a General Committee of twelve, of whom four were appointed by the elected Commissioners, four by the other Commissioners, and four by the Government.

The grounds for thus curtailing the powers of the people were that there was too much talk and too little action in the Corporation, and that the necessary driving power could only be secured by a strong independent executive unfettered by the control of the Corporation or its special Committees.

Needless to add, the measure evoked the strongest protest from the public. Mr. Surendranath Banerjea uttered one of his most eloquent denunciations when this measure was discussed in the Bengal Legislative Council. On the last day of the debate, 27th September, while opposing the bill for the last time, he remarked that the date "will be remembered by future generations of Bengalees as that which marks the extinction of local self-government" in the city of Calcutta.

As a protest against the measure, twenty-eight members of the Corporation, including Surendranath, tendered their resignation. By a curious irony of fate, it was left to Surendranath, as a Minister, to undo the great wrong—twenty-four years later.

Bombay

In Bombay, as in Calcutta, the old system was revived in 1865. Five hundred justices of the peace formed a corporate body for the administration of the town, with a highly-paid official, called Commissioner, as Chairman, and an independent Controller of Accounts. The system did not work well. The Controller of

Accounts scarcely exercised any effective control, while the Corporation was too unwieldy for the purpose of check or guidance.

The constitution was changed in 1872. The strength of the Corporation was reduced to sixty-four members, of whom half were elected by the rate-payers, one-fourth were elected by the resident justices, and the remaining one-fourth were nominated by the Government. The executive authority was vested, as before, in the Commissioner, but the post of the Controller of Accounts was abolished. Instead, provision was made for the weekly audit of accounts by a standing Committee of the Corporation, and monthly audit by paid professional auditors.

This constitution worked fairly well and continued with slight changes till the end of the nineteenth century.

Madras

In Madras the system of government by three Commissioners continued till 1867. By an Act passed in that year, the town was divided into eight wards, and four councillors were appointed for each by the Government.

In 1878 half the members of the Corporation were elected by the rate-payers, but the President and two Vice-Presidents were all salaried officials appointed by the Government. In 1884 the principle of election was further extended, and twenty-four out of thirty-two members of the Corporation were elected by the rate-payers.

During Lord Curzon's Viceroyalty reaction followed, and the Corporation of Madras was reconstituted on the lines of the Calcutta Municipal Act of 1899.

Thus after various trials a system of government was evolved for the three Presidency towns which had the same essential features, viz., a large Corporation with a proportion of elected members, a strong independent executive authority vested in a Government nominee, with adequate safeguards for checking of accounts and statutory provision for the performance of essential duties, such as sanitation, water-supply, etc. The Government had the right to intervene in case of gross negligence or mismanagement.

3. Financial Administration

Important changes were introduced in the financial system of India by the Act of 1858. The Secretary of State in Council had now the supreme control of financial administration, and, subject to some discretionary powers vested in the Government of India,

no expenditure of Indian revenues could be incurred without the sanction of the India Council. Subject to this control, the Government of India exercised supreme authority over financial administration in India, the Provincial Governments having no power to spend without the sanction of the Governor-General-in-Council. The system of budget was introduced in 1860, and the appropriation of revenues under different items, as provided therein, had to be implicitly followed by the local authorities.

This highly centralised system did not work well. The Provincial Governments having no discretion in matters of expenditure, had little incentive to increase of income or economy in expenditure. The Government of India did not possess the requisite knowledge to make an equitable distribution of the available resources over such a vast country. It was inevitable, under these circumstances, that there should be constant friction between the local and central Governments. Strachey has very justly observed that under this system "the distribution of the public income degenerated into something like a scramble in which the most violent had the advantage with little attention to reason".

These glaring defects led to some amount of decentralisation between 1871 and 1877. Under the new scheme centralised subjects like Post Office and Railways were wholly taken over by the Central Government. The receipts from these departments, together with some other sources of revenue, as salt, opium, and customs, were retained wholly by the Central Government. The revenues from other sources, e.g. land-revenue, excise, stamps, forests and registration, were divided between the Provincial and Central Governments, the share of each being determined according to the needs of particular provinces. This settlement of respective shares was subject to periodical review and readjustment. Under this system the Provincial Governments had to manage their expenses from the revenues assigned to them. They had thus not only more freedom and latitude in spending the revenues they collected, but also a direct interest in increasing the revenues and economising in their expenses.

Of the various heads of revenue referred to above, the land-revenue in different parts of British India and the income derived from the Government monopoly of salt and opium have already been dealt with. The stamp-revenue was really a direct tax on judicial proceedings and commercial transactions; people filing suits in law-courts or entering into business transactions had to affix stamps of specified values on the documents in order to make them legally valid.

The revenue under the head of customs was derived from an *ad valorem* duty on various articles exported from or imported into India. The rate of this duty varied from time to time. The most important was the import duty on cotton goods which yielded an income equivalent to nearly two-thirds of the total income from imports. But as soon as cotton mills were established in India, this duty adversely affected the import of cotton goods manufactured in England. The English manufacturers brought pressure upon the Home Government, and the Government of India was persuaded to adopt the policy of Free Trade then current in England. Consequently, in 1882 all the import duties were abolished, save on such commodities as wine and salt on which internal taxes were levied.

But it proved exceedingly difficult to compensate for the loss of customs duty from other sources. The heavy fall in the price of silver, which formed the standard of currency in India, the military expenditure caused by wars in Burma and the threatening attitude of the Russians in the north-west, and the provisions of the Famine Insurance Fund—all imposed heavy strains upon Indian finances. In order to balance the Budget, the Government of India was forced, in 1894, to reimpose a general import duty at the rate of 5 per cent *ad valorem*. In order to safeguard the interests of English manufacturers of cotton goods, an equivalent excise duty was levied on the cotton goods manufactured in Indian mills.

The abolition of the import duties on cotton goods, and still more, the levy of duty on cotton goods manufactured in India when the import duty was reimposed, were so obviously unjust to Indian interests that even the Council of the Viceroy protested against the measures. In both instances the British Cabinet forced their views upon the unwilling Government of India. In the latter case Sir Henry Fowler, the Secretary of State, enunciated the general policy as follows:

"When once a certain line of policy has been adopted under the direction of the (British) Cabinet, it becomes the clear duty of every member of the Government of India to consider not what that policy ought to be, but how effect may best be given to the policy that has been decided on."

In addition to the revenues mentioned above, the income-tax proved to be a valuable source of receipts. It was introduced in 1860 as a temporary measure, to cope with the financial stresses caused by the Revolt. At first it was in the form of a general levy of 4 per cent on all incomes of Rs. 500, or above, and 2 per cent on all incomes between Rs. 200 and Rs. 500. It was

abolished in 1865 but revived again two years later, in the modified shape of a licence tax on trades and professions. A general income-tax was reimposed in 1869, but again dropped. Ultimately the financial difficulties again forced the Government in 1886 to impose a tax on all incomes other than those derived from agriculture. The tax has since been continued, though the rates have varied from time to time.

A few words may be said regarding the vexed problem of currency. During the early period of Mughul rule, gold *mohurs* and silver rupees were both current in Northern India, though gold was the principal currency in Southern India. The rise of numerous independent kingdoms on the break-up of the Mughul Empire led to the introduction of a multiplicity of coins, as the issue of coins was regarded as one of the insignia of sovereignty. It has been estimated that as many as 994 different types of coins, of both gold and silver, were current in India.

Its disadvantages for purposes of trade and commerce were obvious, and the East India Company tried to solve the difficulty by issuing both gold and silver coins with a definite legal ratio, weight, and fineness. But owing to fluctuations in the value of the two metals it proved exceedingly difficult to maintain the legal ratio between the two types of coins. Gradually the gold *mohur*, being under-valued, disappeared. In 1818 the silver rupee of 180 grains ($\frac{11}{12}$th fine) was substituted for the gold *pagoda* of Madras, and in 1835 the rupee of the present form and size, but having the same weight and fineness as that of 1818, was made the sole legal tender throughout the British territories in India. The Government mints coined this rupee freely for the public, the value of the bullion being identical with its legal value.

In 1841 an attempt was made to reintroduce gold coins, and gold *mohurs* were accepted for public payments at the rate of fifteen rupees to a *mohur*. But the price of gold fell owing to discoveries of the metal in Australia and California in 1848–1849, and Lord Dalhousie definitely abandoned the experiment of 1841. Gold was thus given up as the medium of exchange. But this led to scarcity of money, and trade suffered. Several proposals were made to introduce a gold currency in India, instead of silver, but no effect was given to them.

From 1874 the problem became acute. The adoption of a gold standard by most European countries, and an increase in the output of silver, depreciated the value of silver in terms of gold. Thus while a rupee was equivalent to two shillings of English money in 1871, its value fell to 1*s*. 2*d*. in 1892. In view of the extensive trade

of India with foreign countries which had a gold currency, the situation appeared desperate. In 1878 the Government of India recommended to the Secretary of State the introduction of a gold currency in India, but the latter rejected the proposal. In 1893 the Government introduced the following important changes in its currency on the recommendations of the Herschell Committee:

1. Indian mints were closed to the free coinage of gold and silver for the public.
2. Gold was received in mints in exchange for rupees at the ratio of 1*s.* 4*d.* to the rupee.
3. Sovereigns were received in payment of public dues at the rate of Rs. 15/- for a sovereign.
4. Issue of currency notes in exchange for gold coins or bullion at the same rate.

The result of these measures was that although gold was not yet made legal tender it became the standard of value and the exchange value of rupees ceased to coincide with the actual price of silver.

The new measures were regarded as first steps towards the ultimate adoption of a gold currency. Another Committee was appointed in 1898 under Sir Henry Fowler. According to its recommendations, adopted in 1899, both sovereigns and rupees were made unlimited legal tender at the rate of 1*s.* 4*d.* to the rupee, and the mints were opened only to the free coinage of gold. A Gold Standard Reserve was formed in 1900 out of the profits accruing from the coinage of rupees for the Government, which was resumed.

But even this did not solve the problem of Indian currency. Other changes were made in the twentieth century, and even to-day it constitutes one of the most disputed questions in Indian economics.

4. Higher Standard of Government

The transfer of the government of India from the Company to the Crown effected, as we have seen, a closer association between the Governments of India and England. In course of time, both in theory as well as in practice, the Indian Government came to be treated almost as a subordinate branch of the British Government. The Secretary of State, Sir Henry Fowler, stated in unequivocal language that the Government of India must always abide by the decision of the British Cabinet, even when it was regarded by them as injurious to the interests of India. Another Secretary of

State made a similar observation as regards foreign policy. It was inevitable that in formulating policies and lines of action the British Cabinet should be mostly guided by the paramount consideration of the interests of Britain, and, not unoften, Indian interests would be sacrificed for Imperial considerations. This was particularly noticeable in matters affecting trade, manufacture, currency and foreign policy, and in a less degree in other branches of administration.

But against these undoubted evils we must set off the equally undoubted advantages that accrued to India from the same causes. The close and intimate association with the British Government almost revolutionised the Government of India by introducing those higher administrative ideals and the "modern" spirit which distinguished Europe from Asia in the nineteenth century. The British Government naturally tried to impose the same high standard of administrative efficiency in India which had been evolved in their own country, and the enlightened liberal humanistic spirit of the West did not fail to make its influence felt in India. The scientific inventions of the West were also rapidly utilised in India to increase her material resources. In short, England served as the medium through which the modern progressive spirit of Europe remodelled the age-long inert medieval form of government in India. This process had no doubt begun even before the assumption of the government of India by the Crown, but there were no appreciable effects and notable transformations until the latter part of the nineteenth century. The new spirit can best be understood with reference to some typical measures of the Government to which we now turn.

We may first consider the measures dictated by a humanitarian spirit.

A. Restriction of Intoxicating Drugs

The ideals of temperance were sedulously propagated both in England and India, and there was a large and insistent demand by a section of the English public for the complete abolition of the use of opium, hemp, and alcohol in India. The Government of India derived large profits from the monopoly of the opium trade in China and the Straits, and the excise duty on opium, alcohol, and hemp in India. Nevertheless it was forced to yield to public opinion to a certain extent. A Royal Commission was appointed in 1894 to examine the matter. An agreement was concluded with China in 1907 for the gradual decrease and ultimate extinction of the opium trade. As regards home consumption of the three intoxicating

drugs, the Government refused to accept the scheme of total abolition, but adopted a definite policy of restricting and controlling their use by imposing a high excise duty and licensing the retail trade in the commodities. It openly declared that "its settled policy was to minimise temptation for the abstainer and to discourage excess among others; and that no considerations of revenue could be allowed to hamper this policy".

B. Factory Legislation

Students of English history are aware of the continued agitation in England for reducing the hours of work of factory workers and providing them with other amenities of life. By a series of laws the British Government forced the mill-owners to improve the lot of their workers even at a considerable pecuniary loss. In the same spirit the Government of India also passed several Acts to improve the lot of factory-workers in India. By the Acts passed in 1881 and 1891 the hours of work for women and children were limited, and the local governments were authorised to make rules for the supply of good drinking water and the maintenance of proper ventilation and cleanliness in the factories.

C. Famine Relief

Perhaps the most important achievement of Indian administration during the period under review was the formation of a definite system of famine relief. In an agricultural country like India, famine must have proved a great scourge to its people from times immemorial. The statement of Megasthenes that famine never visits India can hardly be regarded as accurate, but perhaps the Greek writer was misled by the fact that the rigours of famine were not so severely felt over a wide region, and were mostly confined to local areas. With the growth of population and the diminution of industrial activity, the periodical famines assumed more threatening proportions. We have no accurate information as to the devastation caused by these up to the commencement of the British period. A terrible famine broke out in Bengal in 1770 and nearly one-third of the population fell victims to it. During the next century famines occurred in different parts of India. The year 1866–1867 witnessed a severe famine which took a heavy toll of human lives in Orissa, and spread all along the eastern coast from Calcutta to Madras. During the next ten years there were local famines in the United Provinces, the Punjab and Rājputāna in 1868–1869, and in Northern Bihār in 1873.

Then followed another terrible famine in 1876 which lasted for nearly two years, and extended over a wide area in Madras, Mysore, Hyderābād, Bombay, and the United Provinces. On all these occasions various measures were adopted by the Government to afford relief to the people, but they were not very effective. It was observed that in the absence of definite principles and well-thought-out methods of work, the relief afforded in various areas was neither uniform nor even commensurate with the expenditure involved. In Bombay, for example, more human lives were saved than in Madras at less than half the cost. The Governor-General, Lord Lytton, rightly held that it was necessary to formulate general principles of famine relief, and appointed a strong Commission under General Sir Richard Strachey for this purpose. The Commission reported in 1880, and its recommendations formed the basis of the Famine Code promulgated in 1883 by the Government of India, and of the various provincial famine codes prepared in following years.

The Commission started with the fundamental principle that it is the duty of the State to offer relief to the needy in times of famine. The relief was to be administered in the shape of providing work for able-bodied men and distributing food or money to the aged and infirm. For the first, schemes of relief-work should be prepared in advance, so that actual operations may begin immediately after famine breaks out. These works should be of permanent utility, and on an extensive scale, so as to give employment to a large number of persons. Local works, such as excavation of ponds or raising embankments, etc., in villages might also be undertaken for the employment of persons who were not fit to be sent out on larger works. It was specially emphasised that the people should be provided with work before their physical efficiency had deteriorated through starvation.

Further relief was to be provided by suspension and remission of land-revenue and rents, and offer of loans for purchase of seed-grain and bullocks.

The Commission held that in order to prevent waste and extravagance in affording relief, a large share of the cost involved should be borne by local authorities, and the Central Government would only supplement the provincial funds after carefully examining the resources and abilities of the province. In order further to bring home to the people concerned a sense of responsibility, the Commission recommended that relief should be administered through the representatives of the tax-payers who were to provide the major part of the funds.

In order to meet the heavy unforeseen expenditure caused by famine, it was decided to set apart fifteen millions of rupees every year in order to constitute the "Famine Relief and Insurance Fund".

The principles of the Famine Code were put into effective operation during the minor famines that occurred in subsequent years, and the terrible famines of 1896–1897 and 1899–1900. The famine of 1896–1897 affected the United Provinces, Bihār, the Central Provinces, Madras and Bombay, the area under acute distress measuring about 125,000 square miles with a population of thirty-four millions. During 1899–1900 Bombay, the Central Provinces, the Punjab, Rājputāna, Barodā and the Central Indian principalities suffered in varying degrees. Relief measures were undertaken on an extensive scale and Lord Curzon estimated "that one-fourth of the entire population of India had come, to a greater or less degree, within the radius of relief operations".

After the famine of 1896–1897, a Commission was appointed under Sir James Lyall. It fully approved of the principles adopted in 1880, suggesting merely some alterations in the detailed working of the scheme.

Another Commission was appointed in 1900 under Sir Antony MacDonnell. It also endorsed the principles of 1880, but laid stress on the benefits occurring from early suspension of land-revenue and rents, and early distribution of advances for purchase of seed-grain and cattle. It recommended the appointment of a Famine Commissioner in a province where relief operations were likely to be adopted on an extensive scale. Among various other recommendations of the Commission, the following may be regarded as the more important:

(*a*) In particular circumstances preference should be given to local works in a village over large public works which had hitherto been the main feature of relief operations.
(*b*) Non-official assistance should be utilised on a larger scale in the matter of distributing relief.
(*c*) Establishment of agricultural banks and introduction of improved methods of agriculture.
(*d*) Wide extension of irrigation work.

These recommendations were accepted and acted upon by the Government. Thus a great step was taken to prevent and combat famine in India. It may be added that the extension of railways also served as an important means of famine relief by facilitating

the transport of grains to the affected province, and their distribution to the various areas where they were badly needed.

We may next turn to activities of the Government directed towards improving the material resources of the country with the aid of scientific discoveries.

D. Railways

The most important among these is the extension of the railway system. Since the very modest beginning made by Dalhousie, 36,000 miles of railway have been constructed at a total cost of 350 millions sterling. To begin with, these enterprises were left to private efforts. Private Companies were encouraged to undertake them on a guarantee given by the Government of India that if their net profits fell below 5 per cent, the balance should be paid by the Government. In return for this the Government secured certain privileges. If the profits of the Company exceeded the guaranteed 5 per cent, the Government would be entitled to half the excess profits. Further, the Government could exercise control over the management of the railway lines, and purchase them at a fixed rate at the end of a stipulated period, usually twenty-five years.

At the beginning, and indeed up to the end of the nineteenth century, the Government suffered heavy losses. But on the expiry of the early contracts, more favourable conditions were imposed on Companies, and in some cases the Government themselves constructed and managed the railway lines. Gradually the railway became a source of revenue. The importance of the railway should not, however, be judged merely by the profits it earned. Its importance lay in the facility of communications and the impetus given to trade and industry. By bringing the distant places of this vast country within easy reach, it has served to foster a spirit of unity and nationality among the Indians.

E. Forests

The forests of India have always proved a valuable source of revenue. But the development of a science of forestry, especially in Germany and France, showed the great influence which forests on a large scale exercise over climate, and laid down the lines on which a forest should be maintained and developed to yield the maximum benefit to the country. The appointment, in 1864, of a German expert as Inspector-General of Forests in India ushered in the new scientific method in the management of

Indian forests. An Act was passed in 1865 for the protection and efficient management of the Government forests, and it was followed by several other Acts in later years. In 1878 a training school was established at Dehra Dun. The Forest Department now controls an area of 500,000 square miles, and India enjoys the benefit of a scientific system of forestry.

F. Irrigation

In an agricultural country like India, irrigation has always formed an important branch of administration. Remarkable irrigation projects were undertaken by both Hindu and Muslim rulers, and the early British rulers also followed in their footsteps. But a new policy was inaugurated by Lord Lawrence in 1866. He financed by public loans extensive irrigation schemes. The results of this new policy were the Sirhind Canal (1882), the Lower Ganges Canal (1878) and Āgra Canal (1874). The first had a total length of 3,700 miles, including the feeder canals.

The "Colony canals" of the Punjab formed a class by themselves. They were intended to reclaim vast areas of waste land which belonged to the Government. The Lower Chenāb Canal constructed between 1890 and 1899, has a total length of 2,700 miles, and irrigates an area of more than two million acres between the Chenāb and Rāvī Rivers. This region, originally lying waste with no population, supported 800,000 in 1901. The canal yields an annual revenue amounting to 40 per cent of the capital outlay.

Irrigation now forms an important branch of every provincial administration, and various projects, both large and small, are being initiated with a view to irrigating the cultivated area and extending cultivation over waste lands.

5. Military Administration

Up to the Revolt, and even for a long time after that, the Presidencies of Bengal, Bombay, and Madras maintained separate armies under separate Commanders. Although the Commander-in-Chief of the Bengal army became nominally the head of the military forces of India, the Governments of Bombay and Madras managed their own forces, and mainly recruited them locally. By an Act which was passed in 1893 and came into operation in 1895, the whole Army in India was placed under the single control of the Commander-in-Chief, and divided into four territorial units —those of Bengal, Madras, Bombay and the Punjab—each under

a Lieutenant-General. In 1904 Lord Kitchener made a new organisation on different principles. The Indian military forces were organised into three army commands and nine divisions. The advantages of this system lay in the fact that it co-ordinated the organisation in time of peace with what would be necessary in time of war. In other words, the same generals would be in charge of the same units of the army both in peace and war.

Each Presidency army originally consisted of three elements, viz. (1) Indian troops, mostly locally recruited, (2) European units belonging to the Company and (3) Royal regiments. After 1858 the last two had of course to be amalgamated, but this provoked great discontent amongst the Company's troops and about 10,000 men claimed their discharge. This is known as the "White Mutiny". The discontent was, however, allayed by the offer of a bounty and other concessions. As a result of the Revolt of 1857–59, several changes were introduced in the organisation of the army. First, the proportion of European troops was raised and that of Indian troops was reduced. In 1863 there were 65,000 European troops as against 140,000 Indians, and practically the same ratio was maintained till the outbreak of the First World War. The artillery was exclusively controlled by European troops.

Secondly, there was a great change in the composition of Indian troops, especially those of Northern India. Formerly these Sepoys were recruited from the same region and belonged almost exclusively to the higher castes. The Revolt showed the defects of this system. Henceforth recruitment was made on a mixed basis so that every company should include men of all races, castes and creeds.

A third change made itself felt only very gradually. It was the introduction of larger elements of fighting races like the Gurkhās, Pathāns, and Sikhs. In course of time they replaced to a large extent the Hindustānī forces of the Bengal army and the locally recruited Sepoys in Bombay and Madras. The most drastic changes were in the Madras army, which was gradually filled by Sikhs, Gurkhās and other Northerners, and ultimately the recruitment of Telugus ceased altogether.

From 1861 an army officer was appointed as a Military Member of the Governor-General's Executive Council, through whom the Government supervised the administration of the Indian army. The position was rendered very anomalous by the fact that the Commander-in-Chief was also an extraordinary member of the Executive Council of the Governor-General. Although he was necessarily superior in rank to the Military Member, any proposal

presented by him had to be submitted to the latter for review and criticism. There might have been some justification for this curious anomaly when each Presidency maintained a separate army, but when all the Indian forces were brought under the single control of the Commander-in-Chief in 1895, the anomaly called for redress. Lord Kitchener took up this question in 1904 and proposed to remove the anomaly by making the Commander-in-Chief the sole adviser of the Government on military matters. Lord Curzon, the Viceroy, strongly opposed this system, as he feared that it would remove to a large extent the ultimate control of the civil over the military authorities, and thereby affect the fundamental principles of the constitution. The Secretary of State, however, agreed with Lord Kitchener, and his decision was conveyed in such terms that Lord Curzon tendered his resignation in 1905. After 1907 the Commander-in-Chief became the only responsible authority, under the Government of India, for military administration.

6. Civil Administration

A very important change, with far-reaching consequences, took place in civil administration in 1905. Until then Bengal, Bihār and Orissa had formed one province ruled by a Lieutenant-Governor. Lord Curzon thought that this territory, comprising 189,000 square miles, was too large a unit for efficient administration and decided to rearrange the provincial boundaries. It was ultimately decided to separate the divisions of Dacca, Chittāgong and Rajshahi from the province. These were joined to Assam, which was then under a Chief Commissioner, and a new province was constituted, called East Bengal and Assam, with Dacca as its capital. The proposal was carried into effect in 1905 in spite of strong protests from the public, and this Partition of Bengal caused a tremendous political agitation which stirred national feeling in India to its very depths, as will be described in a later chapter.

CHAPTER IV

THE GROWTH OF NEW INDIA, 1858–1905

1. Education

The Despatch of 1854 continued to be the basis of educational policy for India even after it was transferred to the Crown, and was confirmed by the Secretary of State in 1859. The importance of primary education was particularly emphasised and the Secretary of State suggested the levy of a special rate on land to provide adequate means for its promotion. The result was a rapid growth in the number of schools and colleges. Some of these were entirely financed by the Government, while others were managed by private bodies with or without a Government grant-in-aid.

In 1882 a Commission was appointed under the chairmanship of Sir William Hunter to review the progress of education under the new policy, and its report was approved by the Government in 1884. The policy of 1854 was fully endorsed, but emphasis was laid upon the fact that primary education had not made sufficient progress. The report drew attention to the special and urgent need for the extension and improvement of the elementary education of the masses, and recommended that the primary schools should be managed by the newly established Municipal and District Boards under the supervision and control of the Government. The Committee observed that the system of grants-in-aid had proved very satisfactory and recommended the "progressive devolution of primary, secondary and collegiate education upon private enterprise and continuous withdrawal of Government from competition therewith". The result was a steady increase in the number of schools and colleges.

2. Social and Religious Reform

The second half of the nineteenth century was marked by a strong wave of reforming activities in religion and society, the path of which had been paved by Rājā Rāmmohan Roy. There was a general recognition of the existing evils and abuses in society and religion. But, as usual, the reforming zeal followed diverse

channels. Some were lured by the Western ideas to follow an extreme radical policy, and this naturally provoked a reaction which sought to strengthen the forces of orthodoxy. Between these two extremes were moderate reformers, who wanted to proceed forward more cautiously along the line of least resistance.

We are even now too close to the period to appraise correctly the value of the different forces that were at work and of the consequences that flowed from them. We shall, therefore, confine ourselves merely to a review of the chief movements. It would be convenient to study them under two heads. First, the movements resulting in the establishment of a group or order outside the pale of orthodox Hindu society, and secondly general changes in the belief, customs and practices of the Hindus as a whole.

A. The Brāhma Samāj

Under the first head, the Brāhma Samāj demands our chief attention as it is the most striking product of a strong reform movement brought about by the impact of new ideas and beliefs that agitated men's minds early in the nineteenth century.

Reference has already been made to a theistic organisation founded by Rājā Rāmmohan Roy in 1828. It was called Brāhma Sabhā and meant to be an assembly of all who believed in the unity of God and discarded the worship of images. A house was built and handed over to a body of Trustees. The Trust Deed which the Rājā executed on 8th January, 1830, directed that the building was to be used "as and for a place of public meeting of all sorts of descriptions of people, without distinction", for the worship of the one Great God, but that no image should be admitted or rituals permitted therein.

This arrangement for the non-sectarian worship of the one True God is looked upon nowadays as the foundation of the Brāhma Samāj. It must be remembered, however, that Rāmmohan Roy never regarded himself as anything but a Hindu, and stoutly denied, up to the last day of his life, the allegation that he was founding a different sect. The detailed programme of his weekly service in what was then called Brāhma Sabhā included the recitation of the Vedas by orthodox Brāhmaṇas and no non-Brāhmaṇa was allowed in the room. The Rājā himself wore the sacred thread of the Brāhmaṇas up to his death.

The departure of Rājā Rāmmohan Roy for England and his subsequent death there led to a steady decline of his organisation till new life was infused into it by Devendranāth Tagore (father

of Rabindranāth), who formally joined the new movement in 1843. He framed a covenant and introduced a formal ceremony of initiation, thus converting the somewhat loose organisation into a spiritual fraternity. Devendranāth began to propagate the new doctrine through his journal, *Tattvabodhinī Patrikā*, and also by the employment of a number of preachers. It must be noted that the mode of initiation into the new faith was based on the *Mahānirvāṇa Tantra*, and the *Tattvabodhinī Patrikā*, the official organ, openly declared the Vedas as a divine revelation and the sole foundation of the religious beliefs of the new Church.

But the younger section among the followers of the new movement, led by Akshaykumār Datta, gradually showed a critical attitude towards the doctrine of the infallibility of the Vedas, and Devendranāth sympathized with them. He made a compilation of select passages from the Upanishads inculcating the idea of one God, and framed a new covenant for the Church embodying the principles of natural and universal theism in the place of the old Vedantic covenant (1850).

Encouraged by this success the younger section not only advocated far-reaching social reforms, but also wanted to apply the dry test of reason even to the fundamental articles of religious belief. This party gained a notable recruit in Keshab Chandra Sen, who joined the new movement in 1857. Keshab Chandra's fervent devotion, passionate enthusiasm and wonderful eloquence popularised the movement and increased its members. At the same time he carried its rationalistic principles to a still further degree, and founded what may be called the new Brāhmaism. He infused the true spirit of repentance and prayer and introduced an element of strong emotion and devotional fervour into the cause of the new Church. A new missionary zeal characterised the followers of Keshab, some of whom gave up their secular affairs and devoted their whole time to the preaching of the new gospel all over Bengal. Keshab himself visited Bombay and Madras to propagate his views.

The results of these activities were very remarkable. Before the end of 1865 there were fifty-four Samājas (local branches), fifty in Bengal, two in the N.W.P. and one each in the Punjab and Madras.

At first Devendranāth warmly appreciated the services of Keshab Chandra and appointed him the minister of the Church and Secretary of the Samāj in defiance of the wishes of many older members. But the progressive ideas of Keshab and his party soon estranged them from the revered leader. They advocated and openly celebrated inter-caste marriage and widow-remarriage,

and insisted that Brāhmaṇa ministers, wearing sacred threads, should not be allowed to preach from the pulpits. Instead of allowing the Samāj to be drawn away from the old Hindu lines laid down by Rājā Rāmmohan Roy, Devendranāth, by virtue of his position as the sole trustee of the Samāj, dismissed Keshab and his followers from all offices and positions of trust and responsibility. Keshab took up the challenge and started a separate organisation which included most of the local branches. Thus by the year 1865 the Brāhma Samāj was divided into two camps, the conservatives and the progressives. The former included men who believed in one God and discarded the worship of images, but did not want to sever all connection with Hindu society, while the latter consisted of those who regarded popular Hinduism as too narrow and chafed at the use of Sanskrit texts and the performance of social practices which symbolised that religion.

After the great schism, the Ādi Brāhma Samāj, the organisation of Devendranāth, quietly followed the pure monotheistic form of Hinduism, setting its face deliberately against social reform or propaganda of any kind. But it soon passed into obscurity. The period of reformation ushered in by Rājā Rāmmohan Roy was over and a revolution was now in progress.

The newly started "Brāhma Samāj of India" had a triumphant career under the guidance of Keshab Chandra Sen. The missionary exertions all over Bengal and even far outside its boundaries led to an increase in the number of local churches. The inclusion of women as members and the adoption of a moderate programme of social reform formed a new feature of the rejuvenated society. It was chiefly due to its efforts that the Government passed the Act III of 1872, which abolished early marriage of girls and polygamy, and sanctioned widow marriages and inter-caste marriages for those who did not profess any recognised faith such as Hinduism and Islam. Another striking feature was the adoption of the *Saṁkīrtan* in the Vaishṇava style for the purpose of propaganda. At first "Jesus was the inspirer and teacher of Keshab and now came Chaitanya. The two streams combined and made a confluence which soon produced novel and striking results". The passion of *Bhakti* (devotion) seized the members, and in true Vaishṇava style many of them prostrated themselves at each other's feet and especially at the feet of Keshab. Reverence for the leader grew apace and he gradually came to be regarded by some as a prophet or a divine incarnation.

This practice of "man-worship" led to a fresh discord in the Brāhma Church. Progressives and rationalists strongly protested

against certain innovations and demanded that a definite constitution should be framed for the management of the churches. Soon other points arose to widen the gulf between the two sections. Keshab held moderate views about female education and female emancipation, and he was not prepared to go to the extreme length proposed by the more advanced section. In his opinion higher University education would not be suitable for women, and free mingling of men and women, or the total abolition of the *Purdah* system, was fraught with grave danger to society. The advanced or progressive section was strongly agitated over these important points of difference with the great leader when the marriage of Keshab's fourteen-year-old daughter with the Hindu Mahārājā of Cooch Bihār in March, 1878, led to the second schism in the Brāhma Church.

Those who differed seceded and on 15th May, 1878, formed a different organisation called the "*Sādhāran Brāhma Samāj*". Subsequent events showed the great strength of this party. Keshab's Church shared the same fate as that of Devendranāth and passed into comparative obscurity. The spirit of the Brāhma movement has now been focused mainly in the *Sādhāran Brāhma Samāj* to which almost all the provincial *Samājas* are affiliated.

The new *Samāj* has consistently followed the path of constitutionalism and upheld an advanced programme of social reform. In respect of the position of women in society it has attained results of far-reaching importance by the removal of the *Purdah* system, introduction of widow-remarriage, abolition of polygamy and early marriage, and provision of higher education, and it is interesting to note that Hindu society has largely adopted these ideas. In the removal of caste-rigidity it has presented Hindu society with another reform which it is gradually accepting. The fact that legislation has been passed validating widow-remarriage and inter-caste marriages among the Hindus shows the great repercussion of the Brāhma movement upon Hindu society. Many far-reaching changes in Hindu social ideas have been and are still being brought about, steadily and silently, by the indirect influence of the Brāhma Samāj. Interdining among different castes at public and sometimes even social functions, and travel to foreign lands beyond the sea without loss of caste, may be quoted as examples. Curiously enough, the only point where it has failed to influence Hindu society, to any appreciable degree, is its emphasis on monotheism and the abolition of the worship of images, the first and fundamental idea with which the new movement started.

B. The Prārthanā Samāj

As has already been noted above, the Brāhma Samāj movement gradually spread outside Bengal, but nowhere did it take deep root except in Mahārāshtra, where it led to the establishment of the *Prārthanā Samāj*. Like the Brāhma Samāj, rational worship of one God and social reform formed its ideals. It has been truly remarked, however, that differences between the emotional character of the Bengalis and the practical shrewd common sense of the Marāthas are clearly reflected in the two institutions which sprang up under similar conditions.

The Brāhma Samāj made its influence felt in Mahārāshtra as early as 1849 with the foundation of Paramahansa Sabhā. But this did not live long or count for much. It was in 1867 that, under the enthusiastic guidance of Keshab Chandra Sen, the Prārthanā Samāj came into existence. The difference in name was evidently deliberate, for unlike the followers of Brāhma Samāj in Bengal, the followers of Prārthanā Samāj never "looked upon themselves as adherents of a new religion or of a new sect, outside and alongside of the general Hindu body, but simply as a movement within it". They were devoted theists, followers of the great religious tradition of Marātha saints like Nāmdev, Tukārām and Rāmdās. But instead of religious speculation they devoted their chief attention to social reform such as interdining and intermarriage among different castes, remarriage of widows and improvement of the lot of women and depressed classes. They established a Foundling Asylum and Orphanage at Pandharpur and founded night schools, a Widows' Home, a Depressed Classes Mission and other useful institutions of this kind. The Prārthanā Samāj has been the centre of many activities for social reform in Western India. Its success is chiefly due to Justice Mahādev Govinda Ranade. As C. F. Andrews observed, "the last and in many ways the most enduring aspect of the new reformation in India has had its rise in the Bombay Presidency and is linked most closely with the name of Justice Ranade". He devoted his whole life to the furtherance of the objects of the Prārthanā Samāj. He was one of the founders of the Widow Marriage Association in 1861, and the famous Deccan Education Society owes its origin to his inspiration. His influence is visible in the foundation of the Indian National Congress, and he inaugurated the practice of holding a Social Conference along with the annual meeting of the Congress.

To Justice Ranade we owe the clear elucidation of two important

principles. First he emphasised the truth that "the reformer must attempt to deal with the whole man and not to carry out reform on one side only". "To Ranade religion was as inseparable from social reform as love to man is inseparable from love to God." His ideas of reform were thus very comprehensive. "You cannot," said he, "have a good social system when you find yourself low in the scale of political rights; nor can you be fit to exercise political rights unless your social system is based on reason and justice. You cannot have a good economical system, when your social arrangements are imperfect. If your religious ideas are low and grovelling you cannot succeed in social, economical and political spheres. This interdependence is not an accident but it is the law of our nature."

The second great principle which Ranade emphasised was that the social organism in India shows a growth which should not be ignored and cannot be forcibly suppressed. "There are those among us," said he, "who think that the work of the reformer is confined only to a brave resolve to break with the past, and do what his own individual reason suggests as proper and fitting. The power of long-formed habits and tendencies is ignored in this view of the matter." Ranade showed a truer grasp of things when he ventured to state: "The true reformer has not to write on a clean slate. His work is more often to complete the half-written sentence."

Ranade's great message was a severe but timely warning to the excessive zeal of certain Indian reformers, and has helped a great deal in giving a new orientation to Indian reforms. This brief sketch of Ranade may be concluded with the eulogy of C. F. Andrews: "Ranade comes nearest to Rājā Rāmmohan Roy and Sir Syed Ahmad Khān among the reformers already mentioned in the largeness of his range of vision and the magnanimity of his character; but he was more advanced than either of them in the width of his constructive aim, his grasp of the principles underlying Western civilisation, and his application of them to Indian conditions."

The Brāhma Samāj and the Prārthanā Samāj were largely products of ideas associated with the West, and represent the Indian response to Western rationalism. Far different in character were two other reforming movements which took their inspiration from India's past and derived their basic principles from her ancient scriptures.

C. The Ārya Samāj

The first in order of time is the Ārya Samāj, founded by Svāmī Dayānanda Saraswatī (1824–1883). He was a good Sanskrit scholar but had no English education. His motto was "Go back to the Vedas". He wanted to shape society on the model of the Vedas by removing all later outgrowths. He not only disregarded the authority of the later scriptures like the Purāṇas, but had no hesitation in declaring them to be the writings of selfish, ignorant men. His basic standpoint was, therefore, exactly that of Rājā Rāmmohan Roy, and the detailed views of both were, to a great extent, similar. Like the Rājā, Dayānanda believed in one God and decried polytheism and the use of images. He also raised his voice against the restrictions of caste, child-marriage and prohibition of sea-voyage; and encouraged female education and remarriage of widows. He also began the *Suddhi* movement, i.e. conversion of non-Hindus to Hinduism—which has since become such an important feature of the Hindu reform movement. The *Suddhi* movement was undoubtedly meant "to realise the ideal of unifying India nationally, socially and religiously". Like Rājā Rāmmohan, Dayānanda published his views through printed books, his most famous work being *Satyārtha Prakāś*, "which expounded his doctrine and formulated it as a doctrine *sui generis*". Unlike Rājā Rāmmohan, however, Dayānanda preached directly to the masses, and did not confine his teachings to an intellectual élite. As a result, his followers rapidly increased in number, and his teachings took deep root, especially in the Punjab and the United Provinces.

Although Dayānanda started from the same basic principle as Rājā Rāmmohan, he lacked the critical spirit of the latter. He claimed that "any scientific theory or principle which is thought to be of modern origin may be proved to be set forth in the Vedas". On an ultimate analysis his general principle amounts to this, that "the Vedas, as interpreted by Dayānanda, contain all the truth". The interpretation of Dayānanda, however, differs widely from the traditional Hindu as well as the modern Western exegesis. In spite of his obvious limitations, Dayānanda undoubtedly proved a dynamic force in Hindu society. His appeal to the masses, which was attended with splendid success, was an eye-opener to all reformers, social, religious and political, and the social and educational work done by him and his followers has achieved solid results. His work was continued after his death by his followers, chief among whom were Lālā Hansrāj, Pandit Guru Dutt, Lālā Lajpat Rāi, and Svāmī Śraddhānanda.

The Ārya Samāj has not, however, escaped the rationalism of the present age. Already there is a growing section among it which recognises the value of English education and is inclined to a more liberal programme. Its chief exponent is Lālā Hansrāj and its visible symbol the Dayānanda Anglo-Vedic College of Lahore. As a counter-move to this we may point to the famous Gurukul of Hardwār, founded in 1902, which seeks to revive the Vedic ideal in modern life.

It may be noted, in conclusion, that Dayānanda, at the beginning of his career, tried to come to terms with the Brāhma Samāj and a Conference was held in Calcutta in 1869 with that end in view. Nothing, however, came of it, and the Ārya Samāj ultimately overwhelmed and absorbed the Brāhma Samāj movement in the Punjab, where, in Lahore, a Brāhma Samāj had already been started in 1863.

D. The Rāmakrishna Mission

The synthesis of the two great forces, the ancient or Oriental and the modern or Western, marks the Rāmakrishna Mission, the last great religious and social movement which characterises the nineteenth century. Rāmakrishna Paramahansa (1836–1886), after whom the Mission is named, was a poor priest in a temple near Calcutta. He had scarcely any formal education, Eastern or Western, worthy the name, but led an intense spiritual life in his splendid isolation. He had a deep faith in the inherent truth of all religions and tested his belief by performing religious exercises in accordance with the practice and usages not only of different Hindu sects, but also of Islam and Christianity. His broad catholicity, mysticism, and spiritual fervour attracted a small number of occasional visitors, mostly from Calcutta. He lived and died as a secluded spiritual devotee, unknown except to a comparatively small group of people. To them he expounded his views in short pithy sayings and admirable parables. Most of these were collected and published before his death, and many other works about him and his sayings have been published since then.

The most famous among his disciples, and the one most beloved of the *guru*, was a young graduate of the Calcutta University named Narendranāth Dutta, afterwards famous as Svāmī Vivekānanda (1863–1902). It was he who carried the message of Rāmakrishna all over India. His learning, eloquence, spiritual fervour and wonderful personality gathered round him a band of followers which included both prince and peasant. With their help, and after untold sufferings, he attended in 1893 the famous "Parliament of Religions" at Chicago, and at once made his mark.

His speeches at that august assembly brought him fame and friends, and from that day the teachings of Rāmakrishna, as interpreted by Svāmī Vivekānanda, came to be recognised as a world-force. Rāmakrishna missions and monasteries came to be established in different centres in the United States, and after the return of the triumphant hero to his country they spread all over India.

The Rāmakrishna Mission stands for religious and social reform but takes its inspiration from the ancient culture of India. It holds up the pure Vedantic doctrine as its ideal, and aims at the development of the highest spirituality inherent in man; but at the same time it recognises the value and utility of later developments in Hinduism such as the worship of images. Rāmakrishna demonstrated in his own life not only the compatibility of the worship of the goddess Kālī with the highest spiritual life, but even something more than that, viz. that the worship of images may be utilised as an excellent means of developing the highest spiritual fervour in man. But he laid his finger on the real source of abuse in present-day Hinduism, viz. mistaking the external rituals for the essential spirit, the symbol for the real.

Another characteristic feature of the Mission, also practically demonstrated by Rāmakrishna, is a belief in the truth of all religions. "All the different religious views are but different ways leading to the same goal," was the characteristic expression of the Great Master. As different words in different languages denote the same substance, e.g. "water", so Allah, Hari, Christ, Kṛishṇa, etc., are but different names under which we worship the same great God. He is both one and many, with and without forms, and may be conceived either as a great universal spirit or through different symbols. This catholic and broad view is in striking contrast to the sectarian views which are dividing the modern world into so many hostile camps and making religion a symbol for hate and discord instead of love and brotherhood.

In addition to these two characteristic features, the success of the Mission in and outside India is due to several other causes. In the first place it has no aggressive proselytising zeal. It has no desire to develop into a separate sect like the Brāhma or the Ārya Samāj and chooses to remain as a purely monastic order, disseminating reforming ideas among the masses without violently uprooting them from their social or religious environments. Secondly, it has put in the forefront of its programme the idea of social service, not as a mere philanthropic work, but as an essential discipline for religious and spiritual life. The Mission has opened many schools and dispensaries, and has always rendered ungrudging

help to the people in times of distress caused by famine or flood or other calamity. In particular, the uplift of the dumb millions of India forms the chief plank of the Mission's platform. In Svāmī Vivekānanda the patriotic and spiritual impulses mingled in a supreme desire to uplift the manhood of India with a view to restoring her to her proper place among the nations of the world. He believed that the present warring world can be saved by spiritual teachings which India alone can impart, but before she can do this she must enjoy the respect of other nations by raising her own status. The Svāmī had thus both a national and universal outlook and this explains his popularity in India and America.

In addition, the Hindus of India have special reasons for venerating Svāmī Vivekānanda. For the first time in the modern age he boldly proclaimed before the world the superiority of Hindu culture and civilisation, the greatness of her past and the hope for her future. Instead of the tone of apology and a sense of inferiority which marked the Indian attitude towards European culture and civilisation, a refreshing boldness and consciousness of inherent strength marked the utterances of Svāmī Vivekānanda. This, combined with his patriotic zeal, made him an embodiment of the highest ideals of the renascent Indian nation. He was, to quote the words of Sir Valentine Chirol, "the first Hindu whose personality won demonstrative recognition abroad for India's ancient civilisation and for her new-born claim to nationhood".

E. The Theosophical Society

The Theosophical Society was founded by the "mysterious" Madame H. P. Blavatsky and Col. H. S. Olcott in the United States in 1875. They came to India in 1879 and in 1886 established their headquarters in Adyar, a suburb of Madras. The real success of the movement in India is, however, due to Mrs. Annie Besant, who joined the Society in 1889 and settled in India in 1893 at the age of forty-six.

The Theosophical Society from the very start allied itself to the Hindu revival movement. Mrs. Besant held that the present problems of India could be solved by the revival and reintroduction of her ancient ideals and institutions. In her autobiography (1893) she writes: "The Indian work is, first of all, the revival, strengthening, and uplifting of the ancient religions. This has brought with it a new self-respect, a pride in the past, a belief in the future, and, as an inevitable result, a great wave of patriotic life, the beginning of the rebuilding of a nation."

She started the Central Hindu School in Benares as a chief means of achieving her object. She lavished her resources and energy on this institution, which gradually developed into a College and ultimately into the Hindu University in 1915.

The Theosophical Society, with its many branches all over India, has proved an important factor in social and religious reform especially in South India. But in its attempt to revert to the old, it supports some usages and beliefs which are considered by many to be retrograde in character, and its occult mysticism has alienated many who might have been its followers. Most of its importance in Indian life was due more to the personality of Mrs. Besant than to any inherent strength of the movement.

The general movements described above led to a great upheaval in Hindu society and stimulated the growth of individual and organised efforts for social reform. It is not possible to give a detailed account of them all in this chapter, and we shall therefore refer briefly to some of the more important among them, which might serve as representative types of this kind of activity in modern India, here and in a subsequent chapter. The Deccan Education Society was founded under Ranade's inspiration in 1884. It started with the idea that the education of the young should be remodelled so as to fit them for the service of the country, a task which the existing system of education had failed to perform. The members of the Society undertook to serve for at least twenty years on a nominal salary (Rs. 75 to start with), and thus it was possible without large endowments or donations to start the famous Fergusson College in Poona, and the Willingdon College at Sangli, with a number of preparatory schools to feed them. The "life-workers of the Society included the famous Gopal Kṛishṇa Gokhale" (1866–1915).

The names of Pandit Iswar Chandra Vidyāsāgar and Malabari stand foremost in connection with the uplifting of Indian women. Their hearts were touched by the miseries of women, and they carried on a life-long campaign to better their lot. As a result of unremitting labour and strenuous agitation, Vidyāsāgar succeeded in inducing the Government to pass a measure legalising the re-marriage of Hindu widows. Similarly Malabari's efforts led to the Age of Consent Act, 1891.

3. National Awakening—Indian National Congress

The most important phenomenon in New India is the growth of a national consciousness which ultimately found active expression

in the formation of the Indian National Congress, the Muslim League, and other bodies of the kind. Various factors contributed to the development of this national awakening, which was based upon two fundamental principles, viz. the unity of India as a whole and the right of her people to rule themselves.

As with all great national movements, e.g. the French Revolution, there was an intellectual background to this political regeneration. In a previous chapter we have traced the growth of English education in India. It is a matter of common knowledge that a tremendous wave of liberalism was passing over English politics and literature during the nineteenth century. By the study of English literature and European history educated Indians imbibed the spirit of democracy and national patriotism which England unequivocally declared to be her political ideals. Further, the promotion of these sentiments was deliberately encouraged by the liberal statesmanship which England at first displayed in her policy towards India and other dominions.

From the very beginning the British Government publicly declared its liberal policy towards India. The Charter Act of 1813 definitely laid it down that "it is the duty of this country to promote the interest and happiness of the native inhabitants of the British dominions in India". This was not only corroborated but even further elucidated by the Parliamentary Committee of 1833 when it laid down "the indisputable principle that the interests of the native subjects are to be consulted in preference to those of Europeans whenever the two come in competition". Finally came the Queen's Proclamation of 1858 in which she declared that "We hold ourselves bound to the natives of our Indian territories by the same obligations of duty which bind us to all our other subjects".

The pronouncement of Queen Victoria acquired a special significance for Indians in view of the democratic constitution granted to Canadian subjects during her reign, followed by similar measures of self-government conceded to other colonies in subsequent times.

All these causes created new aspirations in the minds of educated Indians. They had great faith in the liberal statesmen of Britain and their sense of justice and fair play. They thought that as soon as the Indians could make up a good case and present it well, nothing would be wanting on the part of British liberals to meet their reasonable demands.

The first concrete demand was naturally one for a larger admission of Indians to the higher ranks of the Civil Service. The Civil Service has ever been the "steel-frame" of British administration,

and Macaulay did not very much exaggerate the fact when he said in the House of Commons that "even the character of the Governor-General was less important than the character and spirit of the servants by whom the administration of India was carried on". It was obvious to educated Indians that the first step to secure a real and legitimate share in the management of the administration was to get into the higher ranks of the Civil Service in steadily increasing numbers.

A definite pledge was given by the Charter Act of 1833 that no Indian "shall by reason only of his religion, place of birth, descent, colour or any of them be disabled from holding any office or employment under the Company". This was reiterated in the Queen's Proclamation of 1858 and the Indian Civil Service Act of 1861. In spite of these promises there was plainly visible a growing reluctance on the part of the British Government to admit Indians in large numbers to the Civil Service. The failure to fulfil the pledges so repeatedly given is admitted by British statesmen themselves. "Lord Houghton observed that the declaration which stated that the Government of India would be conducted without reference to differences of race, was magnificent but had hitherto been futile." That the Government did not choose to carry out this policy is admitted by no less an authority than Lord Lytton I, the Governor-General. In a confidential despatch on this subject, he stated that "all means were taken of breaking to the heart the words of promise they had uttered to the ear".

It is easy to imagine the feelings of English-educated Indians, who had pinned their faith on the liberalism and the sense of justice of English statesmen. There was profound disappointment and a rude disillusionment, followed by feelings of bitter resentment. Soon incidents occurred which changed the passive discontent into an active agitation.

These incidents were connected with the appointment of Mr. Surendranāth Banerjea to the I.C.S. Although he proved successful in the competitive examination, attempts were made to remove his name from the list. Ultimately the name was restored by a writ of *Mandamus* in the Queen's Bench, and Mr. Banerjea was appointed to the I.C.S., but he was soon dismissed from the Service on grounds which are now regarded as inadequate.

The man who was thus denied an opportunity to serve the British Government was destined to be the leader of the great national movement in India. He took to public life and in 1876 founded the Indian Association of Calcutta, which, to use the language of its founder, "was to be the centre of an All-India

movement" based on "the conception of a united India, derived from the inspiration of Mazzini". It was an organisation of the educated middle class with a view to creating public opinion by direct appeals to the people. Mr. Banerjea's great opportunity came when in 1877 the maximum age-limit for the Civil Service Examination was reduced from twenty-one to nineteen. This created a painful impression throughout India, and was regarded as a deliberate attempt to blast the prospects of Indian candidates for the Indian Civil Service. The Indian Association organised a national protest against the reactionary measure. A big public meeting was held in Calcutta and Mr. Banerjea led a whirlwind campaign, holding similar meetings at Āgra, Lahore, Amritsar, Meerut, Allahābād, Delhi, Cawnpore, Lucknow, 'Ālīgarh and Benares. The nature and object of these meetings is thus described by Mr. Banerjea: "The agitation was the means; the raising of the maximum limit of age for the open competitive examination and the holding of simultaneous examinations were among the ends; but the underlying conception, and the true aim and purpose of the Civil Service Agitation, was the awakening of a spirit of unity and solidarity among the people of India."

The tour of Mr. Banerjea was a great success. Sir Henry Cotton wrote about it as follows in his book *New India*: "The idea of any Bengalee influence in the Punjab would have been a conception incredible to Lord Lawrence . . . yet it is the case that during the past year the tour of a Bengalee lecturer lecturing in English in Upper India, assumed the character of a triumphal progress; and at the present moment the name of Surendranāth Banerjea excites as much enthusiasm among the rising generation of Multan as in Dacca."

The results of the national movement organised by the Indian Association with the help of Mr. Banerjea were indeed very great. To use the words of Mr. Banerjea: "For the first time under British rule, India, with its varied races and religions, had been brought upon the same platform for a common and united effort. Thus was it demonstrated, by an object-lesson of impressive significance, that, whatever might be our differences in respect of race and language, or social and religious institutions, the people of India could combine and unite for the attainment of their common political ends."

The Civil Service agitation thus taught important lessons which ultimately found expression in the Indian Congress. It also opened up another line along which progress might be made towards the political regeneration of the country. A memorial on the Civil Service

question was adopted at the Calcutta meeting and endorsed at the other public meetings. It contained a prayer to the House of Commons not to lower the limit of age for the open competitive examination for the Indian Civil Service and to hold simultaneous examinations in India and England. Instead of adopting the usual course of sending the memorial by post, Mr. Lālmohan Ghosh, a well-known Bengali barrister in Calcutta, was sent to England to present it in person as the representative of the Indian Association. Mr. Ghosh was an eloquent speaker and made a deep impression upon the British audience about the pressing grievance of India. Mr. S. N. Banerjea thus describes his campaign: "A great meeting was held under the Presidency of John Bright. Mr. Ghosh spoke with a power and eloquence that excited the admiration of all and evoked the warmest tribute from the President. The effect of that meeting was instantaneous. Within twenty-four hours of it, there were laid on the table of the House of Commons the Rules creating what was subsequently known as the Statutory Civil Service. . . . Thus the deputation of an Indian to England voicing India's grievance was attended with an unexpected measure of success and the experiment was in future years tried again and again."

The Civil Service agitation was soon followed up by similar agitations against the Arms Act and the Vernacular Press Act of Lord Lytton, which sought to limit the possession of arms and control the Vernacular Press. All three measures were regarded as part of a policy to hamper the growth of a National India, and show the reactionary character of the regime of Lord Salisbury as Secretary of State for India. History teaches us that "reactionary rulers are often the creators of great public movements". So it proved in India. The agitation against these unpopular measures shaped the political life of India and made it conscious of its strength and potentialities. Soon it ceased to be a mere question of repealing these obnoxious measures. There was a steady development of national aspirations, and a higher ideal dazzled the vision of political India. It was not thought enough that Indians should have their full share of the higher offices. They must eventually bring the entire administration under popular control and therefore make a definite demand for representative institutions.

The new ideal called for an All-India organisation of a permanent character. This was considerably facilitated by the controversy over the Ilbert Bill. The Bill introduced in 1883 by Ilbert, the Law Member of the Viceroy's Council, sought to withdraw the

privilege, hitherto enjoyed by European British subjects in the districts, of trial by a judge of their own race. The Anglo-Indian community carried on an agitation against this measure both in India and England. They started a Defence Association with branches all over India, and raised over a lakh and fifty thousand rupees. It provoked a counter-agitation by educated Indians. The Government ultimately withdrew the Bill and substituted for it a more moderate measure which vested the power of trying Europeans in Sessions Judges and District Magistrates who might be Indians. The success of the anti-Ilbert Bill agitation "left a rankling sense of humiliation in the mind of educated India", but it also demonstrated the value of combination and organisation. The lesson was not lost upon educated India. As before, Surendranāth took the lead and within a year an All-India National Fund was created and the Indian National Conference, with representatives from all parts of India, met in Calcutta (1883).

During the same year a retired civilian, Allan Octavian Hume, addressed an open letter to the graduates of Calcutta University urging them to organise an association for the mental, moral, social, and political regeneration of the people of India. He enlisted official favour in support of such an organisation. The Governor-General, Lord Dufferin, told him "that he found the greatest difficulty in ascertaining the real wishes of the people and that it would be a public benefit if there existed some responsible organisation through which the Government might be kept informed regarding the best Indian public opinion".

Mr. Hume, with the support of some prominent Indians, succeeded in giving effect to his plan, and the first Indian National Congress met in Bombay during the Christmas week of 1885 under the Presidency of a Bengali barrister, Mr. W. C. Bonnerjea. About the same time the second session of the Indian National Conference was held in Calcutta. It appears that the two movements were simultaneous and independent, and the organisers of neither knew about the other until on the eve of their sittings. Both the organisations were conceived on the same lines and adopted the same programme, and it was obviously undesirable that there should be two such associations working independently in two different parts of India. It is a striking testimony to the growth of a feeling of national unity that without any difficulty the Indian National Conference silently merged itself into the Indian National Congress.

The first Indian National Congress consisted only of seventy delegates, for, as noted above, some prominent leaders, including

Surendranāth, could not attend it on account of the simultaneous session of the Indian National Conference. Henceforth the Congress for long years met every year, during Christmas week, in some important town of India, the second and third sessions being held respectively in Calcutta and Madras. Everywhere it evoked great enthusiasm among the local public, and attracted gradually increasing numbers of delegates from different parts of India. It admirably fulfilled the object which Hume had formulated in the following words in his opening manifesto: "directly, to enable all earnest labourers in the National cause to become personally known to each other, to discuss and decide upon the political operations to be undertaken during the ensuing year; and indirectly, this Conference will form the germ of a Native Parliament, and, if properly conducted, will in a few years constitute an unanswerable reply to the assertion that India is unfit for any form of representative institutions."

Throughout the nineteenth century the Congress chiefly concerned itself with criticism of Government policy and demands for reforms. Its views were formulated in the shape of resolutions which were forwarded to the Government for their consideration.

It drew the attention of the Government to the appalling poverty of the country and asked for proper inquiry and redress. It criticised the Arms Act and various administrative measures, particularly the Excise and Salt tax.

As regards reforms, it laid special emphasis on the following specific measures:

(1) Development of self-government by means of representative councils both in the Central as well as in the Provincial Governments.
(2) Abolition of the India Council.
(3) Spread of education, both general and technical.
(4) Reduction of military expenditure, and military training of Indians.
(5) The separation of Judicial and Executive functions in the administration of criminal justice.
(6) Wider employment of Indians in the higher offices in the Public Service, especially by instituting I.C.S. examinations both in England and India.

In criticising Government policy the Congress always maintained great dignity and moderation. It professed unswerving loyalty to the Throne and cherished an unbounded faith in the

liberalism and sense of justice of British statesmen. Its whole endeavour was directed towards rousing their consciousness to the inherent justice of the Indian claims.

In the year 1896 an Industrial Exhibition was held in connection with the Congress to give an impetus to Indian industry. A Social Conference was also added in order to call public attention to, and devise means for the removal of, the acknowledged social evils.

At the very beginning the Government looked upon the Congress movement with favour, at least without any dislike. Government officials not only attended the first meeting of the Congress but even took part in its deliberations. Congress members were invited to a garden party by the Governor-General (Lord Dufferin) in Calcutta (1886), and the Governor in Madras (1887).

But the official world soon changed its view. Lord Dufferin, on the eve of his retirement, expressed his disapproval of the policy and methods of the Indian National Congress at the St. Andrew's Dinner in Calcutta and described the educated community as a "microscopic minority". The high officials took their cue from him, and gradually the Government officers kept aloof from the Congress movement.

The official attitude to the Congress was based on the plea that the educated community as an infinitesimal minority had no right or claim to represent the views of India. The Congress rejoinder to this argument formed the basis on which rested the sole justification of its claim to a representative character. It was ably summed up as follows by Sir Ramesh Chandra Mitra in his speech as Chairman of the Reception Committee of the Congress held in Calcutta in 1896:

"The educated community represented the brain and conscience of the country, and were the legitimate spokesmen of the illiterate masses, the natural custodians of their interests. To hold otherwise would be to presuppose that a foreign administrator in the service of the Government knows more about the wants of the masses than their educated countrymen. It is true in all ages that those who think must govern those who toil; and could it be that the natural order of things was reversed in this unfortunate country?"

It is no wonder that the resolutions of the Congress evoked but little response from the Government. As Hume declared, "the National Congress had endeavoured to instruct the Government, but the Government had refused to be instructed". Disappointed with the Government attitude, the Congress decided to

bring pressure upon the Government by organising public opinion both in India and England. The method, popularly known as Constitutional Agitation, henceforth became the chief instrument of the Congress. Apart from organisation of meetings in India, a paid agency was established in London in 1888. It arranged lectures in different parts of England and distributed pamphlets to educate public opinion. Its place was soon taken by the British Committee of the Indian National Congress which published a weekly paper called *India.*

The agitation in England bore fruit. Charles Bradlaugh, M.P., attended the fifth session of the Congress in Bombay in 1889, and in consultation with Indian leaders drafted a Bill for the reform and the expansion of the Legislative Councils. This he moved in the House of Commons in 1890. To counteract it the Government introduced a Bill of their own which was passed in 1892. The India Councils Act of 1892 (p. 853) is thus indirectly an achievement of the Congress.

As regards the other proposals of the Congress, little was done by the Government. Year after year the Congress passed nearly the same resolutions but without much effect on the Government. This brought about a feeling of despondency, and gradually a spirit of opposition against the Government gained ground. A section of the Congress even began to lose faith in the efficacy of the Congress programme. They ridiculed the idea of sending humble petitions year after year to the Government, only to be most unceremoniously rejected by them. They believed that reforms would not be secured by talk, but action. The leader of this section was Bāl Gangādhar Tilak, a Marātha Brāhmaṇa of the class to which belonged the famous Peshwās.

Among the people of different parts of India the Marāthas, who had lost their independence so recently, had special reasons to join a movement for national regeneration. No wonder, therefore, that the Marātha country proved a congenial soil for fostering the new spirit. Tilak tried to create a strong national feeling among the Indians by an appeal to their historic past. He led the opposition against official interference in social matters. He organised annual festivals in commemoration of Shivājī. Through his paper, *Kesari*, he preached his new political ideals of self-help and national revival among the masses. The speeches and articles of Tilak are generally held to have been responsible for the growth of a Radical section which soon became a powerful wing of the Congress.

All sections and communities of the Indian population did not at first show an equal enthusiasm for the Congress movement.

Some notable Muslim leaders took part in its annual deliberations, and on a few occasions it had a Muslim President. Nevertheless, it is an undeniable fact that a strong section of the Muslims, from the very beginning, adopted an unsympathetic attitude towards the Congress, though Muslims in general were indifferent, rather than hostile to it. Mr. Sayani, who presided over the Congress in 1896, observed with truth: "It is imagined by some persons that all, or almost all, the Muslims of India are against the Congress movement; this is not true. Indeed by far the largest part do not know what the Congress movement is."

There were deep-seated causes for this difference. The Muslims did not show the same zeal and fervour for Western education and culture as the Hindu community led by Rāmmohan Roy, Rājnārāyan Bose, Haris Mukherji, Telang, Ranade, and others. They still showed a preference for the classical studies to which they had so long been accustomed. Their reaction to the British rule was also different. They still brooded over their erstwhile political dominance over the greater part of India, and felt a sullen resentment against the British. They therefore naturally supported, or felt sympathy for, the revolutionary Wahhābi movement and the Revolt of 1857–59. It is interesting to note that even at an early stage the British sought to take advantage of this position by means of the policy of "Divide and Rule". "I cannot," wrote Lord Ellenborough in 1843, "close my eyes to the belief that that race (Muslims) is fundamentally hostile to us, and our true policy is to reconcile the Hindus." This policy was successfully followed for some time till the growth of national consciousness among the Hindus gradually alienated the British, and made them favourably disposed to the Muslims.

This change in the attitude of the British rulers synchronised with the rise of Sir Syed Ahmad as the leader of the Muslims, and the entirely new turn he gave to their policy and activities. He was deeply impressed by the fact that the Muslims were far behind the Hindus in respect of Western learning, and consequently the Hindus practically monopolised the higher offices of the state. He therefore devoted himself to the promotion of English education among the Muslims, and in 1875 founded a school which soon developed into the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College of Ālīgarh. His efforts were crowned with success. It would hardly be an exaggeration to say that no single institution has done so much for any community as this college has done for the promotion of higher education and modern culture among the Muslims.

Sir Syed Ahmad was an ardent patriot and nationalist. He supported the Ilbert Bill and the agitation in favour of holding

simultaneous examinations for the Civil Service. He held that the Hindus and Muslims in India formed one nation. "They are," he said, "two eyes of India. Injure the one and you injure the other. We should try to become one in heart and soul and act in unison; if united, we can support each other, if not, the effect of one against the other will tend to the destruction and downfall of both." He further expressed the view that "no nation can acquire honour and respect so long as it does not attain equality with the ruling race and does not participate in the government of its own country". But in spite of these liberal views Sir Syed was definitely opposed to the Congress movement from the very beginning. He urged the Muslim community to keep aloof from it and denounced its objectives, including the simultaneous examinations for the Civil Service which he had once advocated. In 1886 he set up an Educational Congress as a rival organisation on the ground that the Muslims would not benefit by the discussion of political matters, and education was the only means of ensuring their progress. He also established two other Associations in order to oppose the Congress. The first, the United Indian Patriotic Association, founded in 1888, had both Hindu and Muslim members, but the second, founded in 1893 and known as the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental Defence Association of Upper India, confined its membership to Muslims and Englishmen.

There can scarcely be any doubt that the change in Sir Syed Ahmad's attitude was partly due to the British policy of "Divide and Rule", now applied against the Hindus. This policy found a great exponent in Mr. Beck, the Principal of the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College at Ālīgarh from 1883 to 1899. Throughout this long period Mr. Beck worked with unremitting zeal and industry in order to wean Sir Syed Ahmad from the nationalist movement, and to induce the Muslims to keep aloof from the Hindus, and place themselves under the protecting wings of the British Government. But it is not necessary to suppose that Beck's efforts, though highly successful, were solely responsible for Sir Syed Ahmad's opposition to the Congress. It is quite likely that he had a sincere conviction that English education was the crying need of the community and it would be unwise to divert its energy to politics. It is also possible that he detected in the Congress demand for popular government something highly injurious to the Muslim cause. After all, the Muslims formed but one-fourth of the population of India, and Sir Syed Ahmad publicly expressed his fears that under a democratic system of government, which formed the ideal of the Congress leaders, "the larger community would fully override the interests of the smaller community". This sentiment has been

shared by the Muslim leaders ever since, and has largely shaped their views and actions. Sir Syed Ahmad died in 1898, and Mr. Beck in 1899, but their policy survived and formed the background of Muslim politics in subsequent years. Though even then, as later, some eminent Muslim leaders occasionally took more catholic views, adopted a nationalist policy, and even became ardent champions of the Congress, they could not carry the whole community with them, and in some notable cases they ultimately fell into line with the old policy. The dread of majority rule, first publicly expressed by Sir Syed, and widely spread by the propaganda of Beck and his successors, inspired, in the successive stages of evolution in Muslim politics, the demands for nomination, for a separate electorate with weightage, and lastly for Pakistan, as will be related in a subsequent chapter.

4. Trade and Industry

A. Trade

It has been already noted how the foreign trade of India passed into the hands of European nations, notably the English. Although the trading monopoly of the East India Company was abolished in 1813, and gradually all the European nations were placed on an equal footing in respect of trade in India, the British nation virtually possessed the monopoly of Indian trade until the closing years of the nineteenth century. This was due partly to the undoubted maritime supremacy of the British and partly to their political domination in India, while other historical causes operated in the same direction. Only during the last part of the nineteenth century did Germany and Japan begin to encroach upon the close preserve of British trade in India.

The volume of overseas trade began to increase enormously with the opening of the Suez Canal. In 1855–1860 the average annual value of Indian trade was about fifty-two lakhs of rupees. During the five years beginning with 1869, when the Suez Canal was opened, the average annual value of exports and imports amounted to nearly ninety crores of rupees. The average in 1900 exceeded two hundred crores, while in 1928–1929 it exceeded six hundred crores.

The nature of exports and imports also changed. Instead of the finished products of industry, India now exported jute, wheat, cotton, oilseeds, tea, etc., whereas she imported the goods of European manufacture to which reference will be made later.

The large volume of foreign trade presupposes a corresponding extension of inland trade. This was facilitated by the era of peace

introduced by British rule, the gradual abolition of the vexatious inland transit duties and the development of the means of transport and communication.

The transit duties were gradually abolished in the provinces between 1836 and 1844, and by 1848 inter-provincial trade was rendered free from them.

The development of communications by means of railways, steamships, canals, telegraphs, and cables, which revolutionised Indian trade, mostly took place after 1858. Up to the Revolt railways were practically unknown in India, except for a few miles around Calcutta, Bombay and Madras. But the disasters of the Revolt opened the eyes of the Government to the value of rapid means of communication. By 1871 a general system of railways was completed connecting the different provinces, and the hinterland of each province with its ports. The construction of telegraphs was begun in 1851 and a really effective postal system, with cheap postage rates, was introduced in 1854. The first steamships plied on the Ganges only a few years before the Revolt. As regards the development of roads and canals, no appreciable work was done till the Public Works Department was organised in 1854–1855 by Lord Dalhousie. Lastly, it was in 1865 that the first telegraphic connection was established between India and Europe.

B. Industry

In a previous chapter we have traced the decline and decay of Indian trade and industry. The advent of new and cheap machine-made goods from the West gradually changed men's tastes and habits. The old Indian products were almost completely ousted to make room for foreign imports, and a list of imports into India during the latter part of the nineteenth century is an interesting study both from the economic and social points of view. It consisted of articles of luxury such as silks and woollens, leather and leather goods, cabinet ware and furniture, clocks and watches, earthenware and porcelain, glass and glassware, paper, paste-board, stationery, toys and requisites for games, scents, cigarettes, carts and carriages, and more recently bicycles, motor-cycles and motor-cars. To this must be added articles which have almost become a necessity in every household, such as matches, sewing-machines, umbrellas, soap, cheap glass and chinaware, pens and nibs, aluminium and enamelled ironware, torches and kerosene oil. Neither list is exhaustive. But the imported articles indicate the growth of new habits and tastes, which have proved destructive

to Indian industries, such as the manufacture of fine wool, silk and cotton goods, bell-metal ware, etc., which might otherwise have flourished even now.

Thus slowly but steadily the Indian markets were inundated with foreign manufactured goods and the old home-industry of India came to occupy almost a negligible place in the Indian economy.

Gradually India rose from the stupor in which she was cast by this sudden blow from the West. It was impossible that a highly civilised and intellectual race like the Indians should acquiesce for long in playing the role of hewers of wood and drawers of water in the industrial world. Slowly industries began to be organised on modern lines, and the effect was appreciably marked on the exports and imports of India during the seventies of the last century. Thus the proportion of manufactured exports to total exports of India rose from 8 per cent in 1879 to 16 per cent in 1892 and to 22 per cent in 1907–1908; while the proportion of manufactured imports to total imports fell from 65 per cent in 1879 to 57 per cent in 1892 and to 53 per cent in 1907.

Among the more important organised industries in India, on a large scale, may be mentioned cotton, jute, iron and steel, paper, tanning and leather. But up to the end of the nineteenth century they made very small advance, compared with the total volume of trade in these commodities. Still it was a good beginning and had immense possibilities. It is also to be noted that these big industries were not always managed by Indians, some of them being owned by Europeans.

The nature and extent of this new industrial awakening in India is well illustrated by the history of cotton mills. Apart from isolated instances, such as a mill erected in Calcutta in 1818, the industry was at first centred in Bombay where the first mill was started in 1854. After 1877 several cotton mills were started in cotton-producing areas like Nāgpur, Ahmadābād, Sholāpur, and some other places. The Swadeshī movement in Bengal in 1905 gave a fillip to this industry, and since then large numbers of mills have been started, including several in Bengal.

But this nascent industry, like others, had to make its way against enormous odds. It had to fight for a place in the market securely held by the West and had to compete against the long and mature experience and unlimited capital of Western manufacturers. In this unequal contest it could not hope for any support from the Government. Rather, as events showed, it had at first to face its direct hostility. Lancashire manufacturers grew restive

at the success of Indian mills, and owing to their pressure the Government of India excluded the manufactured English cotton goods from the usual import duty which acted as a protection to Indian industry. When, on account of financial difficulties, the import duty had to be reimposed, the Lancashire interests had to be placated by the imposition of a countervailing excise duty on cotton manufactures in Bombay (p. 865). To the utter misfortune of India, her industry fell an equal victim to the protectionist policy of England in the eighteenth century and the free-trade policy of the nineteenth century, both the opposing principles operating favourably to British and unfavourably to Indian industry. These difficulties partially explain the very slow growth of Indian industry.

CHAPTER V

POLITICAL RELATIONS, 1906–1937

1. The North-West Frontier

The vexed problem of the North-West Frontier engaged the serious attention of Lord Curzon, who found on his arrival in India in January, 1899, that about 10,000 British troops had been quartered on the farther side of the British frontier. The new Viceroy followed in regard to the tribal tracts a course of policy which has been described as "one of withdrawal and concentration". He ably defended the retention of Chitral and the construction of the road from that town to Peshāwār, but in other respects differed from the policy of the "forward" school. Under his orders large numbers of British troops were gradually withdrawn from the Khyber Pass, the Kurram valley, Wāziristān and the tribal area generally, but some posts were retained and fortified at Chakdarra, Malakand and Dargai. The place of the British troops withdrawn was filled by tribal levies under British officers, or by military police. British forces were, however, concentrated within British lines, and strategic railways were constructed up to Dargai at the base of the Malakand, Jāmrud, at the entrance to the Khyber Pass, and Thal, at the mouth of the Kurram valley. At the same time Lord Curzon was careful to regulate and limit the importation of arms to tribesmen and also to encourage the important tribes to maintain peace and tranquillity and check crime by granting them allowances at regular intervals.

Another aspect of Lord Curzon's policy was the creation of the North-West Frontier Province in 1901 in the teeth of much opposition from the Punjab officials. Formerly the north-west frontier districts had been under the control of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, subject only to the indirect control of the Government of India. The new Frontier Province, extending over an area of 40,000 square miles, included the political agencies of the Malakand, the Kurram, the Khyber, the Tochi and Wana, and all the trans-Indus districts of the Punjab, excepting the settled district of Derā Ghāzi Khān which remained under the control of the Punjab

Government. It was placed under a Chief Commissioner, directly responsible to the Government of India. The old North-Western Provinces were given the name of "the United Provinces of Āgra and Oudh".

The civil and military reforms of Lord Curzon on the North-West Frontier gave comparative peace after a period of severe fighting and reduced to some extent the heavy expenditure caused by frontier wars. It was, of course, necessary to blockade the Mahsūds in 1900–1902, and deal with the risings of the Mohmānds and Zakka Khel in 1908–1909, but Lord Curzon claimed that during his seven years of office, he had spent only £248,000 on military activities on the North-West Frontier as against £4,584,000 in the years 1894–1898.

Lord Curzon did not, however, finally solve the Frontier problem. His system could not thoroughly check the spirit of restlessness so prominent among the local tribes, and administrative difficulties regarding justice and revenue continued to trouble both the settled districts and the tribal areas. The pillars of his system fell under the strain of general unrest engendered by the Great War of 1914–18. The changed conditions made the Government of India pursue a vigorous policy in the North-West Frontier, marked by the retaining of commanding posts at important points, opening up the country by roads, entrusting the regular troops with the duties of the Militia for policing the tribal lines, and by attempts to introduce among the tribes the elements of a new civilisation. The influence of the Indian National Movement, and the attempts of the Government to introduce social and educational reforms, not to the liking of the tribes, have complicated the problem to a great extent. In fact, the Government of India had to resort to extensive military preparations in suppressing frontier outbreaks in recent times, such as the rising of the Wāziris in 1919, that of the Mahsūds in 1925, the serious rising of the Wāziris, Mohmānds and Āfrids in 1930–1931, the Mohmānd outbreak in 1933 and the Tori Khel rebellion of 1936–1937.

2. British Relations with Afghānistān and Persia

A. Afghānistān

The relations of the Government of India with Afghānistān were influenced considerably by the political, commercial and constructional activities of Russia in the Persian Gulf and Central Asia and also by the intrigues of the German, Austrian and Turkish

missions at Kābul during the war of 1914–18. On the death of the Amīr, 'Abdur Rahmān, who had concluded a friendly treaty with the British Government, in September 1901, Lord Curzon had some trouble with his successor, Amīr Habibullah, over the renewal of the treaty. Habibullah claimed that it was an agreement between the two countries and did not require renewing on the death of the Amīr; but Lord Curzon argued that the treaty with the late Amīr was a personal one and insisted on its renewal. For some years all communications with the Government of India were stopped by Amīr Habibullah, who refrained from drawing his subsidy and claimed the title of "His Majesty". He was undoubtedly encouraged by the anti-English activities of Russia. But in November 1904, during Lord Curzon's absence from India, the acting Viceroy, Lord Ampthill, sent a mission to Kābul under Sir Louis Dane. A treaty was concluded in March, 1905, by which all the engagements between the British Government and 'Abdur Rahmān were renewed and Amīr Habibullah's claim to the title of "His Majesty" conceded.

The tables were, however, turned two years later after the signing of the Anglo-Russian Convention in August, 1907. According to this Russia agreed to treat Afghānistān as outside her sphere of influence and equal commercial facilities were provided for England and Russia in that kingdom. The Amīr, who "regarded this union of the two great neighbours with natural suspicion", refused to give his consent to the clauses of the Convention. But this counted for nothing, as Russia stood by the agreement. Henceforth Habibullah remained aloof, but during the First World War he rendered England valuable service by maintaining a policy of strict neutrality in spite of the incitement of hostile parties.

The combination of the European powers, and their attempts to introduce Western civilisation in Afghānistān, gave an impetus to Pan-Islamic forces in that country, which became formidable after the fall of the Tsarist Government in Russia in 1917 and the consequent disappearance of Anglo-Russian friendship. Amīr Habibullah made himself unpopular with the orthodox and anti-British party in Afghānistān by his attempts to introduce European manners and customs into his land and was assassinated on the 20th February, 1919.

A short struggle for the throne ensued in which Amānullah, a son of the murdered Amīr, came out successful. Partly under the pressure of internal troubles, and partly under the influence of the war party, Amānullah decided to embark on a war with the English. Thus began the Third Anglo-Afghān War (April–May,

1919). The use of aeroplanes, wireless, and high explosives enabled the British Indian army to defeat the Afghān army severely and bomb Jalālābād and Kābul within ten days. The Afghāns asked for an armistice on the 14th May and a treaty of peace was signed at Rāwalpindi on the 8th August, 1919, which was confirmed by another treaty concluded on the 22nd November, 1921. According to the terms of these treaties, the Afghāns were prohibited from importing arms or munitions through India, and the arrears of the late Amīr's subsidy were confiscated by the British Government and no new grant was made to the new Amīr; but the British Government expressed their desire to make no attempt to control any longer the foreign relations of Afghānistān, and both the parties agreed to respect each other's independence. An accredited British minister was henceforth to reside at Kābul, and the Amīr was to be represented by one of his own ministers residing in London. Since then Anglo-Afghān relations have continued to be cordial in spite of occasional minor disturbances and Bolshevik activities in Afghānistān.

But soon Afghānistān was convulsed by a civil war. On returning from his European tour in the summer of 1928, Amīr Amānullah, full of reforming zeal, tried to introduce certain internal reforms, social, educational and legal, which were not liked by the conservative sections of the people of his kingdom. Their discontent found expression in a civil war and in May, 1929, Amānullah was compelled to abdicate the throne, which was usurped by Bachai-i-Saqqao, a daring adventurer. During the troubles caused by this upheaval, Kābul was cut off from communication with other countries, but the Royal Air Force succeeded in bringing away large numbers of British Indian subjects, many foreigners, and finally, on the 25th February, 1929, the Legation itself. While watching the course of the Afghān civil war with grave anxiety, the Government of India followed a policy of "scrupulous non-intervention". Order was eventually restored in Afghānistān by Muhammad Nādir Shāh, a scion of the old ruling house and an able officer of the expelled Amīr, who became Amīr by general choice. With considerable knowledge of the world, he took up again Amānullah's mantle of reform, but proceeded with much caution and tact with his schemes of modernization. Relations between Afghānistān and India again became satisfactory. But this course of events was tragically interrupted by the assassination of King Nādir Shāh on the 8th November, 1933, by a fanatic with a personal grudge. His son, Muhammad Zahir, however, peacefully ascended the throne and wisely continued the policy of his father.

B. Persia

Great Britain had vital interests in the Middle East, and especially in the Persian Gulf, for political as well as commercial reasons, and she guarded these as jealously as possible. But other powers, like France, Russia, Germany and Turkey, challenged, during the closing years of the nineteenth century, the exclusive influence of Britain in the Persian Gulf and tried to establish their respective control over it. Russian penetration into Northern Persia was particularly a matter of grave anxiety for England. The Government of India vigorously resisted the claims of these powers, and frustrated their efforts. Lord Lansdowne, the British Foreign Secretary, declared in the House of Lords on the 5th May, 1903: "I say it without hesitation, that we should regard the establishment of a naval base or of a fortified post in the Persian Gulf by any other Power as a grave menace to British interests, and we should certainly resist it by all means at our disposal."

The first effective steps to counter these anti-British influences in the Persian Gulf were taken by Lord Curzon, who visited the Gulf in 1903 and tried to protect British interests there by several measures, such as the establishment of consulates in the ports and trading centres in the interior, the Seistān Mission of 1903–1905 which under Sir Henry MacMahon brought to a completion the work of boundary delimitation begun in 1872 by Sir Frederick Goldsmith, the projection of a railway from Quetta to Nushki, the construction of a road from Nushki to Robat Kila, a frontier post, the opening of a postal service along the route and the reorganisation of customs and tariffs.

Soon Persia became subject to grave internal disorders due to the conflict between the forces of constitutionalism, favoured by her people, and the forces of autocracy, represented by the ruling dynasty. England and Russia, however, decided to determine the sphere of their respective interests in Persian territory by a peaceful settlement, and thus signed the Anglo-Russian Convention on the 31st August, 1907. According to this, the two parties agreed to pay due regard to the integrity and political independence of Persia. A Russian sphere of influence was demarcated in Northern Persia and a British sphere in the south-eastern provinces. Each power agreed in regard to the other's sphere of influence "not to seek for herself or her own subjects or those of any other country any political or commercial concessions such as railway, banking, telegraph, roads, transport, or insurance", and not to prevent the other party from acquiring such concessions there.

There is no doubt that the Convention served to avert serious conflicts between England and Russia during the critical period, 1907–1910, when Persia was in a state of chaos which might have tempted any power to intervene in her affairs to further its designs. But it was not above criticism. As Sykes points out, it "gave grave offence to the Persians", who were not consulted in the least about the new settlement which vitally affected their destiny. There is much truth in the significant observation of Lovat Fraser, with reference to this agreement, that "there is something amazingly cynical in the spirit in which Western powers dispose of the heritage of other races". In the opinion of some, the Convention gave more advantages to Russia than to England. While the sphere of influence of the former extended over half the territory of Persia, that of the latter was rather too small. But there was one factor which England could not very well ignore. Russia had already penetrated far too deep into Northern Persia to be asked to retreat quietly, and so, in consideration of this, one has to agree with the statement of Sir J. D. Rees that Great Britain "had not so much given away advantages as accepted a position that had grown up".

During the War of 1914–18, Persia, herself in a miserable condition due to the continuance of internal troubles, declared strict neutrality. But Germany and also her ally Turkey, acting for herself or as the *avant-courier* of Germany, tried to "embarrass Great Britain and Russia by creating disturbances in Persia, in Afghānistān and on the frontiers of India, and to force Persia into the World War on their side". This stirred Great Britain to an unusual activity in the Persian Gulf. However, her relations with Persia continued on the whole to be friendly.

3. The North-Eastern Frontier

A. Tibet and the States on the Northern Frontier

Though nominally subject to the suzerainty of China, Tibet was for all practical purposes an independent theocracy under the two great Lāmās, the Dalāi Lāmā of Lhāsā and the Tashi Lāmā of the famous monastery of Tashilhunpo near Shigatse. Political power was centred in the hands of the Dalāi Lāmā or the council that ruled during his minority.

The earliest attempts to establish British relations with Tibet were made as early as the year 1774. Warren Hastings sent Bogle on a mission to the Tashi Lāmā of Shigatse. The object was mainly to obtain facilities for trade with that country. But in subsequent

times the Tibetans began to resent British intercourse with their country. In 1887 they made an "inexplicable invasion" into the protected State of Sikkim, but were driven out the next year by General Graham. The provisions of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890, relating to the Sikkim-Tibet boundary and some commercial facilities, made more definite in 1893, were coldly received by the Tibetans.

On his arrival in India, Lord Curzon found British relations with Tibet "at an absolute deadlock". The problem became more complicated at this time through two factors. On the one hand, the Dalāi Lāmā having passed beyond his period of minority had overthrown the regency government by a *coup d'état* with the help of his tutor, Dorjieff, a Russian Buddhist, and had been trying to show himself a strong ruler. On the other hand, the Tibetans, eager to throw off Chinese sovereignty, were willing to welcome Russian friendship as a counterpoise. Dorjieff led Tibetan missions to Russia in 1898, 1900, and 1901, and rumours spread that he had concluded a treaty with Russia virtually placing Tibet under the protectorate of Russia. The Russian Government officially contradicted this rumour and assured the British ambassador at St. Petersburg that the object of these missions was religious. But this could not remove England's suspicions about Russian designs. As a matter of fact, British policy in Tibet represented but one phase in the long-drawn-out rivalry between England and Russia in Central Asia.

To meet the situation, Lord Curzon proposed in 1903 to send a mission to Tibet, with an armed escort, which the Home Government sanctioned with much hesitation. A mission under Colonel Younghusband accordingly started for Tibet, and after several sharp encounters with the Tibetans reached Lhāsā on the 3rd August, 1904. Finally, a convention was signed, by which the Tibetans agreed to open trade marts in Gyantse, Gartok and Yatung, to pay an indemnity of twenty-five lakhs and to allow the English to occupy the Chumbi valley for three years as a temporary pledge. In June, 1906, England and China concluded a convention by which the former agreed neither to annex Tibetan territory nor to interfere in the internal administration of Tibet and the latter promised not to allow any other foreign power to interfere with the internal administration or territorial integrity of Tibet. Further, England was granted the power to open telegraph lines connecting the trading stations with India, and the provisions of the Convention of 1890, and the Trade Regulations of 1893, were declared to be in force. The indemnity was paid by

the Chinese Government in three years and the English evacuated the Chumbi valley.

The political results of the Younghusband mission were not very important. Its only direct result was the opening of three trade marts and the establishment of a British Trade Agent at Gyantse. Younghusband is given the credit of "unveiling Lhāsā", but it should not be forgotten that in ancient and medieval times Bengal missionaries had penetrated into Tibet on religious missions, and also that, long before Younghusband, a famous scholar and explorer, Rai Bahādur Sarat Chandra Das, C.I.E., having no dread of the unknown, had entered the forbidden land of the Dalāi Lāmā at the risk of his life.

By the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, both England and Russia agreed to carry on political relations with Tibet through China. The suzerainty of China over Tibet, hitherto a mere "constitutional fiction", was now explicitly reaffirmed and she tried to make it as real as possible, so much so that Chinese troops overran Tibet and the Dalāi Lāmā took refuge in Darjeeling. The British Government, acting on the representations of the Government of India, strongly protested against this policy of the Chinese Government. This attitude of the Government of India, and the disorders in China due to an internal revolution, encouraged the Tibetans to resist Chinese attempts and finally to throw off the last vestige of Chinese suzerainty in 1918.

The changes in Russia after the revolution of 1917, and the growing confusion in China, relieved the Government of India of the menace of external forces affecting English interests in Tibet, and Britain and Tibet have since then remained on terms of cordiality with each other. A British Goodwill Mission, led by Mr. B. J. Gould, I.C.S., of the Political Department, visited Tibet during the winter of 1936–1937 and established or renewed friendly relations with the chief officials of the Tibetan Government and the people of Tibet.

Relations with Nepāl, Sikkim and Bhutān, with which India's northern frontiers are in contact, have been cordial. To resist Chinese activities in Tibet, the Government of India in 1910 strengthened their relations with Bhutān by raising the amount of their subsidy from fifty thousand to a lakh of rupees a year and undertaking to guide Bhutān in her foreign relations. The Government afterwards officially notified China that they would protect the rights and interests of Bhutān and Sikkim.

B. Assam and Burma

On the partition of Bengal in 1905, the new province of Eastern Bengal and Assam was formed by the amalgamation of Assam and the Surmā valley with fifteen districts of the old Bengal province. But this arrangement being annulled in 1912, Assam was again made a separate administrative unit. Of the several Assam border tribes, such as the Daflas, the Miris, the Abors and the Mishmis, none gave much trouble to the British Government except the Abors. In 1911 the Minyong Abors murdered Mr. Williamson and Dr. Gregorson, whereupon the Government of India sent an expedition to the Dihang valley of the Abor country on the north-east frontier, to subdue the tribe. The expedition proved successful in its object, and friendly missions were sent to the Miri and Mishmi countries. Owing to the rather undefined boundary of the Chinese province of Yunnan on the frontier of Burma, the British Government apprehended minor incursions into Burmese territory, and carefully guarded this frontier. Negotiations between China and Great Britain were carried on with a view to settling the frontier between Burma and the Chinese province of Yunnan, and a Delimitation Commission, consisting of British and Chinese Commissioners, with the famous Swiss engineer, Colonel F. Iselin, as its neutral Chairman, conducted enquiries into this matter during 1935 and 1936 and submitted a unanimous report in the spring of 1937, which definitely fixed the frontier line between Burma and Yunnan.

CHAPTER VI

CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES, 1906–1937

I. Whitehall and the Government of India

THE control of the British Parliament over the Government of India exercised through the Secretary of State was firmly held, and even a strong personality like Lord Curzon was overruled by the Home Government. The power of superintendence and direction was vigorously asserted by Lord Morley as the Secretary of State for India, and he claimed a larger and more direct share in Indian administration than his predecessors had done. Mr. Lovat Fraser observed in the *Edinburgh Review* for January, 1918: "Lord Morley . . . whatever his virtues may have been, was certainly the most autocratic and the least constitutional Secretary of State ever seen in Whitehall." But the Governor-General being the man on the spot, his "old discretionary power" did not altogether disappear.

During the early years of the present century, some Indian politicians, including the late Mr. Gokhale, demanded certain changes in the Home Government, particularly the abolition of the India Council. In 1907 two Indian gentlemen were appointed members of Lord Morley's Council. A Committee, appointed in 1919, with Lord Crewe, an ex-Secretary of State for India, as chairman and Prof. A. B. Keith and Mr. B. N. Basu among others as members, to examine and report on the working of the Home Government, recommended the total abolition of the India Council. But the recommendation was not accepted by the Joint Committee of Parliament. The Committee advocated certain changes in details which were given effect to by the Act of 1919.[1] Vacancies in the Council were to be filled, as before, by the Secretary of State, but henceforth it was to consist of not less than eight and not more than twelve members, half of whom were to be qualified by not less than ten years' residence or service in India and must have left India only recently. Their term of office was reduced from seven to five years. The concurrence of a majority vote of the

[1] For the Acts of 1919 and 1935 referred to in this section, *see* Section 2.

Council was required only in cases of (i) the grant or appropriation of any portion of the revenues of India, (ii) the making of contracts, and (iii) the framing of rules to regulate matters relating to the Civil Service. The Council remained clearly subordinate to the Secretary of State, who retained his discretionary powers not only in relation to it but also in relation to the Government of India, particularly for Imperial or Military affairs, foreign relations, the rights of European British subjects, the law of naturalisation, the Public Debt, customs, currency and shipping. His control was restricted only over "transferred" subjects. Before 1919 the salary of the Secretary of State, and the expenses of his department, were paid from the Indian revenues. As a result Parliament could not criticise the Indian Budget in the same way as the Budget presented by the British Chancellor of the Exchequer. With a view to bringing the Secretary of State under more effective criticism by Parliament, the Act of 1919 provided that "the salary of the Secretary of State shall be paid out of moneys provided by Parliament, and the salaries of his under-secretaries or any other expenses of his department may be paid out of moneys provided by Parliament". A Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament was appointed to consider Indian questions, rules and enactments, that were laid before the Houses. Thus indirectly the control of Parliament over British India was strengthened.

The Government of India Act 1935 changed the legal position of the Secretary of State. According to it, "all rights, authority or jurisdiction in or in relation to territories in India" were to rest with the British Crown. The Governor-General or Provincial Governor exercising executive authority on behalf of His Majesty was to be, while acting in his discretion, under the general control of the Secretary of State, who was a member of the British Cabinet and was responsible to Parliament in all matters relating to India. In substance the authority of the Secretary of State remained almost unchanged but for some relaxation due to the introduction of autonomy in certain provinces and partial responsibility at the Centre in case a Federation came into being. He continued to "stand at the top of the Indian administration as its guardian". As provided by the Act of 1935, the India Council was abolished from 1st April, 1937, and in its place the Secretary of State was given a body of advisers not less than three or more than six in number, of whom half at least must have served for ten years under the Crown in India and must have been appointed within two years of ceasing to work in India. The Secretary of State had full liberty in his discretion to consult his

advisers collectively or individually or to ignore them, and he might act or refuse to act according to their advice except in certain specified cases, such as the exercise of powers conferred on him in regard to the Services under the Crown, for which the concurrence of at least one half of the members present at the meeting was necessary.

To relieve the Secretary of State of agency work for the Central and Provincial Governments of India, the Act of 1919 provided for the office of High Commissioner, which was established by Order in Council of 13th August, 1920. He was to be appointed by the Government of India, to whom he remained primarily responsible, and his salary was to be paid from Indian revenues. His duties were to procure stores for Indian governments, to supply trade information, to promote the interests of Indian commerce, to look after the education of Indian students in England, and to furnish information on India to enquirers. He also represented India as one of the delegates at International Conferences. Under the Act of 1935, the High Commissioner was to be controlled by the Governor-General in his "individual judgment", and he might act, if empowered by the Governor-General, for a province, a federated State, or Burma.

2. The Indian Government

The strong regime of Lord Curzon, instead of checking the forces of Indian nationalism, intensified the desire for political advance among the Indians, which manifested itself in some places in an extreme form. Besides taking some measures to assert the law, Government planned certain constitutional changes, which were embodied in the Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909. These reforms provided for the association of qualified Indians with Government to a greater extent in deciding public questions. Thus one seat on the Governor-General's Executive Council was, in actual practice, reserved for an Indian member. Satyendra Prasanna Sinha (afterwards the first Lord Sinha of Raipur) was the first Indian to attain the honour of being appointed Law Member of the Governor-General's Council. The members of the Executive Councils of the Governors of Madras and Bombay were increased to four. An Executive Council was introduced in Bengal in 1909, and when Bihār and Orissa was created a separate province in 1912 it also was given an Executive Council in that year, though three years later such a proposal for the United Provinces was set aside. It should also be noted that, though the Act of 1909 did not specifically provide for the appointment of Indians on provincial

Executive Councils, the practice was begun of including such members in them, Rājā Kishori Lāl Goswāmī being appointed a member of the Executive Council of Bengal.

The most striking feature of the Act of 1909 was that it introduced important changes in the composition and functions of the Legislative Councils. The number of additional members of the Central Legislature was raised from sixteen to a maximum of sixty, of whom not more than twenty-eight were to be officials. The Governor-General had the power to nominate three non-officials to represent certain specified communities and had also at his disposal two other seats to be filled by nomination. The remaining twenty-seven seats were to be filled by non-official elected members, some of whom represented certain special constituencies such as the landowners in seven provinces, the Muhammadans in five provinces, and two Chambers of Commerce in Calcutta and Bombay, while thirteen others were to be elected by the non-official members of the nine provincial Legislative Councils. Thus a small official majority was retained in the Central Legislative Council. Lord Morley clearly laid down that the Governor-General's Council "in its legislative as well as its executive character should continue to be so constituted as to ensure its constant and uninterrupted power to fulfil the constitutional obligations that it owes and must always owe to His Majesty's Government and to the Imperial Parliament". In the provincial Legislative Councils, the number of additional members was raised to a maximum of fifty in the major provinces; and it was so arranged that a combination of official and nominated non-official members might have a small majority over the elected members, except in Bengal where there was a clear elected majority. The greater part of these additional non-official members were to be elected by groups of local bodies, landholders, trade associations and universities. By conceding the demand of the Muhammadan community for separate representation by members chosen by the votes of a Muslim electorate, the Reforms of 1909 introduced the principle of communal representation, which, as the Indian Statutory Commission observed in 1929, became "a cardinal problem and ground of controversy at every revision of the Indian electoral system".

As regards the functions of the Legislatures, the Act of 1909 empowered them to discuss, and to move resolutions on, the Budget, before it was finally settled, and also certain matters of general interest. Their resolutions were to be expressed and to be operative as recommendations to the Executive Government and any of them might be disallowed by the Head of the Government acting as

President of the Council at his discretion. No resolutions could be moved in matters concerning the Army, Foreign Relations, the Indian States and sundry other matters.

Though the Morley-Minto Reforms marked an important step in the introduction of representative government, they did not give Parliamentary Government to India. This was plainly admitted by Lord Morley himself, when he said in the House of Lords on 17th December, 1908: "If it could be said that this chapter of reforms led directly or indirectly to the establishment of a parliamentary system in India, I, for one, would have nothing at all to do with it." In fact, Indian administration still continued to be carried on with absolute responsibility to Whitehall. The non-official members could not act in a responsible manner, as nothing that they might say could lead to any modification in the fundamental policy of the Government. As the authors of the Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms, 1918, observed, "the reforms of 1909 afforded no answer and could afford no answer, to Indian political problems. . . . Responsibility is the savour of popular government, and that savour the present councils wholly lack". Indirect election and separate communal representation had also obvious disadvantages.

The Morley-Minto Reforms did not come up to the expectation of the Indian people, whose discontent continued unabated. They renewed their claims with emphasis during the First World War, which broke out within five years of the introduction of these Reforms; and two schemes were put forward, one by Mr. G. K. Gokhale and the other jointly by the National Congress and the Muslim League. To satisfy the widespread demands of the Indians for constitutional reforms, and in recognition of their loyal services to Great Britain during the war, Mr. Edwin Montagu, the Secretary of State for India, made the famous announcement in the House of Commons on the 20th August, 1917, that "*the policy of His Majesty's Government, with which the Government of India are in complete accord, is that of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire*". He came to India early in November, 1917, and having ascertained public opinion in this country by an extensive tour, published in April, 1918, the Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms, commonly known as the Montagu-Chelmsford Report.[1]

[1] The Report bore the joint signature of Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford, the Governor-General, but, as we know from Mr. Montagu's *Indian Diary*, the Governor-General played a vacillating and insignificant part in the whole transaction.

This Report formed the basis of the Government of India Act, 1919, which came into operation early in 1921.

This Act made a clear division, as far as possible, of the functions of the Central and Provincial Governments. The Centre was entrusted with duties regarding defence, political and external affairs, the principal railways and other strategic communications, posts and telegraphs, currency and coinage, the Public Debt, commerce, civil and criminal law and procedure, ecclesiastical administration, the All-India Services, certain institutions of research and all other matters not mentioned as provincial subjects. The Provincial Governments were charged with duties in respect of internal law and order, administration of justice and jails, irrigation, forests, inspection of factories, supervision of labour questions, famine relief, land-revenue administration, local self-government, education, medical department, sanitation and public health, public works, agriculture, development of industries, excise and co-operative societies. The spheres of the Central and Provincial Governments with regard to the sources of income and the heads of revenue were also delimited.

We have already noted the effect of the Act of 1919 on the Home Government. We have now to study how it modified the Government of India. It did not introduce diarchy in the Central Government, and the Governor-General remained, as before, directly responsible to the Secretary of State and Parliament, and not to the Indian Legislature. The Executive Council was enlarged. Though it was not laid down in the Act, yet after 1921 the practice prevailed of choosing three of the members from among qualified Indians. Lord Sinha was succeeded by Sir 'Ālī Imam as Law Member, but the next Indian member, Sir Sankaran Nair, was given the portfolio of Education. After 1920 some eminent Indian lawyer invariably held the office of Law Member. The Finance Members were recruited from the British Treasury.

The Central Legislature was thoroughly remodelled and made bi-cameral, the two chambers being the Council of State and the Legislative Assembly. The members of the Executive Council could become members of one or the other house of the Legislature on nomination by the Governor-General. The Council of State or the Upper Chamber was mainly a revising body. It was to consist of not more than 60 members, 34 of whom were to be elected. Not more than 20 were to be officials. The Legislative Assembly, or the lower and the more popular chamber, was to consist of 140 members. The number was later on raised to 145 of whom 105 were elected, 26 were nominated officials and 14 nominated non-officials.

Elections to both the houses were direct and the franchise was based on a high property qualification, that for the Assembly being somewhat wider than that for the Council. The tenure of life of the Council of State was fixed at five years and that of the Assembly at three years. But the Governor-General had the power to dissolve either chamber or, in special circumstances, to extend its tenure. The powers of the two chambers were co-ordinate, but demands for grants were submitted to the lower house. In case of a deadlock between the two houses, the Governor-General might summon a joint session. The Council of State was to have a President, nominated by the Governor-General from among its members. The Assembly, too, was to have a President and a Deputy President of its own. The President was to be appointed for the first four years by the Governor-General and thereafter to be elected by the chamber itself.

The powers of the Central Legislature were made extensive in theory. In spite of delimitation of functions between the Central and Provincial Governments, the Central Legislature had the power to enact laws for the whole of British India, subject to the limitation that the previous consent of the Governor-General was necessary for the introduction of bills in certain matters.[1] Further, if a bill, recommended by the Governor-General, was thrown out or unsatisfactorily amended by either house, the Governor-General had the power to certify the original bill as essential for the safety and tranquillity of British India. He was also empowered, in cases of emergency, to promulgate ordinances, which, though originally effective for a period of six months, could be subsequently embodied in law if necessary. Thus the Governor-General was "an important, if not the predominant, factor of the Indian Legislature". As regards finance, the Central Legislature was given some control over it with certain specific exceptions. Thus proposals for appropriation of money for purposes of interest and sinking fund charges on loans, for expenditure classified by the Governor-General as political, ecclesiastical and defence, and for the payment of the salaries or pensions of men appointed under the authority of His Majesty or the Secretary of State in Council, were not to be submitted to the vote of the Legislature;

[1] A bill which had for its object the regulation of a Provincial subject or the repeal or amendment of any Act passed by the Provincial Legislature; a bill which sought to repeal or amend any Act or Ordinances passed by the Governor-General; measures affecting the Public Debt or public revenues of India, the religion of any class of British subjects, the discipline of any portion of His Majesty's Military, Naval and Air Forces and the relations of the Government of India with foreign powers or Indian States.

but for these an appropriation made by the Government was sufficient. Further, the Governor-General had the power, in cases of emergency, to certify any expenditure that he considered essential for the safety and tranquillity of British India or any part thereof. Thus both over legislation and finance the control of the Legislature was in fact greatly limited.

In considering the Provincial Government, we find that the Act of 1919 did away with the distinction between the Regulation Provinces of Bengal, Bombay and Madras and the Non-Regulation Provinces like the Punjab, Assam, etc. All the Provinces, ten in number, with the inclusion of Burma since 1923 and the North-West Frontier Province since 1932, became Governors' Provinces, each having at its head a Governor, appointed by His Majesty. The Governor of a Province, with enormous powers and privileges, continued to remain as the real authority over it. The Act introduced diarchy or dual government in the Provincial Executive. The Governor with his Executive Council was invested with authority over "Reserved subjects",[1] for the administration of which he was responsible not to the Legislature but to the Governor-General and Whitehall. The "Transferred subjects"[2] were placed in charge of the Governor acting with his Ministers, who were to be appointed by him from the elected members of the Provincial Legislative Council and whose numbers varied from province to province and in the same province at times. The ministers were to hold office during the pleasure of the Governor, as has been the case in theory in Great Britain and Canada, though by convention and practice the principle of ministerial responsibility to the Legislature has been established in both these countries. The ministers were required to retain the confidence of the Legislature, but their responsibility to it tended to "demoralise into an irremovable executive". Further, the Governor's powers of interference in Transferred subjects were extensive.

The different Provinces were given unicameral legislatures known as Legislative Councils. The membership of each Legislative Council was increased—139 (later on raised to 140) in Bengal, 127 (132) in Madras, 123 in U.P., 111 (114) in Bombay, 103 in Bihār and Orissa, 93 (94) in the Punjab, 70 (73) in the Central Provinces, and 50 (53) in Assam. At least 70 per cent of the members were to be elected, and of the nominated members not

[1] Police, justice and prisons, irrigation, forests (except in Bombay and Burma), famine relief, land-revenue administration and inspection of factories.

[2] Local self-government, education (excepting European education), public health, sanitation and medical administration, public works, agriculture, excise, co-operative societies and development of industries.

more than 20 per cent were to be officials. Different groups like landowners, chambers of commerce and universities; and communities of Muhammadans, Europeans, Anglo-Indians, Indian Christians and Sikhs in the Punjab were given separate representation through their own electorates. During the first four years the Governor of a Province appointed the President of the local Legislature, and on the expiry of that period the Legislative Councils were given the privilege of electing their own President. Each Legislative Council was given the privilege of entertaining a bill on any subject concerning the Province. No bill relating to any of the Transferred subjects could be passed without its consent; but a bill concerning any of the Reserved subjects might become an Act over its head and in spite of its refusal, if the Governor certified that it was necessary in view of his special responsibility for maintaining the safety and tranquillity of the Province. Further, previous consent of the Governor-General was necessary for introducing certain bills. As regards finance, it was provided that a budget of the estimated income and expenditure, with the exception of certain items[1], was to be placed before the Legislative Council in the form of a demand for grants. So far as the Transferred subjects were concerned, the Council could cut down or refuse any demand. But if in the case of Reserved subjects any demand was rejected or modified by the Council, the Governor had the right to certify the expenditure, as provided for in the original demand, as essential for the discharge of his responsibility. Thus both in matters of law-making and finance, the Council's authority over Reserved subjects was strictly limited.

There is no doubt that the Government of India Act, 1919, gave real responsibility to the representatives of the people in only a very limited sphere of administration; and, judged from the standpoint of a truly democratic measure, it had certain defects with regard to both the Central and Provincial Governments. Nevertheless, it should be regarded as an important instalment of constitutional reform. For the first time the British Government officially laid down, as the goal of constitutional development in India, not only Dominion Status but also Responsible Government. The latter could only mean the parliamentary form of government of the British type which was repudiated by Lord


[1] Provincial contributions to the Central Government; interest and sinking fund charges on loans; the salaries and pensions of officers appointed by or with the approval of His Majesty or the Secretary of State in Council, expenditure of which the amount is prescribed by law.

Morley even as late as 1908 (see page 915). The introduction of direct election, for the first time, on a comparatively wide franchise was a significant concession. Further, the people were given a valuable opportunity both for political training and for influencing the actions of the Government. This Act also provided that after the expiry of a decade of working of the new Constitution, a Commission of Enquiry should be constituted, with the approval of Parliament, to report after due investigation whether responsible government should be further extended or restricted.

The Reforms of 1919 did not satisfy the national aspirations of the Indians, and their effect upon the national struggle for independence is described in Chapter IX. The Indian demand for political advance gradually grew more and more insistent. So the Conservative Government of Mr. Baldwin, in which the late Lord Birkenhead was the Secretary of State for India, appointed a Statutory Commission, earlier than provided in the Act of 1919, under the chairmanship of Sir John Simon, to report on the working of the reforms. As all the seven members of the Commission were British, it was boycotted by the Congressites, the Liberals and important sections of the Muslim community when it landed in Bombay on 3rd February, 1928. There was also a wider ground on which the Congressites took their stand. They held that it did not accord with the principle of self-determination to have constitutional changes effected on the recommendations of a Commission appointed by an outside authority. In view of the difficult situation in India, Sir John Simon wrote a letter to Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, the Premier belonging to the Labour Party which had come to power after the general election of 1929, on the 16th October, 1929, suggesting the advisability of inviting, after the publication of the Report of his Commission, the representatives of both British India and the Indian States to a conference before final decisions were made. This suggestion was accepted by the British Cabinet, and on 31st October, 1929, the Governor-General, Lord Irwin, made the momentous announcement "that the natural issue of India's Constitutional progress . . . is the attainment of Dominion Status" and that a Round Table Conference would be held in London after the Simon Commission had reported.

The Report of the Simon Commission was published in May, 1930. Briefly speaking, it recommended complete Responsible Government in the Provinces, even the control of police and justice being transferred to the Ministers responsible to the Legislatures. Legislatures were to be based on a wider franchise and the official bloc was to go. In the Central Government, it

recommended the continuance of complete British authority and control. It pointed out the importance of the growth of contact with the Indian States and envisaged the scheme of an All-India Federation, including the Princes, though its perfect realisation was considered to be a distant possibility. But the recommendations of the Commission were repudiated outright by the Indian nationalists. The British Government then summoned in London a Round Table Conference, consisting of 16 representatives of the three British political parties, 16 delegates from the Indian States and 57 delegates from British India, including some prominent Indians like Sir Tej Bahādur Sapru, Mr. Srinivāsa Sāstrī, Mr. C. Y.



COUNCIL AND ASSEMBLY BUILDING, DELHI

Chintāmoni, Dr. B. R. Ambedkar and Sir Mohammad Shafi, to consider the question of the Indian Constitution. The first session of the Conference was held from 12th November, 1930, to 19th January, 1931, and the Princes declared their willingness to join the proposed Federation provided that responsibility was given to the Central Government. Though the Congress did not at first participate in the Conference, Gāndhijī attended the second session (7th September to 1st December, 1931) as its sole representative, but could not get what he wanted. The third session of the Conference, attended by a far smaller number of representatives than before, met from 17th November to 24th December, 1932.

As a result of the discussions at the Conferences, the British Government drafted its proposals for the reform of the Indian Constitution,

which were embodied in the White Paper published in March, 1933. The White Paper was examined by a Joint Committee of both the Houses of Parliament, presided over by Lord Linlithgow, Viceroy of India since 1936, with the help of Indian assessors. The Committee approved of the proposals of the White Paper subject to certain modifications and presented its report in October, 1934. A Bill, prepared on the report of this Committee, known as the Government of India Bill, 1935, was introduced in Parliament and became an Act on 2nd August, 1935, with slight alterations.

The Act of 1935 embodied two main principles—(1) an All-India Federation, comprising Governors' Provinces, Chief Commissioners' Provinces, and the Federating Indian States, and (2) Provincial Autonomy, with a Government responsible to an elected Legislature in every Governor's Province. All functions hitherto exercised by the Secretary of State, the Government of India and the Provinces were resumed by the Crown, which redistributed them between the Central Government on the one hand and the Provinces on the other. As regards the Indian States, the functions and powers of paramountcy were to be exercised henceforth not by the Government of India but by "His Majesty's Representative for the exercise of those functions of the Crown". Normally, though not necessarily, this office was to be held by the Governor-General, but as His Majesty's representative and not as the head of the Federal Government. Further, certain important departments like foreign affairs, ecclesiastical affairs and defence, being excluded from the control of the Indian Legislature, were to be administered by the Governor-General under the superintendence and direction of Whitehall alone; and the Governor-General and the Governors of Provinces were invested with special powers, in respect of functions transferred to the control of Ministers, for which they had responsibility to the British Parliament. Thus the constitutional status of India, even under the new Act, was that of a dependency, though it was "gradually gravitating towards that of a Dominion".

The States being "independent" entities could not be compelled to enter the Federation. Each State willing to join it was required to execute through its ruler an Instrument of Accession, which must be accepted by the Crown before it became a member of the Federation. The Federation was to be proclaimed by His Majesty when two conditions were satisfied: (1) an address in that behalf must be presented to the King by each House of Parliament, and (2) States which were entitled to choose not less than fifty-two members in the upper house of the Federal Legislature, and whose population was not less than one-half of the total population of the States, must accede to it.

As this portion of the Act dealing with the Federation was never actually brought into operation, we need not discuss it in detail and will only briefly describe its provisions. The Act provided for a "Federal Executive" of a diarchical nature consisting of two parts. One of these, in charge of "transferred departments", was to be responsible to the Legislature; and the other, dealing with specifically reserved departments like Foreign Affairs, Defence, etc., was to remain under the sole charge of the Governor-General, who was in these matters responsible only to the British Parliament. Even in those subjects which were to be handed over to the Ministers, the Governor-General was given special powers and responsibilities, and discretion to act on his own authority.

The Federal Legislature was to be a bicameral body consisting of a "Lower Chamber", known as the House of Assembly or the Federal Assembly, and an "Upper Chamber", known as the Council of State. The Lower Chamber was to consist of 250 representatives of British India and not more than 125 of the Indian States. The members of the Federal Assembly were to be elected not by popular constituencies, but by the Legislative Assemblies of the Provinces. Even in this indirect form of election, the General (Hindu), Muslim and Sikh seats were to be filled by the representatives of these communities in the Provincial Assemblies, voting separately for a prescribed number of seats for each community. The Council of State, or the Upper Chamber, was to consist of 156 members for British India and not more than 104 for the federating States. The State members were to be appointed by their respective rulers. Of the members for British India, six were to be nominated by the Governor-General so as to secure the due representation of the minority communities, depressed classes, and women, and the rest were to be directly, in a few cases indirectly, elected on a high franchise by communal electorates. The tenure of life of the Federal Assembly was to be for five years, but the Governor-General could dissolve it earlier at his discretion. The Council of State was to be a permanent body not subject to dissolution. The term of each member was not to exceed nine years, and one-third of the total number of members were to retire every three years. Barring some minor details, both the Chambers were to have co-ordinate powers in almost all respects, even in financial matters.

The character and shape of the Provincial Government were changed considerably by the Act of 1935. It made provision for redistribution of the Provinces, and two new Provinces were created—Sind, separated from the Bombay Presidency, and Orissa, comprising a portion of the territory of the old Province

of Bihār and Orissa, part of the Central Provinces, and certain areas of the Madras Presidency, inhabited by the Oriyās. Burma was separated from British India, and Aden also ceased to be a part of India. In all, there were now eleven Governors' Provinces and six Chief Commissioners' Provinces. The Chief Commissioners' Provinces were administered by the Governor-General through a Chief Commissioner appointed by him according to his discretion.

In the Governors' Provinces, diarchy was abolished and Provincial Autonomy introduced. The Act vested the executive authority of a Province in the Governor himself as the representative of the Crown. He was provided with a Council of Ministers to aid and advise him in the discharge of the functions conferred on him by the Act, in the entire sphere of provincial government, except in certain matters like law and order, etc., for which he had special responsibilities and which were in his sole discretion. The Ministers were to be appointed by the Governor normally from amongst the members of the local Legislature[1] and were to be responsible to it. In constituting the Ministry, the Governor was to pay due regard to the interests of minorities. The salaries of the Ministers would not vary during their term of office.

The Provincial Legislature consisted of the Governor as His Majesty's Representative, and one or two chambers. Madras, Bombay, Bengal, the United Provinces, Bihār and Assam, had each two chambers known as the Legislative Council and the Legislative Assembly; the rest of the Provinces, the Punjab, the Central Provinces and Berar, the North-West Frontier Province, Orissa and Sind, had each a single chamber known as the Legislative Assembly. The strength of the Legislative Assembly, or the lower chamber, varied from 50 to 250 members, all elected; and it was to sit for five years, though it might be dissolved earlier by the Governor. The electorate in every Province for choosing representatives of the Legislature was formed on the basis of communities and interests, according to the terms of the Communal Award of 4th August, 1932, as modified by the Poona Pact of the 25th September, 1932. Besides representatives of special electorates, certain seats out of the general ones were reserved for the "scheduled castes", that is, the so-called depressed classes. About 10 per cent of the total population of India was enfranchised by this Act, and women were given a wider franchise than was provided by the Act of

[1] Under the Act of 1919 the Ministers were recruited from among the elected members of the Legislature. But according to the Act of 1935 a nominated member of the Upper Chamber of the Legislature might be appointed a Minister.

1919. The Legislative Council, or the upper chamber, was a permanent body not subject to dissolution, but as near as might be one-third of its members were to retire every third year. It was formed on the same communal basis as the Legislative Assembly. The powers of the two Chambers were co-ordinate, except in the matter of voting certain grants to the Government and introducing financial bills, which were within the purview of the Legislative Assembly. If there were a difference of opinion between the two Chambers in regard to a Bill, the Governor had the power to convoke a joint session of the two Chambers and to form a decision according to the opinion of the majority of members of the joint meeting.

The Governor was invested with some extraordinary powers. Under certain conditions, he could refuse his assent to bills passed by the Legislature. He had the power to promulgate ordinances if, when the Legislature was not in session, he thought that circumstances rendered it necessary for him to take immediate action, and also to issue ordinances at any time with regard to certain subjects. These ordinances had the same force and effect as an Act of the Provincial Legislature during the prescribed period. Further, under certain conditions, the Governor could issue permanent Acts, known as Governor's Acts, either forthwith or after consulting the Legislature if it so pleased him. Again, in case of the failure of the constitutional machinery, the Governor might by proclamation "declare that his functions shall, to such extent as may be specified in the Proclamation, be exercised by him in his discretion". The Governor exercised these powers under the direction and control of the Governor-General and the British Parliament. Thus though the Act of 1935 had given autonomy to the Provinces in a large sphere of public administration, the special powers of the Governor were regarded as limitations on real responsible government. The constitutional provisions regarding the Provincial Governments came into force on the 1st April, 1937. In July, 1937, the Congress formed Ministries in the majority of the Governors' Provinces and remained in office till the closing months of 1939.

3. The Indian States

The constitutional problem of India continued to be very much complicated by the existence of the States as an outstanding feature in Indian political life. British paramountcy over the States was clearly asserted by Lord Curzon, Lord Minto II and Lord Hardinge II, though in view of the disturbed political situation in India after the

Bengal Partition agitation and the difficulties of the 1914–18 War respectively, Lord Minto II and Lord Hardinge II adopted a more conciliatory attitude towards the States and tried to secure greater co-operation from them. When investing the Mahārājā of Jodhpur with ruling powers on the 26th February, 1916, Lord Hardinge II described the Indian princes as "helpers and colleagues in the great task of imperial rule".

Later this policy was manifested in two ways. One was the development of the Imperial Service Troops (maintained by the States and trained by British officers), which had their beginnings in the days of Lord Dufferin (1884–1888) and rendered valuable services to the cause of the British Empire, especially during the First World War. The other was the growth of a consultative body composed of representatives of different States. Attempts to constitute such a body had been made before by Lord Lytton, Lord Curzon, Lord Minto II and Lord Hardinge II, and its importance was further realised by Lord Chelmsford after the First World War. The Montagu-Chelmsford Report made a definite recommendation for such a body, and accordingly the Chamber of Princes was set up by the Crown by a Royal Proclamation on the 8th February, 1921. The Chamber of Princes was a consultative and not an executive body, consisting of representatives of different classes of States, with the Viceroy as its President and a Chancellor and a Pro-Chancellor elected annually from among the members. The Viceroy could consult its Standing Committee freely in matters relating to the territories of the Indian States generally on those problems which concerned British India and the States in common. The Chamber, however, could not deal with the internal affairs of Indian States or their rulers, or their relations with the Crown, or interfere in any way with the existing rights or engagements of the States or restrict their freedom of action.

At the same time, the growth of paramountcy and the right claimed to interfere in the internal affairs of the States were not to the liking of the rulers of the States, who became more touchy on this point owing to the gradual Indianisation of the Government of India. They also began to demand a share in the formulation of the tariff policy and the collection of the customs revenue. So in December, 1927, the Secretary of State appointed the Indian States Committee, popularly known as the Butler Committee, after the name of its Chairman, Sir Harcourt Butler,[1] to investigate the relationship between the Paramount Power and the Indian States

[1] Formerly Governor in succession of the United Provinces and of Burma, and previously a member of the Governor-General's Council.

and to make recommendations for the adjustment of economic and financial relations between British India and the Indian States. The Committee reported early in 1929 and along with several recommendations recorded its strong opinion "that, in view of the historical nature of the relationship between the Paramount Power and the Princes, the latter should not be transferred without their own agreement to a relationship with a new Government in India responsible to an Indian legislature". The recommendations of the Committee were criticised on the ground that they were not in consonance with the spirit of the times and did not make the relations between the two halves of India "harmonious and satisfactory".

But sober opinion on both sides soon realised the necessity of a closer association between the Indian States and British India in a federation, as both were intimately interrelated in various ways. The Nehru Committee in 1928 and the Indian Statutory Commission emphasised this point. We have already noted how the Government of India Act, 1935, provided for the accession of the States to the proposed Federation.


CHAPTER VII

INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION AND GENERAL CONDITION, 1906–1938

1. General Review

THE POLITICAL agitation which followed upon the Partition of Bengal by Lord Curzon gradually assumed a revolutionary character. Apart from the growth of a radical section in the Congress, and the movement for boycotting foreign goods by way of protest against the Partition, secret societies grew up in various parts of India with the avowed object of collecting arms and manufacturing bombs to do away with certain types of officials and, if possible, to organize an armed insurrection. There was a "general state of serious unrest" not only in Bengal but even in distant Provinces like the Punjab and Madras, and Government adopted strong measures. Laws were passed which put severe restrictions on popular movements as well as on the Press and public meetings. Some of the leading figures were deported without trial. Others were hanged or transported for life, and a large number, including notable leaders like Tilak, were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. But even these severe measures could not check the murders and outrages, and ultimately the Government decided to modify Lord Curzon's measure. The despatch of the Government of India on the subject, dated the 25th August, 1911, testified to the bitterness of feeling engendered by the Partition. It also frankly recognised the "substantial grievance" of the Bengalis "who found themselves outnumbered in the legislatures of both the Provinces of Bengal and Eastern Bengal", and the "growing estrangement, which had assumed a very serious character in many parts of the country, between Mahommedans and Hindus."

The accession of King George V was followed by a *Durbar* in Delhi held by the King and Queen in person in December, 1911. His Majesty made two famous announcements in the *Durbar*. One was the creation of the Presidency of Bengal under a Governor. Bihār, Orissa and Chota Nāgpur were separated from it and formed into a Province under a Lieutenant-Governor, while Assam was restored as a Chief-Commissionership. (Both were subsequently placed under Governors.) The other was the transfer of the capital of India from



DELHI DURBAR, 1911

Calcutta to Delhi. The Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, was severely criticised for recommending these measures, but time to a large extent justified his policy. Although terrorist outrages were not stamped out altogether, there was a considerable improvement in the general situation, and feelings against the British grew much less bitter.

This was abundantly demonstrated in less than three years' time, for the outbreak of the World War in 1914 put the loyalty of India to a stern test, and she acquitted herself in a way which won her the gratitude of Britain and the admiration of the world. Her people and Princes ungrudgingly placed their resources at the disposal of the Government, and Indian soldiers fought with bravery and won distinction in various theatres of war in Europe, Africa and Western Asia. Even in the first few months of the war nearly 300,000 were sent overseas to fight on different fronts, and India supplied England with "70,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, 60,000 rifles of the latest type, and more than 550 guns." During the course of the war more than 800,000 combatants and 400,000 non-combatants were recruited on a voluntary basis. India's contribution in material was also almost equally important. Apart from munitions, her cotton, jute, iron, steel, wolfram, manganese, mica, saltpetre, rubber, skins, petroleum, tea and wheat, were of great help to the Allies. India also made financial contributions to her utmost capacity. Although her troops were employed outside her borders, she paid the normal expenditure for their maintenance, which varied between 20 and 30 million pounds sterling per annum. She also paid the cost of an additional force of 300,000 men and made a free gift of £100,000,000 sterling to the British Government. These heavy payments involved India in currency difficulties of a serious nature for many years.

England fully recognised the generous services of India. Apart from the constitutional changes of 1919, described above, Indians were admitted to the War Cabinet and the Imperial Conference. Mr. S. P. Sinha was made a peer and appointed Under-Secretary of State for India. Indians were admitted to King's Commissions in the army. A Territorial Force and a University Training Corps were organised. When the League of Nations was established India became one of its foundation members.

2. Local Self-Government

WHATEVER might have been the intentions of Lord Ripon, his reforms in the sphere of local self-government did not make it free from official control, and, as the Indian Statutory Commission

observed in 1929, "no real attempt was made to inaugurate a system amenable to the will of the local inhabitants". These defects were clearly recognised by the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, and Lord Chelmsford's Government issued a Resolution on the 16th May, 1918, declaring the "policy of the gradual removal of unnecessary Government control and of differentiating the spheres of action appropriate for Government and for local bodies respectively". It was proposed to make these bodies as representative as possible, to remove unnecessary restrictions regarding taxation, the budget and the sanction of works, to bring the franchise as low as possible and to replace nominated Chairmen by elected non-officials. This Resolution also emphasised the importance of developing the corporate life of the village.

In 1921 local self-government became a Transferred subject in charge of Ministers. The Municipalities and Local Boards were vested with enhanced powers and functions, were freed comparatively from official control, became responsible to an enlarged electorate, and came to have elected Chairmen except under extraordinary conditions when expert guidance became necessary. The Provincial Governments began to evince great zeal and interest for the progress of local institutions, and passed several Acts modifying their nature in the cities and the villages to suit modern conditions. It is of course true that the local bodies have not worked satisfactorily in all cases. But this is not because the people are incapable of self-government, but is, as the Central Committee rightly pointed out, "the inevitable result of the suddenness with which the transition from official tutelage to complete freedom was made".

One notable feature of local self-government in modern times is the institution of Improvement Trusts in important cities like Bombay, Calcutta, Lucknow, Allahābād, Cawnpore and Rangoon, which have undertaken important activities to improve local sanitation.

3. The Public Services

During the early years of the twentieth century Indians continued to agitate for a greater share in the Public Services. In September, 1912, a Royal Commission on the Public Services in India was appointed, with Lord Islington as Chairman. Among the members of the Commission were the late Mr. G. K. Gokhale, Lord Ronaldshay (later Lord Zetland), Sir Valentine Chirol, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, Mr. Herbert Fisher, later Warden of New College, Oxford, and Sir 'Abdur Rahīm. Owing to the outbreak

of the First World War, the publication of this Commission's report was deferred till 1917. It recommended that besides the recruitment of Indians to the I.C.S. through the London examination, 25 per cent of the posts in the Superior Civil Service should be filled from among Indians partly by direct recruitment and partly by promotion from the lower service. To make the working of this scheme possible, it also recommended the holding of an examination in India for the recruitment of civilians, thus conceding to the Indians in a changed form what they had been demanding for more than half a century.

The authors of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report took a more liberal and sympathetic view than the Islington Commission, on the question of Indianising the Indian Civil Service. They proposed that (1) "33 per cent of the superior posts should be recruited for in India, and that this percentage should be increased by $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent annually" until the situation was revised by a Commission; (2) that all racial distinctions in the matter of appointments should be abolished; and (3) that "for all the Public Services, for which there is recruitment in England open to Europeans and Indians alike, there must be a system of appointment in India". For about four years, the principle laid down in the Montagu-Chelmsford Report was followed in the matter of recruiting Indians. But the members of the Superior Services became rather perturbed at the growing Indianisation of the Services. Accordingly, pursuant to the recommendation of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, the Secretary of State in Council introduced a scheme under which All-India officers, selected for appointment before 1st January, 1920, and not permanently employed under the Government of India, were allowed to retire, before the completion of the normal period of service, on a pension proportionate to their length of service.

But certain difficulties regarding the Services continued, for the solution of which a Royal Commission was appointed in June, 1923, with Lord Lee of Fareham as its Chairman. The Lee Commission submitted its report in 1924 and most of its recommendations were accepted and put into force by the Government. The Commission recommended that All-India officers of the Indian Civil Service, the Indian Police Service, the Irrigation Branch of the Service of Engineers and the Indian Forest Service should continue to be appointed and controlled by the Secretary of State in Council, while the services in the Transferred departments should be controlled by Provincial Governments, excepting the Indian Medical Service, for which each Province was to appoint in its civil medical department a certain number of officers lent by the

Medical Department of the Army in India. As regards Indianisation of Services which were still to be controlled by the Secretary of State, the Commission recommended that 20 per cent of the officers should be recruited by promotion from Provincial Civil Services, and of the remaining 80 per cent half should be British and half Indian. It calculated that by following this principle there would be in 1939 equal numbers of Europeans and Indians in the Superior Civil Service posts. But this calculation was wrong, and the Simon Commission pointed out that the number of Indians in Superior Civil Service posts was likely to be 643 as against 715 Europeans on the 1st January, 1939. As provided by the Government of India Act, 1919, the Lee Commission recommended the immediate establishment of a Public Service Commission. Such a Commission, composed of five whole-time members, was appointed in 1925. Further, after 1922 certain officers in the Indian Civil Service were recruited on the result of a competitive examination held every year in India.

Part X of the Government of India Act, 1935, defined the rights and status of the civil and military officers in the Provinces and the proposed Federation and guaranteed their existing privileges regarding pay, promotion, leave, pension, etc. It also provided for the establishment of a Federal Public Service Commission and Provincial Public Service Commissions; but two or more Provinces might "agree that one Commission shall serve a group or that all the Provinces shall use one Commission". The functions of the Commissions were purely advisory. They could only recommend names, which the Ministers, at least in some cases, might accept or reject.

4. The Judiciary

The year 1861 saw the establishment of High Courts in Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, in which were amalgamated the previously existing Supreme Courts and Sadar Courts. At least one-third of the judges of the High Courts were to be recruited from Her Majesty's Civil Service in India, another one-third from among barristers of England or advocates of Scotland, and the rest might be recruited from among the pleaders of the High Courts or the officers of the subordinate judiciary. The Chief Justices of the High Courts were to be appointed from among the barristers of England or advocates of Scotland. On the strength of the Indian High Courts Act of 1911, High Courts were established at Patna, Lahore and Rangoon. The elimination of the Civilian element from the bench had been demanded by Indian

public opinion. But the arrangement provided by the Government of India Act, 1935, did not satisfy this demand. It abolished the old proportional arrangement and laid down that judges would be appointed, according to convenience, from these three classes but "not necessarily in the old proportion" and thus held out greater advantage in this respect for members of the Indian Civil Service than what existed before. Further, the old rule of appointing the Chief Justices exclusively from among barristers or advocates was modified to the extent that they now might be recruited either from among the pleaders of High Courts or from among the officers of the Indian Civil Service.

Another change in the Judiciary was necessitated by the proposed Federation. Sections 200 and 203 of the Government of India Act, 1935, provided for the creation of a Federal Court, which was normally to be located at Delhi and was to consist of a Chief Justice and not more than six puisne judges. The judges were to be appointed by the Crown and were to hold office till the age of sixty-five. The Federal Court was to have original jurisdiction in cases of constitutional disputes between one Province and another, between a Province and a federated State, and between a Province and the Federal authorities. It would also hear appeals from the High Courts provided the latter certified that the cases related to a fundamental question of law regarding the interpretation of the Government of India Act or any Order in Council made under it.

The Federal Court was constituted on October 1, 1937.

5. Police and Jails

The Police system established by the Police Act of 1861 revealed grave defects in actual working, chiefly because the responsible task of maintaining law and order was entrusted to rather untrained and consequently irresponsible persons. A Police Commission was appointed in 1902 to investigate the state of police administration. The Commission made comprehensive recommendations regarding different aspects of police organisation, which were accepted in the main by the Government with some minor modifications in matters of detail. This Commission created specialised police agencies, known as Criminal Investigation Departments, in each Province for the investigation of "specialist and professional" crimes. Also a Central Intelligence Bureau under the Home Department of the Government of India was formed to collect information from all provincial Criminal Investigation Departments, and to work for inter-provincial liaison.

Strictly speaking, no Indian or All-India police was created. The police established by the Act of 1861 became an essentially provincial organisation, administered by the Local Government concerned, and not subject to the general control of the Central Government. At the head of the police organisation in each Province was placed an Inspector-General of Police with general control over it. Deputy Inspector-Generals were given subordinate charges of portions of the Province. At the head of each district was appointed a District Superintendent of Police, having under him Inspectors of Police, Sub-Inspectors and Constables in subordinate charges called sub-divisions and *thānās*. In villages provision was made for *chowkidārs* or watchmen, who were not to get stipends but were to receive perquisites from the residents of the village, or rent-free lands, or small sums of money from the Government. In the Presidency towns like Calcutta, Bombay and Madras, was stationed a unified police force under the Police Commissioner, acting not under the provincial Inspector-General but dealing directly with the Government and responsible for law and order and for departmental training and efficiency.

There is no doubt that the police organisation still requires thorough-going reforms. One thing essentially needed is that the "morale and intelligence" of the police officers shall be improved so that they may exercise their authority with more discretion. The recruitment of a number of literate police constables, during recent years, and employment of Home Guards for local watch and ward, are encouraging features.

Jail administration in India came to be regulated in modern times by the Indian Prisons Act of 1894 and by rules issued under it by the Government of India and the Provincial Governments. Three types of jails were established,—Central, District and Subsidiary. In each Province the Jail Department was placed under the control of an Inspector-General of Prisons, who was generally to be a member of the Indian Medical Service with jail experience. The Central Jails were under Superintendents, who also came to be recruited from the same Service and to be assisted in large Central Jails by Deputy Superintendents. A District Jail came under the charge of a Civil Surgeon, with subordinate staff composed of jailors, deputy and assistant jailors, and warders. Many big cities were provided with Reformatory Schools, administered since 1899 by the Education Department.

The Government of India appointed a Jails Committee in 1919 with a view to reforming jail administration. This Committee made a comprehensive survey of Indian prison administration and

emphasised "the necessity of improving and increasing existing jail accommodation; of recruiting a better class of warders; of providing education for prisoners; and of developing prison industries so as to meet the needs of the consuming Departments of Governments". It also recommended the separation of Civil from Criminal offenders and the creation of Children's Courts, and drew particular attention to the reformative side of the system. The Provincial Governments have tried to carry out these recommendations more or less.

Under the Government of India Act, 1919, the maintenance of prisons fell within the sphere of Provincial Governments, subject, however, to all-India legislation. With the introduction of Provincial Autonomy from the 1st April, 1937, jail administration became a Provincial subject and the power of legislation in this respect was vested in the Provincial Governments, the Central Government exercising only concurrent law-making powers with the Provincial Governments as regards the transfer of prisoners and criminals from one unit to another.

6. The Military System and Defence

During the viceroyalty of Lord Curzon, a significant change took place in the Army administration. Till then the Commander-in-Chief was an Extraordinary Member of the Governor-General's Executive Council. But there was also on this body a Military Member as the "constitutional adviser of the Viceroy on all questions relating to the Army". The Commander-in-Chief had to introduce his proposals and schemes before the Council through the Military Member, who was an officer of lower rank than himself. Lord Kitchener, Commander-in-Chief of India since November, 1902, condemned this system as a "military solecism involving, moreover, great expense and delay". He advocated the abolition of the Military Member, and sought to make the Commander-in-Chief the sole military adviser to the Government of India. But Lord Curzon opposed it on the ground that the military must be held subordinate to the civil power. This controversy led to the resignation of the Viceroy in August, 1905. The British Cabinet decided in favour of Lord Kitchener and made a compromise which, however, proved unworkable within a short period and was consequently abrogated. After 1909 the Commander-in-Chief was the sole military adviser of the Government of India, but in the opinion of many publicists Lord Curzon's standpoint was reasonable and just. The next higher authority, above the Commander-in-Chief, in military

administration was the Governor-General-in-Council, who had to pay due regard to all orders received from the Secretary of State in regard to the Defence Administration in India. The Secretary of State, as one of His Majesty's Ministers, had special responsibility and authority in this matter.

The problem of Indian defence has been one of the burning topics of modern Indian politics. With the progress of the Nationalist Movement in India, her people demanded a definite control over the defence administration, and political leaders insistently complained against the heavy Army expenditure, which, in their opinion, should be diverted to "nation-building" activities, The Montagu-Chelmsford Report, after praising the brilliant and faithful services of the Indian Army during the First World War. emphasised "the necessity of grappling with the problem" of Indianising it further. The Nehru Report advocated the transfer of control over the Indian Army to the Ministers. The Skeen Committee, appointed in June, 1925, with Major-General (afterwards General) Sir Andrew Skeen, the then Chief-of-Staff of the Army in India, as Chairman, and commonly known as the "Indian Sandhurst Committee", recommended the abolition of the "eight units scheme", which had been announced in 1923 by Lord Rawlinson, the then Commander-in-Chief in India, and the establishment of an Indian "Sandhurst" by 1933. These recommendations were not fully carried out. The Indian Statutory Commission considered the "cardinal problem" of national defence from different points of view, and insisted on the presence of the British element in the Indian Army on three considerations—frontier defence, internal security and obligations to the Indian States. It observed that "the control of an Army including a British element cannot be made over to an Indian Legislature" and that "the evolution of an entirely Indian military force capable of undertaking unaided the tasks now discharged by the Army in India, must be a very slow process indeed". No "substantial change" was made in the matter of India's defence by the Government of India Act, 1935.

As regards the organisation of the Army, we may note that the Command system introduced by Lord Kitchener in 1904 was abolished by him in 1907, when the Indian Army was divided into two sections, the Northern and the Southern. The war of 1914–18, during which Indian troops of all descriptions rendered valuable services, showed the defects of this system, and it was reorganised after the war was over. The Indian territory was divided into four commands, subdivided into fourteen districts, each district containing a certain

number of brigade commands. One of these, the Western Command, was abolished on the 1st November, 1938.

The defence forces of India consisted in 1939 of the Regular Army, including units from the British Army; the Auxiliary Force, the membership of which was limited to European British subjects; the Territorial Force, composed of three main categories, provincial battalions, urban units and the University Training Corps Units; the Royal Air Force from October, 1932; and the Royal Indian Marine, designated as the Royal Indian Navy from October, 1934. There were also the Indian State Forces, formerly known as the Imperial Service Troops, raised and maintained by the rulers of States at their own cost and for State service.

There were two main categories of officers in the Indian Army, those holding the King's Commission and those holding the Viceroy's Commission. The latter were all Indians having a limited status and power of command. As for the King's Commission, Indians had been eligible for it since 1918 in three ways (*a*) by qualifying themselves as cadets at the Royal Military College at Sandhurst, and the Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun (opened in October, 1932), (*b*) by the selection of efficient Indian officers or promotion of non-commissioned officers of regiments from the ranks, and (*c*) by the award of honorary King's Commissions to officers who cannot qualify themselves for these on account of their advanced age or lack of education. In 1932 the Government announced its intention of Indianising a Division of all Arms and a Cavalry Brigade. Another important stage in the Indianisation of the Indian Army was marked by the passing of the Indian Army (Amendment) Act by the Central Legislature during its autumn session of 1934. According to this measure, officers commissioned from the Indian Military Academy would enjoy legal status and would be designated as "Indian Commissioned officers".

Important steps were taken during succeeding years to bring the equipment and organisation of the defence forces of India into line with modern conditions. In September, 1939, the recommendations of the Chatfield Committee were published. Provision was made for a gift of thirty-three and a half crores by the United Kingdom for bringing about the desired reforms, and a loan of eleven and three-quarter crores free of interest was also provided for. The establishment of British troops was to be reduced by about 25 per cent. The Army was to be distributed on the following basis, namely, frontier defence, internal security, coast defence and general reserve. Provision was also made for light tanks and armoured cars and for motor transport. Artillery regiments

were to be mechanised and better equipped with guns. The Air Force was to be provided with bomber squadrons, flights for coast defence and for co-operation with the army. The Royal Indian Navy was to be strengthened by vessels of the newest type. Ordnance factories were to be reconstructed and expanded.

7. Financial Administration

To Lord Mayo's Government belongs the credit for taking the first important step towards financial decentralisation in India by giving to each Provincial Government a fixed grant for the maintenance of certain definite services, such as police, jails, education and the medical services, with powers, under certain financial rules, to allocate the revenues assigned to them at their discretion and to provide for extra expenditure by economising, or, if necessary, by raising local taxes. The next significant step in this direction was taken in 1877 during the Viceroyalty of Lord Lytton, when, as we have already noted, certain important heads of revenue were provincialised, while the responsibility of Provinces as regards expenditure was extended to the departments of land revenue, general administration, and law and justice. Settlements on these lines were made in 1882 and 1897 with, however, no change of principle in any case.

A departure was made in 1904 with the introduction of "the system of quasi-permanent settlements" under which assignments of revenues made to Provincial Governments were definitely fixed and were not subject to change by the Central Government except under extraordinary circumstances. Something more was gained by the Provinces a little later by the introduction of the famine insurance scheme, according to which a fixed amount was placed by the Government of India to the credit of each Provincial Government, which the latter could utilise in case of famine without touching its normal resources. In 1917 the famine relief expenditure was made a divided head, the expenses being borne by the Central and Provincial Governments in the proportion of three to one.

No radical change in financial relations between the Centre and the Provinces was proposed by the Royal Commission on Decentralisation in India appointed in 1908. But in 1912 Lord Hardinge's Government made the financial settlements permanent, reduced the fixed provincial assignments and increased the share of the Provinces in the growing revenues. The restrictions on the financial powers of the Provincial Governments were still very stringent. The Montagu-Chelmsford Report pointed out how

seriously the existing financial arrangements operated "as an obstacle to provincial enfranchisement" and suggested a wider degree of financial devolution. Accordingly a Committee, known as the Financial Relations Committee, was appointed, with Lord Meston, who had been Lieutenant-Governor of the United Provinces and the Finance Member of the Governor-General's Executive Council, as Chairman. The scheme set up according to the recommendations of this Committee, with slight modifications made by the Joint Select Committee of Parliament, is known as the Meston Award. It avoided, as far as possible, divided heads of revenue. To make the financial relations between the Central and Provincial Governments clear and definite, certain sources of income, such as Land Revenue, Excise, Irrigation, Forests, Judicial Stamps and Registration Fees and Minerals, were made Provincial, while sources like Customs Duty, Income Tax, Railway Revenues, Posts and Telegraphs, Salt and Opium were reserved for the Central Government. Total abolition of the divided heads was not possible and it was laid down that the Provinces should receive some share in the increase of revenue from income tax. The contributions to be made by the Provincial Governments to meet the Central deficit, varying in amount, were also fixed, their total being a little less than ten crores of rupees. The Province of Bihār and Orissa was not required to make any contribution at all. The Provinces protested against these contributions, which, being consequently reduced in amount in successive stages, finally disappeared from the Budget in 1928–1929.

With the beginning of attempts for the introduction of the proposed Federal Constitution, the important question of the distribution of revenues between the Central Government and the Provincial Governments was considered by the India Statutory Commission (Layton Report), by a sub-committee of the Federal Structure Committee under the chairmanship of Lord Peel, and by a Federal Finance Committee with Lord Eustace Percy as its Chairman. The Government of India Act, 1935, provided a composite financial arrangement, based on the findings of the above-mentioned bodies. A classification was made of the sources of revenue as Federal and Provincial in separate lists. The following taxes were to be levied and collected by the Federal Government: (*i*) Duties in respect of succession to property other than agricultural land, (*ii*) Stamp duties in respect of bills of exchange, cheques, promissory notes, bills of lading, letters of credit, policies of insurance, proxies and receipts, (*iii*) Terminal taxes on goods or passengers carried by railway and air, (*iv*) Taxes on railway fares

and freights, (*v*) Taxes on income, excluding corporation taxes (that is, a tax on the profits of companies), (*vi*) Salt excise and export duties.

The net proceeds of some of these duties and taxes, such as the income tax, duties on jute export, etc., were to be distributed, under certain conditions, among the Provinces and the Federal States within which these had been collected. The Federal Legislature was, however, competent to levy a surcharge on these duties and taxes and to appropriate the proceeds for Federal purposes. The Secretary of State appointed a financial expert, Sir Otto Niemeyer, to determine the terms of the financial settlement between the Central and Provincial Governments. His report, published in April, 1936, was accepted and its main recommendations were: (*i*) To enable all the Provinces to possess adequate financial resources on the inauguration of the new Constitution on 1st April, 1937, certain Provinces to be given cash subventions, (*ii*) some Provinces should be granted relief in the form of cancellation of debts incurred prior to 1st April, 1936, (*iii*) twelve and a half per cent of the jute tax should be distributed among the jute-growing Provinces, and (*iv*) subject to certain conditions, half of the income tax should be assigned to the Provinces beginning from five years after the inauguration of Provincial Autonomy. This scheme did not satisfactorily solve the fundamental problem of Indian finance by giving adequate funds to the Provinces for their relief or added strength. In order to secure financial stability, the Reserve Bank Act was passed in 1934 and the Bank began operations in 1935.

Land revenue is the main source of revenue of the Provinces. It is partly in the nature of a rent and partly a tax. In recent times attempts had been made to bring it under the effective control of the Legislature, and with the inauguration of Provincial Autonomy the new Legislatures in the Provinces paid much attention towards revising land revenue administration. The Socialists demanded the abolition of the Zamindārī system, and some new Governments in the Provinces also want to enforce it.

8. Communications and Public Works

A. Railways

Under the new Guarantee System (1879-1900), most of the railways were acquired or purchased by the State on the expiry of the respective periods of contract with the companies concerned.

But the management was left to the companies, subject to Government control, exercised through the Railway Board, which was created in 1905. The fourteen years before the First World War were marked by a rapid extension of railways and a beginning of railway profits. But during the period 1914–1921, there was a setback, partly due to wartime pressure on them and partly due to the decrease of the annual programme of capital expenditure.

After the introduction of the reforms of 1919, a Committee was appointed, with the late Sir William Acworth as its Chairman, to investigate into the working of the railways and recommend a suitable policy for their further development. The Committee recommended an expenditure of 150 crores of rupees every five years on improving the railways; and its majority report definitely favoured State management of the railways and construction of new lines by State agency. The Committee also recommended the creation of a new department of communications, reorganisation of railway boards, establishment of a Railway Rates Tribunal, and separation of the railway budget from the general budget. It should be noted that Indian public opinion has always been opposed to company management of railways, not only because their profits thereby went out of India but also because the companies were considered to be unsympathetic towards Indian national interests. Though the Government of India did not definitely accept the recommendation of the majority report regarding the ending of company management, yet under the pressure of Indian opinion it ultimately took under its direct management the East Indian Railway (1st January, 1925), the Great Indian Peninsular Railway (30th June, 1925), the Burma Railways (1st January, 1929) and the Southern Punjab Railway (1st January, 1930). The Government began to undertake all new construction of railways. The Railway Board was also reorganised. As constituted in 1936, it had the Chief Commissioner as President, the Financial Commissioner and three other members. The Rates Advisory Committee was created in 1926, and the Central Publicity Bureau of the Railway Board was started on the 1st April, 1927. In accordance with the recommendation of the Acworth Committee, railway finance was separated from the general Budget from 1925.

B. Roads

Progressive decentralisation, and the growth of local self-government, have afforded considerable stimulus to road development. More attention has also been recently paid to the need

for co-ordination of rail-road transport, and this question was discussed in 1933 by a specially convened Road-Rail Conference at Simla. A special Road Development Committee was appointed in 1927 to consider the road problems of India. In accordance with its recommendations, the import and excise duties on motor spirit were increased from four to six annas per gallon in March, 1929, the additional duty being earmarked for expenditure on road development; the Standing Committee of the Indian Legislature on Roads was created in the following April; and the All-India Road Conferences began to be convened from time to time.

C. Water Transport

The importance of Water Transport has decreased in modern times, owing to the construction of railways. The water transport of India falls into two divisions: Inland water transport, facilitated by the river systems of Northern India, and Marine transport along India's extensive coastline. In 1918 the Industrial Commission emphasised the need of co-ordinating railway and waterway administrations in order to relieve railway congestion and meet the requirements of small-scale transport. For several reasons, the position of India's shipping and ship-building industries had become unsatisfactory. The need of developing an Indian Mercantile Marine was keenly felt, and, on the recommendation of the Marine Mercantile Committee (1923), the Government provided a training ship, the I.M.M. *T. S. Dufferin*, for Indian cadets.

D. Irrigation

Irrigation works have a special importance in an agricultural country like India, where the rainfall is unequally distributed throughout the seasons and is liable to failure or serious deficiency. The famines of 1896 and 1901 clearly showed the need and importance of protective irrigation works. Lord Curzon appointed a Commission on Irrigation in 1901, which submitted its report in 1903. A new chapter in the irrigation policy of the Government was opened by the recommendations of this Commission. Among other things, it specially recommended the possible extension of the scope of productive, especially protective irrigation works for the Deccan districts of Bombay, Madras, the Central Provinces and Bundelkhand. It sketched out a rough programme of irrigation works for the next twenty years, adding 6½ million acres to the irrigated area at an estimated cost of £30,000,000.

There are three classes of irrigation works in India: (*i*) Wells, (*ii*) Tanks, and (*iii*) Canals. The canals are of three kinds: (*a*) Perennial canals, (*b*) Inundation canals, and (*c*) Storage works. Since 1921 irrigation works have been classified under two main heads: (*i*) Productive, and (*ii*) Unproductive, with a third class covering areas irrigated by non-capital works.


After the reforms of 1919, irrigation became a Provincial subject. The Provincial Governments have shown much activity regarding irrigation works, and the important measures that have been undertaken in this direction, are: (*i*) The Sutlej Valley project in the Punjab, completed in 1933, (*ii*) the Sukkur Barrage in Sind, completed in 1932, (*iii*) the Kāverī Reservoir and Mettur project, completed in 1934, (*iv*) the Nizāmasgar project, completed in 1934, (*v*) the Sarda-Oudh canals in the United Provinces, and (*vi*) the Lloyd Dam in Bombay, completed in 1926, which is one of the largest masses of masonry in the world.

9. Agriculture, Rural Indebtedness and Rural Reconstruction, and the Co-operative Movement

A. Agriculture

As a result of the recommendations of the Famine Commission of 1880, agricultural departments were started in the various Provinces. In 1901 an Inspector-General of Agriculture was appointed to advise the Imperial and Provincial Governments. This post was abolished in 1912, and its duties were transferred to the Director of the Agricultural Research Institute at Pusa, who was until 1929 Agricultural Adviser to the Government of India. The present Departments of Agriculture, however, owe their existence to Lord Curzon, whose famous despatch of 1903 marked the beginning of a reorganisation in 1905. The Pusa Institute was started in 1903, together with a college to provide for advanced agricultural training. An All-India Board of Agriculture was established in 1905 with a view to bringing the Provincial Governments more in touch with one another and making suitable recommendations to the Government of India. The Indian Agricultural Service was constituted in 1906. An agricultural college was founded at Poona in 1908 and similar colleges were started in subsequent years at Cawnpore, Nāgpur, Lyallpur, Coimbatore, and Māndālay.

With the introduction of the reforms of 1919, agriculture became a Transferred subject under a Minister, though the Government



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of India retained responsibility for central research institutions and for certain affairs relating to the diseases and pests of plants and animals. The Royal Commission on Agriculture (Linlithgow Commission) authoritatively reviewed the position of agriculture in India and reported in 1928. Having duly recognised the work done by the agricultural departments, the Commission stressed the enormous possibilities for future work and made comprehensive recommendations regarding the different problems of agriculture. On its recommendation, an important step was taken in July, 1929, by the establishment of the Imperial Council of Agricultural Research, whose primary function was to promote, guide and co-ordinate agricultural, including veterinary, research in India and to extend help in these matters to the Provincial departments of agriculture. The Central Banking Enquiry Committee (1931) recommended that a Provincial Board of Economic Enquiry should be established in each Province to supply the Government with the information it requires to be able to pursue a constructive agricultural policy. Sir John Russell and R. Wright, who subsequently reviewed the progress of agricultural research work in India, made, in their report, important recommendations to bridge the gulf between the research worker and the cultivator. These were examined by a special Sub-Committee of the Imperial Council of Agricultural Research. The Government of India declared their intention to extend further help to the agriculturists by providing better facilities for credit and for the marketing of agricultural produce. A central marketing section was started under the Imperial Council of Agricultural Research. It worked in collaboration with the marketing staff in the different Provinces.

B. Rural Indebtedness and Rural Reconstruction

Closely connected with agriculture is the serious problem of heavy rural indebtedness in modern India. As the Central Banking Enquiry Committee reported in 1931, the total agricultural indebtedness of the Provinces in British India was about 900 crores of rupees. The greater part of the rural debt, contracted at exorbitant rates of interest, is unproductive. The Government adopted certain measures, from time to time, to deal with this problem. The Usurious Loans Act, consolidated and amended in 1918, tried to determine the legal maximum amount of interest recoverable. The Royal Commission on Agriculture recommended regulation of money-lending, and some of the Provincial Banking Enquiry Committees recommended licensing of money-lenders.

Land Alienation Acts were passed in order to restrict the transfer of land. For example, the Punjab Land Alienation Act (1900) prohibited non-agricultural classes from buying land from agriculturists or taking land on mortgage for more than twenty years.

In recent times rural reconstruction claimed an increasing amount of attention both from the Government and the Congress. Mr. F. L. Brayne, I.C.S., tried, as Commissioner for Rural Reconstruction, an important experiment in rural uplift in the Gurgāon District of the Punjab. A similar appointment was made in Bengal. In the Central Provinces and Berar the local government carried on similar work from November, 1929. During the latter part of 1933 His Excellency Sir Frederick Sykes, the then Governor of Bombay, initiated a comprehensive scheme of village reconstruction, the work of which was carried on by District Committees under the guidance of the District Collectors. The Government of India also took an interest in the work of rural reconstruction and granted in 1935–1936 over two crores of rupees for this purpose. The Co-operative Movement in India also aims at solving the problem of rural indebtedness.

C. The Co-operative Movement

Frederick Nicholson, a Madras civilian, first suggested in his Report (1892) to the Madras Government the introduction of co-operative credit societies in India. In 1901 the Government of India appointed a Committee to consider the question of the establishment of agricultural banks in India, and after the Committee submitted its report, the Co-operative Credit Societies Act was passed by the Imperial Legislative Council in 1904. It provided for the starting of rural as well as urban credit societies. Thus the Co-operative Movement was inaugurated in India on the 24th March, 1904. The movement showed remarkable progress in every Province within a few years. It received a fresh impetus by the Amending Act of 1912, which granted recognition to non-credit societies, central financing societies, and unions. The Maclagan Committee (1914–1915) made some valuable recommendations for the organisation of co-operative finance. After the reforms of 1919, co-operation became a Provincial subject and the local governments were left free to adapt the Act of 1912 to their own requirements. There are three parts in the financial structure of the Co-operative Movement: (i) The Agricultural Credit Society, (ii) Central Financing Agencies, and (iii) Provincial Co-operative

Banks. The question of the relief of old debts of agriculturists, through long-term credit, led to the establishment of a special type of bank, known as the Land Mortgage Bank, in some Provinces.

But the Co-operative Movement passed through a very critical stage during recent years, owing partly to the fall of agricultural prices and general economic decline and partly to some defects in its working. In spite of all that has been done, the poverty and indebtedness of the Indian masses are still appalling problems in Indian economic life, like the problem of unemployment among the middle classes (into which investigations were carried on by specially appointed committees, the most important being the Sapru Committee which submitted its report in 1935), in some Provinces like Bengal, Madras, Bombay, the Punjab, U.P. and Bihār, and in some of the Indian States. The solution of these problems is vitally necessary, though the stupendous and perplexing character of the task cannot be denied.

10. Famine Relief

As noted above (p. 871), important recommendations about the principles of famine relief in India were made by the Famine Commission of 1880, which had as its Chairman Sir Richard Strachey. Reference has also been made to the subsequent famines, in 1896–7 and again in 1899–1900, and the Commissions appointed on both these occasions. The last Commission, with Sir Antony MacDonnell as its President, which reported in 1901, stressed the need for "moral strategy" or "putting heart into the people", that is, helping the people with loans and other means, as soon as there is any sign of danger, by timely and liberal grants of *takkavi* loans, by the suspension of land revenue, by being watchful about the signs of approaching calamity, by organising private charity and by enlisting non-official support. The present famine relief policy is shaped in the light of its recommendations. Side by side with the growth of the machinery for famine relief has developed the policy of famine prevention through railway and irrigation works and improvement of agriculture and industries. Under the financial decentralisation rules of the Government of India Act, 1919, each Provincial Government (except Burma, which is now separated from India, and Assam) was required to contribute every year, out of its resources, a definite sum for expenditure on famine. These annual assignments from the revenues of the Provinces were to be spent on relief of famine only, the term "Famine" covering famines caused by drought or other natural calamities; but the sum not required for this purpose was devoted

to building up a Famine Relief Fund. Under the 1935 Constitution, famine relief expenditure became entirely a Provincial charge, though the annual contributions of the Provinces to the Famine Relief Fund continued as before.

11. Trade, Industry, Fiscal Changes, and Labour

A. Trade

We have already observed how after 1869, when the Suez Canal was thrown open for navigation, India's foreign trade began to expand rapidly with the growth of peace and order, improvements in means of communication, the adoption of the policy of free trade, and disappearance of internal customs barriers and transit duties in India. Great Britain for a long time held the predominant position in the Indian market. But after the end of the nineteenth century, other countries, like Germany, the United States of America and Japan, appeared as her competitors in Indian trade, and the volume of it, as a whole, consequently increased. The War of 1914–18 first caused a temporary reduction in the volume of this trade, particularly the import trade. But owing to some favourable factors on the termination of the war, there was a trade boom in India as in other countries, which again was followed by a trade depression. After a temporary recovery, trade received a severe setback due to general economic depression throughout the world. In 1932–1933 the export trade declined in value to Rs.136 crores, and the import trade reached the lowest level, that is, Rs.117 crores, in 1933–1934. Soon there was a partial recovery. During 1934–1935 the value of the export trade rose to Rs.155 crores and of the import trade to 135 crores. The report of the Economic Adviser to the Government of India for 1939 stated that India "witnessed the culmination of a period of recovery in world trade, world production and international price level in 1937–1938". But "the turnover of India's overseas trade in merchandise for the year 1938–39 suffered a substantial reduction as compared with 1937–38".

Important changes have taken place in recent times in the distribution of India's trade. Before the War of 1914–18, there was a distinct tendency on the part of India's foreign trade to divert itself from the United Kingdom to the other European countries. During the war the United Kingdom recovered to a large extent her share in the export trade, though it afterwards decreased so far as the import trade was concerned, owing

to the active competition of the United States of America, Japan and the Central European countries. The United Kingdom's share in the import trade was 40.6 per cent in 1934–1935 as compared with 64 per cent in 1913–1914. Subsequently there was some recovery in her share, and the Ottawa preferences to imports from the United Kingdom were meant to benefit her. Besides India's external trade, her internal trade includes the coasting trade and inland trade. The coasting trade with Burma is of special importance.

The matter of commercial intelligence began to attract increasing attention. Besides the Department of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics (functioning since 1922), there were Indian Trade Commissioners in London and Hamburg. Non-official bodies like the European and Indian Chambers of Commerce also took much interest in the development of trade.

B. Industry

The Famine Commission of 1880 and 1901 emphasised the need of industrialising India as one of the means of combating the problem of famine. A change from the indifferent attitude of the Government towards industries seems to have commenced in the time of Lord Curzon, at whose instance a separate Imperial Department of Commerce and Industries was created in 1905. The *Swadeshī* Movement also gave rise to considerable enthusiasm for the industrial regeneration of India. But the Government again reverted to the old *laissez-faire* policy, when in 1910 Lord Morley, the then Secretary of State for India, who was suspicious even of creating a Provincial Department of Industries, sent a despatch to the Government of India discouraging attempts at the development of industries.

The war of 1914–18 strikingly revealed India's industrial poverty and made the Government realise clearly the importance of industrialisation not only from the economic but also from the military point of view. After the Government of India had issued Rules for the Defence of the country which authorised the Executive to control supplies of all kinds and to organise the resources of India, a Munitions Board was established in February, 1917. Although the primary functions of this Board were to control the purchase and manufacture of Government stores and munitions of war, it indirectly gave a great stimulus to industrial development in India by supplying information and advice, by placing orders with Indian firms and in some other ways.

In response to Indian public demand, the Government appointed an Industrial Commission in 1916 to examine the possibilities of industrial development, to find out new openings for Indian capital in trade and industries and to recommend means of Government encouragement to industries. The Industrial Commission presented its report in 1918 and recommended to the Government the initiation of "a policy of energetic intervention in industrial affairs", the establishment of Imperial and Provincial Departments of Industry, the organisation of scientific and technical services, the provision of greater facilities for industrial and technical education, a change in the policy of purchasing stores, the grant of technical and financial aid to industries, the encouragement of industrial co-operation, and the improvement of transport and freight facilities. Government accepted these recommendations and tried, to some extent, to carry them out in practice. After the reforms, "industries" became a Transferred subject. The fate of Indian industries is closely linked with the tariff policy of the Government, which we will now try to review briefly.

C. Fiscal Changes

The stimulus to industries during 1914–18 was temporary. Soon after its termination, foreign competition appeared again and the need of protection for Indian industries was felt. As a matter of fact, Indian public opinion had demanded a revision of tariff policy for about half a century before the war, and this demand revived under post-war conditions. Although this subject was excluded from the deliberations of the Industrial Commission, the Montagu-Chelmsford Report supported India's claim to determine her own tariff policy. The Joint Select Committee on the India Bill recommended the grant of fiscal autonomy to India. In response to a resolution for full fiscal autonomy, moved in the Council of State in 1921, the Secretary of State sent a despatch, dated 30th June, 1921, accepting this principle. A Fiscal Commission was appointed in the same year to determine the nature of this policy. This Commission recommended the adoption of a policy of "*discriminate protection*", the claims of the respective industries to protection being determined by a Tariff Board. The Government accepted this recommendation and a Tariff Board was appointed in July, 1923. Acting under the instructions of the Government, the Board examined the claims of many industries, and protection was extended to the iron and steel, cotton, paper, sugar, salt, match and other industries. Certain important changes in the tariff were afterwards introduced by several Acts, the most important of these

being the Indian Tariff (Ottawa Trade Agreement) Amendment Act, 1932, which gave effect to the tariff changes necessitated by the Trade Agreement made between the Government of India and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom at the Imperial Economic Conference held at Ottawa during July–August, 1932. These agreements, which came into force from the 1st January, 1933, provided for certain margins of preference on a number of goods on importation into India from the United Kingdom or from a British Colony. According to some Indian politicians and commercialists, they benefited British trade with India at the cost of India's "wider interests", as Pandit Jawaharlāl Nehru puts it in his *Autobiography*.

D. Labour

The modern conditions of life have made the regulation of labour an almost indispensable duty of the State in India. The agitation carried on by Lancashire and Dundee trade interests led to the appointment of a Factory Commission in 1908, which after carefully investigating conditions in factories of different kinds recommended certain important changes. These were accepted in the main by the Government and were finally embodied in the Factory Act of 1911. The Act limited the working hours of children and women to seven and eleven respectively and provided for a compulsory recess for half an hour in the midday in all factories. The old limits (nine to fourteen) for the age of the children were retained, but arrangements were provided to get their age properly certified. Particularly in the case of textile industries, the working hours of children were limited to six and of adult males to twelve. Certain new provisions were introduced about the health and safety of the industrial workers. The ferment in the labour world after 1919 made further changes in the conditions of labour in India necessary, and the incentive for these came this time also mainly from outside. The Draft Conventions and the Draft Recommendations of the International Labour Conference at Washington (1921) were introduced into the reformed Indian Legislature and became law in 1922. This new Act widened the definition of factory; abolished the old distinction between textile and non-textile factories; raised the minimum age for a child employee from nine to twelve, and the maximum age from fourteen to fifteen, provided that the children should not be employed for more than six hours a day, and fixed compulsory rest intervals; restricted the work of all adults to eleven hours a day and sixty hours a week, with a rest interval of one hour after six hours' work

and a regular weekly holiday, and made regulations regarding payment for overtime work. But the provisions of this Act applied only to factories and not to all industrial workers. It underwent slight amendments in 1923 and 1926 to ensure better working. A Workmen's Compensation Act was passed in 1923 providing compensation for certain kinds of injury, or death, of industrial workers of various classes.

But the working of these Acts for a few years revealed some defects in them, and, at the same time, industrial unrest, the influence of the labour movement, and the co-operation of India, as an original member of the League of Nations, in the International Labour Organisation at Geneva, stimulated proposals for further reform. In the middle of the year 1929 the Government of India announced the appointment, by His Majesty the King-Emperor, of a Royal Commission on Indian Labour, with the late Rt. Hon. J. H. Whitley as its Chairman, "to enquire into and report on the existing conditions of labour in industrial undertakings and plantations in British India; on the health, efficiency and standard of living of the workers; and on the relations between the employers and the employed; and to make recommendations". The Royal Commission exhaustively reviewed the existing labour legislation and labour conditions in India, and made a series of recommendations in its Report which was published in July, 1931. It is not possible to attempt here even a brief summary of these recommendations, on some of which action was taken by the Central and Provincial Governments. The most important measures of such labour legislation were the Amendment of the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1933, which further expanded the scope of the Act of 1923; the Indian Factories Act of 1934, which extended the provisions of the previous Factories Acts regarding the hours of work and sanitary and other conditions of industrial labourers; the Payment of Wages Act of 1936, which sought to regulate the payment of wages to the workers; and the C.P. Unregulated Factories Act of 1937, which regulated the labour of women and children and made provision for the welfare of labour in the factories to which the Factories Act of 1934 did not apply. The hours of work were limited to ten a day or fifty a week in all "perennial" factories. Each Province appointed Factory Inspectors to secure the observance of the Factories Acts. Efforts were made to improve the conditions of labourers through welfare work, organised occasionally by institutions like the Y.M.C.A., the Social Service Leagues, and the Depressed Classes Mission Society. Under the reformed Constitution, Congress

Ministries attempted to improve the conditions of labour in various ways, and appointed Committees, such as the Bombay Textile Labour Inquiry Committee (appointed in October, 1937), the Cawnpore Labour Inquiry Committee (appointed in November, 1937), the Central Provinces Textile Labour Inquiry Committee (appointed in February, 1938), and the Bihār Labour Inquiry Committee (appointed in March, 1938), to inquire into the conditions of labour prevailing in the industrial centres and to make recommendations for their improvement. The question of representation of labour in the Central and Provincial Legislatures assumed a special importance and was considered by some committees. The Indian Delimitation Committee, which was set up in 1935 with Sir Lawrie Hammond as Chairman and published its report in February, 1936, proposed the formation of certain constituencies for the return of representatives of labour to the Federal Assembly and to the Provincial Legislative Assemblies on the basis of registered trade unions.

Besides State legislation and philanthropic activities for the benefit of labour, we should note the influence of the labour movement itself in Modern India. This movement owed its origin to the general awakening following the First World War, combined with the high prices of the bare necessities of life and the fixed wages which were mainly responsible for the deplorable conditions of living. The Madras Labour Union, formed by Mr. B. P. Wadia in 1918, may be regarded as the first trade union in the proper sense of the term. The labourers soon realised the value of organisation and the efficacy of strikes. In 1920 Mr. Nārāyan Malhar Joshi created the first All-India Trade Union Congress. Trade Unions sprang up in most of the industrial centres and strikes broke out frequently. Trade Union activities were to a certain extent legalised by the Indian Trade Unions Act of 1926. The Royal Commission recommended a reconsideration of this Act, especially regarding the limitations imposed on the activities of Trade Unions and their officials. The Trade Union Movement continued to expand, though its progress was much hampered by illiteracy among workers, lack of efficient leadership, the agricultural outlook of Indian labour and its heterogeneous character. In 1929 there was a split among its leaders due to the attempts of the Communists to capture the Trade Union Congress. Moderate Trade Unionists under the leadership of Mr. N. M. Joshi seceded from the Congress and started a new organisation called the Indian Trades Union Federation. A further split occurred in 1931. Attempts were made to bring about unity in the ranks of Indian labour by amalgamating

all the bodies into one central organisation, but without success. In 1938 the combined Trade Union Congress had a total membership of about 354,500 with 191 affiliated Unions.

12. Social and Religious Reforms

The cultural renaissance which marked the advent of a new age in India was in full vigour during the first half of the twentieth century.

We have reviewed the activities of the Brāhma Samāj, the Prārthanā Samāj, the Ārya Samāj, the Deccan Education Society, the Theosophical Society and the Rāmakrishna Mission during the second half of the nineteenth century. The twentieth century saw a continuation of these efforts for popular uplift.

After completing his twenty years' service with the Deccan Education Society, Gokhale founded in 1905 the still more famous organisation known as the Servants of India Society. The object of the Society was to train "national missionaries for the service of India, and to promote, by all constitutional means, the true interests of the Indian people". Its members should be such as were "prepared to devote their lives to the cause of the country in a religious spirit". It was not a Society founded for any specific activity, political, educational, economic, or social, but merely a group of men who were trained and equipped for some form of service to the motherland.

"Whether such members in future were to run schools or papers or legislatures or co-operative societies or slum work or what not —that was not of prime importance, but what was to be the distinctive feature, the indispensable characteristic of any such work, was to be the fact that it was to be undertaken for its own sake, as a good work which is its own end, not for the furtherance of a party or a class or a corporation or—least of all—for personal self-aggrandisement."

Both Gokhale and Srinivāsa Sāstrī, who succeeded him as President of the Society on his death in 1915, devoted themselves mainly to politics and attained unique distinction in that line. Some other members devoted themselves to work of other kinds and developed independent organisations. We will refer to the activities of three of them.

(i) One such member, Nārāyan Malhār Joshi, founded in 1911 the Social Service League in Bombay, its aim being "to secure for the masses of the people better and reasonable conditions of life and work". "Within fifteen years they had come to run 17 night-

schools for 760 adults, 3 free day schools for half-timers in the mills, 11 libraries and reading rooms with a daily average of 200 readers, and 2 day nurseries. They had organised over a hundred co-operative societies; they did Police Court Agents' work; gave legal advice and wrote petitions for the illiterate; they arranged fresh-air excursions for slum children and provided six gymnasia and three theatrical stages for the recreation of the working classes; they did sanitary work, gave medical relief in three dispensaries to nearly 20,000 outdoor patients per annum and had started Boys' Clubs and Scout corps."

In 1920 Mr. Joshi founded the All-India Trade Union Congress and became recognised as the foremost representative of the Labour Movement in India. He served the Labour Movement ably until 1929 when a resolution was passed at the annual meeting of the Trade Union Congress to affiliate the All-Indian Federation (founded by Mr. Joshi) to Moscow, and this leaning towards Communism forced Joshi and his adherents to leave the meeting.

(ii) Hriday Nāth Kunzru, another member of the Servants of India Society, founded in 1914 the Sevā Samiti at Allahābād. In addition to the promotion of education, sanitation, physical culture, etc., it organises social service during fairs, famines, floods, epidemics, and especially on the occasion of religious festivals like the Kumbha Melā.

(iii) Shrī Rām Bājpai organised the Sevā Samiti Boy Scouts' Association. It was founded in 1914 on the line of the world-wide Baden-Powell organisation, which at that time refused to allow Indians to join it. Although Lord Baden-Powell, as a result of his personal visit to India, raised the colour bar, Bājpai's organisation decided to preserve its separate existence, as its aim was the complete Indianisation of the Boy Scout Movement in India.

The activities of the five illustrious members of the Servants of India Society (Gokhale, Sāstrī, Joshi, Kunzru and Bājpai) will suffice to indicate clearly its role in moulding the national life of India.

The Servants of India Society conducted three papers—*The Servant of India*, an English weekly edited by Mr. S. G. Vaze; the *Dnyān Prakāsh*, the oldest Marāthi daily, edited by Mr. Limaye; and the *Hitawad*, a weekly.

The minority communities in India, like the Parsis and the Sikhs, were also profoundly influenced by the wave of reformation. The Parsi community owes a great deal to its famous reformer, Behramji M. Malabari, for his brilliant services in the

cause of Indian women, children, education, and journalism. The Zoroastrian Conference, inaugurated in 1910 at the instance of a Parsi priest named Dhala who had visited America and studied in Columbia University under the renowned Zoroastrian scholar, Professor Jackson, has rendered beneficial services to the community. The Chief Khālsā Diwān, with its headquarters at Amritsar and branches in different parts of the country, advocating liberal reforms in society and culture, and the Khālsā College at Amritsar, gave eloquent proofs of Sikh awakening.

Largely through the 'Ālīgarh Movement, the history of which has been already traced, Islam in India was roused to a new life. The chief exponents of this "New Islam" were Maulavī Chirāgh 'Ālī, the Rt. Hon. Syed Amīr 'Ālī, Sir Shaikh Muhammad Iqbāl, Prof. S. Khudābakhsh and Prof. A. M. Maulavī. A number of *anjumans* or societies, and a powerful Muslim press, sprang up for the service of the Muslim community. The Ahmadiyā Movement, started by Mirzā Ghulām Ahmad of Qadian in the Gurudāspur district of the Punjab for the restoration of the "true and unpolluted faith of Islam to the followers of the Prophet", also gained a number of followers in different parts of the world.

Under the influence of the general awakening of the country, a spirit of reform permeated various classes of Indian society and profoundly modified their ideas, habits and customs. The most striking change in Indian social life of to-day is in the position of women. Women are not only coming out of their *purdah* and receiving education, but are also taking active interest in social and political matters and are claiming their rights as citizens. As a matter of fact, the women's movement in India, which started largely under the inspiration of Ramābāī Ranade, has "succeeded with a swiftness and to a degree that would have seemed fantastic even a few years earlier".

Attempts have been made by the State and reformers to do away by legislation with the evil of early marriage. In 1901 the Gāikwār of Barodā passed the Infant Marriage Prevention Act, which fixed the minimum marriageable age in the State, for girls at twelve and for boys at sixteen. The Age of Consent Committee met at Simla in June, 1928, to enquire into the question of marriage reforms. After its report appeared, Rāi Sāheb Harbilās Sārdā's Child Marriage Bill was passed in 1930. The Act evoked much opposition among the conservative sections of the people and did not prove very effectual in actual working. The Widow-Remarriage Movement, which had many notable Indian social reformers as its advocates, has also made some progress, though widow-

remarriage is still so uncommon as to attract attention in the papers whenever it takes place. Laudable attempts to improve the lot of the widows have been made by the Mahārānī's School at Mysore, the Ārya Samāj and the Purity Society in the Punjab, and the Hindu Widow Reform League of Lucknow.

The women themselves have been zealous in making attempts to improve their lot in all possible ways. In 1923 a Women's Indian Association, with many branches, was started and opened a Children's Home in Madras. In 1924 a Birth Control League was founded in Bombay, and the journal *Navayuga* (The New Age) offered its services to the cause of this movement. Of the 6,000 members of the Indian National Conference, held at Belgaum in December, 1924, 1,000 were women. In December, 1925, the talented Indian poetess, Sarojinī Naidu (*née* Chatterjee), became the President of the annual meeting of the Indian National Congress. The Women's Indian Association, started in Madras, has rendered valuable services to the cause of the uplift of women in a variety of ways. It opened, on the 21st March, 1934, a Rescue Home to facilitate the working of the Rescue section of the Immoral Traffic Act, enforced by the Government. Muslim ladies also were affected by the spirit of reform, as is clear from the sessions of the All-India Muslim Ladies Conference since 1914. In 1919 the All-India Muslim Ladies Conference, at its Lahore session, pronounced against polygamy. Her Highness the Dowager Begam of Bhopāl presided over the annual session of the All-India Women's Conference in 1928 and she introduced many social and educational reforms for women in her State. Since 1926, the All-India Women's Conference has expressed, in its annual sessions, the legitimate demands of the women for better facilities regarding education, and abolition of social abuses.

The growth of political consciousness among women is strikingly illustrated by the success of the Women's Suffrage Movement since the day when the historic All-India Women's Deputation waited upon Mr. Montagu in Madras on the 18th December, 1917. Mrs. Annie Besant, Mrs. Sarojinī Naidu and Mrs. Herābāī Tātā gave evidence before the Joint Select Committee on the Government of India Bill, 1919, in support of the extension of the franchise to Indian women. Representatives of Indian womanhood took part in the Round Table Conferences in London. The Government of India Act, 1935, gave political rights to Indian women far in advance of those enjoyed by them before. They were allotted 6 seats out of a total of 156 reserved for British India in the Federal Council of State and 9 out of a total of 250 so reserved in the

Federal Assembly. So far as Provincial Assemblies were concerned, women had reserved to them 8 seats in Madras, 6 in Bombay, 5 in Bengal, 6 in the United Provinces, 4 in the Punjab, 4 in Bihār, 3 in the Central Provinces and Berar, 1 in Assam, 2 in Orissa and 2 in Sind. The franchise qualifications affecting them were liberalised, so that more than 6 million women (against 315,000 under the Act of 1919) received the right to vote, compared with 29 million men.

With the spread of education among women, efforts have been made to train Indian sisters ministrant to serve the poor, the sick and the distressed. The Poona Sevā Sadan, started in 1909 by the late Mrs. Ramābāī Ranade, the late Mr. G. K. Devadhar, and a few other ladies and gentlemen, and its branches in different parts of the country, have done much valuable work "with special reference to the training of nurses and midwives, the promotion of maternity and child welfare, and the finding of employment for widows". Similar work has been done by another organisation also known as the Sevā Sadan Society, started in July, 1908, by the late Mr. B. M. Malabari and Mr. Dayārām Gidumal. Important institutions to serve the same end were inaugurated by the wives of several Viceroys. The National Association for Supplying Medical Aid by Women to the Women of India, started by the Countess of Dufferin in 1885 and having subsequently twelve provincial branches and numerous local committees, had for its object "the training of women as doctors, hospital assistants, nurses and midwives, as well as the provision of dispensaries, wards and hospitals". As a part of this Association, a special Women's Medical Service for India was constituted in 1914. The Victoria Memorial Scholarships Fund was organised by Lady Curzon in 1903 with a view to training midwives. The Lady Hardinge Medical College at Delhi, opened by Lord Hardinge on the 17th February, 1916, trains Indian women in medical science. The Maternity and Child Welfare Bureau, working in connection with the Indian Red Cross Society, has rendered useful services in training women for ministering work. The hospital known as the Chittaranjan Sevā Sadan in Calcutta has done much valuable work in this respect.

A very important feature in the social history of modern India is the gradual change in the condition of the so-called Depressed Classes, who, like the women of India, are "waking from age-long slumber to a new consciousness". Valuable philanthropic work has been done in this respect by the various Christian Societies, the Rāmkrishna Mission and particularly the Ārya Samāj, through the means of *Suddhi*, that is re-Hinduising people who had been

converted to other religions, or Hinduising non-Hindus. The Depressed Classes Mission Society, started in Bombay in 1906 with the object of improving "the social as well as the spiritual conditions of the Depressed Classes", has been sincerely devoted to its mission. The Bhīl Sevā Mandal, founded in 1922 by Mr. Amritlāl Vithaldās Thakkar to elevate the condition of the Bhīls and other aboriginals of India, has done a great deal of useful work. The influence of the "*Harijan*" movement, started by Mahātmā Gāndhi, is potent in this sphere of social service. As a matter of fact, Indian youths of to-day are keenly alive to social service, as is manifest in their activities as members of the Boy Scout Associations, the Junior Red Cross and St. John's Ambulance Associations, the Sevā Samiti Boy Scouts Association, and the Bratachārī Association, started under the guidance of Mr. Gurusaday Datta, I.C.S.

13. Progress of Education and Cultural Renaissance

The general awakening of Modern India would not have been possible without significant changes in the educational ideas and institutions of the country. Much in the sphere of education was tried and achieved in India during the nineteenth century, and still more has been accomplished in the present century. Lord Curzon's viceroyalty marks in this respect, as in several other matters, a turning-point. In January, 1902, he appointed a Universities Commission to investigate the conditions and prospects of the Indian Universities and to recommend measures to improve their constitution and working and standard of teaching. The Commission was presided over by Mr. (afterwards Sir) Thomas Raleigh, Law Member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, and included among its members two distinguished Indians, Mr. Syed Husain Bilgrāmī, then Director of Public Instruction in the Nizām's Dominions, and Mr. (afterwards Sir) Gurudās Banerjee, a judge of the Calcutta High Court. Its report came out in June, 1904, and its recommendations were embodied in the Universities Act of 1904. This Act was intended to tighten Government control over the educational institutions of the country by limiting the number of senators and syndics and creating a majority of nominated members in the Senate. It assigned territorial limits to each University, laid down stringent conditions for the affiliation of new colleges, and prescribed a systematic inspection of colleges by the University. Such a "comprehensive scheme of officialisation" evoked protests from different quarters. But at the same time,

the Act recognised the higher functions of the Universities including instruction of students, appointment of Professors and Lecturers, and equipment of laboratories and museums. Thus, though the late Sir Asutosh Mookerjee, then Vice-Chancellor of the Calcutta University, opposed its illiberal provisions, it was utilised by him to open the teaching section of the University of Calcutta, which has done much useful work for the cause of higher education, not only in Bengal, but also in other parts of the country.

In 1910 a Department of Education was established in the Government of India. It came to have an office of its own and a Member to represent it in the Executive Council. Sir Harcourt Butler was the first Member. The Resolution, dated 21st February, 1913, of the Government of India advocated certain measures for the advance of education and recommended the establishment of teaching and residential Universities. But the educational improvements foreshadowed in it were in most cases delayed by the War of 1914–18 and other causes. The growth of communal consciousness and provincial patriotism greatly helped the establishment of new Universities during the period under review in various places, such as Patna, Lucknow, 'Āligarh, Benares, Āgra, Delhi, Nāgpur, Waltair, Dacca, Mysore, Hyderābād, Chidambaram, Trivandrum and Rangoon. The Indian Women's University at Poona was started in 1916 by Dhondo Keshav Karve, with Sir R. G. Bhandārkar as its first Chancellor. The Vishwabhāratī (1921) founded by Rabindranāth Tagore at Śāntiniketan, Bolpur, is a unique educational institution, famous for its cosmopolitan outlook. It represents a happy blending of the East and the West, and of Old and New India.

The progress of education continued to be reviewed by different Commissions and Committees, some of whose recommendations were put into practice by the Government. These bodies were the Calcutta University Commission with Dr. (afterwards Sir) Michael Sadler as its Chairman and Sir Asutosh Mookerjee as a leading member, whose report was published in August, 1919; the Auxiliary Committee of the Indian Statutory Commission under the Chairmanship of Sir Philip Hartog, which published its Report in 1929; the Lindsay Commission, appointed in 1929 by the International Missionary Council, with Dr. A. D. Lindsay, Master of Balliol College, Oxford, as Chairman, which visited India in 1930–1931 and whose report was published in 1931; and the Unemployment Committee, United Provinces, popularly known as the Sapru Committee after the name of its President, the Rt.

Hon. Sir Tej Bahādur Sapru, which was appointed by the Government of the United Provinces in 1934 and whose report was published in 1936.

There were three important bodies to look after the progress of education in general and to consider changes, if necessary. The Central Advisory Board of Education, created first in 1920 under the Chairmanship of the Educational Commissioner of the Government of India, but abolished in 1923 as a measure of economy on the recommendation of the Indian Retrenchment Committee presided over by Lord Inchcape, was revived in 1935. Since then it has made many suggestions regarding the reform of the present system of education in all stages, higher, secondary or primary, and of all types, literary or vocational. According to the recommendation of the Universities Conference at Simla, summoned by the Government of India in May, 1924, an Inter-University Board for India came into existence during 1925, and has since then been discharging useful functions by collecting information and stimulating thought about present-day University problems. The Bureau of Education in India, abolished in 1923 as a measure of retrenchment, was revived by the Government of India in 1937 "for dealing specially with the collection and dissemination of literature relating to educational problems in the various Provinces".

The Reforms of 1919, supplemented by those of 1935, placed education in the Provinces under the control of their Ministers of Education. The numerical strength of the students in the secondary and primary schools undoubtedly increased. During the year 1935–1936, 51 per cent of the boys and 17 per cent of the girls of school-going age were on the school rolls. But at the same time it is true that there has been much "stagnation" and "wastage" in secondary and primary education. The state of literacy in India, as compared with that of other countries, has been unsatisfactory. The introduction of compulsory and free primary education is one of the important problems of India to-day. As early as 1911 the Honourable Mr. G. K. Gokhale introduced a Bill for this purpose in the Imperial Legislative Council. In later years the question assumed greater and greater importance. Indian leaders of all shades of opinion constantly urged upon the Government the supreme need of the measure. Some attempts were made to drive away illiteracy. Thus eight Provincial Legislatures passed Primary Education Acts "authorising the introduction of compulsory education by local option"; and the Education Minister of one Province inaugurated an Adult Education campaign to make

adults able to read and write. Plans to give secondary education a vocational bias were also considered.

The question of the medium of instruction in educational institutions attracted serious attention under the pressure of national awakening. A representative Conference, which met at Simla in 1917 under the Chairmanship of Sir Sankaran Nair, the then Education Member, discussed the position of English as a foreign language and as a medium of instruction in public schools. Its decisions were not conclusive. But the use of the modern Provincial languages as the medium of instruction and examination in schools and in some places in colleges gradually increased. Some educationists also thought of evolving a common script for the whole of India. Good pioneer work in this direction was done by Mr. A. Latiff, I.C.S., by the introduction of the Romanised Urdu Script.

It is interesting to note that education of women, attempts for the spread of which began in the nineteenth century, has progressed greatly during the present century through State efforts and the activities of various reformed *Samājas* and Societies, like the Brāhma Samāj, the Ārya Samāj and the Servants of India Society. Colleges specially meant for girls were established, and in some Provinces co-education made good progress; for example, in Madras and Assam more girls studied in boys' institutions than in those for girls. Co-education is, however, itself a delicate problem, which requires tactful handling. The Indian Women's University, started at Poona in 1916 by Professor Karve and transferred to Bombay in 1936, has done much valuable work. Customs and prejudices which had so long been detrimental to the growth of education of women are fast disappearing, and a strong public opinion has grown up in its favour, though there are differences of opinion amongst educationists and other thinkers about the nature of education suitable for our womenfolk. Very valuable work on Educational Reform is being done by the All-India Women's Conference, which holds its meetings annually and has constituent conferences in different parts of the country. An All-India Women's Educational Fund Association has been started in connection with this Conference. In 1930 a special Committee was appointed by this Association to determine the feasibility of establishing a central Teachers' Training College. The recommendation of the Committee for the establishment of a college, "on absolutely new lines which would synthesise the work of existing provincial colleges by psychological research", was accepted by the Association, and accordingly the Lady Irwin College was established in New Delhi. This College provides a three years' Teachers' course for those


who intend to qualify themselves as High School teachers of Home Science; others may take the Home course of two years.

Several factors, such as growing contact with the outside world, eager yearning for the revival of the cultural treasures of the past, the desire to reform all aspects of life, and speculations about the problems of common weal and common woe, have profoundly stimulated Indian thought and have caused a comprehensive cultural renaissance, the influence of which is visible on modern Indian Literature as well as Art. Indeed, we have a new age for the Indian regional literatures, Bengali, Oriyā, Hindi, Urdu, Marāthī, each of which presents a harmonious blending of Eastern ideas with those of the West. High-class works have been produced during the last hundred years in different branches of literature, fiction, drama, poetry and essay. In modern Bengali literature, the influence and contributions of Iswara Gupta, Madhusudan Dutt, Bankim Chandra Chatterjee and Rabindranāth Tagore have been unique. Shreejut Sarat Chandra Chatterjee's contributions in the sphere of Bengali literature are also of profound significance. His novels present an interesting picture of the Bengali society of modern times—its merits and demerits, its sorrows and joys—and thus supply sufficient food for reflection to those who seek to reform our social life. The drama has been enriched by the writings of Madhusudan Dutt, Dinabandhu Mitra, Girish Chandra Ghosh, D. L. Roy, Amritalal Basu, and others. This period has further witnessed the production of outstanding biographies and autobiographies; and some notable attempts have been made to reconstruct the history of Bengali literature, largely through the encouragement of the late Sir Asutosh Mookerjee. The *Vangiya Sāhitya Parishad* has been doing much to revive the lost treasures of Bengali literature. Some Indians have to their credit important compositions in English; the names of Toru Dutta, and of Mrs. Sarojinī Naidu, deserve special mention in this respect.

Urdu, Hindi and Oriyā literatures are showing signs of advance. The writings of Sir Muhammad Iqbāl of the Punjab have given birth to a new age in the history of Urdu literature. A great movement is now on foot for the development of Hindi literature.

One very striking feature of Indian cultural renaissance is the spirit of research which animates the study of the past history and antiquities of this country. Since the foundation of the Asiatic Society of Bengal in 1784, a large number of European as well as Indian scholars have devoted themselves earnestly to this branch of study, and their labours have produced marvellous results. The Ancient Monuments Preservation Act,

passed during the Viceroyalty of Lord Curzon, for the protection of historic monuments and relics, and also for State control over the excavation of ancient sites and traffic in antiquities, gave an immense impetus to the cause of research. Under the guidance of the Archaeological Department of the Government of India, and a few other institutions, valuable scientific excavations, which have considerably modified many of the old views about the ancient history of India, have been made on historic sites. Those at Mohenjo-dāro in Sind, Harappā and Taxilā in the Punjab, Pātaliputra and Nālandā in Bihār, Pāhārpur, Mahāsthān and



VICTORIA MEMORIAL, CALCUTTA

Bāngaḍ in Bengal, Sāñchī in the Bhopāl State, Sārnāth near Benares and Nāgārjunikondā in the Madras Presidency deserve special mention. Much attention has also been paid to the establishment and development of museums, in different places, as centres of research and education. Further, the epigraphical materials disclosed by official as well as non-official efforts have supplied us with valuable details about the history and chronology of various dynasties of India. Some of the Indian Universities, notably the Universities of Calcutta, Dacca, Benares and Madras, and organisations like the All-India Oriental Conference, the Indian History Congress, the Bhāndārkar Oriental Research Institute and the *Bhārat Itihāsa Samsodhaka Mandala* at Poona, the Indian Historical

Records Commission and the *Vangiya Sāhitya Parishad*, are giving considerable impetus to the scientific study of Indian history and antiquities.

Indians have also made in the present century remarkable progress in the study of science, philosophy and politics. The valuable discoveries of Sir J. C. Bose, Sir P. C. Ray, Sir C. V. Raman and Dr. Meghnād Sāhā, and the painstaking as well as fruitful anthropological studies of Rāi Bahādur S. C. Roy of Chotanāgpur, have earned them a wide reputation. The cause of scientific research in India is being furthered by scientific surveys, like the Zoological Survey of India, the Botanical Survey of India and the Geological Survey of India, and by the activities of the Indian Science Congress, which meets each year in January. Attention has also been devoted to philosophical studies, through the inspiration of teachers like Sir B. N. Seal, Sir S. Rādhākrishnan, and others. The Indian Universities have become keenly interested in the study of Political Science, and much useful work has been done by the Indian Institute of Political and Social Science, started on the 30th March, 1917, "to promote a systematic study of political and social science in general and Indian political and social problems in particular in all their aspects. . . ."

The spirit of renaissance has also produced a finer appreciation and cultivation of the Fine Arts such as painting and music. Dr. Abanindranāth Tagore has taught and inspired a group of artists; other famous artists of the period are Nandalāl Bose of Bengal and 'Abdur Rahmān Chaghatai of the Punjab, and some members of the Ukil family. The Bombay School of Art has tried to develop a new style by the application of Western technique and methods to current Indian conditions. The artistic renaissance of India owes a great deal to Mr. E. B. Havell, who was for some years Principal of the Government School of Art in Calcutta and left India in 1907, and to Dr. A. K. Coomāraswāmy, who did much to preach the majesty and glory of Indian art. As with painting, there has also been a revival of sculpture. Modern Indian architecture divides itself sharply into two classes: (*i*) that of the indigenous Indian "Master-builder", to be found chiefly in the Indian States, particularly in Rājputāna, and (*ii*) that based on an imitation of Western models. During recent years, there has been a tendency to revive old architectural styles. A new spirit in the cultivation of music is evident in our country. The efforts of some members of the Tagore family are largely responsible for a finer appreciation of music; and new schools for the scientific study and practice of Indian music, vocal as well as

instrumental, have sprung up in Calcutta, Bombay, Poona, Barodā and several other places. Earnest efforts are being made to revive indigenous types of dances and drama. The *Prāchīn Kāmarūpī Nritya Sangha* of Assam is trying to train boys and girls in the characteristic dances of that Province. In South India efforts are being made for the revival and development of *Kathākali*. Good work is being done in this field by Rabindranāth Tagore's Vishwabhāratī, the Travancore University and the Kerala *Kalāmandalam*.

CHAPTER VIII

INDIA DURING AND AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR

1. India's War Contributions

When Britain declared war against Germany on September 3, 1939, India was automatically involved in what afterwards became a global war. Britain was naturally anxious to utilize India's abundant resources for the prosecution of the war. Later, the proximity of the theatres of war to India's borders increased her strategic importance.

For reasons to be noted later, the two great political parties in India, the Congress and the Muslim League, refused to co-operate with the Government in its war effort. The Indian Princes, however, stood solidly behind the Government, which had also no difficulty in securing sufficient recruits without any compulsion. It is unnecessary to describe in detail the course of the war. Suffice it to say that it took a calamitous turn for the Allies in the summer of 1940. First Norway and Denmark, and then Belgium, Holland, and France, quickly fell under enemy control. Britain's own downfall seemed imminent, but the Royal Air Force heroically beat off the superior numbers of the German aircraft, and frustrated the plans for a German invasion of England. The entry of Italy into the war on the side of Germany was regarded as a serious menace to the Suez Canal, the "life-line" of the British Empire. It was thought possible that the enemy might be able to occupy Egypt and eventually make an attack upon India. In fact, the British Parliament passed in mid-June the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act authorizing the Governor-General, "in the event of a complete breakdown of communications with the United Kingdom," to exercise some of the powers of the Secretary of State.

At this fateful and critical moment in the history of Great Britain, her war efforts were greatly reinforced by the man-power and material resources of India. Indian troops fought with their traditional bravery in Africa and the Middle East till the tide turned in favour of the Allies. The part they played in liquidating the Italian Empire in Africa was, as the Viceroy observed in

December, 1941, "of the first significance and of the greatest value."[1] Indian troops also gave splendid assistance to the Allied cause throughout the struggle for the liberation of Europe till the final collapse of the Axis powers in that continent in May, 1945. India's contributions towards the achievement of victory were both manifold and substantial, and earned the highest praise. Lieut.-General Mark Clark, the American General in command of the Allied armies in Italy, paid the following tribute to the valour of Indian troops: "The achievements in combat of these Indian soldiers are noteworthy. They have carried on successfully in grim and bloody fighting against a tenacious enemy helped by terrain particularly favourable for defence. No obstacle has succeeded in delaying them for long or in lowering their high morale or fighting spirit. . . . The Fourth, Eighth and Tenth Indian Divisions will for ever be associated with the fighting for Cassino, the capture of Rome, the Arno valley, the liberation of Florence and the breaking of the Gothic Line. I salute the brave soldiers of these three great Indian divisions." General Leese,[2] the commander of the 8th Army, and General Sir Claude Auchinleck, the Commander-in-Chief in India, spoke in the same strain.

A highly important part was also played by the Indian troops in withstanding the Japanese attack and in driving them out of the territories they had occupied on India's frontier. General Sir William Slim, Commander of the 14th Army, which completely destroyed Japan's military power in South-East Asia, bore testimony to the wonderful services of the Indians in this epic struggle. "India was," he observed in 1946, "our base, and three-quarters of everything we got from there. The best thing of all we got from India was the Indian army. Indeed, the campaign in Burma was largely an Indian Army campaign. The bulk of the fighting troops and almost the whole of those on the lines of communication were soldiers of the Indian Army, and magnificent they were. India, too, trained and sent us our reinforcements."[3]

The pre-war strength of the Indian Army was 182,000. By the middle of 1945 the Army numbered over 2,000,000 men although recruitment had continued all along on a voluntary basis. The casualties in the ranks of the Indian troops numbered 180,000, of whom "one in six was killed besides 6,500 merchant seamen, who were either killed or missing." In addition, bombing caused 4,000 civilian casualties. There would have been larger casualties but for

[1] *The Indian Annual Register*, 1945, Vol. II, p. 284.
[2] *The Statesman*, Nov. 7, 1944.
[3] *Asiatic Review*, April, 1946.

the yeomen service rendered by the members of the Civil Defence Corps, numbering at one time 82,000.[1]

There was a proportionate increase in recruitment to the officer class, including both King's Commissioned officers and Viceroy's Commissioned officers. The Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun made provision for 600 cadets, compared with 200 before the war, and other Officer Training Schools were opened. Though there were only 400 Indian Officers at the outbreak of the war, the number of Indian Commissioned and King's Commissioned officers had risen to more than 10,000 at its close. There was a large increase in the number of training schools of all descriptions to bring about the fuller mechanisation of the Army and secure more efficient training. The Indian Artillery was also greatly expanded and developed. Valuable services were rendered by the Corps of Indian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, formed on 1st May, 1943, for the repair, recovery and maintenance of the technical equipment of the Indian Army; the Indian Signal Corps, formed in 1922 and greatly expanded during this war; the Indian Army Medical Corps, formed in 1943; and the Women's Auxiliary Corps, numbering over 10,000, formed to release soldiers and technicians for more active duty. The Royal Indian Navy, with its personnel raised from 1,200 officers and men at the commencement of the war to about 30,000 by the beginning of 1944, had notable services and exploits to its credit. The Indian Air Force (started in 1932 and subsequently designated the Royal Indian Air Force), with strength augmented from 200 to 27,000, and equipped with modern aircraft, both fighters and bombers, fought gallantly over Burma from 1942 onwards. India also made very large contributions to the Allies in arms, ammunition, equipment and various other kinds of war material. Special reference must be made to the Tata Iron and Steel Company and the Steel Corporation of Bengal, which considerably assisted the war effort by speeding up the production of steel. Indian shipyards built 2,000 small vessels during the war, with a total tonnage of 100,000 tons. Large numbers of Indian railway wagons were sent to the Middle East.

The Indian States were liberal in their help. Besides supplying more than 375,000 recruits for the fighting forces of India, they provided men for technical work, and important materials, such as steel, blankets and other kinds of woollen cloths, silk for parachute manufacture, webbing cloth, and rubber products. The total financial contributions of the States exceeded Rs. 65,000,000. About half the total contribution to the Viceroy's Fund came from them.

[1] For this section, see (1) *Statistics relating to India's War Effort* (Government of India Publ. Feb. 1947); (2) *The Indian Annual Register*, 1945, Vol. I, pp. 277–296.

2. India's Participation in Efforts for Peace

Having made this immense contribution towards the achievement of victory by the Allied powers, India showed a genuine interest in the solution of the problems of tormented humanity and became actively associated with the organizations working for international security and peace. She was associated with the principal organs and specialised agencies of the United Nations Organization. She is a signatory to its charter and is an original member of it. One of her representatives became the Chairman of the Social and Economic Council of the U.N.O. and rendered much valuable assistance in the difficult initial stages. Her prepresentatives all played very important parts in the United Nations' Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation.

In the 1946 session of the U.N., Indian representatives took an independent line on some major issues. They succeeded in making the U.N. take up the question of the treatment of Indians in South Africa against the opposition of the United Kingdom and the U.S.A. India also tried persistently to protect the rights of politically backward peoples in the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations. But in 1947, on two matters in which she was directly interested, that is, her election to the Security Council and the dispute with South Africa, she did not succeed in gaining what she hoped for. She continued, however, to participate actively in the work of the United Nations. As tension developed between the two great groups of world powers, one under the leadership of the U.S.A. and Great Britain, and the other under the U.S.S.R. (Russia), India wisely proclaimed her policy of not identifying herself with either group. She also came to have her diplomatic representatives, of various ranks and designations, from Ambassadors to Consuls and Commissioners, in different countries abroad. Similarly foreign countries stationed here their representatives, diplomatic or consular.

India not only participated in many international Conferences like the Pacific Relations Conference (1934–44), the World Trade Union Conference (February, 1945), the Commonwealth Relations Conference (February-March, 1945), the World Trade Union Congress (September, 1945), the Subject Peoples Conference (London, October, 1945), and the International Labour Conference at Geneva (July, 1947), but also organized the Asian Relations Conference (New Delhi, 23rd March–2nd April, 1947). She also exchanged delegations and missions and entered into various treaties with other countries. Associations interested in India sprang up in foreign

countries, e.g. the National Committee for India's Freedom, formed on the 25th October, 1943, with headquarters at Washington, the Australian India Association formed in October, 1943, and the Indo-Iranian Cultural Society, Teheran, founded in 1944.

3. Post-War Economic Conditions

A. Development of Industries

The social and economic effects of the Second World War on India were profound and far-reaching. No branch of economic life remained unaffected, and with the cessation of hostilities new forces were released in the social and cultural sphere, so that the country had to face various acute problems of reconstruction and re-adjustment. The war can indeed be regarded as marking the beginning of a new social order.

Some favourable factors, such as the growing demand for war materials both at home and from other parts of the Commonwealth, restrictions on imports, and greater care and assistance on the part of the Government with regard to industries, contributed to increased activity and output in all items of industrial manufacture except jute, matches and wheat flour. The decline in jute manufacture was due principally to lack of demand, and the fall in the production of matches to lack of raw materials, while wheat flour dropped owing to the shortage of supplies for mills, though the crops were relatively large. Petroleum and electrical power were the outstanding examples of increased production. Labour shortage affected the production of coal and iron ore. Though India's shipbuilding industry had not yet satisfied legitimate national expectations, it may be noted that shipbuilding yards were opened in Vizagapatam in 1940, and within two years 4,000 sea-going ships were repaired. In April 1947, the Reconstruction Policy Sub-Committee on Shipping recommended a planned development of Indian Shipping on economic as well as strategic considerations.

B. Economic Planning

The complex problems of modern times and the influences of the Second World War created in India, as in most other countries, an almost universal impulse towards a planned reconstruction of the entire pattern of economic life.

A National Planning Committee was constituted towards the end of 1938, at the instance of the Indian National Congress, under the

Chairmanship of Pandit Jawaharlāl Nehru. It consisted of fifteen members together with representatives of the Provincial Governments and such Indian States as chose to join it. But this Committee languished, owing to the change in the political situation after the outbreak of the war and the resignation of the Congress Ministries, and it did not resume its work until September, 1945. Several other plans for economic reconstruction were later formulated, such as the Bombay Plan, the People's Plan, the Gandhian Plan, besides the Provincial plans, the plans of the Departments of the Central Government, plans for major industries, and plans of Indian States. Broadly speaking, the objectives of planning were "to raise the general standard of living of the people as a whole and to ensure useful employment for all" by the development of the resources of the country to the maximum extent possible, and by the distribution of national wealth in an equitable manner. Early in June, 1941, the Government of India formed a Post-War Reconstruction Committee. On the 26th October, 1946, it announced the appointment of an Advisory Planning Board, which, in its Report of January, 1947, emphatically expressed the opinion that the "proper development of large-scale industries can only take place if political units, whether Provinces or States, agree to work in accordance with a common plan." But the state of affairs in industry continued to be disquieting for several reasons, one of which was the continuance of strained relations between labour and management.

C. Labour

The war had tremendous repercussions on labour in India. Abnormal economic conditions, largely the result of an unprecedented rise in the cost of living, caused an insistent demand for better conditions, which had mostly to be satisfied by increases in wages, grants of dearness allowances and bonuses, and the introduction of pension schemes, provident funds, and more scientific systems of payment.

This period was marked by a growing sense of responsibility for the improvement of the lot of the ordinary worker in this country, resulting in important labour legislation. The Factories Amendment Act, passed in April, 1946, and enforced from 1st August, reduced maximum working hours per week from 54 to 48, and from 60 to 50 in perennial and seasonal factories respectively. It fixed the maximum daily hours of work at 9 and 10 respectively. The Act also prescribed uniform rates of payment for overtime work both in perennial and seasonal factories, amounting to double

the ordinary rate. According to the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act of 1946, owners of industrial establishments in British India, employing a hundred or more workers, were required to define clearly the conditions of service and to have these duly certified by an officer appointed for this purpose either by the Central Government or by the Provincial Government as the case might be. The Workmen's Compensation Act of 1946, amended in 1947, made workmen earning wages up to the maximum limit of Rs.400 a month entitled to compensation for injuries sustained in the course of their employment, and laid down a scale of compensation for workers earning between Rs.300 and Rs.400. The Indian National Government passed some important Acts regarding industrial relations, social insurance, and improvement in conditions of work. The Provincial Governments were also alive to their responsibilities in relation to labour and industries; as a specific example may be mentioned the Bombay Industrial Relations Act (1946), which aimed at the regulation and rapid settlement of labour disputes by the establishment of labour courts and also of joint committees of management and labour in industrial establishments. Several other important steps were also taken by the Central and the Provincial Governments to harmonise industrial relations. At a Conference in 1947, representatives of employers, employees and the Government came to a unanimous decision to maintain industrial peace and to avoid lock-outs, strikes, and slowing down of production for the next three years. The various adjudication awards and recommendations of the Conciliation Boards also aimed at securing cordial industrial relations. For instance, the recommendations of the Board of Conciliation (1947), which investigated the causes of industrial disputes in the coalfield areas of Bengal and Bihār, were hailed as a "new deal for coal-miners". They provided for the improvement of the conditions of a class of workers whose interests had been neglected in the past.

The war gave added strength to the labour movement and facilitated the further growth of Trade Unionism. In 1940 the National Trades Union Federation, into which the Indian Trades Union Federation (p. 954) had merged, was amalgamated with the All-India Trade Union Congress. But there was again a cleavage in the ranks of labour in India in 1941, when a new central organisation, called the Indian Federation of Labour, came into being. The year 1947 saw the birth of yet another organisation, under the name of the Indian National Trade Union Congress. Drawing its inspiration from Gandhian philosophy, it sought to "secure redress of grievances, without stoppages of work, by means

of negotiation and conciliation, and failing that, by arbitration or adjudication". This organisation, representing 577 unions of 19 industrial groups, very soon became "a force in national life". But in spite of all this, there is still immense confusion and much ferment in the Indian labour world.

D. The Hard Lot of the Common People

The common people of India, whose condition had always been deplorable, suffered great hardships during and after the war. There was a rapid rise in the prices of all goods "thanks to ceaseless inflation following upon the endless stream of British purchases in India against sterling securities in the Paper Currency Reserve". There was a drastic reduction in the supply of essential commodities, particularly food grains and cloth, to the civilian population. "Before the war the total available supply of cereals was more than 45 million tons. During the first half of the war period it was reduced to 43 million tons. . . . Again, as against the 6,000 million yards of cloth in supply before the war, only 3,700 million yards were available in 1942; and even two years later the supplies barely exceeded 5,000 million yards."

The Report of the Sub-Committee on Labour of the National Planning Committee significantly remarks: "Notwithstanding all measures of control, regulation of price, Government procurement and distribution of essential supplies, like food, kerosene, sugar, and the entire rationing system applied to town after town and Province after Province, prices continued to soar, black markets flourished, corruption knew no bounds of rank or sex." The horrible Bengal famine of 1943, producing untold miseries for the people of that province, was undoubtedly a direct result of war conditions, but was accentuated by the "carelessness and complete lack of foresight of those in authority", and the inordinate greed of persons in certain positions. As the Famine Inquiry Commission presided over by Sir John Woodhead stated in its Report published in May, 1945: "It has been for us a sad task to enquire into the course and causes of the Bengal famine. We have been haunted by a deep sense of tragedy. A million and a half of the poor of Bengal fell victim to circumstances for which they themselves were not responsible. Society, together with its organs, failed to protect its weaker members. Indeed, there was a moral and social breakdown, as well as an administrative breakdown". The wounds inflicted on Bengal by this terrible calamity were very slow to heal.

E. Agriculture

Indian agriculturists and ordinary consumers were the worst sufferers by the failure of economic controls, profiteering, and widely prevailing corruption, though bigger farmers with more surplus to sell derived advantage from high prices. So far as agricultural economy is concerned, numerous problems were brought to the forefront by the Second World War—the planning of production and distribution, the provision of an adequate transport system connecting the widely separated surplus and deficit areas, maintenance of minimum stocks, effective control over costs of production and prices, and regulation of exports and imports. The Central and Provincial Governments promised to bring about an improvement in the state of agriculture and in the lot of the common people by proper agricultural planning, which would facilitate the attainment of high levels of production and prosperity.

F. Co-operation

An important part in this general improvement was assigned to co-operation. During 1945–46 the number of provincial and central co-operative banks was 614, with a total membership of 226,000. The working capital increased from Rs.60 lakhs in 1944–45 to 69·97 lakhs in 1945–46. The number of agricultural co-operative societies rose from 136,354 in 1944–45 to 146,958 in 1946, and their membership increased from 5,013,000 to 5,501,000. It was expected that they would all function fruitfully under the democratic Governments at the Centre and in the Provinces.

G. Trade

The Second World War had, of course, far-reaching effects upon India's trade. It cut her off entirely from the continent of Europe, and from Japan and the various neighbouring countries which were overrun by the Japanese, and it interfered greatly with her trade with the countries within the British Commonwealth of Nations. There was an actual decline of about 38 per cent in exports and 70 per cent in imports in 1942–43 as compared with the pre-war year 1938–39.[1] There was, however, an improvement in India's trading position in 1943–44 as compared with the previous year.[2] The composition

[1] *Eastern Economist*, July 30, 1943, p. 365.
[2] *Review of the Trade of India in* 1943–44, p. 55.

of her export trade was also vastly altered during the war. There was an increase in the exports of manufactured goods and a decrease in those of raw materials. "In 1938 manufactured articles comprised only 30·5 per cent of exports, and raw materials and food 44·3 per cent and 23·5 per cent respectively. In 1944 manufactured articles were 51·5 per cent, and raw materials and food 24·7 per cent and 22·5 per cent respectively." The figures mentioned do not include imports of food grains, etc., made on Government account, and imports of Government stores, railway stocks, etc.[1] During 1946 the value of India's total trade amounted to Rs.566·2 crores compared with Rs.481·9 crores in 1945, there being a larger rise in exports than in imports. The import trade of India, however, soon began to revive and revert to the pre-war position. Even the imports of manufactured articles increased from 31·9 per cent in 1944 to 55·4 per cent in 1946, but certain considerations led to the issue, in May and July 1947, of import control orders intended to reduce imports. The export trade of India was slow to regain its pre-war position, owing mainly to the continuance of shortages of agricultural products and the "rising levels of consumption".[2] On the cessation of hostilities private trade with different countries, so long suspended, could be resumed. Among the important changes in the direction of India's trade it may be noted that a favourable balance of trade was maintained with the countries of the British Commonwealth from the beginning of the war till 1945, but that there was an adverse balance in 1946. The value of both export and import trade with the U.S.A. rose. "The leap in the imports of American merchandise into this country from Rs.978 lakhs in 1938–39 to Rs.67,40 lakhs in 1945-46 is very significant especially in comparison with the increase in the imports from U.K. during the same period from Rs.88,56 lakhs to Rs.101,83 lakhs.[3] There was an adverse balance of trade with the U.S.A. in 1945, but this was altered in India's favour in 1946.[4] The Indian Tariff Board, constituted in 1945, made some recommendations regarding the claims of various industries for protection, but these could not be implemented at once. One notable event of the year 1947 affecting the foreign trade of India was her participation in the Geneva Trade Conference at which several important economic agreements were concluded.[5]

[1] *Eastern Economist*, June 28, 1946, p. 1073.
[2] *Ibid.*, November 7, 1947.
[3] *Ibid.*, January 5, 1947.
[4] *Ibid.*, November 7, 1947.
[5] *Ibid.*, January 2, 1948.

4. Education and Social Progress

The reorganisation of the educational system is universally recognised to be indispensable to the progress of the Indian nation. The new-born democracy and sense of nationalism must be nourished and developed by the spread of the right type of education amongst all sections of the people. It should be remembered that the percentage of literacy between 1931 and 1941 rose from 8 to only about 12. In spite of the increase in the number of institutions, and the new educational measures of recent years, illiteracy still remains an appalling problem for the country.

At the request of the Government of India, the Central Advisory Board of Education submitted at the beginning of 1944 a post-war plan of educational reconstruction covering all the branches of education. It not only prescribed universal compulsory and free education for all boys and girls from six to fourteen, but also contemplated the provision of nursery schools and classes for ten lakhs of children below the age of six. It further recommended the provision of secondary schools with a view to fostering varied types of technical and vocational education suited to the aptitudes of pupils of different classes and capabilities. It also emphasised the need for granting liberal financial assistance in the form of free tuition, scholarships and maintenance grants, so that poverty might be no obstacle to the education of students of proved ability. As a corollary to this it stressed the need for adequate and improved arrangements for higher education, both in Universities and in professional and technical institutions of University level. The Board emphasised the necessity of "enlarging and making more practical the present provision for technical, commercial and art instruction at all levels in order to provide India with the research workers, executives and skilled craftsmen which the expansion of her industrial, economic and agricultural resources will inevitably demand". It also called for greater facilities for the cultural and recreational side of education to help the students "to fulfil themselves as individuals". Feeling that "a curriculum devoid of an ethical basis would prove barren in the end", it attached high importance to the training of character at all stages of education through a properly articulated combination of physical, mental and moral instruction. The Board made it clear that its object throughout was not "to plan an ideal system of public instruction, but rather to lay down the very minimum necessary to place India on an approximate level with other civilised communities", and suggested

that the various authorities in charge of education might work out detailed schemes to suit the particular needs of their respective areas.

The Central and Provincial Governments were not slow in formulating plans and schemes for the development of Primary, Secondary and University education, physical education, education of the handicapped, and vocational (technical, agricultural and commercial) education. The Wardha system of Basic Education, which combines training in handicrafts with literary education, was gradually introduced in different areas by the new Provincial Governments. The question of replacing English as the medium of University education was also mooted and was discussed at a meeting of the Vice-Chancellors of the different Universities and the Minister in charge of Education of the Central Government. The consensus of opinion in the matter is that at this transitional stage the medium should continue to be English for a certain period, to be gradually replaced by the regional or the State language at the end of that period.

The Central Advisory Board in 1944 was emphatic as to the necessity for increasing educational facilities for women, even to the extent of making the same provision for girls as for boys. Recognising the special role of women in children's education, the Board recommended that "apart from the Pre-Primary schools, where all the teachers must be women, at least three-fifths of the teachers in junior Basic Schools and one-half of those in senior Basic Schools, ought to be women". Indian women felt entitled to greater opportunities for working on a basis of equality with men, and many of them were already prominent in various spheres of life. Mrs. Radhabai Subbarayan became the first woman member of the Council of State in 1938, and in 1943 Mrs. Renuka Ray was the first woman to sit in the Central Legislative Assembly. It is a matter of pride for India that women leaders like Vijayalakshmi Pandit and Rajkumari Amrit Kaur came to be actively associated as representatives of their country with international bodies like the United Nations and the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The All-India Women's Conference forwarded to the Constituent Assembly the Charter of Women's Rights, its most important features being the demand for the introduction of universal suffrage in India's new constitution and for the formation of a Social Service Ministry both at the Centre and in the Provinces.

Independent India honoured its womanhood by appointing Sarojini Naidu Governor of the United Provinces, Vijayalakshmi Pandit as Ambassador in Moscow and Washington, and Amrit Kaur as a Minister in the Central Government.

CHAPTER IX

THE STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM

1. Progress of Nationalism (1905–1916)

THE PROGRESS of the nationalist movement forms the most important feature in Indian history during the first half of the present century. The first phase of this movement has been discussed in Chapter IV., 3. The second phase begins in 1905. During the first twenty years of its existence, the Congress passed a series of resolutions to which the Government paid but little heed, and the only notable result of its efforts was the Indian Councils Act of 1892. This failure to achieve any conspicuous success strengthened the radical section of the Congress, which assumed a more militant attitude and demanded bolder action against British Imperialism. The new spirit, which received a fillip from Japan's great victory over Russia in 1904–5, was brought to a head by an unpopular measure of Lord Curzon, viz. the Partition of Bengal, referred to above (p. 875). The destruction of the bond that united the Bengalis, under colour of providing for administrative efficiency, considerably weakened the politically advanced Bengali intelligentsia. It split them into two separate Provinces, in both of which they would be outnumbered by other elements of the population (p. 928), and kindled religious animosities, thus interfering with the growth of a true national spirit transcending creed and community. The Partition of Bengal, carried out despite the strongest opposition from Nationalists, whose leaders included both Hindus and Muslims, roused a fierce spirit of resistance among them, and gave a new turn to the political movement.

Under the guidance of leaders like Surendranath Banerjea, Bepin Chandra Pāl, A. Rasul, Aswini Kumar Datta and Arabinda Ghosh, the agitation spread like wild-fire all over Bengal and even far outside it. Mr. Gokhale, who presided over the Congress in 1905, correctly gauged the situation when he said:

"The tremendous upheaval of popular feeling which has taken place in Bengal in consequence of the Partition will constitute a

landmark in the history of our National progress. . . . A wave of true national consciousness has swept over the province. . . . Bengal's heroic stand against the oppression of a harsh and uncontrolled bureaucracy has astonished and gratified all India, and her sufferings have not been endured in vain, when they have helped to draw closer all parts of the country in sympathy and aspiration."

The Bengalis openly defied the Government and sought to exert pressure upon it by the adoption of such political weapons as the boycott of British goods, *Swadeshi* (use of indigenous goods), and the spread of National Education. The Congress, held in 1906, not only endorsed these plans, but, for the first time in its history, laid down as its goal "the system of government obtaining in the self-governing British colonies" which the President summed up in one word, "*Swarāj*". The new spirit reflected in these changes was sponsored by Tilak, Bepin Chandra Pāl, Lājpat Rāi and other "extremist" leaders. But the "moderate" leaders like Surendranath Banerjea, Pheroze Shah Mehta, and Gokhale did not keep pace with it, and there was an open split between the two parties in the Surat session of the Congress in 1907. For nine years the Extremist section kept out of the Congress.

Much happened during these eventful years. Lord Curzon's policy of disintegrating Bengal and of brushing aside the claims of the Indian educated classes to be the prophets of what they themselves spoke of as the "New Nationalism" bore fruit. In 1906 Nawab Salimulla of Dacca set up a permanent political organization of the Muslims, known as the Muslim League, which supported the Partition of Bengal and opposed the boycott of British goods. The Government launched a campaign of repression. Large numbers of the people of Bengal, and also their sympathisers outside, including Tilak, were tried and imprisoned and, under an old regulation of 1818, some of the leaders were deported without trial. Peaceful pickets were beaten and sent to jail, meetings were broken up by the police with *lathi* charges, and popular outbreaks were suppressed with severity. These measures failed to check the nationalist movement. On the contrary, they gave rise to an underground conspiracy to terrorise the Government by killing officials. Bombs were secretly prepared in the outskirts of Calcutta, and the "anarchist movement", as it came to be called, became a new factor in Indian politics.

As the repressive policy failed in its objective, the Government sought to "rally the Moderates" by granting the Morley-Minto Reforms in 1909 (p. 913) and modifying the Partition of Bengal two years later (p. 928). The Moderates were at first jubilant, but some

of the regulations under the 1909 Reforms, especially the creation of separate electorates for Muslims, were strongly disapproved by most of them. In fact, this policy, which was regarded as one of "divide and rule", alienated the Moderates from the Government and paved the way for their union with the Radical section of the Congress at the Lucknow session in 1916.

The introduction of the separate electorate has an interesting history. It was a device adopted by the new Viceroy, Lord Minto,[1] to win over the Muslims and set them against the Congress movement. A deputation of the Muslims, encouraged by the British officials, if not by the Government itself, was induced to ask for representation as a separate community, and further pray "that their position should be estimated not merely on their numerical strength but in respect to the political importance of their community and the service it has rendered to the Empire". Lord Minto conceded both, and we know from an entry in Lady Minto's diary of 1st October, 1906, that this act was jubilantly hailed by British officialdom as "nothing less than the pulling back of 62 millions of people from joining the ranks of seditious opposition". Even the great Liberal statesman Lord Morley supported this ingenious device of "separate electorate" and "weightage" which was virtually a stab in the back at Indian Nationalism.

Ramsay MacDonald, who later became the Prime Minister of Britain, correctly diagnosed the situation when he observed that "the Mahomedan leaders are inspired by certain Anglo-Indian officials, and these officials have pulled wires at Simla and in London, *and of malice aforethought* sowed discord between Hindu and Mahomedan communities by showing the Muslims special favour".

The Muslim League, founded in 1906 (p. 981), was originally mainly an organization of some Muslims who emphasized the bond of religion in place of the "New Nationalism". Its attitude was at

[1] According to the Countess of Minto (*India, Minto and Morley*, p. 20 n), separate electorates were proposed by Mr. Gokhale. She does not, however, quote any authority in support of her statement. The following summary of a speech by Mr. Gokhale probably represents his real views:

"Mr. Gokhale stated his own position in the matter quite frankly. He had all along been in favour of special separate electorates for important minorities, but he wanted such electorates to provide not the whole of the representation to which the communities were entitled, but only so much of it as was necessary to redress the deficiencies and inequalities of general elections; and he wanted the same treatment to be extended to other important minorities than Mahomedans where necessary. Mr. Gokhale held strongly that in the best interest of their public life and for the future of their land they must first have elections on a territorial basis in which all communities without distinction of race or creed should participate, and then special separate supplementary elections should be held to secure the fair and adequate representation of such important minorities as had received less than their full share in the general elections." *Speeches of Gopal Krishna Gokhale* (Natesan & Co.), p. 1138.

first exclusive, but as its numbers grew, it imbibed the nationalistic spirit which animated the country. In 1913 it adopted "self-government within the Empire" as its goal. The war between Turkey and Britain aroused strong anti-British feelings among powerful sections of Muslims and paved the way for co-operation between them and the Congress. Both the Congress and the League held their sessions at Lucknow in 1916, and concluded the famous "Lucknow Pact" by which the Congress agreed to separate electorates and the two organizations jointly framed a constitutional scheme on the basis of Dominion Status.

The year 1916 which saw the union of the Moderate and Radical sections of the Congress, and the friendly co-operation between it and the Muslim League for the common cause of India, is also memorable for the inauguration of two Home Rule Leagues, one founded by Lokamānya Tilak in April of that year, and another by Annie Besant five months later. These two bodies co-operated in carrying on an intensive propaganda in favour of the "Congress-League Scheme" of political reforms.

2. The Non-Co-operation and Civil Disobedience Movement (1917–1934)

The War of 1914–18 which brought about the rapprochement between the Congress and the Muslim League also furthered the Indian cause in other ways. Indian soldiers rendered splendid service to the Empire at critical moments of the war. In acknowledging it Lord Birkenhead truly remarked: "Without India the war would have been immensely prolonged, if indeed without her help it could have been brought to a victorious conclusion." England felt bound to recompense this service by political reforms in India, particularly as one of the avowed objects of the war was to secure self-determination for subject peoples and to make the world safe for democracy. Besides, the lessons of the Russian Revolution and the collapse of the Tsarist regime probably had some effect on a section of British politicians. All these factors led to the famous announcement of 1917 (p. 915) and the constitution of 1919 to which reference has been made earlier (p. 916).

The publication of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report created a split in the ranks of the Congress. It was considered in a special session of the Congress and condemned as inadequate, disappointing and unsatisfactory. Thereupon most of the leaders of the Moderate Party left the Congress, and later founded the Indian Liberal Federation. Mahātmā Gāndhi was at first inclined to try to make

the reforms work, and the Congress decided in favour of this in December 1919. But he changed his views before a year was over. Under his inspiration the Congress adopted, in a special session held in Calcutta in 1920, the famous resolution on Non-co-operation which recommended the renunciation of Government titles and the boycotting of the Legislatures, law-courts and Government educational institutions, leading up at a later date to the non-payment of taxes. Further, the object of the Indian National Congress was now defined as the attainment of *Swarājya* (self-rule) by all legitimate and peaceful means. This last phrase replaced the words "constitutional means", and *Swarājya* was taken to imply "self-rule within the Empire, if possible, without, if necessary".

The new policy was acclaimed with enthusiasm, and received overwhelming support from the masses. As a British writer has observed, Gāndhijī "not only converted the nationalist movement into a revolutionary movement, but also made it popular". The Congress gave up its old methods of constitutional agitation, and it was now broad-based on the willing support of the masses. This great change was helped by some contemporary events, two of which deserve special mention, viz. the atrocities in the Punjab and the Khilafat agitation.

In 1919 the Government passed a set of new coercive measures, known as the Rowlatt Acts from the name of the President of the Committee on whose report they were based. These sought to perpetuate the extraordinary repressive powers conferred on the Government during the war, for doing away with ordinary legal procedure and for authorising imprisonment without trial. Gāndhijī organised a passive resistance movement in protest, and "a mighty wave of mass demonstrations, strikes, unrest and rioting spread over many parts of India". The Government put down the movement with a heavy hand, the blackest stain on its record being in connection with a prohibited meeting of citizens at an enclosed place called Jālianwāllā Bāgh at Amritsar. Troops under General Dyer fired 1,600 rounds of ammunition into the unarmed crowd who had no means of exit. Even according to official estimates 379 persons were killed, and 1,200 wounded were left untended. Martial law was proclaimed in the Punjab; and the subsequent inquiries revealed a gruesome picture of shootings, hangings, bombing from the air and extremely severe sentences passed by the tribunals during the reign of terror.

The part played by Britain in the defeat of Turkey and the dismemberment of the Turkish empire in the First World War offended the religious and historical sentiment of the Muslims, and

caused them to adopt an aggressive anti-British attitude. The two brothers, Muhammad Ali and Shaukat Ali, and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad organized a mass movement of the Muslims known as the Khilafat movement.

There was already widespread unrest among the industrial workers. The Bombay Mill strike affected more than 125,000 workers at the beginning of 1919 and there were no fewer than 200 strikes involving 15 lakhs of workers during the first six months of 1920. The atrocities in the Punjab stirred the whole country, and in the Khilafat movement Gāndhijī saw "an opportunity of uniting Hindus and Mahomedans as would not arise in a hundred years". He wholeheartedly espoused the Khilafat cause, and there was, as an official publication recorded, "unprecedented fraternisation between the Hindus and the Muslims".

Gāndhijī conceived the idea of canalising the powerful currents of this united mass movement so as to give the utmost impetus to the national struggle for independence. This took shape in the non-violent non-co-operation movement mentioned above. It was first adopted, though not without opposition, in the special session of the Congress held in Calcutta in September 1920, and was reaffirmed, almost unanimously, at the annual session at Nāgpur in December, 1920.

The movement evoked a hearty response throughout the country. Nearly two-thirds of the voters abstained from taking part in the election to the Councils held in November, 1920, and a large number of students came out of schools and colleges. The lawyers who gave up their practices included such distinguished persons as Desabandhu C. R. Das and Pandit Motilāl Nehru. An important feature of the movement was the burning of English cloths on bonfires, and a spirit of civil disobedience and passive resistance against the Government was visible everywhere. As there were nearly 30,000 political prisoners, the jail lost its terror, and imprisonment became a badge of honour. The British Government brought the Prince of Wales to India in the vain hope of rousing the traditional feeling of loyalty among the masses. But a *hartāl* was observed all over India on the day the Prince landed in Bombay, and he had to pass for the most part through deserted streets when he visited the provincial capitals of India.

The year 1921 was thus a memorable landmark in the history of India's struggle for freedom. The Congress, in its annual session at Ahmadābād (December, 1921), not only expressed its determination to continue the programme of non-violent non-co-operation with greater vigour but took steps to organize civil disobedience.

Mahātmā Gāndhi was appointed by the Congress the sole executive authority to lead the national movement. The popular enthusiasm rose to fever heat and there was an eager expectation of a mass movement on a big scale. Gāndhijī, however, decided to confine it at first to Bardoli, a small district of 87,000 people. But even this was suspended on account of an outbreak of mob violence at Chauri Chaurā (a small village near Gorakhpur in the U.P.) in the course of which a police station was burnt and twenty-two policemen killed. Gāndhijī's decision was received with feelings of dismay all over the country, but was endorsed by the Congress Working Committee on 12th February, 1922. In consequence some activities of the national movement had to be suspended for several years.

A new policy was adopted by a section of the Congress under the leadership of C. R. Das and Motilāl Nehru. They organized the Swarājya party and contested the next elections to the Council with a view to wrecking the reforms from within by "uniform, consistent and continuous obstruction". But in spite of some success the policy failed in its main objective.

The spirit of frustration caused by the suspension of the mass movement adversely affected the relations between Hindus and Muslims. There was no common programme to bring them together, and the transformation of Turkey into a secularist State under Kemal Pasha put an end to the Khilafat movement. Other causes were also at work, and designing persons were not wanting to sow discord between the two communities. A series of communal riots broke out in 1923, and with occasional intervals continued to be almost regular features of Indian political life. The failure of the Swarājya Party was largely due to this communal discord. The Muslim League grew in power and revived the old ideas of Sir Syed Ahmad. The Congress, however, was obsessed by an uncompromising nationalist outlook, took no real measure of the magnitude and character of the communal problem, and underestimated the power and position of the Muslim League, reinforced by some Khilafat leaders who no longer took their inspiration from the Mahātmā. The Congress wanted to rally the Muslim Nationalists as a counterpoise to the League, very much in the same way as the British Government wanted to rally the Moderates against the Extremists. The result was the same, for in the long run both proved equally incapable of stemming the tide of their opponents' sweeping success.

The boycott of the Simon Commission (p. 920), provided a great opportunity for the restoration of amity between the different communities and political parties. The Congress, the Muslim League,

and the Liberal Federation, the organization of the Moderates who seceded from the Congress after 1920, all combined to frame a constitution for India. But the All-Parties Convention which met towards the end of 1928 would not concede the claims made by Mr. Jinnah on behalf of the Muslims. He therefore joined the Muslim leaders who did not see eye to eye with the Congress, and on January 1, 1929, held an All-India Muslim Conference which issued a manifesto of Muslim claims. This formed the basis of the famous fourteen demands formulated by Mr. Jinnah later in the same year.

In the Madras session held in 1927 the Congress had declared complete national independence as its goal. Nevertheless the All-Parties Convention, and later the Congress, agreed to accept Dominion Status if granted on or before 31st December, 1929. Failing this the Congress resolved to pursue its goal of complete independence and organize non-violent non-co-operation including non-payment of taxes.

In reply to the Congress demands the Viceroy, Lord Irwin, declared on 31st October, 1929, that "the natural issue of India's constitutional progress" was the attainment of Dominion Status, and further announced that a Round Table Conference of all parties would be held in London to discuss the recommendations of the Simon Commission. As this fell far short of its demands, the Congress, in its Lahore session, held in December, 1929, declared complete independence as its goal, resolved to boycott the Legislatures and the Round Table Conference, and took steps to launch a programme of civil disobedience. As the clock struck midnight on 31st December, 1929, Pandit Jawaharlāl Nehru, the President of the Congress, hoisted the National Flag of India. Independence Day was celebrated all over India on 26th January, 1930. This day, on which the solemn ceremony was repeated year after year, became a landmark in the history of India's struggle for freedom.

Gāndhijī started the Civil Disobedience campaign on April 6, by his famous march to Dandi in Western India to make salt on the sea-shore in defiance of the salt-law regulations. This was the signal for a mass movement on a large scale, involving mass strikes, the boycott of British goods, grave cases of terrorism such as the armoury raid in Chittāgong, and the setting up of "parallel" governments in several places. The Government adopted stern measures of repression. According to official figures there were 29 cases of firing resulting in 103 killed and 420 injured, and 60,000 people were imprisoned in less than a year. Indiscriminate and merciless beating of men and women formed a feature of the repressive campaign undertaken by the Government.

The strike and the boycott hit the British community hard, and the Government, unable to suppress the movement by force, adopted conciliatory measures. The Round Table Conference which met in November 1930, without any representative of the Congress, was adjourned on 2nd January, 1931, and on 4th March the famous Gāndhi-Irwin agreement was signed. By this the Congress agreed to give up Civil Disobedience and join the Round Table Conference, while the Government withdrew the repressive ordinances and released political prisoners excepting those guilty of violence.

Gāndhijī was chosen as the sole representative of the Congress at the second session of the Round Table Conference (7th September to 1st December, 1931). But the communal question proved a baffling problem, and as no agreement was possible between Indian leaders, the Prime Minister, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, had to make the famous Communal Award. On his return to India on 28th December, 1931, Gāndhijī found Government repression in full swing. His request for an interview with the Viceroy was refused, and on 1st January, 1932, the Working Committee of the Congress adopted a resolution for the renewal of Civil Disobedience and the boycott of British goods. On 4th January, Gāndhijī was arrested. The Government declared the Congress to be an illegal body and issued a number of repressive ordinances. They were openly defied, and the Government took severe measures against the resistance movement. According to Congress estimates more than 120,000 persons were arrested by the end of March, 1933, and a dismal record of "wholesale violence, physical outrages, shooting and beating up, punitive expeditions, collective fines on villages and seizure of lands and property of villagers" is found in the India League Delegation Report issued in 1933.

It was at this unhappy juncture that the British Government announced its constitutional proposals (p. 922). The establishment of a separate electorate for the Depressed Classes, which formed a part of the Communal Award given by Ramsay MacDonald, provoked Gāndhijī, then in jail, to undertake a fast. The result was the Poona Pact, which nearly doubled the number of seats reserved for the Depressed Classes, to be filled by a common joint electorate out of a panel of names originally chosen by them alone.

3. The Final Phase (1935–1947)

The Civil Disobedience campaign dragged on till May, 1934, when it was virtually abandoned by the Congress. Once more the Congress decided, as in 1922, to work the reforms introduced by the Act of

1935 to which reference has been made above (p. 922). It swept the polls in elections held at the beginning of 1937 so far as the General or predominantly Hindu seats were concerned. The Muslims desired to form a Coalition Ministry with the Congress in each Province, but the Congress refused to admit into the Ministry any one who did not subscribe to its creed. This decision widened the cleavage between the Congress and the Muslim League, and Mr. Jinnah, who had hitherto been favourably disposed towards the Congress, and had once vehemently protested against the view that India was not a nation,[1] publicly declared that the "Muslims can expect neither justice nor fair play under Congress Government." This sentiment was now shared by the majority of Muslims. Mr. Jinnah became the unquestioned leader of the Muslim community, and was elected each year as President of the League, which soon rallied round it the great bulk of Muslims all over India.

The Congress formed Ministries in seven[2] out of eleven provinces. As their administration was highly successful, the Congress rapidly grew in popularity, its membership increasing from less than half a million at the beginning of 1936 to five million by the end of 1939. But soon a "left wing" developed in the Congress, and its great strength became manifest when its leader Subhās Chandra Bose defeated even Gāndhijī's nominee for the Presidency. When the moderate section ultimately forced Subhās Bose to resign, he formed a new party, the "Forward Bloc", and this open split considerably weakened the power and prestige of the Congress.

Nevertheless the Congress Ministries successfully worked the reforms, and the political situation was fairly tranquil until the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, when the Congress took exception to the fact that India was dragged into the war without her consent. A strong declaration was issued by the Working Committee of the Congress refusing "co-operation in a war which is conducted on imperialist lines". The Committee also asked the British Government to state whether their war aims included the elimination of imperialism and the treatment of India as a free nation. As no satisfactory reply was forthcoming, all the Congress Ministries resigned in October–November, 1939. When the Germans were carrying everything before them, the Congress offered more than once to co-operate in the war effort, if at least a Provisional National Government were set up at the Centre. The utmost concession on the side of the Government was contained in the

[1] *Modern Review*, Oct., 1925, p. 462.

[2] This does not include Sind, which had also become a Congress Province as the Ministers and the majority of members of its Legislative Assembly had identified themselves with the Congress policy.

Viceroy's statement of August 8, 1940. He refused to concede the National Government as "its authority is denied by large and powerful elements in India's national life," which obviously referred to the Muslims. But he offered (1) to set up, after the war, a representative body to devise a new constitution for India, (2) to enlarge the Viceroy's Executive Council by nominating additional Indian members; and (3) to appoint a "War Advisory Council" consisting of representatives of British India and Indian States.

The Congress regarded this "August offer" as quite unsatisfactory, and inaugurated, in October, 1940, an individual Civil Disobedience campaign under the leadership of Mahātmā Gāndhi.

This deadlock continued for a year and a half. At last when the Japanese, after overrunning Malaya, were rapidly advancing in Burma, the British made a conciliatory gesture. On 8th March, 1942, Rangoon fell, and three days later it was announced that Sir Stafford Cripps, a member of the British Cabinet, would be sent out to India. Cripps virtually repeated the August offer. He promised Dominion Status and a constitution-making body after the war was over, but held out no hope of any immediate change in the government of India. The Congress as well as the Muslim League refused his offer, and the Cripps Mission (March–April, 1942) ended in complete failure.

Throughout these negotiations the Congress could not count on the support of the Muslim League. Mr. Jinnah now repudiated the "democratic system of Parliamentary government on the conception of a homogeneous nation and the method of counting heads" as impossible in India, and publicly expressed the view that neither minority safeguards nor separate electorates could save the Muslims from the Congress *rāj* at the centre. When the Congress Ministries in the Provinces resigned, the Muslim League observed a day of deliverance and thanksgiving throughout India.

In January, 1940, Mr. Jinnah declared that the Hindus and Muslims formed two separate nations "who both must share the governance of their common motherland". Three months later, in the Lāhore Session of the Muslim League (March, 1940), he declared that the Muslim nation must have a separate independent state. In other words, he now advocated the establishment of Pakistān or a federation of the Punjab, North-West Frontier or Afghān Province, Kāshmīr, Sind and Baluchistān[1] in a sovereign state. The idea had been first brought into prominence by a group of young Muslims at

[1] The name Pakistān (originally Pakstān), which means "sacred land", is derived by taking the initial letters of the first four and the end of the last name (R. Coupland, *The Constitutional Problem in India*, Part II, p. 199).

the time of the Round Table Conference, but had found no support, and was characterised by Muslim leaders as "a student's scheme", "chimerical and impracticable". Even the modified proposal of Sir Muhammad Iqbāl for a loose federation of Pakistān, comprising one or two Muslim states, with the rest of India, first made in 1930, and repeated in 1939, had not been widely accepted.[1] The idea of Pakistān as a sovereign state was revived by Mr. Jinnah, and was formally endorsed by the Muslim League in 1940. From that date all attempts at reconciliation between the Congress and the League foundered on this issue of Pakistān. The Government could also now plausibly refuse the Congress demand for a national government on the ground that the Muslims were opposed to it.

On August 8, 1942, the All-India Congress Committee adopted a resolution in favour of starting a mass struggle on the widest possible scale. Although the Congress had not made any actual preparations, the Government decided to strike immediately. In the early hours of the morning of August 9, all the Congress leaders were arrested and the Congress was declared an illegal body. As there was no definite organization and a complete lack of leadership, violent riots and assaults and sporadic disorders, such as the cutting of telegraph and telephone lines, damaging railway tracks, stations, etc., occurred on a large scale in different parts of India. The Government again adopted strong measures of repression including firing from aeroplanes. According to official estimates more than 60,000 people were arrested, 18,000 detained without trial, 940 killed, and 1,630 injured through police or military firing during the last five months of 1942.

The outward manifestation of unrest in India was considerably reduced by these repressive measures, but the British Government was soon faced by another serious danger. Subhās Chandra Bose, who had escaped from India in 1941, made contacts with Germany and Japan. When the Japanese conquered the Malay Peninsula, a large number of Indian soldiers fell prisoners into their hands. Under an agreement with the Japanese Government, Bose, now called Netājī (Leader), organised them into an *Azad Hind Fouz* or Indian National Army. He inaugurated the Government of Free India at Singapore, and in 1943 his soldiers advanced with the Japanese army up to the very frontier of India.

On 6th May, 1944, Gāndhijī was released from prison on grounds of health. He held a series of discussions with Mr. Jinnah but no

[1] It is, however, to be noted that some time before April, 1925, Lālā Lājpat Rāi had suggested the creation of Muslim Provinces in the north-east and north-west of India to set at rest the ceaseless Hindu-Muslim bickerings and jealousies in some provinces (*Mod. Rev.* April, 1925, p. 489).

agreement was reached. Lord Wavell, who succeeded Lord Linlithgow as Governor-General in October, 1943, flew to London in March, 1945, and came back with the proposal that the Members of his Council, with the exception of the Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief, should be Indians selected from amongst the leaders of Indian political parties, on a basis of parity between Muslims and the so-called caste Hindus. He summoned a conference at Simla on 25th June, 1945, to select the personnel, but it broke down as the Congress and the League could not come to an agreement.

Not long after this, the Labour Party came into power in Britain. The new British Government made an earnest effort to end the political deadlock in India. They decided to hold fresh elections of Indian Councils, both Central and Provincial, to reconstitute the Viceroy's Executive Council, immediately after the elections, with Indian members as proposed in March, and to summon a constitution-making body as soon as possible. The elections held at the beginning of 1946 resulted in a sweeping victory for the Congress in respect of the General seats and for the Muslim League in respect of Muslim seats.

The Indian National Army organised by Bose surrendered to the British after the collapse of Japan, and a number of its officers were tried in India for treason. This was a highly impolitic step on the part of the Government, as it gave the Indian people a complete picture of an organization of which they had hitherto known very little. A wave of enthusiasm swept the country, and demonstrations were held in a number of cities. On 18th February, 1946, the ratings of the Royal Indian Navy rose in open mutiny which, for a few days, assumed serious proportions.

On 19th February, the British Prime Minister announced that three members of the Cabinet would visit India "to promote, in conjunction with the leaders of Indian opinion, the early realisation of full self-government in India". Later, on 15th March, he referred to complete independence as a possible goal of Indian constitutional development, if Indians so chose. The Cabinet Mission arrived at Delhi in March, 1946, and held a series of conferences with the leaders of the Congress and the League. As no agreement was possible between them, the Mission issued a statement on 16th May, 1946, giving in broad outline their idea of the future government of India and laying down the procedure for framing a detailed constitution.

The Cabinet Mission recommended a federal type of government for the whole of India including the States. The Federal Government would deal with Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communication, and the other powers would be vested in the Provinces and States.

British India was to be divided into three groups of Provinces; one comprising the Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistān; a second comprising Bengal and Assam; and the third the rest. The Union Constitution was to be framed by a Constituent Assembly of 296 members elected on a communal basis by the Provincial Legislative Assemblies, and the representatives of States which joined the Union, while the representatives of the three groups of Provinces were to meet separately to draw up the constitution of the Provinces in each group. Each Province was given the right to opt out of the Federal Union after the first election of its Legislative Council under the new Constitution. The Cabinet Mission further recommended the establishment of an interim National Government by the reconstitution of the Viceroy's Executive Council from among the leaders of the different parties.

On 6th June, the Muslim League accepted the Cabinet Mission's proposals, reiterating that the attainment of the goal of a complete sovereign Pakistān still remained the unalterable objective of the Muslims in India. The Congress rejected the Viceroy's proposal for an interim Government, but agreed to participate in the Constituent Assembly in order to frame the Constitution. The Cabinet Mission left India on 29th June.

The Muslim League demanded that the Viceroy should proceed with his scheme for an interim Government even though the Congress would not take part in it. This the Viceroy refused to do, for he had already declared that it was to be a Government of all the parties who had accepted the Cabinet Mission's plan. There were also sharp differences between the Muslim League and the Congress over the interpretation of the Cabinet Mission's plan.

After a somewhat acrimonious controversy the Muslim League formally withdrew its acceptance of the Cabinet Mission's plan. The Viceroy thereupon, in accordance with his previous declaration, reconstituted his Executive Council without any representative of the League. This complete triumph of the Congress provoked a violent reaction among separatist Muslims, and the Muslim League fixed upon 16th August, 1946, as the day of "Direct Action". On that day, while some of the supporters of the League contented themselves with demonstrations of a peaceful type, a rowdy section in Calcutta got completely out of control. A number of Hindus were killed and their houses and shops were looted and burnt. Soon the Hindus retaliated and for a number of days the streets of Calcutta were the scene of communal riots of the worst type. Neither the League Ministry, nor the Governor and the Viceroy, who were ultimately responsible for law and order, took adequate steps to stop the

hideous violence that disgraced the name of the first city of modern India.

On 2nd September, Pandit Jawaharlāl Nehru and his colleagues were sworn in as members of the Viceroy's Executive Council. Soon after this, the Hindus of a number of villages in the district of Noakhāli and the adjoining part of Comillā suffered terribly from raids organised by bands of armed men belonging to the other community. This provoked reprisals in Bihār, where large numbers of Muslims received the same treatment at the hands of the Hindus. Pandit Nehru flew to Bihār, and the Congress Ministry there took vigorous steps to suppress the disturbances.

The Executive Council of the Viceroy, under the guidance of Nehru, worked like a Cabinet and changed the whole spirit and outlook of Indian government. Lord Wavell, whose power thus became almost non-existent, now sought to bring in the League members as a counterpoise in the name of communal parity. He told Pandit Nehru that the League had agreed to join the Constituent Assembly, and reconstituted the Executive Council by including members of that organisation. The introduction of this new element destroyed the team spirit of the Council, as the League members openly repudiated the idea of collective responsibility. What was worse, the League did not join the Constituent Assembly, and Mr. Jinnah made the startling disclosure that it had never agreed to do so. It was an awkward situation for the Viceroy, and the British Government did nothing to improve it when it declared, on December 6, that if the Muslim League did not join the Constituent Assembly, the decision of this body could not be implemented by the British Government, so far at least as it affected the Provinces with a Muslim majority. Nevertheless, the Constituent Assembly met on 9th December, 1946, without the members of the League. Babu Rājendra Prasād was elected President, and various committees were appointed to draft the different parts of the Constitution.

The tense atmosphere continued till 20th February, 1947, when the British Government made an important announcement of policy. It declared its intention to quit India by June, 1948, and appointed Lord Mountbatten Viceroy of India to arrange for the transfer of authority from British to Indian hands.

This momentous proclamation evoked hearty enthusiasm all over India, save in the ranks of the Muslim League, which once more resorted to "Direct Action." Riots broke out all over the Punjab and soon extended to the North-West Frontier Province, and lootings, arson, murder and violence occurred on a large scale over a wide area. These successive communal outbreaks had a very unfortunate

consequence. The Hindus and the Sikhs, who had hitherto been strongly in favour of a United India, now gradually came to realise its impracticability, and demanded partition of the Punjab and Bengal if the Muslims refused to join the Constituent Assembly.

Lord Mountbatten assumed office as Viceroy on 24th March, 1947, and on 3rd June broadcast the famous declaration laying down "the method by which power will be transferred from British to Indian hands". The main points of this new procedure or policy may be summed up as follows:

1. If the areas with a majority of Muslim population so desired, they should be allowed to form a separate Dominion, and a new Constituent Assembly would be set up for that purpose. But in that case there would be a partition of Bengal and the Punjab if the representatives of the Hindu majority districts in the Legislatures of those Provinces so desired.

2. A referendum would be taken in the North-West Frontier Province to ascertain whether it should join Pakistān or not.

3. The district of Sylhet would be joined to the Muslim area in Bengal after the views of the people had been ascertained by a referendum.

4. Boundary Commissions would be set up to define the boundaries of the Hindu and Muslim Provinces in Bengal and the Punjab.

5. Legislation would be introduced in the current session of Parliament for immediately conferring Dominion Status on India (or the two Dominions if partition is decided upon), without any prejudice to the final decision of the Constituent Assembly (or Assemblies) in this respect.

This historic pronouncement was received with mixed feelings by the public. The Hindus and nationalists of all persuasions deplored the vivisection of India, while the Muslims of the League were not fully satisfied with the "truncated and moth-eaten Pakistān", as Mr. Jinnah once described it.

It was, however, generally agreed that the new scheme offered the best practicable solution of the Indian problem, so far as it could be envisaged at the moment. Accordingly both the Congress and the League accepted it, and the partition of the Punjab and Bengal was effected by two Commissions appointed by the British Government, with Sir Cyril Radcliffe as Chairman of both. The India Independence Bill, passed by the British Parliament on the 1st July, 1947, without any dissent, fixed upon 15th August, 1947, as the date of the transfer of authority. Accordingly, at midnight on 14th–15th August, a special session of the Constituent Assembly was held in Delhi. It solemnly declared the independence of India as a part of the British

Commonwealth and appointed Lord Mountbatten the first Governor-General of the new Indian Dominion.

Mr. Jinnah was chosen as the first Governor-General of Pakistān, which soon took steps to summon its own Constituent Assembly.

15th August, 1947, which saw the end of the long-drawn National Struggle against British rule is a red-letter day in the history of India, and the date will ever remain engraved in the hearts of millions of her people.

APPENDIX I

THE INDIAN STATES IN NEW INDIA

1. General Policy

THE POSITION of the Indian States in Independent India was foreshadowed by the Cabinet Mission, which used the following words in its statement of 16th May, 1946: "It is quite clear that with the attainment of independence by British India, whether inside or outside the Commonwealth, the relationship which has hitherto existed between the Rulers of the States and the British Crown, will no longer be possible. Paramountcy can neither be retained by the British Crown nor transferred to the new Government. . . . At the same time the States are ready and willing to co-operate in the new development of India. The precise form which their co-operation will take must be a matter for negotiations during the building-up of the new constitutional structure, and it by no means follows that it will be identical for all the States." The Cabinet Mission recommended that: "(1) There should be a Union of India, embracing both British India and the States, which should deal with the following subjects: Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Communications; and should have the powers necessary to raise the finances required for the above subjects. (2) The States should retain all subjects and powers other than those ceded to the Union."

The position was further elucidated as follows by the Cabinet Mission in its *Memorandum on States' Treaties and Paramountcy* presented to the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes on the 22nd May, 1946: "When a new fully self-governing or independent Government or Governments come into being . . . His Majesty's Government will cease to exercise the powers of Paramountcy. This means that the rights of the States which flow from their relationship to the Crown will no longer exist and that all the rights surrendered by States to the Paramount power will return to the States. Political arrangements between the States on the one side and the British Crown and British India on the other hand, will thus be brought to an end. The void will have to be filled either by the States entering

into a federal relationship with the successor Government or Governments in British India, or failing this, entering into particular political arrangements with it or them."

The Rulers of the States agreed to accept the Cabinet Mission's plan. Their viewpoint was shown as follows in a resolution passed by the Standing Committee of the Chamber of Princes on the 29th January, 1947: "(1) The entry of the States into the Union shall be on no other basis than that of negotiation, and the final decision will rest with each State . . . which can only be taken after consideration of the complete picture of the constitution. (2) All the rights surrendered by the States to the Paramount power will return to the States. The proposed Union of India will, therefore, exercise only such functions in relation to the States in regard to Union Subjects as are assigned or delegated by them to the Union. Every State shall continue to retain its sovereignty and all rights and powers except those that have been expressly delegated by it. There can be no question of any powers being vested or inherent or implied in the Union in respect of the States unless specifically agreed to by them. (3) The Constitution of each State, its territorial integrity and the succession of its reigning dynasty in accordance with the law, custom and usage of the State, shall not be interfered with by the Union or any part thereof."

But after the declaration regarding the partition of India some of the bigger States like Travancore and Hyderabad, pleaded that they could not accept the original plan to which they had given their assent, on the basis of a United India. They even thought that they were entitled to declare their independence in the changed situation, and talked of entering into treaty relations as between one sovereign State and another. The leader of the Muslim League supported this new attitude, but it did not accord with the views of the Congress leaders and other prominent politicians. In a meeting held on the 15th June, 1947, the All-India Congress Committee stated that they could not "admit the right of any State in India to declare its independence and to live in isolation from the rest of India". "Such a declaration," in the opinion of Mahātmā Gāndhi, "was tantamount to a declaration of war against the free millions of India." Pandit Nehru said that "any recognition of any such independence by any foreign power, whichever it may be and whatever it may be, will be considered an unfriendly act". In a statement of 17th June, 1947, Dr. Ambedkar asserted that according to certain aspects of British Constitutional Law and also International Law, there were some flaws in the Cabinet Mission's memorandum regarding lapse of Paramountcy. His view was that the States "will

be sovereign States to the extent they are, but they cannot be independent States so long as they remain under the suzerainty, as they must be, either of the Crown, if India remains a Dominion, or of the successor State, if India becomes independent".

Sardar Patel took charge of the Indian States Department created by the Government of India, on the 5th July, 1947, "to deal with matters arising between the Central Government and the Indian States". Following his advice as well as that of Lord Mountbatten, all the States, with a few exceptions, decided, on 25th July, to accede to the Indian Union in accordance with an Instrument of Accession which provided that, pending the promulgation of a constitution by the Constituent Assembly, in which the States would be adequately represented, the Dominion Parliament would legislate for the acceding States in matters relating to Defence, External Affairs, Communications and other ancillary subjects.

The policy of the Government of the Indian Dominion regarding the States proved successful in most cases. Their relations were regulated by two processes. One was the merger of the smaller States either into a unit administered by the Central Government, or into the neighbouring Provincial administrations, as for example the merger of the Eastern States into the Provinces of Orissa and the Central Provinces, and of the Deccan States and the Gujarāt States into the Bombay administration. The other process was that of the integration of a number of States into bigger administrative combinations, as for example the United State of Matsya (18th March, 1948), the United State of Kāthiāwār (Saurāshtra) (15th February, 1948), the United State of Rājasthān (25th March, 1948 and 18th April, 1948), the United State of Vindhya Pradesh (4th April, 1948), the United States of Gwālior, Indore and Mālwā (Madhya Bhārat Union, 28th May, 1948), and the Patiāla and East Punjab States Union (15th July, 1948). The administration of a Union of 21 States, known as Himāchal Pradesh, and of Cutch, together having a total area of 19,061 square miles, passed under the control of the Centre.

There still remained some small States and also a few major States unaffected by the processes mentioned above. Regarding such major States the policy of the Government of the Indian Union was stated in the Dominion Parliament on the 15th March, 1948, by Mr. N. V. Gadgil (Indian Minister of Works) speaking on behalf of Sardar Patel: "There is no desire on our part, in any way, to compel or coerce them into merger or integration. If they wish to remain as separate autonomous units, we would have no objection, but if the Rulers and the people of any of these States desire to merge

with the neighbouring Province or form a Union with the neighbouring States on a voluntary basis, obviously the Government of India cannot say 'No'. . . . It is clear, however, that in these States, which remain separate units, there would be continuous popular pressure for the grant of full responsible government. I hope the Rulers of these States will appreciate the necessity of retaining the affection and goodwill of their subjects by timely concessions, rather than futile resistance to popular demands. . . . Our policy in regard to them remains . . . their continued autonomous existence unless both the Rulers and the people desire otherwise."

Along with the modifications in the pattern of an old structure, there took place a considerable transformation of the inner set-up of the States and a reorientation in the attitude and policy of the Rulers towards their peoples. Not only did they introduce various measures for improving the economic condition of their respective areas, but "practically every State", as the *White Paper on Indian States*, issued by the Government of India in July, 1948, noted, "announced its intention to grant full responsible government, and in a vast majority of them power has already been transferred to the people". The same document significantly notes that "a bloodless revolution has been brought about, on the one hand, by the operation of democratic forces unleashed by freedom, and on the other, by the patriotic attitude of the Rulers who have been quick to appreciate the change".

The State of Junāgadh and a few adjoining States joined the United State of Kāthiāwār (Saurāshtra) (31st December, 1948). Mayurbhanj merged into Orissa, Kolhāpur into the Bombay Province, and Rāmpur and Banāras into the U.P. Cochin was amalgamated with Travancore. The biggest Union of Indian States, and one of the biggest political and administrative units of India, known as the "Greater Rājasthān Union", was inaugurated on 30th March, 1949. It has within its fold 15 ancient Rājput States with an area of 120,000 sq. miles, a population of about 13 millions, and an annual revenue of about 10 crores of rupees. The great State of Barodā merged into the Bombay Province on 1st May, 1949, and Bhopāl, Cooch Behār, Tripurā, and Manipur passed under the Central administration. Thus before the end of November, 1949, the integration of Indian States was completed with the exception of Hyderābād and Kāshmīr.

2. Hyderābād

A settlement with Hyderābād, which has a special position as the biggest State in India and having a Muslim ruler over a very large

Hindu population, raised highly intricate issues. On the 29th November, 1947, Hyderābād entered into one year's Standstill Agreement with the Indian Union to maintain the *status quo* which had existed before 15th August, 1947.

In the opinion of Syed Kasim Razvi, President of the *Majlis Ittehad-ul-Muslimin*, the Standstill Agreement in no way interfered with the status of Hyderābād as an independent sovereign State, while Paramountcy was "buried deep once for all". But the Government of India felt that from considerations of defence, internal security, and economy, India would remain exposed to grave dangers with an independent Hyderābād. "An independent State completely landlocked within the heart of another is," they noted in their White Paper on Hyderābād, "an unheard-of proposition."

Besides this fundamental point of divergence between India and Hyderābād, some newly arisen internal and external factors further complicated the situation. The activities within the State of the *Majlis Ittehad-ul-Muslimin* and of the Razakars under the leadership of Kazim Razvi, and incidents on the borders of the Indian provinces of Madras, Central Provinces and Bombay, were a standing menace to peace and harmony, and caused much anxiety in the minds of responsible people in different quarters.

All negotiations between Hyderābād and the Indian Union from January, 1948, proved abortive. The Nizām's Government refused to accept the suggestion made by the Governor-General on behalf of the Government of India for Hyderābād's accession to the Indian Dominion, and also another suggestion of the Government of India for the introduction of responsible government in the State. During the final phase of the negotiations in June, 1948, a Draft Agreement was drawn up. On the 18th June, 1948, three days before his departure from India, Lord Mountbatten appealed to the Nizām to accept the Draft Agreement, but to no effect.

On the Hyderābād Government's rejection of the Draft Agreement, the Government of India put some economic pressure on the former. But this did not improve matters. The forces that worked against accession to the Indian Dominion held a position of vantage in that State and made warlike preparations, such as an increase in the State Army, the formation of irregular armies, and the smuggling of arms and ammunition from abroad with the help of foreign adventurers. Further, the growing violence of the Razakars inside Hyderābād State and in the border tracts of the Indian Union seriously menaced law and order. So the Government of India reiterated their demand for immediate disbandment of the Razakars, and also asked the Nizām to facilitate the return of the Indian troops

to Secunderābād, where they had been stationed before their withdrawal early that year according to the Standstill Agreement. The Nizām, who had already appealed to the United Nations against India, would not accept these terms. At this the Government of India informed the Nizām's Government in a final letter on 11th September that they now considered themselves free to take whatever action they thought necessary to restore law and order.

The Indian troops marched into the Hyderābād State on 13th September. The Government of India declared that it was not an "act of war" but a mere "police action" intended "to restore peace and tranquillity inside the State and a sense of security in the adjoining Indian territory". At 4.30 p.m. on 18th September, 1948, Major-General El Edroos, Commander, Forces of the Hyderābād State, surrendered on behalf of the Nizām to Major-General J. N. Chaudhury, Commander of the First Armoured Division of the Indian Army. Kasim Razvi was arrested and the Razakar organisation was broken up. The Laik Ali Ministry, which had filed complaint against India before the Security Council, resigned on 17th September, and the Nizām cabled on 22nd September to the effect that he had withdrawn the Hyderābād case from the Security Council and that the delegation sent there by the outgoing Ministry had no authority to represent him or his State.

Restoration of peace and order being considered by the Indian Government the first and foremost need of the hour, the affairs of Hyderābād were placed under the control of Major-General J. N. Chaudhury, as Military Governor, to be assisted by a staff of Civil Officers. The Nizām readily accepted the new situation and offered his full co-operation. Order and tranquillity were gradually established by effective administrative measures. On 26th January, 1950, Hyderabad acceded to the Indian Union. As a result of the reorganisation of States in 1956, to which reference will be made later in detail, Hyderabad, as a separate State, has now ceased to exist.

3. Kāshmīr

While the Hyderābād problem seemed to be nearing solution, the situation in the State of Jammu and Kāshmīr remained grave and critical. Situated in the extreme north of the Indian subcontinent, this State covers an area of 84,471 square miles. On the north-east it is bordered by Tibet, on the north by Chinese Turkestān (Sinkiang), and on the north-west by the Soviet Republic of Turkestān and by Afghānistān. On its western border lies Pakistān,

and to the south it touches Pakistān and the Dominion of India. The census of 1941 recorded that the total population of the State was 4,021,615, of whom 77·11 per cent were Muslims, 20·12 per cent Hindus, and 2·77 per cent Sikhs and Buddhists. In view of geographical contiguity and the greater numerical strength of the Muslims in this State, Pakistān was naturally anxious to bring it under her influence.

The State of Jammu and Kāshmīr was subjected to repeated tribal raids from across and within the Pakistān area soon after the partition. On the rapid advance of the raiders up the Jhelum Valley Road, threatening even Srinagar, the Government of Jammu and Kāshmīr sought assistance of the Government of the Indian Dominion. On 26th October the Mahārāja of Kāshmīr formally acceded to the Indian Union, and this step was fully approved by Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah, leader of the All Jammu and Kāshmīr National Conference, an organisation enjoying a large measure of popular confidence and support in the State. The Government of India, while accepting this accession as a provisional step, expressed the view that the future of Kāshmīr should be decided in accordance with the popular will ascertained by means of plebiscite or referendum.

The first contingent of Indian troops reached Kāshmir by air on the morning of 27th October, 1947. On 31st October, an interim Emergency Administration was formed with Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah as its head, which, with the help of Indian forces, successfully resisted tribal raids, believed to be encouraged and supported by Pakistān, whose sympathies were for the Azad Kāshmīr Government, an organization opposed to the new Government in Kāshmīr. On 31st December, the Indian Union sent a memorandum to the Security Council of the United Nations urging the latter "to call upon Pakistān (a member State), to put an end immediately to the giving of such assistance, which is an act of aggression against India." After fruitless efforts at mediation for about five months the United Nations sent a Commission to study things on the spot. This Commission reached India in July, 1948 and on 13th August, 1948, suggested a "Cease Fire" agreement between India and Pakistān. The Indian Union agreed, but the Pakistān Government was not prepared to accept the "Cease Fire" resolution without attaching certain conditions which were unacceptable to the Commission. The presence of Pakistān troops in Kāshmīr territory was now admitted by the Pakistān Government, and the relations between the two Dominions grew extremely strained. Happily good sense ultimately prevailed, and one minute before midnight on

1st January, 1949, a mutual "Cease Fire" agreement was concluded between the Governments of the Indian Union and Pakistān. Hostilities ceased and Admiral Nimitz was appointed U.N. Administrator for the plebiscite. It was hoped that the future of the State of Jammu and Kāshmīr would be determined by a plebiscite held under satisfactory conditions.

In April, 1950, the Security Council appointed Sir Owen Dixon as the U.N. Representative, in place of the U.N. Commission, to help the parties for "the expeditious and enduring solution of the dispute which has arisen between the two Governments in regard to the State of Jammu and Kāshmīr". But his efforts proved to be of no avail. On his request to be relieved, the Security Counci appointed Dr. Frank Graham as U.N. Representative on 30th April, 1951. The latter's efforts were also fruitless.

In 1951 a Constituent Assembly met in Jammu and Kāshmīr to frame a constitution for the State. In February, 1954, the accession of the State to India was ratified by the Constituent Assembly, and in November, 1956, it adopted a constitution legalising the status of Jammu and Kāshmīr as a unit of the Indian Union. The Constituent Assembly dissolved itself on 26th January, 1957, after the formal inauguration of the new constitution. On 26th July, 1957, Bakhsi Ghulam Mohammad was sworn in as Prime Minister of Jammu and Kāshmīr. Yuvaraj Karan Singh was elected unopposed for another term of office as *Sadar-i-Riyasat* of Jammu and Kāshmīr. Two days before this date, the Security Council passed a resolution calling for a *status quo* in Kāshmīr. A resolution sponsored in the Security Council by four countries—Britain, Australia, Cuba and the U.S.A.—for sending United Nations forces to Kāshmīr for the solution of her problem was vetoed by the U.S.S.R. on 20th February, 1957. The deputation of Gunnar Jarring of Sweden, President of the Security Council, with instructions to explore the possibilities for settlement of the Kāshmīr dispute and report to the Security Council before 30th April, 1957, did not produce any concrete result. The revival of the Graham Commission by a resolution of the Security Council was likewise abortive.

The Kāshmīr problem has been before the Security Council for more than a decade, but no solution has been reached. In the absence of the requisite conditions, and in view of the continuance of Pakistān's aggression in a portion of the State, the question of a plebiscite is now dead so far as the Government of India is concerned. It is significant to note that the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kāshmīr has itself declared the accession of the State to India as final.

APPENDIX II

THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, which first met on December 9th, 1946 (p. 994), took three years to complete its work, and the new Constitution was adopted and signed by the President, Dr. Rājendra Prasād, on November 26th, 1949. It came into force on January 26th, 1950, the twentieth anniversary of Independence Day (p. 987). It is a bulky document covering about 270 pages, and its main provisions, as given below, were:—

A. INDIAN UNION

1. India, that is Bhārat, is a Sovereign Democratic Republic[1] and a Union of States. These States are divided into four categories, viz.:

(A) Assam, Bihār, Bombay, Madhya Pradesh (Central Provinces and Berar), Madras, Orissa, Punjab (E. Punjab), the United Provinces,[2] and West Bengal.
(B) Hyderābād, Jammu and Kāshmīr, Madhya Bhārat (p. 999), Mysore, Patiālā and East Punjab States Union, Rājasthān, Saurāshtra, Travancore-Cochin, and Vindhya Pradesh.
(C) Ajmer, Bhopāl, Bilāspur, Coorg, Delhi, Himāchal Pradesh, Kutch, Manipur, and Tripurā.
(D) The Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

The first category consists of the former provinces of British India, while the second and third comprise the old Indian States, either single or integrated into unions, together with three Chief Commissionerships (centrally administered territories) of old, viz. Ajmer-Merwara, Coorg, and Delhi.

[1] But it is still a member of the Commonwealth of Nations. The present status of India is regulated by the "India (Consequential Provision) Bill" passed by the British Parliament, which received the Royal Assent on December 16th, 1949. This Act, while recognising India as a Republican State, preserves for her the rights and privileges at present enjoyed by the Indians under British law.

[2] The name of this Province was altered to Uttar Pradesh in January 1950.

B. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

2. The Constitution guarantees to all citizens freedom of speech and expression, the right to assemble peaceably, and freedom of conscience and worship, subject to general considerations of public security and morality.

3. All citizens, irrespective of religion, race, caste, sex, and place of birth, shall enjoy equality before the law and no disability shall be imposed on them in any respect.

"Untouchability" is abolished and its practice in any form is forbidden.

4. No person shall be deprived of his life, property or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. The law may provide for preventive detention of a person for three months and even for a longer period, either on the recommendation of an Advisory Board, or in accordance with a law passed by Parliament.

The law authorising compulsory acquisition of property should provide for compensation.

C. THE UNION GOVERNMENT

5. The executive power of the Union is vested in the President of India, who is elected for five years by the members of an electoral college consisting of (*a*) the elected members of both Houses of Parliament and (*b*) the elected members of the Legislative Assemblies of the States.

6. There is also a Vice-President of India elected for five years by the members of both Houses of Parliament, assembled at a joint meeting.

7. There is a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head to aid and advise the President. The Prime Minister is appointed by the President, and the other Ministers are appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister. The Council of Ministers is collectively responsible to the House of the People.

8. There is a Parliament for the Union consisting of the President and two Houses known respectively as the Council of States and the House of the People.

9. The Council of States consists of (1) not more than 238 representatives of States, elected by the elected members of the Legislative Assembly of each State, and (2) 12 members nominated by the President on the ground of their having special knowledge or practical experience in literature, science, art, and social service.

10. The House of the People consists of not more than 500 members directly elected by the voters in the States. For this

purpose territorial constituencies have been specially created in such a manner that there is not less than one member for every 750,000 of the population and not more than one member for every 500,000 of the population.

11. The Council of States is not subject to dissolution, but one-third of its members retire on the expiration of every second year. The House of the People, unless sooner dissolved, continues for five years. Both the Houses must meet at least twice in every year.

12. The Vice-President of India is the *ex-officio* Chairman of the Council of States, which elects a Deputy Chairman. The House of the People elects its own Speaker and Deputy Speaker. These officers and members of the two Houses receive salaries and allowances as fixed by Parliament.

13. A Money Bill may originate only in the House of the People and is passed even if the Council of States does not agree to it. All other Bills may originate in either House of Parliament, and are deemed to have been passed only when agreed to by both Houses, or, in case of difference, passed in a joint sitting of the two Houses by a majority of the total number of members of both Houses present and voting.

14. The President's assent is necessary before a Bill becomes law, and he may withhold his assent and return the Bill with his suggestions; but if the Bill is passed again by the Houses he cannot withhold his assent.

15. There is a Supreme Court of India consisting of a Chief Justice of India and, until Parliament by law prescribes a larger number, not more than seven other judges. It has original jurisdiction in any dispute between two or more States and between the Government of India and one or more States. An appeal lies to the Supreme Court from the judgment of any High Court in a State. A judge of the Supreme Court (or of the High Court of a State) shall not be removed from his office except after an address by each House of Parliament passed by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members present and voting.

D. THE STATES (CATEGORY A)

16. There is a Governor for each State appointed by the President for a term of five years and holding office during his pleasure.

17. There is a Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at the head to aid and advise the Governor. The Chief Minister is appointed by the Governor, and the other Ministers by the Governor on the advice of the Chief Minister. The Council of Ministers is collectively responsible to the Legislative Assembly of the State.

18. There is a Legislature in every State which consists of the Governor and the Legislative Assembly, but there is an additional House, known as the Legislative Council, in Bihār, Bombay, Madras, Punjab, the United Provinces, and West Bengal.

19. The members of the Legislative Assembly are chosen by direct election, on a scale of not more than one member for every 75,000 of the population.

20. The total number of members in the Legislative Council is not to exceed one-fourth of the total number of members in the Legislative Assembly. Of these one-third are elected by the Municipalities, District Boards and other local authorities; one-twelfth by graduates of three years' standing; one-twelfth by teachers of three years' standing; and one-third by the members of the Legislative Assembly. The remainder are nominated by the Governor and consist of persons having special knowledge or practical experience in literature, science, art, the co-operative movement, and social service.

21. The duration of the Legislative Council and the Legislative Assembly is the same as laid down respectively for the Council of States and the House of the People in para. 11.

22. Every Legislative Assembly chooses two of its members respectively as Speaker and Deputy Speaker thereof. Every Legislative Council chooses two of its members respectively as Chairman and Deputy Chairman thereof. These officers as well as the members of the two Houses receive such salaries and allowances as may be fixed by the Legislature of the State.

23. A Money Bill may originate only in the Legislative Assembly, and is passed even if the Legislative Council does not agree to it. All other Bills may originate in either House, and are deemed to have been passed only when agreed to by both Houses. But in case of difference, if the Legislative Assembly passes the Bill a second time, it becomes law without the approval of the Legislative Council.

24. The Governor has the same power of assenting to, or withdrawing his assent from, a Bill passed by the Legislature as is possessed by the President (*vide* para. 14). But the Governor may also reserve such a Bill for the consideration of the President.

E. THE STATES (CATEGORIES B, C, D)

25. The main difference between the States belonging to categories A and B is that while the executive head of the former is a Governor, that of the latter is the Rājapramukh, usually the ruler of the old State (or of one of them in the case of an integration of States). The appointment of the Rājapramukh is regulated by the

agreement entered into between each such State and the Government of India. The third and fourth categories of States are administered by the Head of the Indian Union, through a Chief Commissioner appointed by him or through the government of a neighbouring State.

F. THE RELATION BETWEEN THE UNION AND THE STATES

26. Generally speaking, the Parliament may make laws for the whole or any part of India, and the Legislature of a State may make laws for the whole or any part of the State. But the Constitution specifically lays down three lists of subjects, with respect to the first of which the Parliament, and with respect to the second, the Legislature of the State, has exclusive power to make laws; and both have concurrent powers of legislation in regard to the third.

27. The Union List includes, among others, defence of India, naval, military, and air forces, arms and ammunitions, foreign affairs including diplomatic representation, war and peace, railways, maritime shipping and navigation, airways, posts and telegraphs, currency, trade and commerce with foreign countries, inter-State trade and commerce, banking, insurance, and financial corporations, regulation of mines and mineral development, regulation of labour, manufacture of salt, High Courts, certain institutions of all-India importance, certain taxes like income-tax, duties of customs, and duties of excise.

28. The State List includes, among others, police, administration of justice (except constitution of High Courts), prisons, local government, education, communication (within the State), forests, fisheries, and several taxes.

29. The Concurrent List includes, among others, criminal law, civil and criminal procedure, preventive detention for the security of the State, Trade Unions, ports, inland shipping and navigation, trade, commerce and price-control.

30. The executive power of every State is to be so exercised as to ensure compliance with the laws made by Parliament. It shall not impede or prejudice the exercise of the executive power of the Union which extends to the giving of such directions to a State as may appear necessary to the Government of India.

31. Detailed regulations are laid down for the distribution of revenues between the Union and the States, and provision is made for the appointment of a Finance Commission from time to time to revise such distribution.

G. SUFFRAGE AND QUALIFICATIONS FOR MEMBERSHIP OF LEGISLATURE

32. Every citizen of India, of not less than twenty-one years of age, is entitled to vote in the elections to the House of the People and to the Legislative Assembly of the State to which he belongs.

33. No citizen of less than thirty years of age is qualified for the membership of the Council of States or the Legislative Council; the minimum age for the membership of the House of the People and Legislative Assembly is twenty-five years.

34. For a period of ten years from the commencement of this Constitution seats shall be reserved in the House of the People for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, in proportion to their population, and the President may nominate not more than two members of the Anglo-Indian Community to that House.

H. EMERGENCY PROVISIONS

35. The President or the Governor of a State may, when the Houses of Legislature are not in session, promulgate an Ordinance, having the same force and effect as an Act of the Legislature, if he thinks it necessary to take immediate action. Such Ordinances shall cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the reassembly of the Legislature, or earlier if the Legislature disapproves of them.

36. If the President is satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the security of India or any part of it is threatened, he may issue a Proclamation to that effect. While such a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, the executive and legislative powers of the Union practically supersede those of the States.

37. If the President is satisfied that a situation has arisen in which the Government of a State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution, he may, by Proclamation, assume to himself or vest in the Parliament all or any of the powers and functions of the Government of the State.

38. The Proclamation, referred to in the two preceding paras., shall cease to operate at the expiration of two months unless approved by both Houses of Parliament before that date, or in case the House of the People was dissolved at the time, within thirty days of its reconstitution.

I. MISCELLANEOUS

39. Either House of Parliament may bring a charge of Impeachment against the President for violation of the Constitution. If it

is passed by a majority of two-thirds, and is also sustained, after due enquiry, by a similar majority of the other House, the President shall be removed from office.

40. Subject to certain general restrictions which the law imposes, trade, commerce, and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be free.

41. The Constitution provides for the appointment of a Public Service Commission both for the Union and the States, an Attorney-General for India, a Comptroller and Auditor-General of India, as well as Advocate-Generals and High Courts for States.

42. For a period of fifteen years the English language shall continue to be the official language of the Union. Thereafter the official language shall be Hindi in Devanāgari script.

43. The Legislature of a State may by law adopt any local language as its official language provided that the official language of the Union shall be used for communication between two States.

Since 1951 there have been several additions and amendments to the Indian Constitution. The more important of these are noted below:


1. Notwithstanding Article 5 of the Constitution the State is now authorised to make "special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes".

2. The State is authorised to impose reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by Article 19, in the interests of the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of Court, defamation or incitement to an offence.

3. Important modifications in the provision for compulsory acquisition or requisitioning of property and State Monopolies.

4. The States and the Territories of the Indian Union were re-organised with effect from 1st November, 1956. There were thus fourteen States and six Union Territories. The six Union Territories are (1) Delhi, (2) Himachal Pradesh, (3) Manipur, (4) Tripura, (5) The Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and (6) Minicoy and Amindivi Islands. The fourteen States are Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Bombay, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Madras, Mysore, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, and Jammu and Kashmir. Of the former ten Part A States, Assam, Orissa, and Uttar Pradesh have not been territorially affected by this re-organisation. There were some boundary re-adjustments for West Bengal, Bihar and Madras. The Andhra State, as created in 1953 out of the northern part of Madras, was designated Andhra Pradesh, and was enlarged

by the merger of the portion of Hyderabad known as Telengana. Bombay became the largest State in point of area by the merger of Kutch and Saurashtra and the Marathi-speaking districts of Madhya Pradesh and Hyderabad. The new Madhya Pradesh, in spite of the loss of Vidarbha or the eight Marathi-speaking districts, emerged as the second largest State by the addition of Madhya Bharat, Bhopal, and Vindhya Pradesh. The former state of Patiala and East Punjab States Union was added to the Punjab. The Kanarese-speaking districts of Hyderabad were added to Mysore. Travancore-Cochin, with some territorial adjustments, assumed the new name of Kerala. The outstanding features of the re-organisation were (1) the abolition of Rajpramukhs, (2) establishment of zonal councils with advisory capacity in relation to inter-State affairs or border disputes and (3) provision for linguistic safeguards. The Bombay State has been re-organised by the Bombay Re-organisation Act, which received the assent of the President of India on 25th April, 1960, and it has been divided into two States, viz. the Gujarāt State and the Mahārāshtra State.



THE DIVISION OF THE BOMBAY STATE, 1960

GENEALOGICAL TABLES TO PART III

THE NAWĀBS OF OUDH

- Mīr Muhammad Nāsir
  - Mīr Muhammad Amīn SA'ĀDAT KHĀN Burhān-ul-mulk (1722–1739)
    - Sadr-i-Jahān or Sadr-un-Nisā Begam = Mīrzā Muhammad Muqīm Abu-'l-Mansūr Khān SAFDAR JANG (1739–1754)
  - Daughter = Jāfar Beg Khān
    - Mīrzā Muhammad Muqīm Abu-'l-Mansūr Khān SAFDAR JANG (1739–1754)
      - Jalāl-ud-dīn Haidar SHUJĀ-UD-DAULAH (1754–1775)
        - Asaf-ud-daulah (1775–1797)
          - Wāzīr 'Ālī (1797–1798) deposed and succeeded by Sa'ādat 'Ālī (1798–1814)
            - Ghāzī-ud-dīn Haidar (1814–1827)
              - Nāsir-ud-dīn Haidar (1827–1837)
                - Muna Jān
            - 'Ālī Shāh (1837–1842)
              - Amjad 'Ālī Shāh (1842–1847)
                - Mustafa 'Ālī Khān Haidar
                - Wāzid 'Ālī Shāh (1847–1856)
                  - Brijis Qadr (1857)
                - Suleiman Qadr

THE GĀIKWĀR FAMILY

- Dāmājī I
- Jhingojī
  - Pilājī (1721–1732)
    - Dāmājī II (1732–1768)
      - Govind Rāo (1768–1771; 1793–1800)
        - Ānand Rāo (1800–1819)
        - Sayājī Rāo II (1818–1847)
          - Ganpat Rāo (1847–1856)
          - Khande Rāo (1856–1870)
            Adopted Sayajī Rāo III (1875–1939)
          - Malhār Rāo (1870–1875)
      - Sayājī Rāo I (1771–1778)
      - Fateh Sing (1771–1789)
      - Mānājī (1789–1793)
      - Others

THE HOLKAR FAMILY

- "Cundajee"
  - Malhār Rāo Holkar (1728–1764)
    - Khande Rāo = Ahalyā Bāī (1765–1795)
      (killed 1754)
      - Malle Rāo (1764–1766)
      - Muktā Bāi

Tukojī Holkar (appointed commander by Ahalyā Bāī in 1767) (1795–1797)

- Kāsī Rāo
- Malhār Rāo
- Jaswant Rāo I (1798–1811)
  - Malhār Rāo Holkar (II) (1811–1833)
    - Hari Rāo Holkar (1834–1843)
      - Tukojī Rāo Holkar II (1843–1886)
        - Sivājī Rāo Holkar (1886–1903)
          - Tukojī Rāo Holkar III (1903–1926)
            - Jaswant Rāo II (1926–)
- Vithojī

THE BHONSLAS (Nāgpur)

- Mudhojī
  - Bapujī
    - Bimbajī
      - Raghūjī I (1738–1755)
        - Mudhojī
          - Raghūjī II adopted by Janojī (1788–1816)
            - Parsojī
              - Raghūjī III (1818–1853)
          - Vyankojī
            - Mudhojī (Appa Sāheb)
        - Janojī
        - Others
  - Parsojī
    - Kanhojī

THE SINDHIA FAMILY

Minā Bāī = Ranojī Sindhia (1726–1750) = a Rājput Lady of Mālwa

- Children of Ranojī Sindhia and Minā Bāī:
  - Jey pāt (Jayappa) d. 1759
    - Jānkojī (killed at Pānīpat almost immediately after accession to power).
  - Dattājī
  - Jotiba
- Children of Ranojī Sindhia and a Rājput Lady of Mālwa:
  - Mādhava Rāo (Māhādājī) Sindhia d. 1794
  - Tukojī (died on the field of Pānīpat)
    - Kedarji
    - Jyotaba
    - Anand Rāo
      - Daulat Rāo Sindhia (1794–1827)
        - Jankojī Rāo (1827–1843)
          - Jayajī Rāo (1843–1886)
            - Mādhava Rāo II (1886–1925)
              - Jivajī Rāo (1925–)

MAHĀRĀJĀ RANJIT SINGH'S FAMILY

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Budh Singh
(Founder of the Sukarchakia Confederacy)
(d. 1716)
├── Chandra Singh
│   (Ancestor of the Sindhianwala branch of the family)
└── Nodh Singh
    (d. 1752)
    └── Charat Singh
        (d. 1774)
        └── Mahan (Maha) Singh (eldest son) (d. 1792)
            = Daughter (of Raja Gajpat Singh of Jind)
            └── Ranjit Singh (b. 1780: d. 1839)
                = (1) Mahtab Kaur
                  (2) Raj Kaur (Mai Nakāiu)
                  (3) Dia Kaur
                  (4) Ratan Kaur
                  (5) Jindan
                  (6) Others
                ├── Kharak Singh (1839–1840) = Chand Kaur (1840–1841)
                │   └── Nao Nehal Singh (1840)
                ├── Sher Singh (1841–1843)
                │   ├── Bakh Singh
                │   ├── Partab Singh
                │   ├── Dewa Singh
                │   ├── Shah Deo Singh
                │   ├── Narain Singh
                │   │   ├── Harnam Singh
                │   │   └── Aotar Singh
                │   ├── Thakur Singh
                │   └── Karam Singh
                ├── Tara Singh
                ├── Kashmira Singh
                ├── Pishora Singh
                ├── Multana Singh
                └── Dalip Singh (1843–1849)
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THE DURRĀNĪ SHĀHS

- Ahmad Shāh, Durrānī (1747–1773)
  - Tīmūr Shāh (1773–1793)
    - Humāyūn
    - Mahmūd (1800–1803, 1809–1818)
      - Kāmrān
        - Jehāngīr
    - Zamān Shāh (1793–1800)
    - Shujā (1803–1809, 1839–1842)
      - Tīmūr
    - Ayyūb (1818–1826)

THE NIZĀMS OF HYDERABAD

Khwāja Abid Kabj Khān (Governor of Ajmer)

Mir Shihāb-ud-dīn, Ghāzi-ud-dīn Khan Fīrūz Jang (Governor of Gujarāt)

1. Mir Qamār-ud-dīn, Nizām-ul-mulk Asaf Jāh
Created Subahdār of the Deccan by the Mughul Emperor Farrukhsiyar, 1713.
Became practically independent 1724 (1713–1748).

- Ghāzī-ud-dīn Khān
  - Ghāzī-ud-dīn Imād-ul-Mulk
- 2. Mīr Muhammad Nāsir Jang (1748–1750)
- 3. Mīr Āsaf-ud-daulah Salābat Jang (1751–1761)
- 4. Nizām 'Ālī (1762–1803)
  - 5. Mīr Akbar 'Ālī Khān Sikandar Jah (1802–1829)
    - 6. Nāsir-ud-daulah Farkhundah 'Ālī Khān (1829–1857)
      - 7. Afzul-ud-daulah (1857–1869)
        - 8. Mīr Mahbub 'Ālī Khān (1869–1911)
          - 9. H.E.H. Nawab Mīr Usmān Ālī Khān Bahādur Fateh Jang (1911–)
- Mīr Shujā-ul-mulk Basālat Jang
- daughter
  - Muzaffar Jang (1750–1751)

THE NAWĀBS OF ARCOT

1. Zulf'iqar 'Ālī Khān
Created Nawāb of the Carnatic by the Emperor Aurangzeb
(c. A.D. 1690–1703)

2. Dāūd Khān
(A.D. 1703–1710)

Agibattī Muhammad Khān

- 3. Muhammad Sayyid Sa'ādat-ullah Khān I (1710–1732)
- Ghulām 'Ālī Khān
  - 4. Dost 'Ālī Khān (1732–1740)
    - Husain
    - 5. Safdar 'Ālī Khān (1740–1742)
      - 6. Sa'ādat-ullah Khān II 'Muhammad Sayyid' (1742–1744)
    - Dau. md. Ghulām Murtazā 'Ālī
      - Sāhib Jadda (Zada)
    - Dau. md. Cihanda Sāhib, alias Husain DostKhān (1749)
      - Rājā Sāhib (1759)

7. Anwār-ud-dīn Muhammad
Appointed Nāwāb by Nizām-ul-mulk
Rival Chanda Sāhib. (1744–1749)

- Mahfuz Khān
- 8. Wala Jāh Muhammad 'Ālī (1749–1795)
  - 9. Omdut-ul-Umarā (1795–1801)
    - 10. 'Ālī Hussain
  - Amīr-ul-Umarā
    - 'Azīm-ud-daulah (1801–1819)
      - 11. 'Azam Jāh (1819–1825)
      - 12. 'Azīm Jāh Bahādur 'Prince of Arcot' (1867–1874)
- 'Abdul Rahim
- 'Abdul Wahab
- Nājib-ullah

THE NAWĀBS OF BENGAL SUBAH

Murshid Qulī Jāfar Khān
(1703–1727)

Daughter = Shujā-ud-dīn
(1727–1739)

Sarfarāz Khān
(1739–1740)

. . . . .

(Mirzā Muhammad, adventurer from Turkestān)

'Alīvardī Khān
(1740–1756)

Hājī Ahmad

Daughter (Aminā Begam) = Zain-ud-dīn

Sirāj-ud-daulah
(1756–1757)

. . . . .

Mīr Jāfar
(First time 1757–1760)
(Second time 1763–1765)

Daughter
(Fatemā Begam) = Mīr Kāsīm
(1760–1763)

Najm-ud-daulah
(1765–1766)

Saif-ud-daulah
(1766–1770)

BARAKZĀI WĀZIRS AND AMĪRS

- Jamāl Khān, Barakzāi (1747–1773)
  - Pāyindā Khān (1773–1800)
    - Fateh Khān (1800–1818)
    - Other brothers
    - Dost Muhammad Khān (Amīr of Kābul) (1826–1863)
      - Afzal Khān
        - 'Abdur Rahmān (1880–1901)
          - Habibullah (1901–1919)
            - Hayat
            - Amānullah (1919–1929)
              - ⋮ Nādir Shāh (1929–1933)
                - Muhammad Zahir Shāh (1933–)
          - Nasrullah
      - Sher 'Ālī (1863–1866; 1868–1879)
        - Yakub Khān (1879 –1880)
        - Ayūb Khān

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GOVERNORS-GENERAL

I. Governors-General of Fort William in Bengal

(*Regulating Act of* 1773)

(*Temporary and officiating in italics*)

1774 (October)	Warren Hastings
1785 (February)	*Sir John Macpherson*
1786 (September)	Earl (Marquess) Cornwallis
1793	Sir John Shore (Lord Teignmouth)
1798 (March)	*Sir A. Clarke*
1798 (May)	Earl of Mornington (Marquess Wellesley)
1805 (30th July)	Marquess Cornwallis (for the second time)
1805 (October)	*Sir George Barlow*
1807 (July)	Baron (Earl of) Minto I
1813 (4th October)	Earl of Moira (Marquess of Hastings)
1823 (January)	*John Adam*
1823 (1st August)	Baron (Earl) Amherst
1828 (March)	*William Butterworth Bayley*
1828 (4th July)	Lord William Cavendish-Bentinck

II. Governors-General of India

(*Charter Act of* 1833)

1833	Lord William Cavendish-Bentinck
1835 (20th March)	*Sir Charles (Lord) Metcalfe*
1836 (March)	Baron (Earl of) Auckland
1842 (February)	Baron (Earl of) Ellenborough
1844 (June)	*William Wilberforce Bird*
1844 (July)	Sir Henry (Viscount) Hardinge
1848 (January)	Earl (Marquess) of Dalhousie
1856 (February)	Viscount (Earl) Canning

III. Governors-General and Viceroys

1858 (1st November)	Viscount (Earl) Canning
1862 (March)	Earl of Elgin and Kincardine I
1863	*Sir Robert Napier (Baron Napier of Magdala)*
1863	*Sir William T. Denison*
1864 (January)	Sir John (Lord) Lawrence
1869 (January)	Earl of Mayo

1872	*Sir John Strachey*
1872	*Lord Napier of Merchistoun*
1872 (May)	Baron (Earl of) Northbrook
1876 (April)	Baron (Earl of) Lytton I
1880 (June)	Marquess of Ripon
1884 (December)	Earl of Dufferin (Marquess of Dufferin and Ava)
1888 (December)	Marquess of Lansdowne
1894 (January)	Earl of Elgin and Kincardine II
1899 (6th January)	Baron (Marquess) Curzon of Kedleston
1904 (April)	*Lord Ampthill*
1904 (December)	Baron (Marquess) Curzon of Kedleston (re-appointed)
1905 (November)	Earl of Minto II
1910 (November)	Baron Hardinge of Penshurst
1916 (April)	Baron Chelmsford
1921 (April)	Earl of Reading
1925	*Lord Lytton II*
1926 (April)	Lord Irwin
1929	*Lord Goschen* (during the absence of Lord Irwin on leave)
1931 (April)	Earl of Willingdon
1934 (May–August)	*Sir George Stanley* (Offg.)
1936 (18th April)	Marquess of Linlithgow

IV. Governors-General and Crown Representatives (*Act of* 1935)

1937 (31st March)	Marquess of Linlithgow
1938 (June–October)	*Baron Brabourne* (Offg.)
1938	Marquess of Linlithgow
1943	Viscount (Earl) Wavell
1945	*Sir John Colville* (Offg.)
1947 (March–August)	Viscount (Earl) Mountbatten (last Viceroy of United India, First Governor-General of the Indian Dominion, 1947–48).

V. Governors-General (*Indian Independence Act*)

Indian Union

1947	Earl Mountbatten
(November)	*Śrī Chakravarti Rājagopālāchāri* (Offg.)
1948 (June)	Śrī Chakravarti Rājagopālāchāri

Pakistān

1947	Qaid-i-Azam M. A. Jinnah
1948 (September)	Khwajeh Nazimuddin

PRIME MINISTERS

Indian Union

1947	Pandit Jawaharlāl Nehru

Pakistān

1947	Liāquat 'Ālī Khān

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA

1950	Śrī Rājendra Prasād

CHRONOLOGY

B.C.

3102. Epoch of the Kali Yuga Era and of the Bhārata War according to one school of astronomers.

c. 2700. Date of Indus Valley Seals found at Kish.

2449. Date of heroes of the Bhārata War according to a second group of astronomers and chronologists.

c. 1435. Aryan Kings in Western Asia.

c. 1414. Date of the Bhārata War according to certain Purānas.

c. 1375. Worship of Aryan deities in the land of the Mitanni.

817. Traditional date of the birth of Pārśvanātha.

558. Accession of Cyrus the Great, conqueror of Kāpiśi.

544. Traditional Epoch of the Ceylonese Era of Buddha's Nirvāṇa.

527. Traditional Epoch of the Era of Mahāvīra's Nirvāṇa.

522. Accession of Darius I, conqueror of the "Indian" satrapy of the Persian Empire.

c. 518–517. Naval Expedition of Skylax and conquest of the Indian satrapy.

486. Cantonese date of Buddha's Nirvāṇa.

327–326. Invasion of India by Alexander.

325. Alexander leaves India.

c. 324. Rise of the Maurya Dynasty.

313. Jaina date of the year of Chandragupta's accession, probably as ruler of Avanti.

c. 305. Indian Expedition of Seleukos Nikator.

c. 273–232. The reign of Aśoka.

c. 206. Indian Expedition of Antiochos III, King of Syria.

c. 187. Rise of the Dynasty of Pushyamitra.

165. Plato, King of Bactria.

162. Latest possible date for the assumption of the title "Great" by Eukratides, King of Bactria and the Indian borderland.

c. 145–101. Elāra Chola, King of Ceylon.

138– 88. Conflict of the kings of Parthia with Śakas in Eastern Irān.

c. 126. The Chinese ambassador Chang-Kien visits the Yueh-chi in the Oxus region.
58. Epoch of the Kṛita–Mālava–Vikrama Era.
57–38. Squared letters appear on Parthian coins.
c. 44–29. Tamil kings in Ceylon.
c. 30. End of Śuṅga-Kāṇva rule in Eastern Mālwa. Sātavāhana supremacy in the Deccan.
c. 26–20. Indian embassies to Augustus.
2. A Chinese official instructed in Buddhism by a Yueh-chi King.

A.D.

c. 1. Isidore of Charax.
c. 47. Takht-i-Bāhi record of Gondophernes.
c. 64. The Chinese Emperor Ming-ti sends for Buddhist texts.
77. Pliny's Natural History.
78. Epoch of the Śaka Era.
Decline of the Parthian and the consolidation of the Kushān power in the Indus valley.
89–105. Kushān King repulsed by the Chinese General Pan Chao.
c. 100. Indian embassy to the Roman Emperor Trajan.
119–124. Nahapāna.
His power overthrown by Gautamīputra Śātakarṇi.
130–150. Rudradāman I, contemporary of Vāsishṭhīputra Śrī Śātakarṇi.
148–170. An-Shih-Kao translates a work by Kanishka's chaplain.
c. 152. China loses Khotān.
c. 200. Palmyra created a Roman colony.
230. The Yueh-chi King Po-tiao (Vāsudeva?) sends an embassy to China.
248. Epoch of the Traikuṭaka-Kalachuri Era.
276–293. Sassanian conquest of parts of North-West India.
320. (Feb. 26) Gupta Era begins.
c. 360. Ceylonese Embassy to Samudra Gupta.
c. 380. Accession of Chandra Gupta II.
388. Latest known date of the Śakas of Western India.
405–411. Travels of Fa-Hien in the Gupta Empire.
c. 415. Accession of Kumāra Gupta I.
436. Siṁhavarman, the Pallava King of Kāñchī, mentioned in the Lokavibhāga.

c. 448. Huns in the Oxus valley.
455. Accession of Skanda Gupta.
458. Date of the Lokavibhāga.
467. Latest known date of Skanda Gupta.
473. Kumara Gupta II.
476. Birth of the astronomer Āryabhaṭa.
c. 477–495. Reign of Budha Gupta.
507–508. Vainya Gupta.
Gopachandra, a contemporary of Vainya Gupta.
510–511. Bhānu Gupta.
533. Yaśodharman, conqueror of Mihirakula the Hun King.
543–544. Continuance of Gupta rule in North Bengal.
Rise of the Chalukyas of Vātāpi.
547. Kosmas Indikopleustes.
554. Iśānavarman Maukhari.
566–567. Accession of Kīrtivarman I, Chalukya.
606. Accession of Harshavardhana.
609. Coronation of Pulakeśin II, Chalukya.
619–620. Supremacy of Śaśāṅka in Eastern India.
622. Era of the Hijra.
634. Reference to the fame of Kālidāsa and Bhāravi in the Aihole inscription.
637. Arab raid against Thānā.
639. Foundation of Lhāsā by Srong-tsan-Gampo.
641. Harsha's embassy to China.
c. 642. Death of Pulakeśin II.
Probable date of the death of Aṁśuvarman of Nepāl.
c. 642–668. Narasiṁhavarman I, the Great Pallava.
643. Harsha's meeting with Hiuen-Tsang.
First mission of Wang-Hiuen-T'se.
646. Second mission of Wang-Hiuen-T'se.
Śilāditya (of Mewar?)
c. 646–647. Death of Harsha.
c. 647–648. Bhāskaravarman or Kumārarāja, King of Kāmarupa, helped Wang-Hiuen-T'se.
657. Third mission of Wang-Hiuen-T'se.
661. Guhila Aparājita.
667. "Five Indies" send ambassadors to China.
672–673. Ādityasena.
674. Vikramāditya I, Chalukya.
Parameśvaravarman I, Pallava.

675–685. Itsing at Nālandā.
711. Invasion of Sind by Muhammad b. Qāsim.
712. Arab conquest of Nīrūn and Aror.
Defeat and death of Dāhir.
713. Capture of Multān by the Muslims.
720. Śri Narasimha Potavarman's diplomatic relations with China.
724–743. Khalif Hishām.
Junaid, Governor of Sind.
731. Yaśovarman's embassy to China.
733. Lalitāditya Muktāpīḍa receives investiture as king from the Emperor of China.
742. Dantidurga a feudatory of the Chalukyas.
743–789. Sāntarakshita and Padmasambhava invited to Tibet.
Rise of Lamaism.
753. Rise of the Rāshṭrakūṭa Empire.
783. Indrāyudha (Kanauj).
Vatsarāja (Pratihāra.)
793–815. Govinda III, Rāshṭrakūṭa.
815. Nāgabhaṭa (Pratihāra).
815–877. Amoghavarsha I, Rāshṭrakūṭa.
829. Harjara, King of Kāmarūpa.
c. 836. Accession of Bhoja I, King of Kanauj.
c. 850. Lalliya Shāhi.
855. Accession of Avantivarman of Kāshmīr.
c. 871–907. Āditya I, Chola.
879. New Nepalese Era.
892. Coronation of Bhīma I, Eastern Chālukya.
893. Mahendrapāla I (Pratihāra).
907. Accession of Parāntaka I, Chola.
914. Mahīpāla I (Pratihāra).
Continuance of Pratihāra rule in Surāshṭra.
939. Yaśaskara, King of Kāshmīr.
942–943. Guhila Bhatripaṭṭa II.
945. Coronation of Amma II (Vijayāditya VI), Eastern Chalukya.
c. 950–1003. Queen Diddā of Kāshmīr.
c. 954–1002. Dhaṅga Chandella.
c. 962. Foundation of the Kingdom of Ghaznī.
973. Foundation of the later Chalukya Empire (of Kalyāna).
c. 974–995. Muñja.
977. Accession of Sabuktigīn.

985. Accession of Rājarāja the Great, Chola.
986–987. First invasion of Sabuktigīn.
c. 995. Accession of Sindhurāja Navasāhasāṅka.
997. Death of Sabuktigīn.
998. Accession of Sultān Mahmūd.
1001. Great defeat of Jaipāl by Sultān Mahmūd.
1008. Battle near Und.
1012–1044. Rājendra Chola I.
1013. Mahmūd captures Nandānā.
1018. Rājyapāla (Pratihāra).
Kanauj seized by Mahmūd of Ghaznī.
c. 1018–1055. Bhoja of Dhārā.
1026. Sārnāth inscription of the time of Mahipāla I of Bengal.
Fall of Nidar Bhim (Shāhi).
Sack of Somnāth (during the reign of Bhīmdeva I).
1030. Death of Sultān Mahmūd.
1032. Vimala Sha.
1039. Death of Gāngeyadeva Kalachuri.
c. 1040. Coronation of Lakshmī-karṇa of the Kalachuri Dynasty.
1052. Red Fort at Delhi.
1070–1122. Rājendra Chola, Kulottuṅga I.
1076–1127. Vikramāditya VI of Kalyāna.
c. 1076–1148. Anantavarman Choḍa Gaṅga.
1089–1101. Harsha of Kāshmīr.
1090. Rise of the Gāhaḍavālas.
c. 1098. Kīrtivarman Chandella.
c. 1106–1141. Vishṇuvardhana Hoysala.
1113–1114. Foundation of an Era by Siddharāja Jayasimha of Gujarāt.
1114–1154. Govinda Chandra, the Great Gāhaḍavāla King.
1119. Epoch of the Lakshmaṇa Sena Era.
c. 1143–1172. Kumārapāla of Gujarāt.
1153–1164. Vigraharāja IV (Vīsaladeva).
1158. Ballāla Sena.
c. 1167–1202. Paramardi Chandella.
1170–1194. Jayachchandra.
1175. Muhammad bin Sām invades India and captures Multān.
1178. Muhammad defeated in Gujarāt.
1179–1242. Bhīmdev II of Gujarāt.
c. 1185–1205. Lakshmaṇa Sena of Bengal.

1186. Fall of the Yamīnī Dynasty.
1191. First battle of Tarāin.
1192. Second battle of Tarāin.
Fall of Prithvīrāja III Chāhamāna (Chauhān).
1192–1193. Qutb-ud-dīn Aibak takes Delhi.
1194. Battle of Chandwār. Fall of the Gāhaḍavālas.
1197–1247. Singhana the Great, Yādava King.
c. 1200. Ikhtiyār-ud-dīn conquers parts of Eastern India.
1206. Death of Muhammad bin Sām and accession of Qutb-ud-dīn in India.
1210. Death of Qutb-ud-dīn.
Accession of Ārām Shāh.
1210–1211. Accession of Iltutmish.
1221. Invasion of the Mongols under Chingīz Khān.
1228. Ahoms in Assam.
1231. Tejahpāla.
1231–1232. Foundation of the Qutb Minār.
1236. Death of Iltutmish.
Accession and deposition of Fīrūz.
Accession of Raziyya.
1240. Deposition and murder of Raziyya.
Accession of Mu'iz-ud-dīn Bahrām.
1241. Capture of Lahore by the Mongols.
c. 1244–1262. Vīsaladeva, King of Gujarāt.
1246. Deposition and death of Ma'sūd.
Accession of Nāsir-ud-dīn Mahmūd.
1251–1270. Jaṭāvarman Sundara Pāṇḍya I.
1260–1291. Rudrammā, the Great Kākatīya Queen.
1266. Death of Nāsir-ud-dīn Mahmūd.
Accession of Ghiyās-ud-dīn Balban.
1279. Latest known date of Rājendra IV Chola.
Rebellion of Tughril in Bengal.
1280. Bughrā Khān appointed to the Government of Bengal.
1287. Death of Balban.
Accession of Mu'iz-ud-dīn Kaiqubād.
Mongol invasion repelled.
1288. Marco Polo at Kayal.
1290. Death of Kaiqubād.
Accession of Jalāl-ud-dīn Fīrūz Khaljī.
1292. 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī captures Bhīlsa.
Mongol invasion.
1294. Devagiri pillaged by 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī.
1296. Accession of 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī.

1297. Conquest of Gujarāt (from Karnadeva II).
1301. Capture of Ranthambhor by 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī.
1302-1303. Capture of Chitor.
Mongol invasion.
1305. Conquest of Mālwa, Ujjain, Māndū, Dhār and Chanderī by the Khaljīs.
1306-1307. Kāfūr's expedition to Devagiri.
1308. Expedition to Warangal.
1310. Malik Nāib's expedition into the South Indian Peninsula.
1316. Death of 'Alā-ud-dīn.
Accession of Shihāb-ud-dīn 'Umar.
Death of Malik Nāib.
Deposition of 'Umar and accession of Qutb-ud-dīn Mubārak.
1317-1318. Extinction of the Yādava Dynasty.
1320. Usurpation of Nāsir-ud-dīn Khusrav.
His overthrow by Ghiyās-ud-dīn Tughluq.
1321. Expedition to Warangal under Muhammad Jauna (Ulugh Khān).
Rebellion of Muhammad.
1323. Second expedition to Warangal under Muhammad.
Mongol invasion.
1325. Accession of Muhammad bin Tughluq.
1326–7. Rebellion of Gurshāsp.
1327. Destruction of Kampilī.
Transference of the capital from Delhi to Daulatābād.
1328. The Mongols invade India.
1329. Qarachil expedition. Issue of forced currency of brass and copper for silver.
1333–4. Arrival of Ibn Batūtah.
1334. Rebellion in Madurā.
Capture of Anegundī by Muhammad bin Tughluq.
1336. Traditional date of the foundation of Vijayanagar.
1337–1338. Expedition to Nagarkot.
1338–1339. Independent Sultānate in Bengal.
1339. Shāh Mīr, King of Kāshmīr.
1342. Ibn Batūtah leaves Delhi on his mission to China.
1345. Accession of Shams-ud-dīn Iliyās in Bengal.
1347. 'Alā-ud-dīn Bahman Shāh proclaimed King of the Deccan.
1351. Death of Muhammad bin Tughluq.
Accession of Fīrūz, son of Rajab.

1353. Fīrūz's first expedition to Bengal.
1359. Fīrūz's second expedition to Bengal.
1360. Fīrūz's expedition to Orissa.
1361. Capture of Nagarkot or Kāngra by Fīrūz.
1363. Fīrūz's first expedition to Sind.
1374. Bukka sends an embassy to the Emperor of China.
1377. Extinction of the Sultānate of Madurā.
1382. Rebellion of Rājā Ahmad or Malik Rājā in Khāndesh.
1388. Death of Fīrūz, son of Rajab.
Accession of Ghiyās-ud-dīn Tughluq II.
1389. Death of Tughluq II.
1392. Dilāwār Khān, Governor of Mālwa.
1393. Independent Sultānate of Jaunpur.
1398. Invasion of Timūr.
1414. Khizr Khān occupied Delhi.
Rājā Ganesh in Bengal.
1417–1418. Coins of Danujamardana.
1420. Nicolo Conti visits Vijayanagar.
1424. Capture of Warangal by Ahmad Shāh Bahmanī.
1429. Transfer of the Bahmanī capital from Gulbarga to Bīdar.
c. 1430–1469. Rānā Kumbha.
1434–1435. Kapilendra, King of Orissa.
1443. 'Abdur Razzāk comes to India.
1451. Bahlūl Lodī ascends the throne of Delhi.
1458–1511. Mahmūd Begarha.
1459. Foundation of Jodhpur.
1469. Birth of Guru Nānak.
1470. Death of Zain-ul-'Ābidīn.
1472. Birth of Farid (Sher Khān).
1481. Murder of Mahmūd Gāwān.
1484. Independence of Berar.
1486. Abyssinian rule in Bengal.
1486–1487. Fall of the Sangama Dynasty of Vijayanagar.
Beginning of the rule of the Sāluva Dynasty.
1489. Accession of Sikandar Lodī.
1489–1490. Foundation of the 'Ādil Shāhī Dynasty of Bijāpur.
1490. Establishment of the independent Nizām Shāhī Dynasty of Ahmadnagar.
1493. Husain Shāh elected King of Bengal.
1494. Accession of Bābur in Farghāna.
1497–1498. First voyage of Vasco da Gama.

1504. Bābur occupies Kābul.
1505. Beginning of the rule of the Tuluva Dynasty in Vijayanagar.
1509. Albuquerque, Portuguese Governor of India.
Accession of Kṛishṇadeva Rāya.
c. 1509-1527. Rāṇā Sanga.
1510. The Portuguese capture Goa.
1511. Bābur captures Samarqānd again.
1512-1518. Independence of the Kutb Shāhī Dynasty of Golkundā.
1513. Death of Albuquerque.
1517. Death of Sikandar Lodī.
Accession of Ibrāhīm Lodī.
1526. First battle of Pānīpat.
1527. Battle of Khānua.
1529. Battle of Gogrā.
1529-1530. Death of Kṛishṇadeva Rāya.
1530. Death of Bābur and accession of Humāyūn.
1533. Bahādur of Gujarāt captures Chitor.
1534. Humāyūn marches to Mālwa.
1535. Defeat of Bahādur Shāh of Gujarāt and his flight to Māndū.
1537. Death of Bahādur Shāh of Gujarāt.
1538. Sher Khān defeats Mahmūd Shāh of Bengal.
Humāyūn enters Gaur.
Death of Guru Nānak.
1539. Sher Khān defeats Humāyūn at Chaunsa and assumes sovereignty.
1540. Humāyūn's defeat near Kanauj.
1542. Birth of Akbar.
1544. Humāyūn arrives in Persia.
1545. Death of Sher Shāh.
Accession of Islām Shāh.
1552. Death of Guru Angad.
1554. Death of Islām Shāh.
Accession of Muhammad 'Ādil Shāh.
Sikandar Sūr in the Punjāb.
1555. Humāyūn recovers the throne of Delhi.
1556. Death of Humāyūn and accession of Akbar.
Second battle of Pānīpat.
1558. Death of Ibrāhīm Sūr. End of the Sūr Dynasty.
1560. Fall of Bairam Khān.
1561. Mughul invasion of Mālwa.

1562. Akbar marries a princess of Amber.
End of Petticoat Government.
1564. Abolition of the *Jizya*.
Death of Rāṇī Durgāvatī and annexation of the Gond kingdom.
1565. Battle of Talikota.
1568. Kararānī's conquest of Orissa.
Fall of Chitor.
1569. Capture of Ranthambhor and Kālinjar.
Birth of Salīm.
1571. Foundation of Fathpur Sīkrī.
1572. Akbar annexes Gujarāt.
1573. Surāt surrenders to Akbar.
Understanding with the Portuguese.
1574. Death of Guru Amardās.
1575. Battle of Tukaroi.
1576. Subjugation of Bengal.
Death of Dāūd near Rājmahal.
The battle of Gogundā or Haldighāt.
1577. Akbar's troops invade Khāndesh.
1579. "Infallibility Decree" promulgated.
1580. Accession of Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shāh II in Bijāpur.
First Jesuit mission at Āgra.
Rebellion in Bihār and Bengal.
1581. Akbar's march against Muhammad Hakīm and reconciliation with him.
Death of Guru Rāmdās.
1582. Divine Faith promulgated.
1585. Fitch at Āgra.
1586. Annexation of Kāshmīr.
1589. Death of Todar Mal and Bhagwān Dās.
1591. Mughul conquest of Sind.
1592. Annexation of Orissa.
1595. Siege of Ahmadnagar.
Acquisition of Qandahār.
Annexation of Baluchistān.
Death of Faizī.
1597. Death of Rānā Pratāp.
1600. Charter to the London East India Company.
Ahmadnagar stormed.
1601. Capture of Asīrgarh.
1602. Death of Abul Fazl. Formation of the United East India Company of the Netherlands.

1605. Death of Akbar and accession of Jahāngīr.
1606. Rebellion of Khusrav.
Qandahār invested by the Persians.
Execution of the Fifth Sikh Guru, Arjan.
1607. Qandahār relieved by the Mughuls.
Sher Afghān, first husband of Nūr Jahān, killed.
1607. Second revolt of Khusrav.
1608. Malik 'Ambar takes Ahmadnagar.
1609. Hawkins arrives at Āgra.
The Dutch open a factory at Pulicat.
1611. Jahāngīr marries Nūr Jahān.
Hawkins leaves Āgra. The English establish a factory at Masulipatam.
1612. Khurram marries Mumtāz Mahal.
First English factory at Surāt.
The Mughul Governor of Bengal defeats the rebellious Afghāns.
Mughuls annex Kuch Hājo.
1613. Jahāngīr's *firman* to the English Company.
1615. Submission of Mewār to the Mughuls.
Arrival of Sir Thomas Roe in India.
1616. Roe received by Jahāngīr.
The Dutch establish a factory at Surāt.
1618. Roe, after obtaining *firmans* for English trade, leaves the Imperial Court.
1619. Roe leaves India.
1620. Capture of the Kāngra fort.
Shahryār betrothed to Nūr Jahān's daughter (by Sher Afghān).
Malik 'Ambar revolts in the Deccan.
1622. Death of Khusrav. Shāh 'Abbās of Persia besieges and takes Qandahār. Shāh Jahān ordered to recover Qandahār but rebels. Malik 'Ambar takes Bīdar.
1624. Suppression of Shāh Jahān's rebellion.
1625. Dutch Factory at Chinsurā.
1626. Death of Malik 'Ambar.
Rebellion of Mahābat Khān.
1627. Death of Jahāngīr.
Birth of Shivājī (or 1630 according to some).
1628. Shāh Jahān proclaimed Emperor.
1629. Rebellion of Khān Jahān Lodī.
1631. Death of Mumtāz Mahal.

1631. Defeat and death of Khān Jahān Lodī.
1632. Mughul invasion of Bijāpur.
Sack of Hugli.
Grant of the "*Golden Firman*" to the English Company by the Sultān of Golkundā.
1633. End of Ahmadnagar Dynasty.
1634. *Firman* permitting English trade in Bengal.
1636. Treaties with Bijāpur and Golkundā.
Shāhjī enters the service of Bijāpur.
Aurangzeb appointed Viceroy of the Deccan.
1638. Peace between the Mughuls and the Āhoms.
Qandahār recovered by the Mughuls.
1639. Foundation of Fort St. George at Madras.
1646. Shivājī captures Torna.
1649. Persians recover Qandahār.
1651. English factory started at Hugli.
Firman granted to the English Company by Shujā.
1653. Aurangzeb reappointed Viceroy of the Deccan.
The Dutch start a factory at Chinsurā.
1656. The Mughuls attack Hyderābād and Golkundā. Peace with Golkundā. Annexation of Jāvlī by Shivājī. Death of Muhammad 'Ādil Shāh of Bijāpur. Another *firman* granted to the English by Shujā.
1657. Shivājī raids Ahmadnagar and Junnar but is pardoned.
Invasion of Bijāpur by Aurangzeb.
Aurangzeb captures Bīdar and Kalyānī.
Illness of Shāh Jahān.
The war of succession begins.
1658. Battles of Dharmāt and Samūgarh.
Coronation of Aurangzeb.
1659. Battles of Khajwah and Deorāi.
Execution of Dārā. Captivity of Murād and Shāh Jahān.
Second coronation of Aurangzeb.
Murder of Afzal Khān.
1660. Shujā chased from Bengal to Arākān. Mīr Jumla appointed Governor of Bengal.
1661. Cession of Bombay to the English.
Execution of Murād. Mughul capture of Cooch Bihār.
1662. Peace with Āhoms.

1662. Death of Sulaimān Shukoh.
1663. Death of Mīr Jumla. Shāistā Khān appointed Governor of Bengal.
1664. Shivājī sacks Surāt.
Colbert, the French Minister, founds an India Company.
1664. Shivājī assumes royal title.
1666. Death of Shāh Jahān.
Capture of Chittāgong.
Shivājī's visit to Āgra and escape.
1667. The Yūsufzāīs rebel.
1668. New religious ordinances.
Cession of Bombay to the East India Company.
First French factory started at Surāt.
1669. Jāt rebellion under Gokla.
1670. Second sack of Surāt.
1671. Rise of Chhatrasāl Bundelā.
1672. Satnāmī outbreak.
Revolt of the Afrīdīs.
Shāistā Khān's *firman* to the English Company.
1674. François Martin founds Pondicherry.
Shivājī assumes the title of Chhatrapati.
1675. Execution of Teg Bahādur, Guru of the Sikhs.
1677. Shivājī's conquests in the Carnatic.
1678. Mārwār occupied by the Mughuls.
Death of Jaswant Singh.
1679. Re-imposition of the *Jizya.*
Mughul attack on Mārwār.
1680. Death of Shivājī.
Rebellion of Prince Akbar.
Aurangzeb's *firman* to the English Company.
1681. Loss of Kāmarūpa by the Mughuls.
Aurangzeb goes to the Deccan.
1686. English war with the Mughuls.
Fall of Bijāpur.
1687. Fall of Golkundā.
1689. Execution of Sambhūjī. Rājārām succeeds but retires to Jinjī.
1690. Peace between the Mughuls and the English.
Calcutta founded.
1691. Defeat of the Jāts. Aurangzeb at the zenith of his power.
Grant of a *firman* by Ibrāhīm Khān to the English.

1692. Renewed Marātha activity in the Deccan.
1698. The new English Company Trading to the East Indies.
The English obtain zamindārī of Sutanaṭī, Calcutta and Govindapur.
1699. First Marātha raid on Mālwa.
1700. Death of Rājārām and regency of his widow Tārā Bāī.
1702. Amalgamation of the English and the London East India Companies.
1703. The Marāthas enter Berar.
1706. The Marāthas raid Gujarāt and sack Barodā.
1707. Death of Aurangzeb.
Battle of Jajau.
Accession of Bahādur Shāh.
1708. Shāhu, King of the Marāthas.
Death of Guru Govind Singh.
1712. Death of Bahādur Shāh.
Accession of Jahāndār Shāh.
1713. Farrukhsiyar becomes Emperor.
Jahāndār Shāh murdered.
1714. Bālājī Viswanāth Peshwā. Husain 'Ālī appointed Viceroy of the Deccan.
The treaty of the Marāthas with Husain 'Ālī.
1716. Execution of Bāndā, the Sikh leader. The Surman Embassy.
1717. Farrukhsiyar's *firman* to the English Company.
Re-imposition of *Jizya*.
1719. Husain 'Ālī returns to Delhi with the Marāthas.
Farrukhsiyar put to death.
Death of Rafī-ud-Darajāt.
Accession of Muhammad Shāh.
1720. Accession of Bāji Rāo Peshwā.
Fall of the Sayyid brothers.
1724. Sa'ādat Khān appointed Governor of Oudh.
Nizām virtually independent in the Deccan.
Qamār-ud-dīn becomes *wazīr*.
1725–1739. Shujā-ud-dīn, Governor of Bengal.
1735. Bāji Rāo recognised by the Imperial Government as ruler of Mālwa.
1739. Nādir Shāh takes Delhi.
Death of Shujā-ud-dīn and accession of Sarfarāz in Bengal.

1739. The Marāthas capture Salsette and Bassein.
1740. 'Ālīvardī Khān becomes Governor of Bengal.
Accession of Bālājī Rāo Peshwā.
The Marāthas invade Arcot.
Dost 'Ālī killed.
1742. Marātha invasion of Bengal.
Dupleix Governor of Pondicherry.
Murder of Safdar 'Ālī, Nawāb of the Carnatic.
1744–1748. First Anglo-French War.
1745. Rise of the Rohillas.
1746. La Bourdonnais takes Madras.
1747. Invasion of Ahmad Shāh Abdālī.
1748. Death of Nizām-ul-mulk.
Death of Muhammad Shāh of Delhi and accession of Ahmad Shāh.
1749. Death of Shāhu.
Madras restored to the British.
1750. Defeat and death of Nāsir Jang.
1750–1754. War of the Deccan and Carnatic succession.
1751. Clive's defence of Arcot.
Death of Muzaffar Jang and accession of Salābat Jang.
Treaty of 'Ālīvardī with the Marāthas.
1754. Recall of Dupleix. Godeheu's treaty with the English.
Accession of 'Ālamgīr II.
1756. Death of 'Ālīvardī Khān.
Accession of Sirāj-ud-daulah.
1756–1763. Seven Years' War.
1756. Sirāj-ud-daulah captures Calcutta.
1757. Sack of Delhi and Mathurā by Ahmad Shāh Abdālī.
The English capture Chandernagore.
Battle of Plassey.
Mīr Jāfar made Nawāb of Bengal.
1758. Lally in India. The Marāthas in the Punjab.
Capture of Masulipatam by Forde.
1759. Forde defeats the Dutch at Bedārā.
'Ālī Gauhar invades Bihār.
Murder of 'Ālamgīr II by Ghāzi-ud-dīn.
1760. Battle of Wandiwāsh.
Battle of Udgīr.
Mīr Qāsim, Nawāb of Bengal.
Vansittart, Company's Governor in Bengal.

1761. Third battle of Pānīpat.
Fall of Pondicherry.
Shāh 'Ālam II becomes Emperor.
Shujā-ud-daulah becomes *wazīr*.
Accession of Mādhava Rāo Peshwā.
Rise of Hyder 'Ālī.
1763. Expulsion of Mīr Kāsīm.
1764. Battle of Buxār.
1765. Death of Mīr Jāfar.
Grant of the *Diwāni* of Bengal, Bihār and Orissa to the British.
Treaty of Allāhābād.
Clive, Company's Governor in Bengal.
1766. Grant of the Northern Sarkārs to the English.
1767. Departure of Clive. Verelst, Company's Governor in Bengal.
1767–1769. The First Mysore War.
1770. The Great Bengal Famine.
1772. Warren Hastings' appointment as Governor.
Death of Mādhava Rāo Peshwā.
1773. The Regulating Act.
1774. The Rohilla (Ruhela) War.
Warren Hastings becomes Governor-General.
Establishment of Supreme Court, Calcutta.
1775. Trial and execution of Nanda Kumār.
1775–1782. The First Anglo-Marātha War.
1776. The Treaty of Purandhar.
1779. Convention of Wadgāon.
1780. Popham's capture of Gwālior.
1780–1784. Second Mysore War.
1781. Deposition of Chait Singh.
Act passed to amend the Regulating Act.
1782. Affair of the Begams of Oudh.
The Treaty of Salbai.
Death of Hyder 'Ālī.
1783. Death of Coote.
Fox's India Bills.
1784. Treaty of Mangalore.
Pitt's India Act.
1785. Resignation of Warren Hastings.
1786. Lord Cornwallis becomes Governor-General.
1790–1792. Third Mysore War.
1792. Treaty of Seringapatam.

1792. Ranjit Singh succeeds his father as leader of a Sikh Misl.
1793. The Permanent Settlement of Bengal.
Renewal of the Company's Charter.
1794. Death of Mahādājī Sindhia.
1795. The Battle of Kharda.
Death of Ahalyā Bāī.
1797. Zamān Shāh at Lahore.
Death of Asaf-ud-daulah of Oudh.
1798. Wāzīr 'Ālī deposed and succeeded by Sa'ādat 'Āli.
Lord Mornington (Wellesley) becomes Governor-General.
Subsidiary Treaty with the Nizām.
1799. Fourth Mysore War.
Death of Tipu. Partition of Mysore.
Ranjit Singh's appointment to the Governorship of Lahore.
Malcolm's mission to Persia.
William Carey opens Baptist Mission at Serampore.
1800. Death of Nānā Fadnavis.
Establishment of the College of Fort William.
1801. Annexation of the Carnatic.
1802. Treaty of Bassein.
1803–1805. The Second Anglo-Marātha War.
1805. Siege of Bharatpur fails. Recall of Wellesley.
1806. Vellore Mutiny.
1808. Mission of Malcolm to Persia and of Elphinstone to Kābul.
1809. Treaty of Amritsar.
1813. Renewal of the Company's Charter.
1814–1816. The Anglo-Gurkhā War.
1817–1818. The Pindarī War.
1817–1819. The Last Anglo-Marātha War.
1819. Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay.
1820. Munro, Governor of Madras.
The Samāchār Darpan started.
1824–1826. The First Burmese War.
1826. Fall of Bharatpur.
1827. Death of Sir Thomas Munro.
Malcolm, Governor of Bombay.
1828. Lord William Bentinck becomes Governor-General.
1829. Prohibition of Satī.
1829–1837. Suppression of Thuggee.

1830. Rāmmohan Roy visits England.
1831. Rājā of Mysore deposed and its administration taken over by the Company.
Burnes' journey up the Indus.
1831. Meeting of Ranjit and the Governor-General at Rupar.
1832. Annexation of Jaintiā.
1833. Renewal of the Company's Charter.
Abolition of the Company's trading rights.
Legislative power centralised.
1834. Annexation of Coorg.
Macaulay Law Member.
Formation of the Āgra Province.
1835. Education Resolution.
Metcalfe and abolition of Press restrictions.
1838. Tripartite Treaty between Shāh Shujā, Ranjit Singh and the English.
1839. Death of Ranjit Singh.
New treaty forced on the Amīrs of Sind.
1839–1842. The First Afghān War.
1843. Conquest of Sind.
Gwālior War.
Suppression of slavery.
1845–1846. The First Anglo-Sikh War.
1848. Lord Dalhousie becomes Governor-General.
1848–1849. The Second Anglo-Sikh War.
1849. Opening of a Hindu girls' school in Calcutta by Drinkwater Bethune.
1852. The Second Anglo-Burmese War.
1853. Railway opened from Bombay to Thana.
Telegraph line from Calcutta to Āgra.
Annexation of Nāgpur.
Cession of Berar.
Renewal of the Company's charter.
1854. Sir Charles Wood's Education Despatch.
1855. The Santāl insurrection.
1856. Annexation of Oudh.
University Act.
1857–1858. The Sepoy Mutiny.
1858. British India placed under the direct government of the Crown.
Queen Victoria's Proclamation.
1859. Indigo disputes in Bengal.
1861. Indian Councils Act.

1861. The Indian High Courts Act.
Introduction of the Penal Code.
1862. Amalgamation of the Supreme and Sadar courts into High Courts.
1863. Death of Dost Muhammad. Ambala Campaign.
1864. Bhutān War.
1865. The Orissa Famine. Opening of telegraphic communication with Europe.
1868. Punjab Tenancy Act. Railway opened from Ambala to Delhi.
Sher 'Ālī, Amīr of Afghānistān, receives an annual grant of six lacs of rupees.
1869. Ambala Conference with Sher 'Ālī.
Yakūb's rebellion in Afghānistān.
1870. Mayo's Provincial Settlement.
1872. Seistan Boundary Report.
1873. Russians reduce Khiva. The Simla Conference.
1874. The Bihār famine. Disraeli becomes Prime Minister in England.
1875. Gāikwār of Barodā's case. Visit of the Prince of Wales.
1876. The Royal Titles Act.
1876–1877. Delhi Durbar.
The Queen of England proclaimed Empress of India.
1878. Outbreak of the Second Anglo-Afghān War.
Vernacular Press Act.
1880. 'Abdur Rahmān recognised as Amīr of Afghānistān.
Famine Commission.
1881. Factory Act.
Rendition of Mysore.
1882. Hunter Commission.
1883. The Ilbert Bill.
1885. First Meeting of the Indian National Congress.
Bengal Tenancy Act.
Bengal Local Self-Government Act.
Third Anglo-Burmese War.
1886. Annexation of Upper Burma.
Delimitation of Afghān northern boundary.
1889. Abdication of Mahārājā of Kāshmīr.
Second visit of Prince of Wales.
1891. Factory Act.
Age of Consent Act.
Manipur Rebellion.

1892. Indian Councils Act.
1893. Durand's mission to Kābul.
1895. The Chitral Expedition.
1897. Frontier risings.
Plague at Bombay.
1897. Famine Commission.
1899. Lord Curzon becomes Governor-General.
1900. Famine Commission.
1904. British Expedition to Tibet.
Universities Act.
Co-operative Societies Act.
1905. The First Partition of Bengal.
Lord Minto becomes Governor-General.
Morley Secretary of State for India.
1906. Foundation of the Muslim League.
Congress declaration regarding *Swarāj*.
1907. The Anglo-Russian Convention.
1908. The Newspapers Act.
1909. The Morley-Minto Reforms.
Appointment of S. P. Sinha to the Governor-General's Council.
1910. Lord Crewe Secretary of State for India.
1911. The Delhi Durbar.
Partition of Bengal modified.
Census of India.
1912. Removal of the Imperial capital to Delhi.
1913. Educational Resolution of the Government of India.
1914–1918. The First World War.
1915. Defence of India Act.
1916. Sadler Commission.
The Lucknow Pact of the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League.
The Home Rule League founded.
Foundation of the Women's University at Poona.
1917. Mr. Montagu's declaration in the House of Commons. His visit to India.
1917–1918. Indians made eligible for the King's Commission.
The Indian National Liberal Federation.
Report of the Industrial Commission.
1919. The Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms.
Punjab Disturbances.
Royal Proclamation.

1920. The Khilāfat Movement. The Non-Co-operation Movement.
Lord Sinha, Governor of Bihār and Orissa.
Mahātmā Gāndhi leads the Congress.
1921. Chamber of Princes.
Moplah Rebellion.
The Prince of Wales visits India.
Census of India.
1922. Resignation of Mr. Montagu.
1923. Swarajists in Indian Councils.
Certification of Salt tax.
Question of Indianising the command of certain regiments—the eight-unit plan.
1925. All-India Depressed Class Association.
Reforms Enquiry Committee Report.
Death of C. R. Dās.
Formation of Inter-University Board.
1926. Report of the Skeen Committee.
Lord Reading's letter to the Nizām.
Royal Commission on Agriculture.
Factories Act.
1927. Indian Navy Act.
Appointment of the Simon Commission.
Capetown Agreement.
1928. Deposition of Amānullah, King of Afghānistān.
All Parties Conference.
The Nehru Report.
Report of the Royal Commission on Agriculture.
1928–1933. Nādir Shāh, King of Afghānistān.
1929. Lord Irwin's Announcement of 31st October.
Trade Union split.
Establishment of the Imperial Council of Agricultural Research.
Lahore Congress.
Appointment of the Royal Commission on Indian Labour.
1930. Civil Disobedience Movement.
Report of the Statutory Commission.
Rebellion in Burma.
Round Table Conference (First Session).
1931. Irwin-Gāndhi Pact.
Census of India.
Round Table Conference (Second Session).

1931. Publication of the Royal Labour Commission's Report.
1932. Suppression of the Congress. Round Table Conference (Third Session).
The Communal Award. The Poona Pact.
The Indian Military Academy, Dehra Dun.
1933. Publication of the White Paper.
1934. Civil Disobedience Movement called off.
The Indian Factories Act, 1934.
The Bihār Earthquake.
Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform.
1935. New Government of India Act.
1936. Death of King-Emperor George V (21st January).
Accession and abdication of Edward VIII.
Accession of George VI.
1937. 1st April—Inauguration of Provincial Autonomy.
Congress Ministries in the majority of Provinces.
1939. Second World War begins (3rd September).
Resignation of Congress Ministries and the beginning of political deadlock in India.
1941. Japan enters the war (7th December). Pearl Harbour incident.
1942. Fall of Singapore (15th February).
Evacuation of Rangoon (7th March).
Cripps Mission (22nd March–12th April).
Evacuation of Burma (29th April).
August Revolution and arrest of Indian Leaders.
1943. Lord Wavell Governor-General.
Lord Mountbatten Supreme Commander of South-East Asia.
1944. Gandhi-Jinnah talks opened in Bombay on Śrī Rājagopālāchāri's proposals for solution of constitutional deadlock (9th September).
Talks break down on Pakistān issue (27th September).
1945. Lord Wavell's broadcast announcing British Government's determination to go ahead with the task of fitting India for self-government (19th September).
1945. First trial of Indian National Army men opened (5th November).
1946. Mutiny in Royal Indian Navy (18th February).
Announcement of special mission of Cabinet Ministers to India (19th February).
Cabinet Mission's plan announced (16th May).

British Cabinet's plan for Interim Government announced (16th June).

Muslim League decides to participate in the Interim Government; Congress announces acceptance of the long-term part of 16th May plan, but refuses invitation to participate in Interim Government (25th June).

Muslim League withdraws its acceptance and decides on a policy of direct action (29th July). This leads to outbreak of mob violence in Calcutta (16th August).

Interim Government formed (2nd September).

Muslim League's willingness to enter Interim Government announced (12th October). League members sworn in (26th October). League's refusal to join Constituent Assembly to continue (14th November).

Indian leaders leave with Lord Wavell for London for discussions with British Government (30th November).

Constituent Assembly's first meeting (9th December).

1947. British Government's historic announcement of transfer of power to "responsible Indian hands" not later than June, 1948. Lord Mountbatten's appointment as Viceroy of India in succession to Lord Wavell (20th February).

Announcement of Lord Mountbatten's plan for Partition of India (3rd June).

Indian Independence Act (15th August).

1948. Death of Mahātmā Gāndhi (30th January).

Śrī Chakravarti Rājagopālachāri appointed Governor-General (21st June).

Death of Qaid-i-Azam Jinnah (11th September).

Troops of Government of India enter Hyderābād State (September).

1949. New Constitution of India adopted and signed (26th November).

1950. New Constitution comes into force (26th January).

1951. Beginning of Bhoodan Movement (voluntary offer of land for distribution among the poor).

Inauguration of First Five Year Plan.

1952. First General Election.

Accession of Queen Elizabeth II.

Chandernagore incorporated with India.

1953. New State of Andhra inaugurated.
Chandigarh inaugurated as capital of Punjab.

1954. Announcement of Panchsila as basis of India's foreign policy.
Pondicherry, Karikal, Mahé, Yanaon incorporated with India.
Pakistan to be a federation of two units, West Pakistan and East Pakistan.

1955. Hindu Marriage Act (18th May).


1956. Nationalisation of insurance companies (19th January).
Pakistan proclaimed an Islamic Republic (23rd March).
Hindu Succession Act (17th June).
Atomic reactor in operation (4th August).
Reorganisation of States (November).
Inauguration of Second Five Year Plan.
Celebration of 2500th anniversary of death of Gautama Buddha.

1957. At a special ceremony held at Nalanda, the Dalai Lama of Tibet presents the relics of Hiuen-Tsang to India (12th January).
Opening of the Hirakud Dam (13th January).
Second General Election. Introduction of the decimal system of coinage (1st April).
Celebration of the centenary of the First Struggle for Freedom (August).


1958. Four-member cultural delegation from the U.S.S.R. (13th January).
Introduction of the metric system of weights (1st October).

1959. The Dalai Lama enters Indian territory for political asylum (31st March).
Indo-Pakistan agreement on the utilisation of the Indus waters (17th April).
Foundation stone of the Kosi Barrage laid at Bhimnagar (30th April).
Inauguration of the rail-cum-road bridge over the river Ganga at Hathidah near Mokamah (1st May).
The President takes over the administration of Kerala (31st January).
Sino-Indian border disputes.
Indo-Portuguese dispute.
Arrival of Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the U.S.A., in New Delhi (9th December).

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ne of the most breathtaking
ings on earth, Taj Mahal is the
est masterpiece of Mughal archi-
re. This elegy in marble was built
e Emperor Shah Jahan in memory
is beloved wife Mumtaz Mahal.
ty thousand men worked for 22
, from 1632 to 1653, on its
ruction. A vision of beauty and
leur, the huge complex of build-
was adorned with delicate filigree
, calligraphic inscriptions, ornate
a dura work and gardens with
ues of cypresses and cascading
rs. The mausoleum stands on a
ce 20 feet high and is 315 feet
re.





Qutb Minar, the Tower of Peace and Victory, was founded in Delhi by Qutb-ud-Din Aibak and completed by successive rulers of city. The Tower is 235 feet high and its summit is reached by 239 steps.